

SUBJECT  
cc Master

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File VC  
VC2 AC/A  
bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1985

Dear Colin,

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 8 July with which you enclosed the draft of a possible statement by the Ten on Southern Africa. The Prime Minister discussed this with the Foreign Secretary this morning.

The Foreign Secretary said that the vote in the US Senate yesterday was a further sign of the increasing difficulty we were facing internationally over South Africa. At a recent Commonwealth meeting on Southern Africa our representative had found himself in a minority of one even more markedly than before. He thought it might be useful in due course if the Prime Minister herself were to speak to the Commonwealth Secretary General. Her bilateral meetings with African Heads of Government during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting would also have an important part to play in fending off pressure for sanctions. He thought that agreement by the Ten on a reasonable statement on South Africa would help us construct a defensible position at CHOGM.

The Prime Minister said that she did not like the revised draft statement. By identifying steps which we thought the South African government should take, there was a risk that we would be confronted with even more pressing demands for economic sanctions if the steps in question were not taken within a fairly short time. She also saw a risk that if we were to take the initiative in launching a text others would try to strengthen it in ways which would be unacceptable to us. However, she was prepared to agree that the Foreign Secretary should have a text in reserve to make such use of as he saw fit. This could be the revised text enclosed with your letter, taking into account the following points:

- (i) If possible, the reference to deploring acts of violence in paragraph 2 should be cast in such a way as to make clear that the Ten deplored the use of violence as a means of achieving political ends. The Prime Minister could, however, accept in the last resort the text as it is, omitting the passage in square brackets.

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


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- (ii) While the Prime Minister would prefer to see the passage in square brackets at the end of paragraph 2 omitted, she recognises that it may be the only way to secure agreement on an otherwise acceptable text.
- (iii) The Prime Minister would wish the words "its rightful political" to be omitted in the last sentence of paragraph 3.
- (iv) The words "to create the conditions for such a dialogue" at the beginning of paragraph 4 should be replaced by "to improve the prospects for such a dialogue".
- (v) The last tirect of paragraph 4 should be omitted altogether.
- (vi) The Prime Minister would prefer to see omitted the words "and other acknowledged political leaders" in the first tirect of paragraph 4 though does not insist on this.

If in the course of discussion we come under pressure to accept a text significantly stronger than that now under discussion, the Prime Minister would wish to be consulted before a decision was taken to accept it.

Yours sincerely  
  
C.D. POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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