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CHOGM: SOUTH AFRICA: YOUR TALKS WITH CLARK

SUMMARY

1. A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE CANADIANS SEE THE NEED FOR CONTINUED AND INCREASING PRESSURE UPON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO IMPLEMENT FULL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, BUT NEVERTHELESS PREPARED FOR A TOTAL BREAK WITH SOUTH AFRICA IF NO PROGRESS ON APARTHEID. ACTION BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR CAN POSSIBLY BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN GOVERNMENT MEASURES. CANADA ANXIOUS TO AVOID A MAJOR RIFT WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH ON SOUTH AFRICA. THEIR OBJECTIVE AT CHOGM WILL BE UNITY AND MOVEMENT. HMG'S POSITION EXPLAINED.

DETAIL

2. MR CLARK SAID THIS HAD BECOME A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE FOR BOTH THE CANADIAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD NOT GO AWAY. THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SEEKING CHANGE FOR A LONG TIME, WITH LITTLE RESULT, AND HAD BEEN STEPPING UP THE PRESSURE. THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IF FORCED TO DISRUPT RELATIONS THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO THAT. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED AND SURPRISED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE BUSINESS SECTOR WERE PREPARED TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR, AND WOULD LET US HAVE A NOTE OF THE MAIN IDEAS THAT HAD EMERGED FROM HIS CONTACTS WITH THEM. CANADA WAS VERY CONCERNED TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND STRENGTH OF THE COMMONWEALTH. THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT, IF THE RESPONSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (SAG) WAS INADEQUATE, IT COULD IGNITE SERIOUS TENSIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH. CANADA WISHED TO WORK WITH ITS FRIENDS TO KEEP UP GRADUALIST PRESSURE, AND HOPED THAT WE COULD EMERGE FROM CHOGM WITH BOTH UNITY AND SOME MOVEMENT. THE COMMONWEALTH COULD EVEN EMERGE STRENGTHENED. BUT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT.

3. YOU AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. BRITAIN DID NOT INTEND TO PUT IT AT RISK. ON THE OTHER HAND WE BELIEVED IT WAS WRONG TO THINK IN TERMS OF GOING AS FAR AS MANDATORY SANCTIONS AND WE WERE NOT ALONE IN THIS. WE DID NOT SHARE CANADA'S WILLINGNESS, IF NECESSARY, TO BREAK ALL LINKS BECAUSE OF THE NATURE AND SCALE OF OUR ECONOMIC LINKS (WITH A QUARTER OF A MILLION WORKING ON JOBS RELATED TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND 300,000 BRITISH SUBJECTS THERE. BUT THIS HAD NOT STOPPED US MAINTAINING PRESSURE.

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4. YOU WERE IN FAVOUR OF AVOIDING AN ALL OR NOTHING SANCTIONS DEBATE AT CHOGM. ALL OF US HAD, FOR A LONG TIME, BANNED ARMS, SPORTING CONTACTS, AND IN OUR CASE, NORTH SEA OIL. YOU HOPED WE COULD KEEP THE DEBATE ON WAYS OF CONCERTING OUR SEVERAL APPROACHES, RATHER THAN PARTICULAR MEASURES THAT ALL SHOULD ADOPT, AND LOOK FOR WAYS OF CO-OPERATING EG MOBILISING COMMERCIAL OPINION, WHICH COULD BE EFFECTIVE.

5. WAS THERE ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO PERSUADE THE SAG OF THE NEED TO DO MORE:

(A) THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD SENT EMMISARIES. SHOULD THE COMMONWEALTH DO SOMETHING SIMILAR?

(B) WE SHOULD LOOK AGAIN AT THE NAMIBIA QUESTION, WHERE THE SAG WERE CLEARLY IN THE WRONG AND HAD DISAPPOINTED HOPES BY MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. IF THEY WERE NOW TO MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ON NAMIBIA THAT COULD SEND A STRONG SIGNAL.

6. MR CLARK AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE A FRESH LOOK, VERY QUICKLY, TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WE COULD DO ON NAMIBIA. VARIOUS NOTIONS WERE BEING FLOATED ABOUT COMMONWEALTH CONVERSATIONS OR DELEGATIONS. OFFICIALS SHOULD DISCUSS QUICKLY WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ON THAT, TOO. CANADA WOULD BE READY TO PARTICIPATE OR STAND ASIDE, WHICHEVER WOULD HELP.

7. HE SAID THAT NONE OF HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES WANTED TO RUSH INTO SANCTIONS AS NORMALLY UNDERSTOOD, IE FULL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, WHICH MIGHT INCREASE STURBORNNESS AND DECREASE CONTACT. BUT THERE WAS POLITICAL PRESSURE FOR QUOTE SANCTIONS UNQUOTE. THIS WAS WHY THEY HAD TAKEN TO DESCRIBING THEIR MEASURES AS SANCTIONS.

8. THERE WAS A NEED FOR MOVEMENT. IT NEED NOT ALL HAPPEN AT CHOGM: BUT IF WE WANTED TO MOVE INDIA OFF ITS FULL SANCTIONS TRACK WE HAD TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO AN INCREASE OF PRESSURE AFTER CHOGM COMPARED WITH BEFORE.

9. YOU SAID THAT IT WAS NOT JUST BRITAIN THAT BELIEVED A VARIABLE APPROACH WAS LEGITIMATE. THE FRONT LINE STATES TOO HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS UNLESS THEY WERE BAILED OUT, WHICH THEY WOULD NOT BE. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO CONCERT, WITHOUT PRECISE CO-ORDINATION. HE COUNSELLED SOME CARE IN THE USE OF THE TERMS SANCTIONS. FOR THE MAIN IDEA THE TERM ECONOMIC BOYCOTT WAS PERHAPS MORE ACCURATE.

DAY

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