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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 July, 1985

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Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi,

2 August 1985

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I enclose a brief and background note for this meeting.

I also enclose a memorandum which Chief Buthelezi has asked us to present to the Prime Minister. The main substance is set out in the "Declaration of Intent" of which a copy is at Annex B.

Chief Buthelezi arrived in London on his private visit on Monday, 29 July. He saw the Archbishop of Canterbury on 30 July. He also plans to visit the Test Match. He has sought no publicity for his visit and so far the press have not reported it.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH CHIEF GATSHA BUTHELEZI:

2 AUGUST 85

Our Objectives

- (i) To give our support to Chief Buthelezi in working for non-violent change in South Africa.
- (ii) To encourage him to continue his efforts to open a dialogue with President Botha.
- (iii) To encourage him to continue to speak publicly against sanctions and disinvestment.

Points to Make

- (i) We remain wholeheartedly opposed to apartheid and in favour of non-violent change towards a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.
- (ii) Fully support your efforts to enter into direct negotiations with South African Government. Dialogue essential if fundamental problems to be tackled.
- (iii) We appreciate your concern to obtain a "Statement of Intent" from President Botha to show your supporters that you are negotiating in good faith. But important not to spend too much time on preconditions rather than getting dialogue started.
- (iv) Firm opposition to sanctions. Would hinder reform and hurt the black community. Recent domestic and international pressure misguided. Your statements against disinvestment very helpful in educating people to realities of situation. Hope you will continue to make them.



- (v) What are the next steps you would like South African Government to take?
- (vi) What can we in Britain do to help encourage peaceful change in South Africa?

His objectives

- (i) To enhance his international and domestic status as leader of black opinion.
- (ii) To seek our goodwill and influence to get power-sharing negotiations started.
- (iii) To urge us to continue a policy of "constructive engagement".

Your response

- (i) No intention of reducing our involvement and influence in South Africa.
- (ii) Dialogue and reconciliation necessary not only with South African Government but between all various communities and factions in South Africa.

MEETINGS WITH CHIEF GATSHA BUTHELEZI 2 AUGUST 1985

BACKGROUND

References

- A LPR
- B Draft "Declaration of Intent"
- C Pretoria telno 154 of 29 July
- D Pretoria telno 156 of 29 July
- E Summary of the Buthelezi Commission's recommendations and findings

1. Chief Buthelezi is an important moderate Black leader in South Africa. Chief Minister of Kwazulu, a homeland which has refused to accept nominal "independence", and head of Inkatha, a political movement which claims a million members. His support comes almost entirely from the Zulus and is largely confined to the Zulu heartland of Kwazulu and Natal. Nevertheless, he will be a considerable factor in any future settlement.
2. Buthelezi is the only black leader with substantial support who is prepared to entertain the idea of negotiating with the government on the basis of a compromise short of one man one vote in a unitary state. However on 26 March he demanded that, before he will enter such negotiations the government must make a "Statement of Intent". "I asked Mr Botha to accept that we do not insist on a statement of intent which is a thinly disguised White capitulation to Black demands. All we require, Minister, is a commitment to search for acceptable ways of moving towards power-sharing".
3. However the South African Government has pointedly failed to make any response. On 4 July Dr Worrall told the PUS that the Government could not issue a Declaration of Intent. Buthelezi was seriously annoyed by President Botha's intransigence in his "Weekend World" interview with Brian Walden on 26 May and cancelled a planned

visit by Botha to Kwazulu. However he has since renewed his efforts to obtain a basis for negotiation and on 17 July stated in a conciliatory speech:

"We are willing to concede reasonable safeguards to white interests and go to considerable lengths to preserve the confidence of whites in the system of government because we realise that if whites were to withdraw their skills and experience, we, the blacks, would suffer dearly".

4. The failure of the South African Government to give any commitment makes Buthelezi's position increasingly difficult since he has nothing to show for his moderation and refusal to espouse a confrontationist approach.

5. Buthelezi cannot in any case be regarded as a spokesman for more than a minority of black South Africans. The majority of ^{urban} blacks in South Africa support the ANC and the UDF and there is considerable bad feeling between these organisations and Inkatha. The urban blacks tend to regard Buthelezi as an "Uncle Tom" and in so far as they would support any moderate leader not in prison would look to Bishop Tutu. (Buthelezi however is not on good terms with Tutu). His opposition to all forms of sanctions, and willingness to campaign abroad against them, have increased radical allegations of collaboration against him.

6. However, there is no doubt that Buthelezi is a staunch and genuine opponent of apartheid. Many whites see him as the "acceptable face" of black politics. The importance of his initiative in offering to join negotiations in return for a "Declaration of Intent" should not be underestimated. Particularly illuminating is the failure of the Government to respond; if it is not prepared to negotiate on easy terms with such a moderate as Buthelezi, this bodes ill for future prospects of genuine reform.

Natal/Kwazulu

7. The possibility of a regional experiment in a power-sharing administration in the Natal/Kwazulu area is one which exercises much interest in academic and occasionally press circles, as well as in

liberal circles extending to the more progressive wing of the National Party.

8. In 1982 the report of the Buthelezi Commission was published, advocating a single legislative chamber for Natal, with strong regional bodies beneath. The Commission was composed of a formidable list of academics, politicians (PFP, Inkatha, Labour Party), community representatives and business and industrial interests.

9. As the South African Government gropes for possible constitutional solutions, the idea of a Natal experiment, where there are no significant Afrikaaner votes at risk, may become increasingly attractive. We have received information that Mr Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, has been making informal soundings in this direction.

10. While Buthelezi is extremely proud of the Commission report and keen to see its recommendation implemented, he sees this as a part of reformed South Africa and it is unlikely that he could be "bought off" his national objectives by a regional dispensation.

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 FM PRETORIA 291500Z JULY 1985
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELNO. 156 OF 29 JULY 1985

VISIT OF CHIEF BUTHELEZI

1. WHEN I SAW HIM OFF AT THE AIRPORT LAST NIGHT BUTHELEZI TOLD ME HE WAS MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO CALLING ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF LATER THIS WEEK.
2. HIS VISIT TO LONDO TAKES PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND DESCRIBED IN MY TELEGRAM NO 153. HE REGRETS THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY HERE. BUT HE ACCEPTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE RIGHT TO ACT AGAINST THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAD BEEN GETTING OUT OF HAND. HE DEPLORES THE LATEST INTERNATIONAL MOVES TO INTRODUCE MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH IN HIS VIEW OVERLOOK THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE LIKELY TO BE CAUSED TO SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS.
3. AS YOU KNOW, HE IS A CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE HERE, BITTERLY CRITICISED BY A MAJORITY OF POLITICALLY-ACTIVE URBAN BLACKS, AT LOGGERHEADS WITH THE UDF AND WITH BISHOP TUTU, DISTRUSTFUL OF PRESIDENT BOTHA WITH WHOM HE GETS ON BADLY. NEVERTHELESS BUTHELEZI IS IMPORTANT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS WHICH ARE SPECIALLY RELEVANT NOW. HE LEADS THE LARGEST OF THE MANY BLACK COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE IS ONE OF THE FEW OUTSPOKEN MODERATES AMONG INFLUENTIAL BLACKS. HE IS COMMITTED TO THE 'POLITICS OF NEGOTIATION' AND HAS SAID THAT HE IS PREPARED TO SEEK A COMPROMISE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. HE IS ESTEEMED BY MANY WHITES. ON TELEVISION HE COMES ACROSS NOT ONLY AS RATIONAL AND ARTICULATE BUT AS A CREDIBLE LEADER WITH WHOM WHITES COULD DO BUSINESS - A RARE PUBLIC IMAGE HERE. HIS ANTI-DISINVESTMENT VIEWS COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (AS WELL AS OUR OWN) AND PROBABLY CARRY MORE WEIGHT INTERNATIONALLY THAN THEIRS. NATAL HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET DURING THE RECENT UNREST THANKS LARGELY TO HIS RESTRAINING HAND.
4. ABOVE ALL HE ADOCATES SOLUTION WHICH, WITH SUFFICIENT SKILL AND DETERMINATION, COULD PROVIDE THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE BASIS OF A WAY FORWARD FROM THE PRESENT IMPASSE. YET THE GOVERNMENT HAVE REFUSED TILL NOW TO CONTEMPLATE A FAIRLY VAGUE AND MODERATE STATEMENT OF INTENT SUCH AS BUTHELEZI INSISTS UPON. IN PRI BUTHELEZI HAS MET INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT BUT NOT AS PART OF ANY ORGANISED FORUM. IN HIS VIEW THE KEY IS ONE FORM OF UNDERTAKING ABOUT POWER-SHARING BEFORE BLACK LEADERS LIKE HIMSELF WILL SPLIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE ACROSS THE TABLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

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5. HE WILL TRY TO PERSUADE THE PRIME MINISTER TO ENDORSE HIS GENERAL APPROACH. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AGREEING TO A DECLARATION OF INTENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY THEIR NEED FOR A GESTURE AT THE END OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. BUTHELEZI AGREED THIS WAS POSSIBLE THOUGH HE HAD NO INDICATION OF IT YET FOR THE GOVERNMENT SIDE.

6. ANY DEAL WITH BUTHELEZI WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ENCOMPASS TWO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

(A) SOUTH AFRICAN FEDERATION

A FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT IS BUTHELEZI'S SHORTHAND FOR SOME FORM OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT IN WHICH BLACKS SHARE POWER WITH WHITES ALBEIT ON A WEIGHTED BASIS INITIALLY. THIS IS OF COURSE ALSO THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY WHICH SLABBERT LEADS. THERE IS A CRUCIAL GAP BETWEEN THIS AND THE NATIONAL PARTY'S IDEA OF CONFEDERATION WHICH, IN BUTHELEZI'S EYES, WOULD MEAN THE DIFFERENT PARTS BEING INDEPENDENT BEFORE THEY CAME TOGETHER. A FURTHER STUMBLING BLOCK IS THE GOVERNMENT'S TOTAL REJECTION OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS THE FAINTEST OF HINTS THAT ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN SOMETHING OTHER THAN A WESTMINSTER MODEL MIGHT ONE DAY BE CONSIDERED, THIS NEVERTHELESS SEEMS A SLIGHT AND DISTANT PROSPECT. IN ANY CASE IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR BUTHELEZI UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CAN BRING THEMSELVES TO MAKE EVEN A LOOSELY-WORDED COMMITMENT.

(B) REGIONAL CO-OPERATION WITH KWAZULU.

BUTHELEZI'S IDEA IS FOR JOINT MANAGEMENT OF WHITE AND BLACK AREAS AT LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL. IF THIS COULD WORK ANYWHERE IT IS PROBABLY BETWEEN WHITES IN NATAL AND THE ZULUS. A SUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT THERE WOULD NOT ONLY BENEFIT THAT AREA BUT COULD POINT THE WAY TO A SIMILAR PATTERN ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. HITHERTO HOWEVER THE GOVERNMENT HAVE FOUGHT SHY OF GOING FAR WITH BUTHELEZI DOWN THIS ROAD, IF AT ALL.

7. GOVERNMENT MINISTERS ARE STILL PUTTING OUT LINES TO BUTHELEZI BUT WITHOUT OFFERING HIM ANY ADVANCE OVER THEIR PREVIOUS THINKING. IN LONDON I BELIEVE HE IS LIKELY TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND ITS AFTERMATH REPRESENT ALMOST THE GOVERNMENT'S LAST CHANCE TO WIN OVER RESPONSIBLE BLACK LEADERSHIP AND THAT HIS OWN IDEAS ARE MORE RELEVANT AND URGENT THAN EVER.

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MR FERGUSON
MR JOHNSON.

DECLARATION OF INTENT

We the undersigned hereby declare our commitment to serve God in obedience to His divine will for our country and together:

Recognise that:

- The history of mankind shows the need for adaptive change among all peoples and all nations.
- Nations which have managed to avoid the use of violence in the achievement of national objectives are the nations which have grown in wisdom.
- Both mistakes and lessons not yet learned led to errors of judgement in the mainstream politics in both the Black and White sections of our society.
- The South African people are a family of mankind, seeking to live in harmony in the African community of nations and seeking to do so by expressing civilised ideals in the practical social, economic and political affairs of our country.
- The South African constitution as it is now written is by force of history and reality a first step in constitutional reform which urgently needs the second step to be taken of enriching the constitution to make it as acceptable to the broad mass of African opinion as it has been made acceptable to the broad mass of White opinion.
- The Westminster model of government was not ordained by God to be the only form of good government.

We therefore accept:

- The need to make the preamble to the South African constitution of equal value to all the groups and peoples of the country by enriching the clause: "To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples" to include the notion that this can best be done by sharing power. We need to share power in such a way that no one group can dictate to any other group how to express its own self-determination, and we also need to share power in a formula within which the hallowed values of good government are not

compromised.

- The need to preserve the constitutionality of the adaptive democratic process on which we will jointly rely in being subservient to the divine will for our country.

We will therefore together seek:

- To negotiate as leaders to amend the South African constitution to make it acceptable to all groups.
- To find an alternative political system to that which the world at large understands by the word 'apartheid' and also to seek an alternative political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.
- To give expression to the common citizenship of all South Africa's peoples without qualifying the meaning of citizenship for any group.
- To use the opportunities presented in practical politics at first, second and third tier levels of government to fashion national unity by deepening the democratic process, and to use the democratic process in explorations of what needs to be done to get the people to legitimise the instruments of government.

We therefore pledge ourselves:

- To express national pride and patriotism by insisting that South Africans will decide South Africa's future in the acceptance of each other as individuals and groups and the acceptance of each other's cultural rights to be who they are.
- To start where we find ourselves in history and to move from there to build on all that is positive and valuable and to change that which is negative and undesirable.
- Each to work in our own constituencies to develop a South African pride in managing our own South African affairs in harmony with internationally accepted standards of civilised decency without being dictated to from without.

Having thus declared we stand together to defend our right even with our lives to take the steps and the time needed to

establish consensus between groups and to win support for our joint efforts in the South African family of nations.

And furthermore to stand together to defend South Africa from external onslaughts and to stand together to resist any use of violence which threatens the politics of negotiation aimed at national reconciliation."



BUTHELEZI COMMISSION: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Recognising the socio-economic interdependence of Natal/KwaZulu, it considers the creation of an independent KwaZulu against the interests of the people in the Province and proposes instead a consociational form of regional government with enhanced powers. It suggests a multi-ethnic executive council chosen by a Chief Minister who would in turn be elected by a Legislative Assembly elected by universal adult suffrage with proportional representation. Protection for minority groups would be built-in and they would have assured representation. The Assembly's powers would be limited by a Bill of Individual and Group Rights together with a minority group right of veto which would be over-riding on certain issues, i.e. language, religion and education. Legislation would be tested by an independent judiciary.

2. As an interim measure, a multi-ethnic council is proposed consisting of the white Provincial Council, the KwaZulu Cabinet and representatives from the Indian and Coloured communities under the joint chairmanship of the Provincial Administrator and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. This Council would establish a series of joint commissions and committees, a steering committee to oversee constitutional changes and a multi-racial executive and legislature for the Durban metropolitan area.

ECONOMIC:

3. The Commission proposes the improvement of agricultural techniques and financing, greater utilisation of Trust lands, and the extension of black urban freehold rights but warns against rural freehold tenure, and the government's consolidation proposals. It urges the removal of racial restrictions in business, a free market in labour (abolition of influx control), the encouragement of labour intensive industry, the fostering of a viable black trade union movement and the establishment of a free port at Richards Bay.

EDUCATION:

4. The wide disparities in quality of education are examined and it is proposed to upgrade black educational standards through the gradual integration of black, white and Indian educational systems by developing non-racial district education boards and a regional educational council. Among the options offered are open schools (open to all race groups) at selected sites.

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ADMINISTRATION:

5. Closer administrative co-ordination is urged through a number of newly-created regional bodies (in particular metropolitan councils and authorities for the major utilities) supervised by 'a congress of executives', a joint planning commission, a joint social and economic development commission and a joint education board.

HEALTH & WELFARE:

6. The integration of health services at district and regional level is proposed to maximise the use of rare resources with emphasis on total community development and flexibility of standards according to circumstances. The preventative rather than the curative is stressed. In rural areas, resources should be devoted to primary health care and third world medical techniques.

ATTITUDES:

7. Commenting on the evidence put before it, the Commission mentioned a high degree of tolerance between racial groups and a general acceptance that the moral position of the present regime was indefensible; a hardening of black attitudes in general but in particular among the educated urban youth; the recognition of white businessmen of the need to relax influx and other controls; that whites were more relaxed about integrating housing than education; that of all the minorities the Afrikaners expressed most concern about minority rights and that Indian attitudes towards blacks in power were ambivalent.

8. The survey of white, Indian and Coloured attitudes showed a majority were not confident about the future, expected instability and disturbances if there is no political reform, believed that KwaZulu cannot last as a separate identity, and rejected independence for KwaZulu which they see as destabilising the region. They also rejected universal suffrage (90%-whites and 60%-Coloured and Indian) and rejected extending the franchise to Indians and Coloureds only, instead supporting the gradual extension of black political rights (under 50% for whites). There was most support for the proposition that Natal/KwaZulu remains as at present with greater co-operation by blacks sharing in regional decision-making and joint government. A majority supported black representation on city and provincial councils and went as far as agreeing to allow blacks to enter white schools if they are able to pay the fees.

9. The survey of black attitudes shows 70% expressing



increased political discontent and anger and 30% espousing actual militancy and confrontation. A majority believe that ANC insurgents would receive sympathy and co-operation from many blacks; the ANC has most support on the Reef (37%) while in Natal most (67%) support Inkatha. Blacks generally express more political concern than whites and specifically compare their situation with that of whites. They reject territorial separation into black homelands; those living outside KwaZulu have no significant identification with it, and those living within have no pride of identity with it. 66% reveal no conscious tribal identity and reject KwaZulu and KwaZulu independence. 60% will however accept KwaZulu independence if it is allied to major concessions of land, urban and industrial resources and the right to live and work freely and permanently outside KwaZulu. Blacks strongly insist on black representation in South Africa's central affairs and demand universal franchise although they are prepared to accept gradual enfranchisement and regional non-racial political co-operation. They have beliefs which suggest they value democratic institutions and the principles of balance and moderation, they support the market economy rather than communal or socialist economies.

10. The Commission concludes that general black values make possible their integration into a more open political system if social and economic circumstances don't magnify racial feeling.

BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MANGOSUTHU GATSHA

Chief Minister of KwaZulu; President of Inkatha-Yenkululekho Yesizwe; Chairman of the South African Black Alliance (SABA).

Born 1928. Chief of the Buthelizi clan and uncle of, and hereditary Chief Indua (ie Adviser or Minister) to, the King of the Zulus. A prince of the royal house through the maternal line.

Began university at Fort Hare, from which he was expelled, and completed his history degree at the University of Natal.

1970: Chief Executive Councillor, Zulu Territorial Authority (from 1972 the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly); 1975: revived Inkatha (the National Cultural Liberation Movement); 1976: Chief Minister, KwaZulu Government.

Deeply rooted in, and knowledgeable about, tribal tradition and custom, Buthelezi – like the KwaZulu Government – is a curious product of feudal autocracy and modern collective Cabinet responsibility. His power base remains Inkatha (SABA has virtually ceased to exist with the withdrawal of the Coloured Labour Party and the demise of the Indian Reform Party) and the rigid control he exercises over it has brought him into sharp conflict with other organisations, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), whose objectives of political change by peaceful means he professes to share. Buthelezi has repeatedly attacked the homelands policy and has refused to consider KwaZulu's taking "independence".

He can show great charm and humour and is seldom discourteous in public but he can be ruthless with Zulus who step out of line and the elaborate civility he adopts in dealing with whites can hide deep private contempt.

Detests being addressed, or referred to, as "Gatsha".

His public speaking is often wooden and stylised and in conversation his English is not absolutely sure (though extempore in Zulu he can be marvellously amusing). He inspires fanatical loyalty among many Zulus.

Has travelled extensively and recently spent four weeks in North America speaking against disinvestment. He has visited UK and spoken at Wilton Park. A devout Anglican. Suffers from diabetes which he controls by dieting. His wife, Princess Irene, suffers from hypertension and seldom accompanies him.

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FM PRETORIA 291330Z JULY 1985
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO. 154 OF 29 JULY 1985

MY TELNO 152: CHIEF BUTHELEZI'S MEMORANDA

1. THE MAIN POINTS IN THE TWO LENGTHY MEMORANDA FOR PRESENTATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE ARE:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

- A. THE UPWARD SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE HAS JUSTIFIED WARNINGS BUTHELEZI SENT TO WESTERN LEADERS IN 1984 ABOUT THE INADEQUACY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION.
- B. UNLESS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ACTS NOW BLACK POLITICS WILL BE INCREASINGLY RADICALISED.
- C. BUTHELEZI'S MINIMUM DEMAND IS THAT SOUTH AFRICA MUST BE RECOGNISED AS ONE COUNTRY WITH ONE PEOPLE. THE STATE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE RULED THIS OUT BUT BUTHELEZI HOPES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL EXERT EVERY PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO BEGIN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS BASIS.
- D. UNDISCRIMINATE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR A WORTHWHILE FUTURE. BUTHELEZI WOULD ONLY SUPPORT THIS SORT OF PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IF IT COULD BE SHOWN THAT IT WOULD NOT HURT BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE WEST WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO HELP THEM OUT IF THEY THEN GOT INTO DIFFICULTIES.
- E. THE STATE PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF INTENT IS THE MOST NEGATIVE ASPECT OF HIS LEADERSHIP.
- F. BUTHELEZI QUOTES IN FULL THE TEXT OF, A POSSIBLE OUTLINE STATEMENT WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BLACKS AND WHITES. HE IS NOT LOOKING FOR ENDORSEMENT OF HIS DRAFT STATEMENT. BUT HE HOPES THE PRIME MINISTER CAN GIVE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO HIS EFFORTS BY THE EMERGENCE OF A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD COULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL GROUPS.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

A. THE CURRENT VIOLENCE IS DUE IN PART TO ECONOMIC RETRENCHMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE IS BLACK POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION.

B. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE BUT HAS NOT AGREED TO REAL POWER SHARING. THE STATE PRESIDENT HAS REJECTED THE IDEA OF A UNITARY STATE WITH ONE MAN ONE VOTE. NOR IS HE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A FEDERAL UNION.

C. THE GAP BETWEEN BUTHELEZI AND THE STATE PRESIDENT HAS LOOKED UNBRIDGEABLE BUT RECENT EVENTS IN HIGHLIGHTING BLACK/WHITE INTERDEPENDENCE MAY OPEN UP A PROSPECT OF REAL NEGOTIATION. BUTHELEZI WOULD NOT INSIST ON HIS PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO EXAMINE FEDERAL AND OTHER SOLUTIONS.

D. BUTHELEZI WELCOMES THE BRITISH STAND AGAINST DISINVESTMENT WHICH CANNOT HELP THE BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA BUT HE LOOKS TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO DO WHATEVER THEY CAN TO STRENGTHEN THE AIM OF THOSE COMMITTED TO THE POLITICS OF NEGOTIATION.

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MEMORANDUM FOR PRESENTATION TO THE RT. HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
MP, PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, DURING A VISIT TO LONDON
BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER KWAZULU, PRESIDENT OF
INKATHA AND CHAIRMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ALLIANCE
AUGUST 1985

In June 1984, the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha - then Prime Minister - visited Britain and Europe and met with a number of Heads of Government. This trip of his followed on the Referendum held in South Africa in November the previous year in which White South Africa had given him a massive endorsement of the new constitution under which the present South African Tricameral Parliament now operates. At the time, various Western Heads of State and Foreign Offices expressed cautious optimism that at last the South African Government had taken a small step in the right direction by including Indian and Coloured people as junior partners in government. Mr. P.W. Botha's European trip was specifically designed to use his success in the Referendum campaign to buy time for South Africa, and to drive home the advantages which the cautious but positive responses by a number of Western Governments held for him.

I was deeply concerned about the misinterpretation of the constitutional developments in South Africa by people in so many quarters and I wrote a short Memorandum to the Heads of States whom Mr. Botha would be seeing, about the constitutional developments which were taking place. In that Memorandum I said:

"I believe it is important for Western Heads of State to know that the South African Government is continuing to pursue policies which must necessarily lead to disaster and that it is in Western national and international interests that Western Heads of State tax Mr. Botha on some issues.

Firstly, there is the new constitution. The new constitution permanently excludes Blacks from having any say in the government of 87 per cent of the land and therefore in the policies which determine how the country's national wealth, the country's internal policies, and the country's foreign policy are determined. The new constitution is based on repugnant racism and gives Whites a constitutionally entrenched right to rule over Blacks in their midst in perpetuity. So-called White South Africa now has, and will ever increasingly have, a population which is numerically dominated by Blacks. The White controlled new tricameral parliament will remain a minority government and will continue to violate the most fundamental of Western democratic

principles. Western Heads of State should know that the new constitution is a prescription for violence and that it pulls the rug from beneath the feet of responsible Black leaders such as myself..."

I believe that events in South Africa since mid-1984 have shown that my concerns expressed in this Memorandum were fully justified. Instead of buying time for progress towards normalising South Africa, the new constitution had bought time towards the evolution of violence. During the Referendum campaign, I did everything I could possibly do to warn White South Africa that a Yes vote in favour of the new constitution would deepen Black anger, and would widen the chasm between Black and White which successive apartheid Governments in South Africa had created. I warned that the new constitution was a prescription for violence and that nothing that the Government had done, and nothing in the new constitution, addressed the central questions in South Africa which revolve around the disenfranchisement of 72 per cent of the population and their exclusion from any meaningful participation in the Government of their country.

Those warnings were not heeded and today we have the tragic evidence that my fears were fully justified. Black anger has risen sharply across the length and breadth of South Africa and not only have the levels of violence and the spread of violence used for political purposes now risen to historically unprecedented heights, but the ugliness of violence being employed for political purposes, has deepened tragically. The vast range of repressive measures made available to the Government through Draconian laws which have been passed over decades of National Party rule, have proved insufficient to contain Black anger. The State President has now had to declare a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts which has resulted in between eight and nine million South Africans living in circumstances which characterise the worst of Police States.

The upward spiral of violence employed for political purposes in South Africa will only be broken if the South Africa now turns to address the fundamental issues which White South Africa needs to face up to. The Government needs to address the question of giving Blacks a say in the Government of their country. Unless this is done, and done boldly and soon, the forces working for non-violent, democratic solutions leading to politics of negotiation will suffer irreparable harm.

It is in these circumstances, Madam Prime Minister, that I so deeply appreciate the opportunity of meeting with you to talk about South and Southern Africa. Whatever happens in South Africa has ramifications for the whole of the sub-continent and for a very

wide range of Western interests in South and Southern Africa. The sense of gratitude that I am conveying is more than a sense of gratitude borne out of your recognition, Madam Prime Minister, that I and Inkatha are playing a positive role in South Africa. My gratitude runs deeper than that. My ancestors fought wars against British armies. We were subjugated by Great Britain, and the might of the Zulu empire was smashed by Britain and my forefathers and their people were handed to racist White political control by British action in South Africa which led to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. I am indeed grateful that today you as head of the country which thus once subjugated my people and handed us over to be brutalised by racism, can meet in friendship and common concern about what is happening today. I am totally convinced that the lack of permanent enmity and hatred which could have characterised my attitude to you, and could be generalised as an attitude amongst the Zulu people towards Great Britain, could be equally apparent in future attitudes towards White South Africa, if the South African Government followed the wisdom of Britain and withdrew from racist policies.

I pursue policies of democratic opposition to apartheid, and I remain committed to non-violent tactics and strategies, because unless Black South Africa wins the struggle for liberation through these means, we will be left with an aftermath of bitterness and hatred which will take generations to dissipate.

Despite the upward spiralling of violence in South Africa, there remains even today the kind of goodwill among Black South Africans which has resulted in my leadership and Inkatha's aims and objectives being supported by a card-carrying membership of over a million people. Beyond these card-carrying members, there is a further vast Black South African support and sympathy amongst those who are not yet card-carrying members. No party political machine is capable of doing more than actually enrolling but a proportion of the total potential support for a political programme. Inkatha's membership makes it the largest Black political organisation ever to have emerged in the history of South Africa. It is a genuine voice of the people and Inkatha is a genuine cross-section of Black South Africa. It reflects demographic realities; it is dominated numerically by peasants and workers; it is representative of every class of Black South Africans and it is supported as much in the urban areas as it is in rural areas. Inkatha's aims and objectives and its statement of belief are compatible with the best principles of democratic government that have been evolved by the Western industrialised world.

I see South Africa locked into a north/south axis by history itself, and I see the natural destiny of the people of South Africa as a destiny within the international Western industrial sphere of interest. It is in this context that the value of Inkatha must be

seen. It is a mass movement which is truly democratic. Its policies and its tactics and strategies are in principle and in practice determined by Annual General Conferences which take place each year. It is a grass root political movement in which the people themselves elect to follow the courses they follow and elect leaders to pursue tactics and strategies they have determined to further the causes which revolve around their aspirations. I say nothing and I do nothing outside the mandate which is given to me by my massive Black constituency. Every point of view, Madam Prime Minister, that I express today is a point of view which is an Inkatha point of view and a point of view which has not only been endorsed by Inkatha's leadership and its Annual General Conferences, but which has also been endorsed by mass meetings I hold across the country.

There are other Black voices. Inkatha is not the only political group. There are other Black views about what should and should not happen, but there is no voice to equal Inkatha's voice in terms of being a voice determined by ordinary Black people.

I am now daily being made aware of the fact that unless the South African Government now takes very early and bold steps towards normalising South Africa, as a modern, industrialised, democratic state, there will be increased radicalisation in Black politics, and the upward spiral of violence for political purposes which we are now witnessing, will succeed in making South Africa ungovernable, not only for the National Party, but for any future Government - whether it be Black or White.

If South Africa has any future at all worth having, that future will have to be characterised by a constitution which enshrines genuine democratic principles and practices and which gives rise to genuine democratic government, and which will also have to be characterised by a real and continued increase in the quality of life for ordinary people. After the struggle for liberation in South Africa has been won, we will have to face the heritage of poverty and despair among the masses which apartheid has already bequeathed to the country. We as Black South Africans therefore dare not involve ourselves in tactics and strategies which undermine democracy and which destroy the productive capacity of the South African economy. This is a message I constantly deliver to my people. I say to them that there is no easy solution to the South African problem; I say to them that there will be no overnight victory; and I say to them that after the political victory, there will be continued poverty for a considerable time to follow and that they must accept there is no Utopian future. I argue that socialist and communist doctrines contain no magic which will solve South Africa's problems, and that the free enterprise system and enlightened capitalism, leading to a massive development of the South African economy, are things that Black South Africa

simply has to accept. In our circumstances, the free enterprise system is the most potent force of development available to us.

I am also deeply convinced that White South Africa would rather adopt a scorched earth policy, and destroy the future for everyone, than capitulate now immediately to a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state. Black South Africa has cherished the ideal of a one-man-one-vote system in a unitary state for generations. I argue, I plead and I cajole with Black South Africans, that if we are to avoid destroying the foundations of the future, we must commit ourselves to the politics of negotiation and we must be prepared to compromises wherever compromises can possibly be made without them being self-defeating. I and millions of Black South Africans are prepared at this point in time to shelve our ideal of a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state if negotiations between Blacks and Whites can begin to find a compromise solution acceptable to all population groups. One-man-one-vote in a unitary state will always be our cherished ideal. But I believe it can be shelved for now in order to make a start where a start is possible.

I have already gone as far as it is humanly possible for me to go towards establishing the basis of real negotiations in South Africa. I believe that it is vital for the future of South Africa for every leader, whether he or she be Black, White, Coloured or Indian to reduce the list of non-negotiables to the barest possible minimum, which they will have to take to the conference table. I and the vast majority of Black South Africans are prepared to negotiate, and we are prepared to limit our list of non-negotiables.

I insist only that whatever negotiations do take place recognises that South Africa is one country, with one people, who have together but a single destiny; and that negotiations should be directed at tangible progress towards normalising South Africa.

I have only had one single formal discussion with the State President of South Africa once in the last four and a half years, and I have only seen him once informally during that period of time. It was after my formal meeting with him in May this year, and it was after I had repeatedly offered to enter the politics of negotiation, that the State President in an interview with Mr. Brian Walden which was televised in Britain and South Africa, said that he would not accept a single South Africa, whether it be a unitary state, or whether it be a federal union. If the President is incapable of even entertaining thoughts of talking about one South Africa, with one people, under one government, then as far as I am concerned there is nothing left to talk about. If there are to be any negotiations in South Africa worth having, they must be negotiations to find feasible and practical ways and means of

giving constitutional expression to these very simple and basic demands.

The present parliamentary system locates the final deciding power over 87 per cent of the country, over all its wealth, and therefore over its fiscal policy and its internal and foreign policy, in the White Chamber of the Tricameral Parliament. On no single occasion has the State President given any evidence of his willingness to entertain a future in which this 87 per cent of the country, which Whites claim as their own domain, is sacrificed in favour of a shared future for all. I believe, Madam Prime Minister, that you and other Heads of Western Governments, should be made aware of the fact that whatever reforms are being introduced, and however meaningful those reforms are in fact in the daily lives of Black people, unless the Government of South Africa is prepared to begin meaningful negotiations with Blacks, there can only be an escalation of violence. As a Black leader, I ask you Madam Prime Minister, to exert every pressure on the South African Government available to you to begin formal negotiations with Black leaders who recognise the need for Whites to relinquish the monopoly of power they enjoy in South Africa.

There is in South Africa already a significant body of Black opinion which has already finally concluded that there are no prospects of bringing about change through negotiation and this has already resulted in South Africa having entered the first phase of civil war. The unprecedented current levels of violence used for political purposes is ever-increasingly expressing itself more in Black/Black confrontations than in Black/White confrontations or Black confrontations with the Government. The African National Congress' Mission-in-Exile is seeking to make South Africa ungovernable by encouraging Black South Africans, and particularly the youth, to kill any Black who opposes them and who is prepared to work towards compromise solutions. The ANC's Mission-in-Exile sees the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change, and it intends using the resources for violence at its disposal to further revolutionary aims which will in the end ensconce it as a post-liberation government. Those committed to the armed struggle and to the employment of violence for political purposes, will ever-increasingly become intolerant of any success in the politics of negotiation. The ANC's Mission-in-Exile is not seeking a compromise solution. It is driven by winner-takes-all revolutionary fires, and we face the tragic reality in South Africa that the destruction of the politics of compromise and negotiation is becoming of prime concern to the ANC's Mission-in-Exile.

It is in a very real sense of the concept that I say that South Africa has already entered the first phase of civil war, and that what was a struggle against apartheid is now becoming a struggle to thwart democratic opposition to apartheid. It is in this context

that I am asking you, Madam Prime Minister, to exert every possible pressure on Pretoria to strengthen the politics of negotiation by insisting that the State President declare his intention to negotiate with Blacks about the future of South Africa as one country, with one people who share one destiny. I believe that President Reagan has embarked on a course of action in his constructive engagement policy which could accumulate the kind of pressures which we so badly need in South Africa. Whether or not the American party political scene permits this policy of ever evolving into anything meaningful remains to be seen, and I am concerned about the fact that apartheid is being drawn into American party politics. I am also concerned about statements now increasingly being made by the Labour Party here in Britain. Some Democrats in the United States and some members of the British Labour Party are adopting stances and making statements which if continued will accumulate advantages for those committing South Africa to civil war, and to the solution of South Africa's problems through the armed struggle and through generalised violence.

I as a Black political leader in South Africa am aware of the role that the British Government played to end hostilities between Black and White in Zimbabwe. I am aware, Madam Prime Minister, that it was your Cabinet which pursued the diplomatic endeavours which led to the Lancaster House negotiations. Black South Africa regards it as a very considerable achievement, and it has encouraged us to think that British diplomacy, which has accumulated its own distinctive nature over the centuries, remains a vital force in the Western world which could yet play a distinctive role in South Africa. I do not draw naive parallels between what was required in Zimbabwe to bring about a cessation of hostilities and what is now required in South Africa to bring about the de-escalation of violence and the promotion of the politics of diplomacy. Nor am I ignoring the constitutional role, and the role in international law, within which British diplomacy brought about a settlement in Zimbabwe. I am simply referring to the value of Britain as an honest broker in international diplomacy and I am expressing faith that Britain could fulfill the role of an honest broker in South Africa and between South Africa and the West.

I have admired, Madam Prime Minister, the extent to which you and your Government have refused to bow to pressure to take indiscriminate action simply because apartheid is morally repugnant. In a sense, there may now be a ripeness of time in which diplomacy could be more effective than it was in the past.

Black South Africans have always seen the West as toothless when it came to dealing with apartheid. Apartheid under the National Party has grown vigorously and has thrived for over 37 years, despite all the moral and diplomatic pressure which has been exerted on successive National Party Governments. It would be tragic for

South Africa and the whole of Southern Africa, if Britain and its allies failed to make the combined weight of Western pressure on the South African Government an ever-increasingly positive factor in bringing about meaningful change in my country, now that there is greater fluidity in the South African situation.

Statesmanship demands that apartheid is condemned and that opposition to apartheid is strengthened in such a way that the politics of negotiation are furthered, and the democratic future of South Africa is assured. Apartheid is so abhorrent that just simply any measure against it is seen as justified by some in the West. I have no doubt that there are many in the British Labour Party, and even, Madam Prime Minister, amongst your rank and file party members, who are genuinely indignant about apartheid and in whom that indignation gives rise to irresponsible action in supporting the forces of destruction in South Africa.

This has become very apparent in the disinvestment debate in the United States, and it is very apparent in much of the activity of pressure groups in Great Britain and Western Europe. There is too much at stake, not only for millions in South Africa, but for the whole sub-continent of Southern Africa for Western indignation to give rise to indiscriminate action against apartheid.

The recent indignation by France which has led to the recalling of its Ambassador from South Africa will be applauded by many Black South Africans merely for its symbolic importance. This kind of European reaction to current events will send shock waves through White South Africa. When, however, the French associate their indignation with a high political symbolic value for those committed to the struggle for liberation, with the further action of prohibiting any further investment in South Africa, their action becomes a double-edged sword which hurts both Black and White, and which strengthens the revolutionary forces in the country working against democracy. I am pursuing a path of non-violent, democratic opposition to the Government precisely because I see this as the only way of preserving the future. Vast backlogs in Black housing, health services and welfare, and in such things as education, can only be wiped out some time in the future if the South African economy grows at its maximum possible rate. Any move against South Africa which damages its economy now, is a move which will damage the prospects of a worthwhile future. I am pursuing the politics of negotiation because I do not want to reduce South Africa to ungovernability, and this is what mass poverty will do some time in the future if the country's economic growth base is damaged now.

Inkatha holds an Annual General Conference every year and at every one of these Conferences, I inform delegates what I have said on their behalf on the question of disinvestment. I inform them that I tell the world:

- that ordinary Black South Africans still seek a negotiated settlement and seek to pursue non-violent tactics and strategies;
- they know the meaning of poverty and are aware of the fact that if they do not have work they suffer terrible deprivation and that therefore any strategy which results in a decrease in the number of jobs available to Blacks is rejected by Blacks;
- Blacks in South Africa who have jobs with foreign companies would never be persuaded to relinquish their jobs to further the aims and objectives of those who pursue the disinvestment lobby;
- that no membership-based Black organisation in South Africa has an executive with a mandate from its members to call for disinvestment;
- that Black protest politicians who are not involved in constituency politics but who are involved in voicing Black grievances in a manner calculated to gain media acclaim, are more prone to call for disinvestment than other leaders.
- that every leader of an organisation working to make this country ungovernable and who is prepared to use violence, whether it be mob violence or armed violence, to bring about political change, argues for disinvestment;
- that there is no prospect of the armed struggle succeeding within the foreseeable future and that we therefore will have to rely on the politics of negotiation; and that the politics of negotiation are favoured by what has now become a total dependence by White South Africa on Black South Africa;
- that Black bargaining power is increased by Black economic advancement and vertical mobility which accompanies it;
- that it is the responsibility of Black South Africans to liberate South Africa from apartheid oppression in such a way that we do not force on neighbouring Black States, and States further afield in Southern and Central Africa, to pay the costs of our struggle.
- I tell them that we respect the national choices of Black States in Southern Africa and that we have no quarrel with those who have opted for a socialist future under a one-Party state, but that that is not a viable option for us; and that the benefits we will derive from working within a race-free,

democratic state in which there will be equality for all, and in which the principles of the free enterprise system will dominate in government planning, will have a very significant spill-over benefit for other States in Southern Africa.

I will report to my constituency, Madam Prime Minister, what I have said to you today about disinvestment. I will do so at Inkatha's Central Committee; and I will do so at mass meetings I hold in various places in the country, including Soweto which is in South Africa's industrial heartland. Wherever I do so, I will receive mass acclaim for the sentiments I am expressing.

Western industrialised countries which are moving towards banning future investment in South Africa, or even worse to withdrawing existing investment, and which regard Black opinion among rank and file workers and peasants as irrelevant, stand in the very real danger of pursuing aims and objectives which conflict with what is beneficial in our struggle for liberation. And in this vein, I would like to make an additional point. I am beginning to hear more and more arguments in favour of selective disinvestment because many of the points I have made above are taken and it is naively believed that, for example, prohibition of further investment in capital intensive industries, is warranted. Every Western Government knows that economies are not maleable things and cannot be turned on or off at will, and can only be directed towards political ends with very limited success. The naivety of some who think they can damage one part of the economy without it having repercussions for another part of the economy, is to me alarming. I am most certainly open to persuasion that one or another form of disinvestment may put pressure on Pretoria without damaging the economy, or causing greater Black suffering. I argue against disinvestment because it has these negative effects. Any sanctions against South Africa which would not harm the growth of the economy, but which would exert pressure on Pretoria, would be welcome by every Black South African. I have always spoken against irresponsible exploitative capitalism, but that to me is another debate entirely.

There is also a ripeness of time in which blunders would lead to irrecoverable losses. The West should realise that the threat of violence, and the threat of economic sanctions has more utility than the employment of violence and the implementation of damaging sanctions. The West should also realise that as soon as sanctions do begin to bite, it is Black South Africa which will bear the brunt of the burden. The West should also realise that the South African Government is quite capable of taking retaliatory measures of the most despicable kind. If sanctions began to bite, and Blacks began to suffer the burden of those sanctions, Pretoria would have no scruples about repatriating more than a million workers in South Africa who come from neighbouring States.

President Kaunda and President Banda unilaterally took action to stop the recruitment of mine workers in Zambia and Malawi. The South African Government is quite capable of taking reciprocal action and repatriating foreign workers. More than a million families would suffer increased deprivation in impoverished neighbouring States. I plead with the West not to push the whole of South Africa into an abyss because they underestimate the brutality with which Pretoria could respond in a situation in which very real threats became unbearable realities.

Today, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, our brothers in Mocambique are developing trade links with South Africa. Despite the admirable stand of Zimbabwe on the issue of apartheid, economic realities are such that she still has a trade mission in Johannesburg. I often wonder, when sanctions are advocated, what countries such as Zimbabwe are supposed to do. Would Zimbabwe's trade mission in Johannesburg be expected to be withdrawn from South Africa when sanctions are applied? What will the international community actually do for citizens of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Mocambique, once Mr. Louis Nel's threat is carried out and citizens of these independent States in Southern Africa are actually deported out of South Africa? South Africa showed her claws recently when the Lesotho border was closed for a few days with resultant suffering of many Lesotho citizens and their families.

I am not saying that pressures should not be brought to bear on the South African polecat. All I am saying is that all of us who work for the destruction of the apartheid polecat should not be blinded by anger to the extent that we fail to examine carefully the consequences of every act we take in the process of doing so. I have become very skeptical on the issue of whether the West would come to the rescue of more than a million citizens of these independent States when the crunch comes, and South Africa decides to expel them as a retaliatory act. I have become skeptical because I have not seen a single Western country do anything to the rogue elephant, which the South African Defence Force has been, when they have killed our brothers and sisters in countries such as Lesotho, Mocambique, Angola and Botswana.

Madam Prime Minister, the position the British adopted in last week's Security Council debate must be applauded, and I plead with you to withstand all party political pressures which may be exerted on you to continue to protect the prospects of British diplomacy being employed to assist in the non-violent resolution of the South African problem.

I am fully aware of the fact that even the maximum possible growth rate of the South African economy will leave a great many Black South Africans jobless for a very considerable time into the

future. The Black birth rate in South Africa is approaching three per cent per annum, and already more than half of all Black South Africans are 15 years old and younger. This huge population bulge of millions of young people moving towards the market place, is going to create almost insoluble problems for whatever government rules South Africa. I am therefore aware that the development of an informal economy, and the development of self-help, schemes is vital for our future. I am also aware that the growth rate of the informal economy rises and falls as the growth rate of the formal economy rises and falls. Western governments should understand that the cause for which we all struggle for in South Africa demands the maximisation of the West's input into the South African economy. Millions of people now, and future generations, will benefit from a vast inflow of capital into South Africa, and the inflow of new technology and managerial skills which will come with it.

I believe that in part President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement holds some promise for South Africa, because it is objective-orientated. Slamming down the equivalent of an iron curtain between the West and South Africa, is not helpful to the causes I serve. If you, Madam Prime Minister, and other Western leaders, were to direct your opposition to apartheid and to seek to bring the State President to the point where he can make a declaration of intent which leaders like myself could co-sign with him, you will achieve something of historic significance.

I isolate the State President's unwillingness to make such a declaration of intent as by far the most negative aspect of his whole political career and his current leadership of the country. I have been pleading with Mr. P.W. Botha to make a declaration of intent since he first took office as Prime Minister. Until he declares his willingness to negotiate about the future with Blacks on terms they can accept - and which Whites will also accept - there is no hope of breaking the upward spiral of violence. For many years I have been loathe to put pen to paper and draft such a declaration of intent because ideally it should have come as a product of goodwill amongst Black and White leaders to enable them to get round a conference table. Because, however, the State President has so finally and clearly stated that he is not prepared to talk about one South Africa, I had reluctantly to succumb to pressures on me to draft such a declaration of intent. I have done so in order to produce a discussion document and to give content to the notion of a declaration of intent which could be debated and if necessary amended for acceptance. It reads as follows:

DECLARATION OF INTENT

We the undersigned hereby declare our commitment to serve God in obedience to His divine will for our country and together:

Recognise that:

- The history of mankind shows the need for adaptive change among all peoples and all nations.
- Nations grow in wisdom.
- Both mistakes and lessons not yet learned led to errors of judgement in the mainstream politics in both the Black and White sections of our society.
- The South African people are a family of mankind, seeking to live in harmony in the African community of nations and seeking to do so by expressing civilised ideals in the practical social, economic and political affairs of our country.
- The South African constitution as it is now written is by force of history and reality a first step in constitutional reform which urgently needs the second step to be taken of enriching the constitution to make it as acceptable to the broad mass of African opinion as it has been made acceptable to the broad mass of White opinion.
- The Westminster model of government was not ordained by God to be the only form of good government.

We therefore accept:

- The need to make the preamble to the South African constitution of equal value to all the groups and peoples of the country by enriching the clause: "To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples" to include the notion that this can best be done by sharing power in such a way that no one group can dictate to any other group how to express its own self-determination.
- The need to preserve the constitutionality of the adaptive democratic process on which we will jointly rely in being subservient to the divine will for our country.

We will therefore together seek:

- To negotiate as leaders to amend the South African constitution to make it acceptable to all groups.

- To find an alternative political system to that which the world at large understands by the word 'apartheid' and also to seek an alternative political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.
- To use the opportunities presented in practical politics at first, second and third tier levels of government to fashion national unity by deepening the democratic process, and to use the democratic process in explorations of what needs to be done to get the people to legitimise the instruments of government.

We therefore pledge ourselves:

- To express national pride and patriotism by insisting that South Africans will decide South Africa's future in the acceptance of each other as individuals and groups and the acceptance of each other's cultural rights to be who they are.
- To start where we find ourselves in history and to move from there to build on all that is positive and valuable and to change that which is negative and undesirable.
- Each to work in our own constituencies to develop a South African pride in managing our own South African affairs in harmony with internationally accepted standards of civilised decency without being dictated to from without.

Having thus declared we stand together to defend our right even with our lives to take the steps and the time needed to establish consensus between groups and to win support for our joint efforts in the South African family of nations.

And furthermore to stand together to defend South Africa from external onslaughts and to stand together to resist any use of violence which threatens the politics of negotiation aimed at national reconciliation.

It is my carefully considered judgement that all Black leaders committed to the politics of negotiation could sell such a declaration of intent to their supporters, and I am totally convinced that Mr. P.W. Botha could in fact sell this declaration

of intent to the White South African electorate. I ask you, Madam Prime Minister, to examine this declaration of intent, and I would find it a most valuable contribution if you would find it possible to endorse the kind of endeavours within which I found it necessary to draft the declaration. I am seeking to establish points of consensus across Black/White political chasms in South Africa. I believe it is the kind of document which, if signed by the State President, would make the West believe that he is serious about leading South Africa to reform. I am, Madam Prime Minister, not asking for an endorsement by your Government of this specific wording of a declaration of intent that is now needed. I am simply asking that the British encourage the emergence of a consensus document, as a compromise consensus document, which could be accepted by all population groups and which would encourage the West to believe that there is hope for the future.



BUTHELEZI COMMISSION: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Recognising the socio-economic interdependence of Natal/KwaZulu, it considers the creation of an independent KwaZulu against the interests of the people in the Province and proposes instead a consociational form of regional government with enhanced powers. It suggests a multi-ethnic executive council chosen by a Chief Minister who would in turn be elected by a Legislative Assembly elected by universal adult suffrage with proportional representation. Protection for minority groups would be built-in and they would have assured representation. The Assembly's powers would be limited by a Bill of Individual and Group Rights together with a minority group right of veto which would be over-riding on certain issues, i.e. language, religion and education. Legislation would be tested by an independent judiciary.

2. As an interim measure, a multi-ethnic council is proposed consisting of the white Provincial Council, the KwaZulu Cabinet and representatives from the Indian and Coloured communities under the joint chairmanship of the Provincial Administrator and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. This Council would establish a series of joint commissions and committees, a steering committee to oversee constitutional changes and a multi-racial executive and legislature for the Durban metropolitan area.

ECONOMIC:

3. The Commission proposes the improvement of agricultural techniques and financing, greater utilisation of Trust lands, and the extension of black urban freehold rights but warns against rural freehold tenure, and the government's consolidation proposals. It urges the removal of racial restrictions in business, a free market in labour (abolition of influx control), the encouragement of labour intensive industry, the fostering of a viable black trade union movement and the establishment of a free port at Richards Bay.

EDUCATION:

4. The wide disparities in quality of education are examined and it is proposed to upgrade black educational standards through the gradual integration of black, white and Indian educational systems by developing non-racial district education boards and a regional educational council. Among the options offered are open schools (open to all race groups) at selected sites.



ADMINISTRATION:

5. Closer administrative co-ordination is urged through a number of newly-created regional bodies (in particular metropolitan councils and authorities for the major utilities) supervised by 'a congress of executives', a joint planning commission, a joint social and economic development commission and a joint education board.

HEALTH & WELFARE:

6. The integration of health services at district and regional level is proposed to maximise the use of rare resources with emphasis on total community development and flexibility of standards according to circumstances. The preventative rather than the curative is stressed. In rural areas, resources should be devoted to primary health care and third world medical techniques.

ATTITUDES:

7. Commenting on the evidence put before it, the Commission mentioned a high degree of tolerance between racial groups and a general acceptance that the moral position of the present regime was indefensible; a hardening of black attitudes in general but in particular among the educated urban youth; the recognition of white businessmen of the need to relax influx and other controls; that whites were more relaxed about integrating housing than education; that of all the minorities the Afrikaners expressed most concern about minority rights and that Indian attitudes towards blacks in power were ambivalent.

8. The survey of white, Indian and Coloured attitudes showed a majority were not confident about the future, expected instability and disturbances if there is no political reform, believed that KwaZulu cannot last as a separate identity, and rejected independence for KwaZulu which they see as destabilising the region. They also rejected universal suffrage (90%-whites and 60%-Coloured and Indian) and rejected extending the franchise to Indians and Coloureds only, instead supporting the gradual extension of black political rights (under 50% for whites). There was most support for the proposition that Natal/KwaZulu remains as at present with greater co-operation by blacks sharing in regional decision-making and joint government. A majority supported black representation on city and provincial councils and went as far as agreeing to allow blacks to enter white schools if they are able to pay the fees.

9. The survey of black attitudes shows 70% expressing



increased political discontent and anger and 30% espousing actual militancy and confrontation. A majority believe that ANC insurgents would receive sympathy and co-operation from many blacks; the ANC has most support on the Reef (37%) while in Natal most (67%) support Inkatha. Blacks generally express more political concern than whites and specifically compare their situation with that of whites. They reject territorial separation into black homelands; those living outside KwaZulu have no significant identification with it, and those living within have no pride of identity with it. 66% reveal no conscious tribal identity and reject KwaZulu and KwaZulu independence. 60% will however accept KwaZulu independence if it is allied to major concessions of land, urban and industrial resources and the right to live and work freely and permanently outside KwaZulu. Blacks strongly insist on black representation in South Africa's central affairs and demand universal franchise although they are prepared to accept gradual enfranchisement and regional non-racial political co-operation. They have beliefs which suggest they value democratic institutions and the principles of balance and moderation, they support the market economy rather than communal or socialist economies.

10. The Commission concludes that general black values make possible their integration into a more open political system if social and economic circumstances don't magnify racial feeling.



BUTHELEZI COMMISSION REPORT: THE REPORT ON THE ATTITUDES SURVEYS

Sample

1. The survey (carried out in 1981) was based upon a "quota sample" of:
- | | | |
|----------------|---|----------|
| 525 whites | } | in Natal |
| 200 Indians | | |
| 100 Coloureds) | | |
| 2629 blacks | - mainly but not exclusively Zulus in KwaZulu and on the Witwatersrand. | |

This was supplemented by a postal sample of 2001 whites.

Black Attitudesa) Political Concerns

2. In general blacks rate political concerns high in their list of prominent life interests. Interest in politics and militancy increase with higher urbanisation, education and income. Inkatha members tend also to be militant particularly in the urban areas. (Comment: Inkatha has hitherto been thought to be a predominantly conservative organisation.) The report found a "growing climate of revolutionary ideology" amongst blacks.

3. Although many blacks recognise economic and social improvements in recent years, feelings of anger and frustration have increased dramatically since 1977, particularly amongst middle class men. (Comment: the white establishment has long sought to create a black middle class in the hope that it would divert demands for political reform.)

4. Mr Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe had a significant impact on black South African perceptions. It changed the old belief that white power was immutable and suggested that a violent overthrow of the existing government was possible.

b) Expectations and Aspirations

5. In general blacks expect increasing unrest (in the form of strikes, boycotts, demonstrations) if there is no reform within the next ten years. There is an "overwhelming consensus" that without reform revolution will take place.

6. Blacks aspire to equality with whites. In general they are in favour of integrated facilities. But only a small majority is in favour of integrated residential areas. (Comment: "swamping" by blacks is one of many whites' "primordial" fears. This finding perhaps indicates that there would be no great stampede of blacks to white areas if the Group Areas Act were removed.)

7. Labour issues and political issues are fairly separate in the minds of most blacks. As yet there is little sign of unions being

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perceived as vehicles for achieving political change. In general further labour disturbances are expected in the next few years over economic issues.

8. As may be expected, most migrant workers would prefer a job closer to their family. But only 39% of migrant workers (mainly the lower skilled and recently urbanised) would like to bring their family with them from rural areas to the town. Even amongst urban blacks there remains a strong attachment to the land, and a resistance to urban life. (Comment: according to the report, this indicates that a relaxation of influx control would not lead to a dramatic change in the rate and pattern of urbanisation.)

9. Even in rural areas the proportion of people wanting individual title to land is as high as 60%. (The exceptions are those who have land under the tribal system and do not have to pay rent or share.) (Comment: whites often claim that blacks are unused to owning or would not wish to own land.)

c) Leadership Trends and Organisations

10. Developments since 1977 (school boycotts, the Biko affair, Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe) have led to increased support for the African National Congress (ANC). On the Witwatersrand Buthelezi has recovered some support lost to Motlana and Black Consciousness leaders in 1979/80 but remains far behind the ANC leaders. Buthelezi is the most popular black leader in KwaZulu and Natal. Trade unions are not generally regarded as political organisations (see para 7).

d) Ethnicity

11. Blacks reject most aspects of separate development. The principle is acceptable to blacks only as regards marriage and to a lesser extent housing.

12. In general it is the mainly unskilled and poorly educated people who regard themselves as primarily Zulus (or Sothos, Xhosas etc) and accept KwaZulu (or whatever homeland) as their home. Most blacks have negative feelings towards their designated homeland as a "national state" and reject "independence". Nevertheless, black interest in ethnicity is fairly high. A third of blacks in metropolitan areas and a majority in rural areas have a strong Zulu identity although there is little feeling of superiority over other groups. Amongst non-Zulus substantial numbers feared "swamping" by other tribes. (Comment: the report works hard to water down indications of "tribalism" amongst blacks. But it remains clear that, particularly at the lower end of the social scale, many blacks have a strong attachment to their tribal origins. This may however be comparable with an Afrikaner's concept of the "volk".)

e) Political Values

13. As regards systems of government there is a slim majority of blacks who would accept representatives of the homelands sitting on

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an equal basis with whites in Parliament. A substantial minority support black majority rule. The concept of a minority veto is unattractive to most blacks. (Comment: the report claims that these findings indicate that blacks would not automatically demand one man one vote.)

14. Many blacks favour equal representation of groups in government. There is no great support for domination by one group. There is little enthusiasm for separate schools for whites and coloureds or for the retention of large white farms.

15. Few blacks favour the "winner takes all" Westminster system. Large majorities favour leaders being responsive to criticism and support the principle of Parliamentary opposition and independence of the courts. A large majority however is in favour of a strong leader and a one party state. (Comment: the report claims that these findings are not necessarily contradictory as opposition to the government can be expressed in a one party system. Moreover, according to the report, whites have strong leanings towards restrictions on the democratic process.)

16. In general blacks favour a mixed economy, with private enterprise to generate growth and a welfare system to protect the under-privileged.

17. The report concludes that blacks have not fallen for "shallow idealism", and that black attitudes are not incompatible with a modern and balanced system of government.

Population Minorities (Whites, Coloureds and Indians)

18. Although only between a third and a quarter of minority groups profess anxiety about their political future, there is equally not a great deal of confidence about the future. Whites tend to be politically more conservative than coloureds and Indians, but on many issues (eg private enterprise) are closer to black views. On political issues coloureds and Indians are closer to blacks, but all three minority groups fear the consequences of black majority rule. Universal suffrage is firmly rejected by all the minority groups but there is more support for a gradual extension of political rights to blacks.

19. There was "emphatic rejection" by coloureds and Indians of the exclusion of blacks from the franchise. Coloureds and Indians in particular fear the consequences of black resentment over exclusion.

20. A majority of whites support the principles of separate development but consider independent homelands to be a security threat. The majority prefer a federal or confederal system. Whites tend to have "primordial" fears about living in homelands (eg drop in standards, crime control, authoritarianism). The report claims that many whites have a strong emotional attachment to political separation which is not consistent when confronted with the implications of this policy. For example, present government policies towards Natal are not supported by the majority of whites, coloureds, Indians and Asians.