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FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S AND SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTIES  
MIPT

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO UNGA 24 OCTOBER

1. TEXT OF US EMBASSY NON-PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS:

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SOUGHT, OVER THE PAST YEAR, TO  
ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN A DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

WE HAVE HELD, AS PART OF THAT EFFORT, A NUMBER OF EXPERTS'  
TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. WHILE THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE NOT  
YIELDED ANY BREAKTHROUGHS, THEY HAVE BEEN USEFUL IN CLARIFYING

OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND AVOIDING MISCALCULATION.

IN OUR VIEW, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PUT THESE EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS ON A MORE REGULAR SCHEDULE. WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS STEP.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO MOVE BEYOND EXCHANGING VIEWS.

WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE US-SOVIET AGENDA NECESSARILY EXTENDS BEYOND ARMS CONTROL, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET SIDE SOMETIMES PREFERS TO RESIST THIS.

AS A RESULT, THE PRESIDENT WILL PROPOSE AT THE UNGA NEXT WEEK, A FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH A SERIES OF CONFLICTS THAT HAVE TAKEN A HEAVY TOLL ON THE PEOPLE INVOLVED, AND HAVE CREATED EXTREME CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET SUPPORT OF REPRESSIVE REGIMES. WE WOULD WELCOME PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF YOUR SUPPORT.

HE WILL ADDRESS THE CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN, NICARAGUA, CAMBODIA, ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

THESE ISSUES ARE AT THE CORE OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, INDEED IT WAS THESE ISSUES THAT WERE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR SHATTERING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970S.

THE SOVIET EFFORT TO USE FORCE AND PROXIES TO IMPOSE GOVERNMENTS OF ITS OWN CHOOSING HAS FAILED. THE REGIMES WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE SUPPORTED ARE REPRESSIVE AND UNPOPULAR, AND HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES DESPITE OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION, OFTEN INCLUDING ADVISERS, FOREIGN TROOPS AND MASSIVE MILITARY SUPPLIES. IN FACT THE POLICIES OF THESE SOVIET-STYLE REGIMES HAVE GIVEN RISE TO INDIGENOUS OPPOSITION SEEKING TO LIBERALISE OR OVERTHROW THEM.

THE SYMPATHIES OF FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLES EVERYWHERE ARE WITH THOSE WHO FIGHT FOR GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION. - AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THESE PROBLEMS REQUIRE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY SOLUTIONS.

EACH CONFLICT HAS ITS OWN CHARACTER AND REQUIREMENTS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION SEMI-COLON THE MEANS MAY VARY, BUT WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS A PEACE PROCESS THAT SEEKS PROGRESS AT THREE LEVELS.

THE FIRST LEVEL IS A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE WARRING PARTIES IN GIVEN CONFLICTS. IN AFGHANISTAN, THIS INCLUDES THE SOVIET UNION. NEGOTIATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING AN END TO VIOLENCE, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS.

SECOND, ONCE THE PARTIES MAKE REAL PROGRESS SEPARATE SOVIET-AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS COULD BEGIN. THESE TALKS WOULD NOT BE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WOULD AIM TO SUPPORT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BETWEEN THE WARRING PARTIES. THAT WOULD FOCUS ON ENDING OR PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF OUTSIDE MILITARY PRESENCE.

IN SOME CASES, SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA, THEY MIGHT OFFER GUARANTEES FOR AGREEMENTS REACHED. BUT IN EVERY CASE, THE PRIMARY US-SOVIET ROLE WILL BE TO SUPPORT REGIONAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE OUTSIDE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND LIMITATION OF THE FLOW OF OUTSIDE ARMS.

FINALLY, IF THE FIRST TWO STAGES ARE SUCCESSFUL, IT WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE REINTEGRATION OF THESE COUNTRIES INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO THIS EFFORT.

THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING WILL COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE THOSE PEACE-MAKING MECHANISMS THAT ARE ALREADY IN PLACE.

HE BELIEVES THAT IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATION AMONG THE LOCAL PARTIES AND THROUGH MUTUAL RESTRAINT, THEY WILL ONLY GROW MORE DIFFICULT.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS, UNTIL NOW, RESERVED FOR ITSELF THE RIGHT TO SUPPORT MILITARILY WHAT IT CALLS NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOME AREAS WHILE INTERVENING ON BEHALF OF UNPOPULAR COMMUNIST REGIMES AGAINST GENUINE FREEDOM STRUGGLES. IN OTHERS IT HAS INTERVENED AGAINST GENUINE POPULAR REVOLUTIONS.

IF MOSCOW CONTINUES THIS POLICY, WE WILL BE FORCED TO RESPOND IN KIND AND TENSIONS WILL NOT BE REDUCED.

WE WANT TO STRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IS NOT A PLAN FOR US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM. ON THE CONTRARY, IT PUTS THE BURDEN ON THE LOCAL PARTIES TO REACH ACCOMMODATION AND OFFERS THE WELCOME PROSPECT OF SUPERPOWER RESTRAINT AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT FROM THESE CONFLICTS.

WE NOTED THAT IN SHEVARDNADZE'S REMARKS AT THE UNGA, HHE SAID THAT CONFLICTS COULD BE RESOLVED AND THAT IN MANY CASES MECHANISMS FOR MEDIATION WERE ALREADY IN PLACE.

WE FRANKLY DOUBT THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THESE EFFORTS, BUT WE HOPE SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENTS AT THE UNGA MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BETTER PREPARED TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO HELP PROMOTE SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICTS WHICH HAVE PLAGUED THESE REGIONS.

WE INTEND TO PRESENT OUR IDEAS TO THE SOVIETS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT MAKES HIS SPEECH. WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO FIND PARTS OF THE PROPOSAL DIFFICULT, BUT WE HOPE THEY WILL ULTIMATELY AGREE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS.

WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS AND HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT AFTER THE PRESIDENT HAS PRESENTED THIS PROPOSAL TO THE UNGA.

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