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BREAKFAST MEETING OF FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS:
PREPARATIONS FOR NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AT LISBON.

SUMMARY

1. (I) GROMYKO HAD URGED ATTENDANCE BY FOREIGN MINISTERS AT HELSINKI 10TH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATION IN AUGUST. HIS AIM WAS PRESUMABLY TO PROVIDE FOR FURTHER US/SOVIET BILATERAL. AGREED THAT DECISION ON ATTENDANCE TO BE TAKEN AT LISBON NATO MINISTERIAL.

(II) IN DISCUSSION OF HANDLING OF SDI AT LISBON, SHULTZ SENSED RELUCTANCE OF EUROPEANS TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR SDI. THIS WAS HARMFUL FOR GENEVA PROCESS. I UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ALLIANCE COHESION. WE AGREED TO WORK TOWARDS JOINT STATEMENT AT LISBON ON ALLIED POSITION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INCLUDING SDI.

DETAIL

2. TOWARDS THE END OF THE BREAKFAST MEETING BETWEEN THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS REPORTED IN MIPT THERE WAS AN INTERESTING DISCUSSION ABOUT ALLIANCE COHESION IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AT LISBON.

3. THIS DISCUSSION AROSE OUT OF A REMARK BY SHULTZ AT THE END OF HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO. THE LATTER HAD TAKEN HIM ASIDE AND UNDERLINED HIS VIEW THAT ATTENDANCE AT THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN AUGUST SHOULD BE AT THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. SHULTZ HAD TAKEN THIS TO BE AN IMPLICIT SUGGESTION FOR A FURTHER BILATERAL MEETING AT THAT TIME. HE HAD REPLIED NON-COMMITALLY

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UNTIL HE COULD DISCUSS IT WITH THE PRESIDENT. BUT IN FACT HE BELIEVED THAT MOST OF THE ALLIES WERE IN FAVOUR OF ATTENDANCE AT THIS LEVEL AND HE SUGGESTED AT THE BREAKFAST THAT A DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE LISBON MEETING. THIS WAS GENERALLY ENDORSED.

4. GENSCHER THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETING AT LISBON WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO RE-STATE THE OVERALL WESTERN STRATEGY ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS. WE WERE ALL IN AGREEMENT THAT GORBACHEV WAS FACING ENORMOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AT HOME AND THAT THIS WOULD BE HIS TOP PRIORITY IN THE COMING MONTHS. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEFORE HIM A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE OPTIONS FOR SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

5. SHULTZ REPLIED CAUTIOUSLY THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A REASONABLE SUGGESTION. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP SUCH A STATEMENT OUT OF EARLIER NATO MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

6. BUT IN THIS PRIVATE FORUM, SHULTZ WANTED TO UNDERLINE AN IMPORTANT POINT ABOUT STRATEGIC DEFENCE. HE HAD NOTED RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF SOME EUROPEAN ALLIES TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE U S POSITION ON STRATEGIC DEFENCE. THIS WAS HARMFUL FOR THE GENEVA PROCESS. HE RECOGNISED THAT THERE WAS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR THE U S POSITION ON SDI (IE THE QUOTE 3RD BASKET UNQUOTE AT GENEVA) AND PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME. THE POINT HE WANTED TO MAKE WAS THAT SILENCE BY THE ALLIES ON THE FORMER WAS INTERPRETED BY THE RUSSIANS AS ABSENCE OF SUPPORT (DESPITE SOVIET RESEARCH IN THE SAME AREA) FOR THE PROGRAMME OF RESEARCH WHICH THE U S HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEE WHETHER A NEW DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE BALANCE COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THE BASIS OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES.

7. I COMMENTED THAT SHULTZ HAD RAISED A CRUCIAL POINT. ON THE ANALYSIS WHICH SHULTZ HAD JUST GIVEN (MIPT) IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT THE GENEVA PROCESS WOULD BE EVEN MORE DRAWN OUT THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE COHESION FOR AS LONG AS IT TOOK. OUR COHESION HAD HELD WELL THROUGH THE WHOLE PROCESS OF INF DEPLOYMENT AND BEYOND. WE NEEDED TO

MAINTAIN IT NOW IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. I CONTINUED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW DESCRIBING STRATEGIC DEFENCE AS QUOTE SPACE ATTACK WEAPONS UNQUOTE. IN OUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WE WERE CAREFUL TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE MASSIVE SCALE OF SOVIET RESEARCH IN THE SAME FIELD. I HAD MADE THIS VERY CLEAR FOR EXAMPLE IN ALL MY RECENT PRESENTATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL THE NATO ALLIES SHOULD DO THE SAME.

9. BUT THERE WAS AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT UNDERLYING POINT. THE SOVIET PRESENTATION WAS THAT THE U S HAD LAUNCHED A MAJOR NEW QUOTE INITIATIVE UNQUOTE WHICH THEY PORTRAYED AS A THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY. THE MORE THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME WAS BUILT UP IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE AS AN QUOTE INITIATIVE UNQUOTE THE MORE THIS SOVIET PERCEPTION, AND PROPAGANDA LINE, WAS REINFORCED. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO PRESENT IT, AS HAD BEEN DONE IN SOME AMERICAN STATEMENTS RECENTLY, AS A RESPONSE TO SOVIET EFFORTS AND AS A RESEARCH PROGRAMME WHOSE EVENTUAL OUTCOME WAS TO BE DETERMINED BUT WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO SEE WHETHER A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM SHOULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF STABILITY AND SECURITY.

10. SHULTZ ACCEPTED THE FORCE OF THIS POINT BUT HE HAD TWO COMMENTS TO MAKE. FIRST IF THE ADMINISTRATION WAS TO GET FUNDING FOR THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME IT HAD TO BE SOLD TO CONGRESS. FOR THIS IT WAS NECESSARY TO STATE ITS PURPOSE CLEARLY AND PERSUASIVELY. SECOND, PRESIDENT REAGAN HIMSELF HAD PUT A GREAT DEAL OF IMPETUS BEHIND THE SDI. THIS HAD CERTAINLY HELPED TO GET THE RUSSIANS BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IF THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED FORCEFULLY IT WOULD NOT HAVE CAUGHT THEIR ATTENTION IN THIS WAY. MCFARLANE ADDED THAT HE FULLY ACCEPTED THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMING WESTERN PUBLICS CLEARLY ABOUT THE NATURE AND SCALE OF SOVIET RESEARCH IN THIS FIELD, AS I HAD SAID. WE ALSO NEEDED TO GET ACROSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUED BUILD-UP OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY MOBILE MIRVED SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD GREATLY COMPLICATE WESTERN CALCULATIONS ABOUT SOVIET OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.

11. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED DUMAS UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE HANDLING OF THIS QUESTION RIGHT AT LISBON. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD MADE HIS OWN POSITION QUITE CLEAR ON SDI. THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY THE U S BUT IT WAS ESSENTIALLY THEIR AFFAIR. FRANCE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT ON IT. GENSCHER ADDED THAT IN ANYTHING FROM LISBON IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO UNDERLINE THAT NATO WAS STICKING FIRMLY TO THE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE. HE SUGGESTED THAT A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PREPARED AMONG POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND THAT IT WAS VITAL THAT IT SHOULD EMBRACE THE FRENCH POSITION. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FRENCH THE STATEMENT BY NATO DEFENCE MINISTERS AT LUXEMBOURG HAD FAILED TO DO THIS AND HAD THEREFORE OPENED OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING. THE ALLIANCE HAD GOT USED TO FOOT-NOTES BY GREECE AND DENMARK BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE FOOT-NOTES BY FRANCE. ANDREOTTI SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF TRYING TO FIND THE RIGHT WORDS AT LISBON TO EXPRESS ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR BOTH THE AIMS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE.

12. SHULTZ ACCEPTED THE LOGIC OF THESE COMMENTS. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO IMPLY THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD TAKE UP A POSITION WHICH WAS OPPOSED TO DEPLOYMENT OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. THE IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYMENT IF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME ESTABLISHED THAT A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS WAS FEASIBLE. BUT HE ACCEPTED THE NEED TO CONVINCE WESTERN PUBLICS OF THIS.

13. SHULTZ ENDED BY SUGGESTING THAT WHAT I HAD SAID REPRESENTED A POSITION ON WHICH IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND AGREEMENT. OTHERS SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT POLITICAL DIRECTORS MIGHT PURSUE. SHULTZ EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IN DISCUSSION WITH THE FRENCH AND OTHER EUROPEAN PARTNERS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND AGREED LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE ENDORSED WITHOUT MUCH FURTHER DISCUSSION AT LISBON. WE SHALL BE CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO PURSUE THIS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

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