

CONFIDENTIAL

9419 - 1

OCMIAN 9419
CONFIDENTIAL
OO ROMEE
PP ATHEN
PP PRETO
FM FCOLN TO BONNN
171100Z SEP
GRS 450

One Point²

see sidelined part

N.C.V

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 491

OF 171100Z SEPTEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, PRETORIA, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL VIENNA

MY TELNOS 489 AND 490

1. GENSCHER HAVING ATTEMPTED TO TELEPHONE ME YESTERDAY EVENING,
I TELEPHONED HIM BACK EARLY THIS MORNING.

(A) SOUTH AFRICA

2. I EXPLAINED OUR WISH TO AVOID ANY EC LEGISLATION FOLLOWING
THE RECENT DISCUSSION IN POLITICAL COOPERATION. WE UNDERSTOOD
THAT THE COMMISSION WERE NONETHELESS LIKELY TO MAKE PROPOSALS
BEFORE LONG. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IF THE FRG COULD UNDERTAKE
TO OPPOSE ANY SUCH PROPOSALS. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT HE HAD
ALREADY GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO EXACTLY THAT EFFECT. HE SAW NO
NEED FOR COMMUNITY ACTION. FOLLOW UP SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE
MEMBER STATES. THERE HAD BEEN NO MENTION DURING THE POCO
DISCUSSION OF ANY SUGGESTION THAT ACTION WAS ALSO NECESSARY IN
THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT. ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD LEAD ONLY TO
COMPLICATIONS, IN THE FRG AS WELL AS THE UK. HE ADDED THAT IT
WOULD OF COURSE HELP IF THE UK COULD FALL IN LINE WITH ITS
PARTNERS, AND ASKED TO BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED OF ANY CHANGE
IN OUR POSITION. I SAID WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD INDEED BE

1

CONFIDENTIAL

POSSIBLE

CONFIDENTIAL

9419 - 1

POSSIBLE FOR US TO JOIN THE CONSENSUS, BUT EXPLAINED THAT WE DID NOT YET SEE OUR WAY CLEAR TO DOING SO.

(B) MBFR

3. I STRESSED THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS WE STILL FELT IT IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE, AND URGED THAT THE UK AND FRG SHOULD TOGETHER PRESS THE US HARD TO AGREE. GENSCHER SAID HE NEEDED NO CONVINCING. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THOSE CONCERNED AT SENIOR LEVELS IN WASHINGTON WERE COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED WITH GENEVA AND SDI MATTERS. IF NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE TRILATERAL, THEN THE MATTER SHOULD BE RAISED A QUATRE NEXT WEEK. I AGREED.

(C) WEU

4. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD READ THE PAPER PRODUCED BY THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP AND WAS CONTENT WITH IT. CONTRARY TO OUR VIEW, HE THOUGHT THERE WAS STILL SOME SCOPE FOR FURTHER WORK BY THE SWG. HE WANTED A DISCUSSION ON THE PROS AND CONS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME TO GO ON UNTIL A COMMON POSITION HAD BEEN REACHED. I SAID THAT WHILE I SAW SOME FORCE IN THAT VIEW I WAS EQUALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD (AS BEFORE) RANGE BEYOND THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION AND TOUCH ALSO ON MATTERS OF STRATEGY. ANY FURTHER WORK SHOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION. GENSCHER AGREED. HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT ITALY AND THE BENELUX WERE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A COMMON POSITION ON PARTICIPATION, NOT IN MATTERS OF STRATEGY. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE UK POSITION.

HOWE

OCMIAN 9419

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION

FRAME EXTERNAL

ECD(E)

SAFD

2

CONFIDENTIAL