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16

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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MR ~~WESLEY~~ DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST  
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RESIDENT CLERK



**IMMEDIATE**

15.1.85

GRS 1850

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FM UKDEL NATO 171609Z JUL 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 195 OF 17 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK(DACU), WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW,  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA,  
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YOUR TELNO 124

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL - BRIEFING ON US/SOVIET/GENEVA TALKS

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, TOWER AND GLITMAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL TO-DAY. PROGRESS WAS SLOW AS EXPECTED, WITH NO MOVEMENT IN FORMAL SOVIET POSITIONS. THE SOVIET POSITION ON INF HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY POLEMICAL AND HARDLINE, BUT THERE HAS BEEN SOME SUCCESS IN ENGAGING THE RUSSIANS IN DISCUSSION ON QUOTE THE U S AGENDA UNQUOTE ON SPACE AND DEFENCE AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE SUGGESTED SOME MOVEMENT IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. LINKAGE STILL STRESSED. SOME DISCUSSION IN COUNCIL OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN THE LIGHT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. A U.S. TEAM WILL BRIEF THE COUNCIL ON SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE NEXT WEEK.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS OVERVIEW KAMPELMAN SAID THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN SLOW AND THAT SOVIET TACTICS HAD VARIED IN EACH OF THE THREE GROUPS. PROGRESS IN EACH GROUP CONTINUED TO BE HELD HOSTAGE (KARPOV'S WORD) TO THE OTHERS. INSISTENCE ON A BAN ON RESEARCH INTO SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS REMAINED THEIR FORMAL POSITION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME ECHO OF THE VEILED THREAT OF A WALK-OUT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF

VEILED THREAT OF A WALK-OUT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR TACTICS WAS BECOMING CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS. THIS, AND THE FORTHCOMING HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS IN HELSINKI AND GENEVA MIGHT PROVIDE THE STIMULUS FOR MORE PROGRESS IN ROUND 3.

3. ON THE STRATEGIC GROUP TOWER REPORTED THAT A BAN ON SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS AND AN INF SOLUTION (ON SOVIET TERMS) CONTINUED TO BE SOVIET PREREQUISITES FOR PROGRESS. HOWEVER THEY HAD REVEALED SOME MORE ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION.

4. TOWER CONFIRMED TO THE COUNCIL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET SUGGESTION REPORTED TO US BILATERALLY (WASHINGTON TELNO 2110 OF 12 JULY). THE RUSSIANS HAD INDICATED THEIR INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING 2 AGGREGATES, ONE FOR DELIVERY VEHICLES AND ONE FOR WARHEADS ON DELIVERY VEHICLES. THEY HAD ALSO SUGGESTED A JOINT OBLIGATION TO HAVE NO MORE THAN A PREDETERMINED PERCENTAGE OF ANY ONE TYPE OF DEFENSIVE WEAPON WITHIN THE AGGREGATE (THE PERCENTAGE FIGURE FOR ALL TYPES). THEY HAD DECLINED TO PUT NUMBERS TO ANY OF THESE SUGGESTIONS. THEY HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE WERE A SOLUTION TO INF, CUTS OF MORE THAN 25 PERCENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

5. TOWER PLAYED DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS. THEY WERE TOO SKETCHY TO JUDGE THEIR FULL IMPLICATION. THEY MIGHT STILL LEAVE THE SOVIET PROMPT HARD TARGET CAPABILITY UNTOUCHED, WHILE DEGRADING THE U.S. SECOND STRIKE FORCE. THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO REJECT THE LEGITIMACY OF U.S. CONCERNS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT.

6. THE U.S. HAD CONCENTRATED ON REJECTING SOVIET CRITICISM OF THEIR FORMAL POSITION, FOR EXAMPLE, ON TRADE-OFFS.

7. GLITMAN REPORTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE OR NO EVOLUTION ON THE SOVIET SIDE SINCE THE INTERIM REPORT ON 19 JUNE. (UKDEL NATO TELNO 169.) IN FACT IN A POLEMICAL PLENARY STATEMENT ON 20 JUNE THEY HAD REASSERTED THAT THE U.S., THROUGH ITS QUOTE ILLEGAL UNQUOTE LRINF DEPLOYMENTS, WAS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY. THEY REPEATED THEIR DEMAND THAT THE SS20'S SHOULD BE OFFSET AGAINST BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILE SYSTEMS. THEY CLAIMED THAT THEIR FAR EASTERN DEPLOYMENTS WERE REQUIRED TO COUNTER U.S. NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. THEIR DEMANDS ON AIRCRAFT REMAINED MAXIMALIST.

8. THE U.S. HAD CHALLENGED SOVIET ASSERTIONS ON DATA BUT DETECTED NO SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS OTHER THAN THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. GLITMAN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE CRITERIA (AGREED IN 1979) FOR INF AGREEMENT AND SAID THAT CHANGES TO THE SOVIET POSITION COULD NOT BE RULED OUT.

9. IN A DETAILED REPORT KAMPELMAN RECALLED THAT THE U.S. HAD DEVOTED THE EARLY PART OF THE SESSION ON SPACE AND DEFENCE TO EXPLAINING THE CONSISTENCY OF SDI RESEARCH WITH THE ABM TREATY. IN THE SECOND HALF THEY HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN TERMS OF THE

CONSISTENCY OF SDI RESEARCH WITH THE ABM TREATY. IN THE SECOND HALF THEY HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN TERMS OF THE PROHIBITION OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE AND A POSSIBLE NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

10. CONFIRMING THAT THE SOVIET TEAM HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY ABRAHAMSON ON THE SDI, OVER AN INFORMAL LUNCH, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT KARPOV HAD BEEN APPRECIATIVE BUT HAD COMMENTED THAT HE HAD CONFIRMED HIS VIEW THAT THE U.S. WAS DEVELOPING A PROHIBITED TERRITORIAL DEFENCE. SOVIET QUESTIONING OF ABRAHAMSON HAD BEEN WELL PREPARED. THE SOVIET SIDE OUTLINED SOME POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO SDI, INCLUDING QUANTITATIVE BUILD-UP AND IMPROVEMENT OF OFFENSIVE FORCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED SOVIET ABM TECHNOLOGIES, BUT ACCOMPANIED BY THE WARNING THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD QUOTE COPY UNQUOTE THE U.S. SDI PROGRAMME. THE U.S. HAD REPLIED THAT IN VIEW OF THEIR CRITERIA FOR DEPLOYMENT (SURVIVABILITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS AT THE MARGIN), PROLIFERATION OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS WOULD NOT BE A REASONABLE RESPONSE. THEY HAD EMPHASISED THE RELATIONSHIP IN ANY TRANSITION TO A STRATEGY WITH A GREATER EMPHASIS ON DEFENCE, BETWEEN DEFENSIVE FORCES AND REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES. STABILITY WOULD BE INCREASED BY SURVIVABLE DEFENCES AND SURVIVABLE OFFENSIVE FORCES SO LONG AS THESE WERE REQUIRED FOR DETERRENCE. REDUCTIONS IN DESTABILISING SYSTEMS THEREFORE STOOD ON THEIR OWN MERITS. DEFENCES SUPPORTED THE CASE FOR REDUCTIONS WHILE REDUCING THE VALUE OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND PROVIDING ASSURANCE AGAINST NON-COMPLIANCE.

11. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CHARACTERISED THESE ARGUMENTS AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT PROVIDING A FIRM PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY THEY HAD LAID MORE STRESS ON THE PROHIBITION OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE (ART 1(2) OF THE ABM TREATY) THAN IN THE PAST. THE U.S. HAD RESPONDED THAT PART 1 WAS NOT RELEVANT TO RESEARCH AND THAT THE ABM TREATY NEGOTIATING RECORD SHOWED THAT RESEARCH WAS NOT PROHIBITED. THEY HAD ALSO POINTED TO KRASNOYARSK. THE RUSSIANS HAD CLAIMED THAT ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN SDI WOULD BE A FLAGRANT VIOLATION AND HAD GIVEN PROMINENCE TO AN ASAT BAN. THE U.S. SIDE HAD RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY ASAT BAN WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE, RELIABLE AND VERIFIABLE THAT WAS SHORT OF A COMPREHENSIVE BAN AND HAD REFERRED TO THE 1978/79 ASAT TALKS WHEN THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID A COMPREHENSIVE BAN WAS IMPOSSIBLE, A POSITION WITH WHICH THE U.S. NOW AGREED. BUT KAMPELMAN HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN TO FURTHER SOVIET IDEAS.

12. IN SUMMARY THE RUSSIANS WERE BEGINNING TO DISCUSS SPACE AND DEFENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE U S AGENDA ALTHOUGH THEIR FORMAL POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED.

13. IN DISCUSSION SEVERAL PERMREPS ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY INFORMAL INDICATIONS OR INTUITIONS OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVEMENTS, OR POSSIBLY OF AN OFFER DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, AS A RESULT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES OR THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. BOBCH (DENMARK) ASKED

POSSIBLY OF AN OFFER DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, AS A RESULT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES OR THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. BORCH (DENMARK) ASKED IN PARTICULAR WHAT SIGNIFICANCE COULD BE GIVEN TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS WHICH HAD NOT EXPLICITLY CALLED FOR A BAN ON SDI RESEARCH. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ALLIANCE UNITY AND THE IMPORTANT EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION OF THE RECENT DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS. HE SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF DEBATE ON SDI AND FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY FOR ARMS CONTROL. HE ALSO ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF KAMPELMAN'S REFERENCE ON 19 JUNE TO THE SALT II NEGOTIATING RECORD PROVIDING A DEFINITION OF THE LINE BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. KAMPELMAN PROMISED TO SEND ME DETAILS. 14. \* KAMPELMAN SAID THAT HE COULD ONLY SPECULATE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN UNAWARE OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE US/SOVIET SUMMIT BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT. THEY HAD LITTLE OR NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR NEW FOREIGN MINISTER. LEADERSHIP CHANGES APPEARED TO OVERSHADOW THE SITUATION BUT NOT TO GUIDE IT. KARPOV HAD INVITED HIM TO READ GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO THE UCS QUOTE CAREFULL UNQUOTE, BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RESPOND TO SUBSEQUENT REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION. HE HAD HOWEVER STRESSED THAT THE LETTER WAS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH A CONTINUED DEMAND FOR A BAN ON RESEARCH (THE RUSSIAN TERM FOR QUOTE CREATION UNQUOTE ENCOMPASSED RESEARCH) AND THAT THIS REMAINED HIS FORMAL INSTRUCTION. BUT KAMPELMAN DID NOT DISMISS ALTOGETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE. HE ADDED THAT THE U S HAD EXPECTED AN ATTRACTIVE PUBLIC SOVIET OFFICE TO BE TRADED AGAINST SDI. BUT THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED: THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE CONCERNED ABOUT COMING UNDER PRESSURE TO LIVE UP TO AN OFFER OF SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS.

15. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION SENATOR TOWER DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET SUFFICIENT U S CONCERNS BY NOVEMBER FOR A VLADIVOSTOK TYPE DECLARATION. THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE SOLARZ/CHEROV CONVERSATION WHICH ADDED TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET POSITION. ANY PUBLIC SOVIET OFFER WOULD NEED TO BE ANALYSED IN THE GREATEST DETAIL. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WAS IMPORTANT BUT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DICTATE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. HE SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT WANT TO AMALGAMATE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS. GLITMAN WAS MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THIS, BUT ADDED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS GOT WHAT THEY WANTED ON SDI THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THEY WOULD MAKE ANY CONCESSION ON INF. THE SAME MIGHT APPLY TO INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS (TOWER INDICATED ASSENT.)

16. FULL TEXTS OF OPENING STATEMENTS FOLLOWED BY BAG FOR FCO, MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN AND MOSCOW.

GRAHAM  
BT