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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 566 OF 26 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA PARIS WASHINGTON

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LUSAKA HARARE GABORONE MAPUTO

INFO SAVING ADDIS ABABA MOSCOW LAGOS NEW DELHI DAKAR

YOUR TEL NO 261 (NOT TO ALL):

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON SOUTH AFRICA: CONCLUSION.

SUMMARY.

1. AFTER 10 FURTHER SPEECHES OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE AND PROTRACTED NON-ALIGNED DELIBERATIONS, THE TWO DAY DEBATE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMERGENCY ENDS WITH:

(A) A NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AMENDMENT REFERRING TO CHAPTER VII MEASURES BEING VETOED BY THE UK AND THE US (FRANCE ABSTAINING, HAVING RENEGED ON A PROMISE TO VETO):

(B) THE PASSAGE OF SCR. 569 (TEXT IN MIFT) BY 13-0-2 (UK,US).

DETAIL

DEBATE

2. THE SPEAKERS DURING TWO FURTHER SESSIONS WERE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, MADAGASCAR, SENEGAL, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, ZAIRE, SYRIA, ETHIOPIA, GDR, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UKRAINE. ZAIRE GAVE STRONG SUPPORT TO THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. SEVERAL OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS COMPLAINED THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH.

RESOLUTION

3. AFTER A DAY AND A HALF OF NEGOTIATION, THE FRENCH FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE NON-ALIGNED ON THE TEXT. THE NON-ALIGNED INSISTED ON A REFERENCE TO CHAPTER VII MEASURES, AND SAID THAT THE LEAST THEY COULD ACCEPT WOULD BE REPETITION OF OP 13 OF SCR 566 (THE NAMIBIA RESOLUTION ADOPTED LAST MONTH WITH BRITISH AND AMERICAN ABSTENTIONS AND FRANCE VOTING IN FAVOUR). THE FRENCH ARGUED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO A RESOLUTION ON APARTHEID AND WOULD BE VETOED. THEY LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE THREATENING TO CAST A VETO THEMSELVES, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER KEMOULARIA SAID THIS IN TERMS. THE FRENCH TERMINATED THE NEGOTIATIONS BY TABLING A VERSION OF THEIR ORIGINAL TEXT WHICH TOOK ON BOARD SOME OF THE Milder AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE NON-ALIGNED. THE NON-ALIGNED RESPONDED BY PUTTING FORWARD THE AMENDMENT IN MY SECOND IFT.

4. WHEN THE FRENCH INFORMED US OF THE OUTCOME OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS, KEMOULARIA SAID CATEGORICALLY (TO CLARK OF THE US AND TO ME SIMULTANEOUSLY) THAT FRANCE WOULD VETO THE NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENT. HIS DEPUTY REPEATED THIS DURING THE AFTERNOON. HALF AN HOUR BEFORE THE VOTE, KEMOULARIA TOLD CLARK THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ABSTAIN. UNTIL WE TOOK THE MATTER UP WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION, KEMOULARIA DID NOT HAVE THE COURTESY TO TELL ME DIRECTLY. WE MADE OUR FEELINGS CLEAR, WITH RESTRAINT. KEMOULARIA'S COUNSELLOR BLAMED THE DECISION ON THE MATIGNON, AND SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD DIRECT ANY COMPLAINTS TO THAT QUARTER. (HE LATER CALLED TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL APOLOGIES AND EMBARRASSMENT.)

EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE

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5. MY POV IS IN MY THIRD IFT.

6. KEMOULARIA CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE FRENCH INITIATIVE, AND EXPLAINED THE ABSTENTION ON THE AMENDMENT SIMPLY BY SAYING THAT IT DID NOT APPLY TO THE SUBJECT BEFORE THE COUNCIL. CLARK (US) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD MAINTAIN THE POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, AS A VOICE OF REASON SPEAKING TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND REPEATED HIS EARLIER STRICTURES ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISOLATION.

7. BURKINA FASO (FOR THE NON-ALIGNED) REGRETTED THAT THE RESOLUTION SUFFERED FROM A FUNDAMENTAL GAP BY CONTAINING NOT EVEN A VEILED REFERENCE TO CHAPTER VII, REGRETTED THE VETOES, AND DEPLORED FORMULATIONS WHICH APPEARED TO LEGITIMISE THE RACIST REGIME.

8. THE USSR CRITICISED THE US AND THE UK FOR THEIR VETOES AND ABSTENTIONS.

CONCLUSION

9. OUR VETOES SAVED THE DAY FOR FRANCE. THERE HAD BEEN WIDESPREAD SPECULATION ABOUT FRENCH MOTIVES IN CONVENING THE COUNCIL. IT WAS FELT THAT THE FRENCH HAD PROBABLY ACCOMPLISHED THEIR DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES THROUGH THEIR INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT (AND THE QUAI APPARENTLY SAID AS MUCH TO THE US EMBASSY ON 25 JULY, IMPLYING THAT SUCCESS AT THE UN WAS NO LONGER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE). THE RECALL OF THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT HAVING ALSO ACHIEVED A WIDE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT, IT IS HARD TO DIVINE WHY THE FRENCH EXPOSED THEIR MEASURES TO CRITICAL ATTENTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RAN THE RISK OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION. THEIR DRAFT WAS A GAMBLE, AS THEY WERE ASKING THE NON-ALIGNED TO ACCEPT MEASURES BELOW THE HIGH-WATER MARK OF SCR 566, AND TO ADDRESS THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMERGENCY ON THE COAT-TAILS OF A WESTERN PERMANENT MEMBER. LIKE THE DUTCH WITH THE ARMS IMPORT BAN LAST YEAR (SCR 558), THE FRENCH FOUND THAT GRATITUDE AT THEIR INITIATIVE DID NOT INHIBIT THE NON-ALIGNED FROM SEEKING AWKWARD AMENDMENTS. EVEN IF THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN DRIVING THEIR ORIGINAL DRAFT THROUGH IN A SINGLE SESSION WITHOUT ARGUMENT, THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE CREATED A ROD FOR THEIR OWN BACKS ON THE NEXT OCCASION THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS ASKED TO CONSIDER SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THEY HAD RAISED EXPECTATIONS HIGH, AND HAD A HARD TIME EXPLAINING WHY THEY COULD NOT GO BEYOND THEIR EXISTING TEXT. HAD THEY NOT COME TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEIR STOCK AT THE UN WOULD STILL HAVE RISEN VERY HIGH. INSTEAD, THEY SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO A LONG ARGUMENT WITH THE NON-ALIGNED, IN WHICH THE LIMITATIONS OF THEIR POSITION WERE EXPOSED. THIS THREATENED TO LEAVE THEM WITH A MESSY OUTCOME. HOWEVER, WHETHER BY ACCIDENT OR BY DESIGN (OR BOTH), THE FRENCH IN THE END WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE UK AND THE US ATTRACTED ODIUM BY VETOING A CHAPTER VII PROPOSAL, WHILE FRANCE APPEARED LESS INTRANSIGENT BY ABSTAINING AND GAINED CREDIT FOR CO-SPONSORING THE RESOLUTION.

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10. ALTHOUGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCR 569 MAY IN THE LONG RUN PROVE AWKWARD FOR FRANCE, IN THE SHORT TERM IT IS THE US AND THE UK WHOSE POSITION AT THE UN HAS SUSTAINED DAMAGE. IT WILL BE EVIDENT FROM OUR REPORTS THAT THE FRENCH, FROM START TO FINISH, MADE VERY LITTLE EFFORT TO CONSULT US OR TO KEEP US INFORMED. THE DANES WERE MUCH BETTER, AND DID THEIR BIT AS INOFFENSIVELY AS THEY COULD IN AN AWKWARD SITUATION. AUSTRALIA PLAYED VIRTUALLY NO PART. INDIA AND BURKINA FASO APPEARED TO DRIVE THE NON-ALIGNED PACK. COORDINATION WITH THE US WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

MAXEY

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