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TELNO 742

OF 041220Z SEPTEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKREP NEW YORK, OTHER EC POSTS

MYTELNO 728 AND TELCON HUMFREY/RICHARDSON : VISIT BY TROIKA TO
SOUTH AFRICA

1. CORRIAS TOLD RICHARDSON THIS MORNING THAT ANDREOTTI AND HE HAD FOUND THE VISIT 'POSITIVE AND VERY USEFUL'. THE TROIKA'S MERE PRESENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA SHOWED THAT POLITICAL INITIATIVES WITH THAT COUNTRY WERE POSSIBLE, REDUCED SOUTH AFRICA'S SENSE OF ISOLATION AND ENABLED THE EC MINISTERS TO UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION. THEY FOUND PIK BOTHA BELLIGERENT, PRESIDENT BOTHA CALMER, BUT BOTH IN CORRIAS' VIEW FUNDAMENTALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT COULD PERSUADE THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO ACCEPT FAR-REACHING REFORM AND THE DIFFICULTY OF IDENTIFYING AUTHENTIC BLACK LEADERS WITH WHOM TO NEGOTIATE AND WHO COULD MAKE THE OUTCOME OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS STICK. PRESIDENT BOTHA ADMITTED THAT REFORM SHOULD HAVE BEGUN YEARS AGO. POWER SHARING WAS AT THE CENTRE OF THE TALKS.

2. CORRIAS SAID THAT THE TROIKA HAD DELIBERATELY CONFINED THEMSELVES TO GENERALITIES, APART FROM AN INJUDICIOUS REFERENCE BY POOS (PLEASE PROTECT) TO THE NEED FOR ONE MAN ONE VOTE. THEY HAD TAKEN THE VIEW THAT IT WAS FOR THE SAG AND LEADERS OF OTHER COMMUNITIES TO SIT DOWN AND WORK OUT A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM. THEY HAD THEREFORE NOT PRESSED, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR A FIRM COMMITMENT ON A DATE FOR ENDING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY: THEY HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN TOLD IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE SAG WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT ON 11 SEPTEMBER ON INFLUX CONTROL AND THE PASS LAWS. THE QUESTION OF COMMON CITIZENSHIP REMAINS UNCLEAR: PRESIDENT BOTHA HAD SAID THAT THE SAG NOW REALISED THAT BLACKS LIVING OUTSIDE THE HOMELANDS OF WHICH THEY WERE NOMINALLY CITIZENS WERE IN NO POSITION TO EXERCISE THEIR 'POLITICAL RIGHTS', BUT THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP FOR RESIDENTS OF THE HOMELANDS DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN RAISED. THERE WAS TALK OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE, WITH AN OPEN AGENDA.

3. CORRIAS SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD, IN FACT, VOLUNTEERED TO PRODUCE THEIR DECLARATION OF INTENT, ANTICIPATING THE TROIKA'S PRESSURE FOR SOME SUCH DOCUMENT. THEY HAD NOT INTENDED TO PUBLISH

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IT, BUT THEIR HAND HAD BEEN FORCED BY LEAKS. ANDREOTTI HAD PROPOSED SOME MODIFICATIONS TO THE TEXT, WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD ACCEPTED: FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE SAG 'SHARES IN THE REJECTION' OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (WHERE THE ORIGINAL WORDING SIMPLY READS 'REJECTS'). AND THE WORDING ON THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND REVIEW OF THE SITUATION OF DETAINEES, THE FURTHEST THAT BOTHA WAS PREPARED TO GO. CORRIAS REGARDED IT AS MILDLY ENCOURAGING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE PREPARED TO SIT DOWN AT A TABLE AND DISCUSS THEIR INTERNAL SITUATION WITH MINISTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. THE TROIKA HAD FOUND BOTH THE WHITE AND BLACK EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS CONCERNED ABOUT THE RECESSION, PRESSING HARD FOR POLITICAL REFORM AND FEARFUL THAT OTHERWISE THE PRESENT STRUCTURE MIGHT COLLAPSE. BOTH HAD OPPOSED SANCTIONS. THE UNIONS APPEAR TO BE DEVIDED: CUSA, WHICH CORRIAS DESCRIBED AS A RADICAL BLACK MINORITY GROUP, WANTED THEM BUT THE METAL WORKERS WERE OPPOSED AND SO CORRIAS THOUGHT, WERE THE MINERS. CHURCH LEADERS WERE LIKEWISE DEVIDED.

5. CORRIAS SAID THAT THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE, AND SO TO HIS SURPRISE HAD BEEN LE CLERCQ. ANDREOTTI HAD PLAYED A MODERATING ROLE. RICHARDSON ASKED WHETHER ANDREOTTI STILL SOOD BY THE VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON 2 AUGUST (MY TUR). WHILE MAKING THE USUSAL CAVEAT ABOUT ITALIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS, CORRIAS SAID THAT ANDREOTTI HAD COME BACK CONVINCED THAT CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, AND NOT SANCTIONS, WERE THE RIGHT ANSWER. HE AGREED ENTIRELY WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF LETTING FINANCIAL MARKETS EXERT THEIR OWN PRESSURE ON THE SAG (YRTELNO 83 TO LUXEMBOURG).

6. ANDREOTTI HAS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN SPEAKING TO THE MEDIA:-

A. THERE IS NO AGREEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA ON WHAT TO DO, EVEN WITHIN THE VARIOUS COMMUNITIES.

B. THE SOUTH AFRICAN DECLARATION OF INTENT WAS AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT.

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C. ECONOMIC PRESSURE MIGHT ENCOURAGE A RADICAL BUT NON-VIOLENT REFORM PROGRAMME.

D. PREVAILING SOUTH AFRICAN OPINION WAS AGAINST SANCTIONS AS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

FCO ADVANCE TO PS/SOSFA, HUMFREY SAFD
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