



PM/85/36

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister  
 C.D.P. 24/7  
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Cyprus

1. Following our recent discussion about developments in the UN Secretary-General's initiative on Cyprus, I thought I should let you know how I propose to take matters forward in the light of President Kyprianou's private acceptance of the Secretary-General's revised documentation.

2. The Secretary-General has told the Americans, Germans and ourselves that he expects "soon" to ask us to help in ensuring that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side now accept the slight revisions to the documentation which he has negotiated with the Greek Cypriots following their rejection of the original documentation in January. This would enable Perez de Cuellar's initiative to proceed. The Turks' initial reaction appears reasonably positive. But they have made plain that Denktash cannot be expected to take substantive decisions until after his round of referendum and elections, designed to consolidate the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", are completed in late June. The Secretary-General, we and the Americans agree that it would be very difficult to prevail on either the Turks or Denktash to postpone or cancel these plans. Indeed I consider that pressure on them to do so would be likely to be counter-productive. But there is a risk that Kyprianou will use these constitutional developments to engage in criticism of Denktash which itself could jeopardise the process, or even more damaging, possibly seek to re-open his own acceptance of the new documentation.

He has  
 now  
 asked  
 C.D.P.





3. Thus the considered Turkish response to the revised documentation and Kyprianou's reaction to the developments in the north are likely to colour the Secretary-General's plans on how next to proceed. His current preference is for working groups of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to meet under UN auspices before the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections on 23 June and for another high-level meeting to take place shortly thereafter. But he may consider it prudent to proceed even more slowly until after 23 June, with just the minimum activity to avoid a vacuum.

4. Against this background, another approach to the Turks or Denktash will need to be carefully handled if it is to be effective. This may be a factor in the Secretary-General's own delay in making a specific request for us for support.

5. But, depending on the Secretary-General's request and on other developments, I have in mind sending a personal message to the Turkish Foreign Minister, couched in friendly terms, expressing our appreciation of the Turks' constructive role so far, and seeking confirmation of their willingness to press Denktash not to resile on earlier agreement. I would then follow up with him when I see Halefoglu in Lisbon at the North Atlantic Council on 6-7 June.

6. Depending on Kyprianou's reaction to events, it may also prove necessary to encourage him again to avoid actions threatening Perez de Cuellar's game plan. Indeed, the Secretary-General may ask us to do so. Certainly whilst it is welcome

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that he has finally accepted the revised documentation  
we are a long way from the stage at which we can  
consider any sort of congratulatory message to him.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
24 April, 1985

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