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Notes on the Emergency Cabinet Committee

1. I set this up following the advice of Harold Macmillan who soon after the weekend of the invasion came to see me to offer his support as the senior Prime Minister. Alec Dutt had been going to come with him but was unable to do so because of the recurrence of his old back trouble.

H.M. advised strongly that a small emergency committee be set up for the conduct of the Falklands campaign and that if necessary a separate economic committee should be covered. He said it would be fatal to mix the two.

He also asked if we had reinforcedAttrition made arrangements for "wounded ships" and suggested S. Africa may be approached if necessary and asked about Argentina and nuclear weapons.

I decided to keep the economic of-

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The campaign completely separate. The Kennedy  
Committee therefore consisted of the Home  
Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary  
and Chancellor of the Duchy (Lord Penton) as well as  
myself. The Chief of Defence Staff, Tony Lewis  
and the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office  
Sir Anthony Acland attended regularly. Within  
a few meetings it became necessary for the  
Attorney-General to join as we constantly had  
to consider what actions came within the  
interests rights of self-defence and Article 51  
of the United Nations Charter.

Realising that the longer term problems of  
the Falklands required someone whole time, I  
asked Sir Michael Palliser if he would  
undertake this task which he did and he  
regularly attended the meetings too. In practice  
his contribution and expertise were constantly  
applied to the diplomatic side of our work  
especially in advising on contacts, consultation  
and information with other countries.

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Sir Robert Mansel led the Secretariat, and absolutely outstanding for his far-sightedness, vigour and diligence was Robert Wade-Gery who regrettably left before our work was finally complete because he had been appointed High Commissioner in Delhi.

The terms of reference of this sub-committee of the Overseas & Defence Policy Committee (called Sub-committee on the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands - or OI (SA) for short) were

"To keep under review political and military developments relating to the South Atlantic and the Falklands and to report as necessary to OI."

It was set up formally on the Tuesday following the invasion the previous Friday.

The agenda usually consisted of  
First - all military matters i.e. (i) report on last 24 hours (ii) immediate decisions  
(iii) longer term matters to be put in hand

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Second. Diplomatic matters - which were of course particularly important while the Task Force was in passage to the Falklands and the several sets of negotiations were in progress.

and towards the end

Third - preparations for the "post-war" period and the longer term.

By the time of our first meeting (15 April) the Task Force had already been despatched with a speed and vigour which astounded the world and made us feel very proud and very British. The decision had been taken by Cabinet on the evening of the day of the invasion (Friday). The main carrier force and auxiliary ships left port on Monday supported fully and properly equipped. Also we had secured the passage of the Sanctions Security Council Resolution 502

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through the superlative performance of our representative at the United Nations (it was superlative throughout the entire campaign) and the unremitting diplomatic effort of the F.O.

Also by the time of our first meeting Peter Campbell has resigned at his own insistence in spite of herculean efforts on the part of Willie Whitehead and myself to persuade him to stay. John North had offered his resignation ~~which~~ which I could not possibly accept when the Park Lane was on the ocean. Thank goodness I didn't accept it - John was splendid throughout the campaign.

Our first meeting was taken up with a message from Al Hay that he wanted to come to London that day. But we had a debate in the House and couldn't receive him. He agreed to come the following

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day (Monday Thursday). We made it clear that he was coming as a friend and not as a mediator.

2) We discussed the next military steps especially as our SSN's were due in the area within the next few days. We were not able to decide immediately on whether to set up a 200 mile exclusion zone for ships round the Falklands because of arguments about the effect on traffic etc but agreed to meet about 7p. that same evening in my room at the House to decide whether the Defence Sec. is riding up the debate should announce such a zone. Unusually for him, John had had an extremely difficult time winding up the previous Saturday and it was vital for his own confidence that he should do well that day. We had extended the debate for an hour (to end at 11p.-) which gave us

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a little more time.

We were uncertain about whether to fly the Governor to Atkinson to put him aboard the Torle Force. Some argued that it would boost the confidence of the Falkland Islanders - who we realised must be in a state of despair. On balance we felt it would look genuinely and that he could probably be of more help to us at home.

I had seen the Governor, (Peter Hunt) and the two Newscasters on their return. I had spoken to him on Saturday when he landed in Montevideo, - the first time we knew for sure the time and pattern of the invasion. When he and the two Newscasters saw me in No 10, I asked him - "were you aware that an invasion was in the offing?" and he replied "No - I thought it was just another alarm of the kind we had had

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Previously. He told me that when he had received our message on the previous Wednesday - he had contacted one of the Argentine representatives (I believe of the anti-life) on the island who assured him that as far as he knew, nothing was afoot. Mrs. in retrospect it appears that there were a number of other Argentines who had been reporting on every movement of our men.

One of the Puerto commanders sketched out the shape of the operation, which he said had been very well planned with the first wave of troops coming from the landward side. They would not come out and fight but waited until overwhelming armor and force had arrived. Then, he told me, the local Argentine commander knew almost every one of the names of the reinforced men who had been there only four days. Our two commanders were very anxious to go back. One of them was very familiar with the landward having been on a tour of duty for



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Several months. They were soon flown to  
Ascension and joined the main Force. It was  
they who finally broke the surrender at Government  
House when Port Stanley fell. The Govern-  
ment was in fact a great help to us in London -  
frequently broadcasting on kindred services to  
the Falklands advising them that his boys were  
packed to return as soon as he could.

The media commentators were constantly  
questioning him about whether he really  
expected to return and he never flinched.  
He reiterated that I had said in the House the  
our objective was the restoration of  
British Sovereignty and the return of British  
administration and he was sure that was  
what I meant.

There were of course to be many  
times in the coming negotiations when we  
wondered whether we should be able to

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Secure the return of Res. Hunt.

But to return to 7<sup>th</sup> April. We soon heard that Mr Hay would come on Easter Thursday and we met accordingly at 7<sup>th</sup> that evening. We had a long argument. Francis was absolutely against announcing a Maritime Exclusion Zone that evening. He thought it would upset Hay coming the next day and we could wait longer before deciding. John Nott fought strongly for the zone and eventually through patient persistence the rest of us managed to overcome Francis's objections. It was a matter to be repeated many times. The decision was the right one. John did a speech which was a speech announcing the establishment of the zone. Not a voice was raised against it and Jim Callaghan was heard say "absolutely right". And so the zone took effect from midnight 11/12 April - i.e. came into effect in the early hours of Easter Monday morning. It is

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Worth noting that at no time during the Falklands operation did we say we would take action until we were in a position to do it. By the time the MEC commenced an SSN was there and others arriving very shortly indeed. I was determined that we should never put ourselves in a position where "bluff" could be called. And we never did.

Harp was also informed of the zone a little in advance of the announcement. When I met him the next day he said it was an absolutely right decision.

3rd Meeting - We met briefly before Harp arrived and approved the Rules of Engagement for the SSN's in the Falkland Zone - the first time for most of us there. Many more R.O.K.'s were to follow and we leaned the importance of approval then online - i.e. before any possible embarrassing occasion could arise and of getting them right.

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We discussed how to handle the Haig talks. But my mind and decisions were already totally committed - Argentine must withdraw, British administration must be restored.

I'm afraid the firmness of this approach came as something of a shock to Mr Haig and his advisers who included General Waller, Mr. Linds and Ed Theater from the U.S. Embassy in London (The Ambassador was away). It soon became clear that mediation was his purpose but at least he came to see us first to be clear about our position before going to Buenos Aires. Again again we stressed - all Argentine forces out, British ~~administration~~ <sup>administration</sup> restored (by this time we had realised that British Sovereignty at law had not been affected ~~changed~~ by the fact of invasion) - then we would negotiate with Argentina on the basis that the islanders' wishes were paramount. Mr Haig really wanted to issue an agreed statement before he

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left recognizing that there may have to be an  
intermediate phase between Argentine withdrawal  
and the restoration of British sovereignty - but  
was not prepared to do so. At the time, General  
Waller said to me that "you certainly live  
up to your name as the Iron Lady". It hadn't  
really occurred to me to look at it that way -  
to me the position was clear-cut and that  
was that.

I had previously asked General Waller  
whether going back over their intelligence there  
had been any signs of an impending invasion  
knowing that the information we had put  
together from our intelligence on the Wed. before  
the invasion had come as a shock to them  
when Nikita Khrushchev told him as a matter  
of urgency. But the fact is that the U.S. were  
no more aware than we were and they had their  
eyes on Central America rather more than  
South America. At the time the T.V. camera

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When he left Mr Hay was absolutely fair (I always found he was fair - throughout the whole negotiations - tough, indeed a very tough negotiator but fair in his dealings with us and with the press. When we disagreed with any part of a statement he wanted to make, he would take it out.)

He took off for B.A. The Tank Force continued and the military planning proceeded apace and with enthusiasm and concentration. None of us knew whether it would need to be used, but we thought that the nearer the Tank Force got, the more chance there may be that the Argentines would withdraw.

I confess that, from the outset, I never really believed that a military force could withdraw. The scenes in the Square in B.A. (Babington scenes do the crowd below missed and cheating) were of such jubilation that I could see the Junta pulling

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Out ~~except~~ unless they were granted sovereignty  
on the side of withdrawal. This I had  
great patient hours explaining to Hay that they  
couldn't have. I remember asking him whether  
if a burglar had taken all his possessions  
he would consider that he had to negotiate  
with the burglar as to how much he was  
'entitled' to keep.

I'm afraid that Al had a very  
difficult time in B.A. Again crowds were  
chanting in the main square although General  
Walker told me afterwards that the crowds  
stopped abruptly at the crisis for the  
square. It was difficult for our American  
friends to know with whom they were negotiating.  
First Galtieri, then the rest of the junta, then  
the military (50 or so) behind the scenes.

Over that hectic weekend, Richard  
Foot officially asked for the recall of  
Parliament to report on Hay's visit. His

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latter in B.A. took much longer than expected.

Eventually our own group met again at No. 10 on Sunday evening because there were some decisions that we had to take over the Task Force. We agreed that Parliament should be recalled on the Wednesday, which would give time should anything come out of Haig's visit to B.A.

We renewed the position and response from other countries, the old Commonwealth especially Rob Muldoon and also Nelson Fraser were mentioned. The G7C had come up bumps with President. Pitter and (who was staunch throughout) and Helmut Schmidt - who was also firm in the lead. All had agreed to take positive action on arms control suspension and to stop inputs from the Argentine. We decided that



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Francis and I, together with John would meet Mr. Harp on Monday morning to resume talks. When we had heard what he had to say we would adjourn and call in Whitehall for consultation.

Thus began in earnest the long series of negotiations. When we had been discussing in Cabinet whether to send the Tank Free - or rather the pro's case, for there was never much doubt that it would have to go - we had been very worried about the time it would take to get there and how we should deal with public opinion in the intervening period. We knew that the Argentines would probably pile new material into the islands (which they did) and we weren't quite sure how we were going to occupy opinion at home. We needed here

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Worried about that particular matter - ships were constantly being chartered, and there was a shuttle service of negotiations which kept the media very busy. We had also decided to put defence correspondents on the ships and they reported during the long journey.

Never shall I forget that first "round". Again General Walker and Sanders were with Haig.

It began by giving an oral account of some proposals he was putting forward and which ~~was~~ <sup>we</sup> understood had been discussed in D.A. and ~~was~~ which could secure agreement - to wit: -

There were several points and I made a careful note

1. On varis 502 - we ~~should~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~seen~~ <sup>seen</sup> after following up which should be seen

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2. All security forces to be withdrawn from islands & zones within 2 weeks.

3. No further forces to be introduced. The withdrawn forces would go back to normal operating areas.

4. There should be a commission in place of the Governor consisting of one U.K., one U.K. or Argentine who would act together (voted by majority or majority was not specified) but their first duty was to supervise withdrawal. For that purpose they would

need each to have a browser. Each member of the commission could fly his flag at headquarters.

5. The traditional local administrative i.e. Green Arg. Councils would continue but each would have one Argentine rep. added to them.

6. Travel standards and communications would be promoted by the Commission - but they could only act by making recommendations to the U.K. & Argentine representatives who

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would both have to open before anything  
could be done

? The interim period would end hopefully  
by end December and negotiations about the  
status of the islands would be conducted  
during that time.

We adjourned & went into our  
larger committee. There several proposals  
were full of holes about which we would  
have to negotiate hard but they were  
presented in such a way that it  
looked as if there was a possibility that  
we could get the Argentine forces off  
by force only

a) a Commission of which we constituted  
 $\frac{1}{3}$  in place of a former  
-and a commission that looked  
pretty powerful except to achieve  
with moral

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- (b) one Argentine rep on each Council and we would have to ensure that he had been resident on the islands (both of them) and was not someone from Argentine nominated by the junta and
- (c) an Argentine flag flown alongside others at headquarters.

There was obviously a lot more to it because (i) there was no security for the islanders after the interim period.

The U.S. would have to be asked to secure the islands from renewed invasion (ii) we were concerned that we the approved party seemed to have no right to defend our own people. Even with what still deployed to normal areas near. Surely we could now say that the South Atlantic was a normal area. We must have the right to

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be at least as close to the Falklands as the Argentine forces.

(ii) There was nothing to make it clear

that the islanders wishes were paramount in the final negotiations

(iii) There must be no possibility of steadily putting more and more Argentines on to the island during the interim period so that by some kind of erosion they would soon be in the majority and our people would then probably leave.

We went back for further discussion and it was soon clear that we had not got the full story. I gathered whilst the Task Force to be back the moment an agreement was signed. We argued for nearly two hours on this point alone until I said I just would be prepared to accept it. The Task Force would continue. If an agreement were signed it would not enter the exclusion

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Zones which were defined as 150 nautical miles round Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich.

[Note - we rejected all requests that we had ever put South Georgia into the first proposals. But at the time there was a possibility of getting the Argentines off without a battle.

2 The Argentines starting from the Commission's agreement of 1971 wanted Argentines to have the same rights to residence, property, business etc as the Falkland Islanders. They wanted the Commission try to promote that and to decide it. We fought that one down on the grounds that the principle of the administration must not change the nature of the life on the islands. The laws administration there before must continue.

3 The Argentines wanted several U.N. Assent resolutions mentioned by name and that negotiations on the long-term future were to be concluded in the spirit of those texts. They were all resolutions the spirit of which was that Argentines had

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letter to the landlords and that it was time  
Western colonialism was ended! No mention  
of self-determination! We looked carefully  
at the resolutions and at the charter. The  
battle on self-determination is between  
those who believe that "interests" can be  
paramount (in which case governments can decide  
what is in the best interests of the people) and  
those who say that the people expressed  
wishes are the proper guide to their interests  
and the proper yardstick for self-determination.

We argued through the evening until  
quite late into the night but finally came  
to a compromise that we would pursue  
further negotiations on a somewhat woolly  
text - but there were some conditions which  
were crystal clear - the outer chavel zones, that

the one interest per land must be land  
and that they must have the same quality



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We were to meet again the following morning. The American team had had a direct secure line from No 10 to the White House and had pursued their own enquiries while we were engaged. It is possible they had been in touch with B.A. but we do not know.

So ended Week 1 Monday.

By the following morning events had moved further. Like the previous night (continuation) Haig had received a message from B.A. Apparently as he left B.A. to return to London. Costa Sender had thrust a document with 5 demands on it into Haig's hand saying they were his (C.M.) five points which were essential. During the night of Week 1 Monday a message was received saying that the five demands were absolute. I cannot remember them at

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but the main features were

- 1) Sovereignty must belong to the Argentines
  - 2) The Argentine Coasts must be
  - 3) . . . flag must be flown
- etc.

I need go no further. It seemed as if our previous day had been wasted - and yet - wasn't this really what we expected of a Junta. The condition for withdrawal was that they keep the spoils of invasion.

At Home - General Walker & Mr. & Mrs. were very depressed and began to work on B.A. Later in the day he reported that the Junta was not to now permitting with the 5 points. but were being difficult about the issue of reference for the negotiations on the 'final' status. We promised with the parameters of the landed wishes and pointed out that we were working for the restoration of British administration. We

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decided to prepare our draft of the relevant part about what would be acceptable to us.

We realised that we could go no further indeed none of us were worried that we had clearly gone too far in even considering the Special Commission. The withdrawal - or agreement that we would not enter the exclusion zone if the Argentines withdrew. We knew that we must get a guarantee of the islanders' security from the U.S. But if the Argentines would totally withdraw, could we proceed from returning - would there be any more north meetings?

They decided to return to Washington over B.A. We asked us not to reveal the details of the discussion - quite right. One last negotiation in public success fully.

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We had to report to Parliament the

following day

Leahy 1983 - written in retrospect from now.

Parliament was understanding that day - and in other debates - that we could not reveal the details of the negotiations.

Shortly after the evening speeches Mr. Haig was on the telephone. He had been having trouble from B.A. that the U.S. was not being "even handed" as between

Argentina and Britain. He was going to have to make a statement if he was ever to be able to return to B.A. to continue the negotiations. Problems arose over the use of

Ascension Island. We were having to put an enormous amount of equipment, planes & ships through there which required extra staff, stores and fuel. In practice the U.S.

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was being splendidly helpful but B.A. was complaining and it was suggested that the statement would include a passage to the effect that only 'normal' facilities were being permitted. This would have made life impossible for us and I had to insist that although the base was American the Islands were British sovereign territory and we must use them as much as we wish. Fortunately Mr Haig was very co-operative and the matter of Ascension was not mentioned in the statement.

The Committee met again on Easter Thursday morning - not in No 10 but in the M.O.D. We had to send more troops to join the Task Force to agree the new draft about the united interest

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should have and to open a message  
to the U.S. stressing the need for the U.S.  
to play an important role in enforcing the  
agreement during the interim period and  
ensuring that after it terminated the Argentinians  
did not attempt another invasion. I'm  
afraid we never got very far in visiting  
the Americans in either of these ways.

We had met at N.S.I. so that  
the whole committee could have a thorough  
military briefing. It was important that  
we knew precisely the forces ranged against  
us, their capability, the effects of the  
Antarctic winter and the options available.  
At the time many people had the idea that  
if the negotiations were not successful, the  
Task Force could blockade the Falklands and

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mount several Commando type raids. Anyone who had harboured such ideas was soon disabused of them. Quite apart from the losses of aircraft which could be expected (and the loss aircraft carriers only had 20 hours) the difficulties of maintaining them in stormy seas were enormous. It was clear that we had a period of 2-3 weeks in May during which we should have to land, if such a landing were feasible without terrible casualties. We were faced almost immediately with problems of how much more equipment, troops, and aircraft to send - how to deal with P.O.W's which to do about, I George and when. There was to be no respite at all. Decisions must be made quickly. I looked from the Chief of Staff to the Committee. It was a lot for them to take and I realised they were

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Somewhat stunned (except of course J & S for  
Peter who was already aware). By this time  
the press had got to know we were all at  
M.O.D. I remember saying that everyone must  
look confident as they left and we would  
start to take the requisite decisions the  
following day.

The M.O.D. were magnificent at  
planning the logistics. Requests for more  
merchant ships, rules of engagement, more troops  
came through thick and fast. Sometimes I  
realise that we can take things a day at  
a time which would be impossible if they all  
came at us at once. So it was to be with  
the Falklands. The initial Task Force seemed  
big but a veritable Armada was to follow.  
Our main task on the Friday



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Was to consider and approve the Rules of Engagement for transit for within the 200 mile zone round South Georgia and for repositioning of South Georgia.

It was the first time any of us had had the awesome responsibility of ensuring that our Armed Forces had the right instructions, that they were clear and that we had covered all possible eventualities. At no time must they ever be in difficulty because of our lack of foresight. We questioned the Chief of Staff carefully and after a long discussion and close examination we approved them. Many others were to follow as each new phase of the operation had to be considered.

We had other things to consider. Vulcan bombers had been converted to in-flight refuelling and one of the newspapers had found out. Would they

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run a scare story that we could therefore reach the Argentine mainland - which we had no intention of doing. We decided there was nothing we could do to prevent any such report. I had also received a report from President Reagan saying that Carter was anxious to avoid conflict!! There was no difficulty in replying to that one! At Hay had the unenviable task of returning to P.A. with one modified proposal.

He was having a very difficult time with the junta. I was at Chequers over the weekend and had to return to No. 10 on Saturday evening to receive a telephone call from President Reagan. For some reason the direct telephone line was not working well to

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Chapman. B.A. apparently was wanting further  
concessions from us - even though they were the  
aggressors. I said we could go no further and  
President Reagan agreed that it would not  
be reasonable to ask us to move further.

On Monday we wanted to know exactly  
where things stood on the negotiations and what  
was the level then being discussed in B.A.  
Later that day further details arrived. They  
did not meet our requirements especially on  
the paramountcy of the wishes of the Islanders. It  
was clear that Argentina was trying to keep what  
she had taken by force. We agreed with  
Hoy that he should go to Washington from B.A.  
and not come on to London. We would  
let him have a detailed commentary on his  
latest proposals.

We also authorized the operation to

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repossess S Georgia. As events happened  
this was to take longer to start than we  
anticipated because the ships arrived in  
a Force 4 gale which lasted for several  
days.

The following day, having received  
a message from Hay, we agreed that  
Francis should go to Washington with our  
Counter-proposals to Hay's latest D.A. proposals.  
They were dreadful - even Hay admitted that  
they were a significant step backwards from  
the London text in each of the areas of  
greatest importance - the bottom negotiations -  
the interim administration and with drawal.  
Our flight was to start off at 1750 and within  
15 days was to redeploy to usual operating bases  
on areas. The arrangements for interim administration

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World have given the Argentines 2 reps. on each council. Residence, ownership, disposition of property should all be promoted & facilitated between the Islands & Argentina. There would be proposals for compensation of islanders who did not wish to remain etc. It was of course a complete take-over within the interim period. And having got the British Forces out of the way the Argentines could have returned at any time. Mr. Harj was not going to publish the text, but merely say he had finished that phase of his efforts.

We agreed that Francis in his discussion should be guided by our counter-proposals and should request an American guarantee on the security of the islands.

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On Saturday the 24<sup>th</sup> April, Francis returned from Washington. This was to be one of the most crucial days in the Falklands story and a critical one for me personally.

Early on Saturday morning Francis came to my study in No 10 to tell me the results of his efforts. The document he brought back was a complete sell-out. It differed infinitesimally from the D.A. text. In one respect it was worse - our naval forces would have to be 2000 nm or more away by the end of the seventh day after agreement.

Hay had obviously played upon the closeness of hostilities and the need to prevent them. He is a powerful persuader and

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anyone the other side of the table must  
stand up to him and not give ground.

I told Francis that the terms  
he had returned with were totally  
unacceptable. They would rob the Falklands  
of their freedom and Britain of her honour  
and respect.

Clearly Haig had got at him with  
the argument that as hostilities were close,  
this was the last chance of a political  
solution. He <sup>(Haig)</sup> suggested that if we did not  
agree a deal that Haig could put to the  
Argentines then we might be on our own.  
He was sceptical about our capacity to achieve  
a satisfactory military solution and thought  
uninformed support would evaporate quickly  
after the first shot had been fired.

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Hay replied on final comments and  
answer to his letter by Scr. evening Washington  
time.

I reported to Francis that we could  
not accept them. They were a total rebel  
from our fundamental position. He said he  
thought we should accept them. We were  
at loggerheads.

We had arranged a meeting for  
6.15 p.m. Saturday evening. The rest of that  
day I spent comparing the four letters  
that we had considered over the whole of  
the resolutions' demonstration how far our  
position had deteriorated and how the  
Falkland Islanders were being betrayed. I asked  
for the A-4 to come to No. 10 as soon as he  
could be found. The message went asking the



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went to the F.O. less than an hour before  
the meeting the mistake was discovered he  
came to No 10 only to collect all my work-  
books. Nevertheless, and despite my  
clear views expressed that morning, Francis  
had put in a paper to the committee  
recommending acceptance of the Hay terms.  
His paper admitted that there were obvious  
objections of principle but not of standing  
those and the difficulties they would create  
with Parliament and public opinion he  
recommended that we accept the draft on  
the grounds that the arrangement offered  
the best chance of a peaceful solution and  
was clearly preferable to the military  
alternative. A former Deputy Secretary &  
present Foreign Secretary of Britain recommended

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Place at that time had it fore  
through the committee I could not have  
played.

Shortly before 6 p.m. people were  
assembling outside the cabinet room. And  
Francis was trying to get their support. I  
asked Willie Whitehead to come over and  
told him I could not accept these terms  
and gave him my reasons. As always, he  
backed my judgment.

The meeting began. The Foreign  
Secretary put his paper & recommended that  
we concur in the plan. But I showed  
preparation on my point - had not been worked  
I went through the last clause by down  
asking what it meant - how come we had  
now accepted what had been rejected, why had we  
not insisted as a minimum on self-determination

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how had he come to accept - virtually  
unlimited Argentine immigration and acquisition  
of property on an equal basis. Mitchell was  
battered by my interpretation. Cecil was  
very sceptical of the agreement and disliked  
it. But John Noel found the procedural  
way through because he didn't like it either  
and agreed we could not accept it. His  
proposal was that we should make no  
comment on the draft but tell Hay to put  
it to the Argentines. If they accepted it we  
should undoubtedly be put in a difficult  
position but we could then put the matter  
to Parliament in the light of their acceptance.  
If they rejected it (and we thought they would  
because it is virtually impossible for a military  
 junta to withdraw) then we could urge the  
U.S. to come down on our side as  
Hay had indicated he would provided we did not

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back the negotiations. So it was decided. We sent a message at the appointed time indicating that as the Argentines had started the aggression, and our purpose had been to ensure their early withdrawal in accordance with the Security Council resolution, we thought the next step was for Hay to put his ideas to them urgently and in the hope of what they said. We would then consider them in Cabinet.

So the "crisis" passed, the crisis of Britain's honor.

Other things had been happening that week. On the Thursday, Gatterer had visited the Falklands and his visit was marked across on T.V. screens.

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Our courage and bravery. And right at the beginning had we lost not only 2 helicopters but 16 or 17 SAS and helicopter crews.

My heart was heavy as I charged to go to a dinner at the Nassau House to support the Civic Trust, and to speak. I

wondered how I could conceal my feelings,

whether this was an omen and was there work to come. Was the task we had set ourselves impossible. Just as I reached

the bottom of the staircase Clive came rushing out of the office - a third helicopter

(a Wessex) had landed on the glacier picked up all the men safely and the other two helicopter crews. I went out walking

on air. Nothing else in the world mattered -

the men were safe. What a marvellous pilot.

10 DOWNING STREET

North's letter - when I was in the Falklands,  
Jan. 1983 - I met him on HMS Antares.

A wonderful person but so modest and  
quietly professional. He said he had never had  
so many people in his helicopter. But through  
his supreme skill and courage and calm,  
all was well. We detected another ship

HMS Brilliant to go from the main task  
force to South Georgia to make up the  
helicopter force and fuel supplies.

After that, and following the  
difficult and decisive Saturday, things began  
to go well in South Georgia. Our forces  
landed on Sunday and took Grytviken. Then  
one of our sailors spotted an Argentine submarine <sup>(Santa Fe)</sup>  
on the surface but about to submerge and

It was ... captured. After ...

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But there had been another matter which had made the decision on the Saturday evening one of very deep feeling.

On that Thursday evening (22<sup>nd</sup> April) the CDS and John Wolf came to see me urgently. Our Special Forces had landed on a glacier in South Georgia to carry out a reconnaissance. There was a cruel wind which blew all the snow from the glacier and there was no way they could dig in and keep warm. They sent a message to Mrs Antini asking for helicopters to take them off. The first helicopter came in - it crashed. The snow blindness was so bad. The same thing had happened to the second. We didn't know whether all four had been lost or not. It was a terrible start to the campaign. Was the weather going to beat

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Argentinian soldier wanted by both France & Sweden for alleged murder was in charge of the garrison at Grytten and murdered. His capture was to give us problems, as the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war didn't permit us to hand him over to France or Sweden. He had to be returned to the Argentine.

I leaved the news late afternoon at Chequers, and went over to see the Queen at Windsor. It was wonderful to be able personally to give her the news that one of her islands had been restored to her. I returned to Chequers Downing Street awaiting the release of the news and the confirmation of the signal. I felt that John Noy should



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have the privilege of announcing it to  
journalists along to No. 10. (Mr. Meadows  
(press officer for M.O.D.)) joined us together  
we drafted the press release. We went  
out to announce the good news to the  
assembled career crews. Alan J. took  
days + days to get photographs back - that  
was one of our problems throughout the  
campaign.

The recapture of South Georgia  
gave the Falkland Islanders great heart.  
But the press assumed that it would only  
be a matter of days before we took the  
Falklands. There were many more arduous  
days weeks before that happened.

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It had indeed been an eventful weekend. One went from near despair to confident reassurance. On the Sunday I had asked not only the Emergency Committee to the news but all the chiefs of staff including Admiral Fieldhouse and Major-General Moore. After lunch we had a meeting to discuss both the military and political matters. It was important that those responsible for each should understand the other. There was still a lot of planning to do and we were desperately worried about German submarines and the carrier groups - the 25<sup>th</sup> of May. They represented a real threat to any landing. We also

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heard from Haig that he had received  
one Saturday message and would be  
putting his ideas to the Argentine Govt.

The following day we agreed  
the announcement of a Total Embargo  
zone and the R.O.E. It applied to  
all aircraft as well as ships. It meant that  
we had to do everything possible to close the  
airport at Port Stanley.

M Haig was at an OAS  
conference that day and he made a  
full and forthright speech. OAS  
insisted that S.C.R. 502 be observed  
but recognized Argentine sovereignty.

Written on

10 DOWNING STREET

Leamington Sunday

1983 - a year after.

We were all aware that the negotiations could not go on indefinitely; that soon we should have to make critical decisions about a landing. I know of the work going on in MOJ about the detailed planning and the possible choice of landing areas. There was at this time a feeling of discomfort on our benches that we might be giving up too much in the negotiations. But in part of the Home the view that we must go on or on negotiating and not give up until negotiations failed prevailed. This was especially so of Michael Foot. Some of his party. Knowing the type military timetable I had to say in the House over and over again that no military steps were being held up because of negotiations. And they never were.

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About this time I received a message indirectly from the President of Mexico through a personal messenger that although he did not wish to be involved taking sides in the dispute - he would gladly provide a venue for a meeting between those concerned if it would be helpful. This message coincided

with the OAS meeting and convinced Harry to suggest that a much simpler formula could be launched at that meeting if the Mexicans were prepared to put it. But Harry turned down the suggestion and I doubt whether the Mexicans would in fact have proposed it.

Instead Harry passed his text to the Argentines on Sunday <sup>(27 April)</sup> requesting a reply by midnight (P.A. time) on 27/28 April.

We had of course by this time returned South Georgia but were still expected under his text to withdraw half our forces within 7 days.

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We could never have accepted the  
Hay formula. He was however quite tough  
in the way he put it to the Turks - no  
amendments were permissible and he imposed the  
British line which related to. He also added that  
if the Bulgarians did not respond positively  
to that approach he would regard the proposals  
as being lulled down. From meeting  
that day (Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> April) we thought we  
had not long to wait before a definitive  
reply was received. In the meantime we  
went on to other business sorting out the military  
decisions that would need to be taken on the  
morning so that we had a little time to  
think about them - for example, should we venture  
the use of refuelled Vulcans to bomb the  
Plovdiv airfield when the Turks first arrived,  
whether the considerable amphibious force that  
was being held off at Salonica should proceed.

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The merchant fleet that had been chartered had reached considerable proportions and the rest of which the necessary conversions had been carried out - to e.g. the Tarbena and the Uganda was a superfluous advertisement for what Britain could do. Someone everyone, the whole population was involved in this campaign and nothing was too much trouble. We of course had many anxieties to bear - our great armada of ships was well within the possibility of attack from their aircraft carrier submarines and the prospect of losing a ship carrying large numbers of troops was terrible. So we did not want the amphibious unit to sail south before it was necessary. That day we did authorize the Vulcan considered thunder

aircraft to go to Munich in case they were

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But things did not move as quickly on the Diplomatic side as we had thought - although the military preparations continued at all possible speed.

One deadline for an Argentine reply passed and another 24 hours was given - the deadline was fixed at midnight Washington time on 29/30<sup>th</sup> Apr. i.e. Thursday/Friday. We reported to full Cabinet later in the morning. They shared our view that it could be fatal to allow deadline to slip.

After Cabinet I sent a message to President Peron saying that in our view the Argentines must now be regarded as having ~~been rejected by the Argos~~ rejected the British proposals. They had ignored the deadline and Costa Mendez had sent a letter to Gray stating that the U.S. proposals fell short of Argentine demands.



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and did not deny Argentine aspirations  
in relation to Sovereignty. Mr Haig  
had previously told Francis that he  
had made it clear to the Junta that if  
they did not accept, the U. S. would  
support us. We regarded that point as  
having been needed and believed would  
feel deeply let down if that support  
was not known forthcoming. We felt  
that Britain and the U. S. should now be  
seen to be on the same side staunchly  
standing for those fundamental values on  
which the Western way of life depends.

The President, Mr Haig, and  
we believe the Weinberger were negotiated.  
Later on the Friday, Haig announced public  
support for us in the form of a ban on arms

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Notes to Argentina, coupled with financial  
restrictions and help for us over requests  
for "material" support.

We were very  
pleased very grateful. The President sent me a wonderful reply  
L from them on the

Hay & Weinberger couldn't do enough for us.

Whatever we wanted they did them almost  
to procure. That day we decided that

Francis should go to the U.S. to see Hay

to visit the U.N. - see Perez de Cuellar

We also had to consider whether the ICRC

could be persuaded to have a mission on the  
islands and what more could be done

to help 3 prisoners who had been put into  
detention awaiting 'trial' in Argentina. Further

we decided to brief the Opp<sup>r</sup> parties

on Priny Council's terms about the negotiations

although we couldn't reveal everything because

Hay did not want to publish them.

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That day the T.E.Z. came into force.

A number of difficult problems assailed us. We remained desperately worried about the aircraft carrier which so far had only been sighted twice by the subs. Both times outside the T.E.Z. Nevertheless she was a threat to our ships & supply lines as were her assorted cruiser group & destroyer company Escort. Previously, on 23-4 April we had given a formal warning to Argentina that any approach on the part of Argentine warships which could amount to a threat to our lines with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would be regarded as hostile and dealt with accordingly. The aircraft carrier could cover 500 miles a day and her aircraft a further

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500. We <sup>therefore</sup> authorized an attack whenever she was provided it was south of 35° and east of longitude 48 and outside territorial waters of 12 miles. Such an attack was within the inherent right of self defence and within Art. 51. of the U.N. Charter. In view of the 23-4 April notification no further warning was required.

The Chiefs of Staff had also decided that we needed to send down some 2000 to 3000 more soldiers. By that time the landing site had been chosen and we were going to need far more than we already had on the way to fight across land. The only ship or ships available ~~was~~ was the A.C. 11.

We knew too that the Port Stanley airfield would have to be attacked

10 DOWNING STREET

that night if weather permitted. The  
choice of aircraft had to be left to  
C.D.S. but we knew we were going to  
need every hour we had and without more  
had to be sent down on the Atlantic  
Conway.

That evening I had to go to a  
great rally in Stephen Hastings  
constituency. They had put up the largest  
marquee I had ever seen. Stephen spoke  
splendidly and so did Alan Turner - Roy  
who had been the previous M.P. - a  
magnificent speech. I was given a rousing  
reception - but more than that. It was a  
very emotional time - Britain was being  
killed and the odds of weather & distance  
were difficult to overcome. And yet no-one

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had any doubt that we could win through. The responsibilities on one's shoulders were enormous. We could only get the decisions through on time. Try to force what they checked, supply instead try to over-supply equipment because we may lose some. Keep the morale of our people the highest, and our friends across the world with us. And speak for the U.S. - Post Dudson of New Zealand was a real friend. Right from the beginning he led the field. He offered us a New Zealand frigate to replace one of ours on permanent patrol so that ours could be released for active service.

We stayed at Milton - that most beautiful ancestral home which belongs to Stephen's wife. Over breakfast there was a telephone call for me to say that-

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The Vulcans had bombed Port Stanley. So far no casualties but it would be many hours before they returned to Atterton.

I could not tell my hosts. We left soon after - listening to the radio in the car all the way back to Cheyenne.

It was well after 2 p.m. when the Vulcan and Lantana arrived safely back at Atterton. What a relief - 4 or 5 repullings and a fantastically long trip for the crew. This really was a suspension of time - although later such facts came to be taken for granted.

That day the Argentine Air Force  
 attacked our Task Force very heavily indeed.  
~~It~~ The Argentines were in a position to  
 send photographs to the outside world - we weren't.  
 They claimed many of our planes were shot down  
 but Brian Hancher in a famous broadcast  
 put the record straight. When he said 'I counted  
 them all out, and I counted them all back'.  
 What a relief - there was some damage but not  
 a lot. Nevertheless the attack had been heavy  
 and one wondered whether we would have  
 enough air-cover.

I had arranged another Cheques  
 meeting on Sunday. Decisions had to be taken.  
 The Cheques meetings were always very good.  
 The combination of the "War" cabinet, chiefs  
 of staff and cabinet office worked extremely



10 DOWNING STREET (ii)

well and we were really welded into a very effective team.

We met again - the background of the previous day's heavy attack. Admiral Paddock said that one of our submarines had been shadowing the Belgians which was accompanied by two destroyers carrying rocket missiles. She was not far off the inclusion zone and in the light of the intelligence we had about the intentions of the Argentine fleet, there was no doubt she was a threat. I called everyone together quickly - the committee (the F.S. went there but Sir Anthony (Paddock was) the CDS and Adm. Paddock etc etc. We decided that British forces should be able to attack any Argentine naval vessel on the basis of the previous day for the aircraft carrier. After lunch we met in full formal session again and approved reinforcements - the 200? for the Falklands.

Politically we had to consider the legal consequences if Argentina formally declared war on Britain - which she never did.

The F-5 was not with us that day - he was in New York college on the Friday. A crew of the U.N.

We broke up desperately worried that we hadn't got - found the aircraft carrier again. We believed the navy had been revised for a major attack on our Task Force or on our landing craft & ships in the west of a landing.

The next day Monday 3 May the submarine torpedoed the Belgians which later sank. The two accompanying destroyers were not touched because slow to sink.

10 DOWNING STREET (10)

up survivors from the Helgram. We knew she had been hit but it was some hours before we knew she had sunk.

The following day, HMS. Sheffield was hit by an L-rocket missile and just were burning furiously. They could not be got under control and she was abandoned. It was difficult to get precise numbers of those who had been killed or wounded and it was an anxious time for all the relatives and for everyone in Britain. The rescue operation - transfer to hospital treatment on U-boats was carried out heavily - but we were indeed shocked at the ferocity of the fire that it could be controlled - so many suffered such bad burns. Sheffield had chaff but didn't have time to get it up to deflect the L-rocket which was not seen until too late.

10 DOWNING STREET (N)

At first we heard that casualties were limited to 20 - and then 40. We never learned how best to announce previous news. We would have liked to confirm all news - as - but first. But the Argentinians were putting out statements some true some false before we knew the facts and our families spent some agonising days & nights. We also talked Harrier that day - It was indeed a bad day.

Francis had returned from Washington and New York. Inevitably Al Harri & Peter de Cullen were involved in new negotiations. "to fill a vacuum" were bound to get a ceasefire. Obviously from our viewpoint that wasn't enough - it would leave the Argentinians in possession. It had to be a ceasefire accompanied by withdrawal

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Above all - the wishes of the islanders  
must be respected in any settlement of their  
status.

I received a ~~letter~~ message from  
President Reagan urging us to consider some  
U.S. / Peruvian proposals.

In the meantime one of our submarines  
had found the '25 May' carrier but  
there was a legal question as to whether  
she was in territorial waters or not. She was  
in the middle of a bay & the question was  
whether the whole bay was territorial waters or  
only the 12 miles from shore leaving the centre  
outside. We had to consult the A-G &  
other senior legal advisers. I called a

D1) committee that evening in the House &

we agreed she was outside territorial

waters - the submarine could do so - the

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should attack. Has the carrier moved -  
we believe westward and north - and we never  
found her again. Our anxieties about the  
political damage she could do remained.

The Committee and Cabinet when  
I called together for a special meeting  
then had to consider the U.S. / Peruvian  
proposals before us. The Foreign Secretary  
wanted us to accept them. He thought  
it would be damaging to reject their  
proposal especially in view of the battle  
in the South Atlantic. However the R.F.C.  
having been very sharp at first was shifting  
ground. The sanctions they had agreed were  
only for 1 month and this would be difficult  
about getting everyone's agreement to renew.  
I was unhappy with them and called  
Cabinet together.

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Cabinet didn't like them very much -  
but agreed that we must make some  
response. These proposals were not very  
detailed, indeed they left a lot to be worked  
out. Nevertheless they could be  
accepted provided three things were made  
perfectly clear: that South Georgia & the other  
dependencies were outside the proposals; that  
any interim administration must consult the  
islands' executive and legislative council and  
the wishes of the inhabitants must be respected  
in the long-term settlement. We agreed  
to request King to make those amendments.  
Francis was doubtful but Cabinet was firm.  
The truth was that none of us liked the terms  
but if we could make them reasonable in the  
interim and long-term, and secure the  
withdrawal of Argentine forces, and therefore  
avoid further loss of life - we would agree.

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In fact Reagan and I have accepted the amendments and forwarded the revised letter to Peru.

But Argentina was now more interested in pursuing the matter through the United Nations. Peter de Guibere had made certain proposals which were nothing more than a framework and we were right back to the drawing-board again with yet another round of proposals. Nevertheless the framework was a familiar one to us and by this time we knew all the pitfalls and the things we must watch upon.

I must at this point say that Cabinet were marvellous throughout. They stuck to certain fundamental principles uncluttered by details. Those principles had to be observed in any negotiated settlement and that was that.



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With the sailing of Sheffield and the  
realisation that other ships on picket duty  
could be damaged by Lascruets - we had a  
public relations problem on our hands although  
the public were as resolute as ever. We  
decided it was necessary to have a  
statement in the House about the Peruvian  
proposals and for MoJ to indicate intent,  
to which reinforcements were going to the  
Falklands. Terry Lewis was visiting  
Northwood that afternoon and we worked him  
on T.V. to indicate his views which were in  
fact very confident or reassuring. This was  
one occasion on which we succeeded in  
getting the P.R. right. Argentina had  
rejected the Peruvian proposals as we expected.  
At least we were not at fault in the eyes  
of the international community and the terms  
we had insisted upon were reasonable and

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Self-determination is of course a cardinal principle for the free world.

Francis went off to an W.E.C. meeting in Belgium - some country house - but could not persuade them all to renew sanctions.

The committee (without the chiefs of staff) had our customary Sunday afternoon meeting at Chequers. I am glad that Chequers played quite a part in the Falklands story. Winston had used it quite a lot during World War II and its atmosphere helped to get us all together. It was a wonderful example of how odds can be overcome with singleness of purpose and total co-operation between the political & military experts.

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hooking back it is easy to forget what a large part the attempts to negotiate played in the Falklands story - because of course we know with the benefit of hindsight that they did not succeed. But then I never

did see how a military dictatorship could withdraw unless they managed to persuade a United Nations - sympathetic to Republican sovereignty - that within a few weeks time sovereignty would be transferred. Our diplomatic task was to maintain the United Nations principle in practice that aggression must not pay.

And so we entered another round of negotiations. But not once did I hold up the military preparations. We were all aware that we were coming to the critical time. If we were to land and negotiate it would have to be done somewhere between the 16<sup>th</sup> 30<sup>th</sup> May. The weather and the

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Condition of the troops were the compelling factors  
So U.N. negotiations had to be completed  
within 10 days or so. If they were successful  
within our fundamental principles and minimum  
requirements - well good. If not or they were  
still dragging on, then if the Chiefs of Staff  
agreed, we should have to go ahead.

We came to rely tremendously on  
Sir Anthony Parsons who had been magnificent  
throughout. That Sunday afternoon we

discussed all these things as well as some  
military matters which had arisen.

Argentine civilian aircraft were flying over  
our supply lines and doubtless communicating  
their findings direct to submarines. Could  
we be sure that if we shot at a  
civilian aircraft - it would be an Argentine one  
And there was a danger that Atterton could  
be attacked by a commando raid.

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All of these things we considered & made  
preparations to meet, in the next few hours  
& days. Both the radar characteristics  
and the typical flight path of an aircraft  
on surveillance helped to identify such  
reconnaissance missions.

In the meantime, trouble with  
the media continued. Many of the public  
(including us) did not like the attitude  
particularly of the BBC and I was very  
worried about it. They were sometimes  
reporting as if they were neutral between  
Britain & Argentina. At other times we  
felt strongly that they were assisting the  
enemy by open discussions with experts on  
the next likely steps in the campaign.  
This applied to TV as much as to BBC.  
This of course was the first conflict we  
had fought without censorship. The media  
& the job took totally different views, by

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Concern was always the safety of our  
forces. There was news. Our position  
was made more difficult because we had  
limited satellite communication and all  
photographs had to be returned by way of  
ships to Attersea and then airmailed from there.

Over the middle days of that week  
A number of instructions went to Anthony Parsons  
about withdrawal districts, interim administration  
no immigration or property acquisition during  
the interim period and above all the Government  
must not prejudge the issue on sovereignty.  
That was for the islands. There were  
considerable discussions on the constitutional  
position of a United Nations administrator.  
We thought the U.N. representative could only  
administer the law - he could not change it.  
If he were to attempt to do so, he was obliged  
to act through the legislative council.  
We still hankered after a United States

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military guarantee of the integrity of the islands. A guarantee was needed if we could not repeal our then military deployments

On Thursday 13<sup>th</sup> May we had another debate in the House. Our back benches were becoming restless about the resolutions. There was a noticeable difference in approach on this matter between Francis and myself. His weaker line was not liked - a fact which he picked up quickly.

That day we handed over to the ICRC at Ascension Island all the prisoners captured on South Georgia. (188) They were flown out to Uruguay to be returned to Argentina. Astiz was detained.

We were reaching the end of the road in the U.N. negotiations. We were advised that if our specific conditions

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was spelt out - the resolutions would  
end the other and we might be blamed.  
On the other hand the Argentines were making  
contradictory statements about sovereignty. There  
had been a rumour that they would not  
'prejudge' the issue of sovereignty but  
the speaker of Costa Rica indicated that they  
did just that.

At our Friday meeting we therefore  
decided to recall Anthony Parsons for  
consultation - also Nides Anderson who had  
been simply superb in putting our case in  
Washington. Mrs. Kilepatinis behaviour had been  
very unwise and thoroughly anti-British.  
Nides it was more than a matter for her. He  
said what would the Americans have thought if  
he had done at the Iranian Embassy the  
night the hostages were taken? We British thought  
the same thing of Mrs. K. when she went to  
the Argentinean Embassy the Fri. night night of the



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invasion of the Falklands.

In preparation for a meeting we decided to prepare our own negotiating terms. If we didn't, we feared Puzos de Cuellar might put up one that we could not accept. We were adamant on the wishes of the islanders and on not including S. G. Corp.

That morning we all had a major briefing about a landing on Falklands. We all had great confidence not only in Admiral Fieldhouse but in General Moore who was still in London preparing the plans.

Once again we had an important Sunday meeting at Chequers - the usual pattern, lunch together and then straight down to business in the Parlour upstairs and sit until we had thoroughly ventilated our concerns, discussed all the possibilities and finally arrived at a decision for action.

We went over every point in detail

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making substantial changes to the document as we went. We had the full constitutional position of both the U.N. and the law on Falklands administration before us. We

hardened our terms so as to protect the position in the interim. and by using Art 73 of U.N. Charter to modify it self-determination clause was able to

explain the merit significance of every phrase to the House of Commons thus

allaying their fears. Francis had to go to Hamburg that evening for a N.A.T.O meeting the following day. It was essential

that we keep U.S. support and F.S. was authorized to brief Al Hay about our proposals that evening.

We agreed that Anthony Parsons should hand over the text as our final negotiating position and ask him to put it to the Argentines. We required an answer by Wednesday evening. If one was not

— Art 73 "without it inhabitants in our parameters."

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received Francis's suggestion that we  
publish the document. The idea was a good  
one and, as events happened we did just that.  
But we thought it possible that the  
Republicans might accept it. It would then  
be very wise of them to do so. The world  
would then congratulate them over act of  
statesmanship and the pressure would be on  
us to negotiate with them on sovereignty.

We met again on the Monday  
morning. We had a difficult problem -  
it looked as if the Pope may cancel his  
visit to Britain. After all the eager  
and detailed preparation of our Roman  
Catholics and the keen anticipation of many  
other people to see this good man who  
was such a courageous leader, I very  
much wanted the visit to go ahead

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I suggested that all Cabinet Ministers should refrain from being involved. The Pope as Head of State must meet the Queen but the Cabinet need not see him nor I myself. Nor should be attended any functions officially. Our Junior Ministers who were R.C. would of course go in their private capacity. When we later referred this to Cabinet, Quintin was very disappointed but agreed and understood. We had all wanted a chance to talk with the Pope but the important thing was to enable him to continue with his visit.

He had a marvellous, moving, and historic visit to Britain. Cardinal Casaroli came to see me and we had a long talk about the Falklands or Argentina. We had of course talked before when I visited the

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Pope in the Vatican - but on that occasion it had been about the Irish question and hunger strikes. This time I explained that in my view the essence of liberty and democracy is personal choice as an individual and self-determination as a people. I was glad to have the chance of such a long talk.

In the R.E.C. - eight of the members agreed to enter sanctions for seven days. I had telephoned Colombo (having failed to get Spadolini) to urge him to support but he explained that it was possible Spadolini's government would fall if they did. Ireland also did not renew sanctions although I personally phoned Hankey.

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Tuesday 18<sup>th</sup> May 1982

On the morning of Tuesday 18<sup>th</sup> we had a full committee including all the Chiefs of Staff. We were sorely aware of the decision before us - we had to decide whether to go ahead with the landing about which we had been briefed the previous week. Being aware of how much was unknown and of the immense burden on us all, I knew that I had to ask each senior chief to give his view and his judgment. The possibility of a receipted settlement still existed but expired late afternoon the following day. We must be ready if that happened.

We each considered all aspects of the situation in full. Nothing was withheld

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- we should be vulnerable on landing, had we enough air cover, British ships would be in range and their positions known - we had not been able to destroy as many ships or aircraft as we would have wished before the landing, we did not know where their submarines were. BUT if there were delay, we could suffer more losses, indeed from our viewpoint and the condition of our troops, the sooner a landing took place the better - the decision we had taken to delay had been right: we had excellent fighting forces and the ship had very considerable in the plan of the Force Commander. None of them could quantify the possible casualties, it was not possible to do so. They were aware that if we held back now Britain's military credibility would be severely tarnished. They considered that the advantages to be gained

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Outweighed the risks and the landing should be undertaken, as planned, by night.

All rules of engagement had previously been agreed.

We discussed these matters at length and questioned them on each aspect.

We were unanimous in authorising the landing on the basis of the Force Commander's Plan. We were told that we could step it up to late Thursday which enabled us thoroughly to consider any reply to the negotiations and to discuss and either cancel or reaffirm after cabinet on Thursday morning.

Apart from that, the timing was for the Force Commander.

At the United Nations, Mr. Pever de Gutter was handling matters with great privacy (which was very necessary)



10 DOWNING STREET

and diplomacy. We were indeed fortunate to have such a skilled Secretary-General. We were to have a Cabinet meeting later that day about the draft agreement and this subject to then come before Parliament on 20<sup>th</sup> May. It should be accompanied by a commentary describing the U.N. resolutions.

On Wednesday the U.N. handed over to us the text of an Argentine reply to our proposals. They amounted to a rejection of our paper. In a last minute bid to avert a breakdown, the S-G presented his aide-mémoire to us & to Argentina setting out his proposals.

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On Thursday morning our Committee met before Cabinet.

The authorisation to land stood and (subject to Cabinet) would go ahead.

But one of our USF-S suggested that as the S-G's aide-memoire had considerable similarities to our own proposals the world wouldn't understand if we went ahead with military measures. The fact was that the S-G's proposals were sketchy and obscure and we could have been right back near the beginning again. The objection from the Argentines vis-à-vis was delay. I turned up very firmly - there could be no question of holding up the military timetable. It could be held for our forces. If the weather was right the landing went ahead.

The Committee and later Cabinet agreed

10 DOWNING STREET

How then to arrange matters so the world did not conclude that a landing was imminent? Fortunately by that time we had had the enormously successful Commando raid on Pebble Island so we deliberately set out to give the impression that we should continue for some time with such raids. The press never forgave us - but we had to do it.

On that Thursday the S-G. having received no reply from the Argentinians about the aide-memoire declared that his peace efforts had come to an end.

The debate in the House went well.

We awaited the weather.

An anxious day and night were ahead.

I had a full day's engagements in the country on Friday and now how what it was to carry on with business - as - usual. Ironically

I had to open a major extension of Levens who specialised in storage and international movement and packaging.

Over 1200 people had been invited including many Ambassadors. The band of the Guards was there and speeches etc were expected. What could I say but that

8,000 miles was really only a  
heart-beat away - And it was for  
all our people; not only those who  
family were in the Task Force. One felt  
the whole audience with us. It was a matter  
of pride, respect, conviction and brave  
free that meant we must restore the  
Falklands. Sometimes we inspected  
everything, rode on a forty-mile truck  
had lunch in an enormous warehouse  
and fled to the office to see if there  
was any news. - Not yet. Of course  
there was more to do than to let us  
know what was happening. I returned  
to my Frithley office again noon till 5 p.m.  
and in connected language understood that  
events had happened but no more news.  
Then it was four on T.V. and the  
emotion at a reception in Woodhouse  
School that night was overwhelming. The

Union Trade was flying in San Carlos Bay. We had returned to the Falklands. My heart was full but desperately anxious about Carnethis. We had landed on a hostile coast on a winter's night with a fleet of ships full of men and equipment. Was it possible that he had not been detected.

I left soon after I had spoken to return to No. 10. John Noy came in with a full report. The actual landing had been achieved without a single casualty but day-time was now and of course attacks were fierce from the air. How they missed the White Caribou is a miracle. We got here away the following night.

But from then on we were in

were in known positions and all our  
air cover had to come from Hermes and  
Innamite which themselves had to start off  
a long way. The rapier's were being  
unloaded as fast as possible but there were  
dangerous hours ahead.

✓ Argentine air attacks on Sunday  
were heavy on ships in Falkland Sound and  
San Carlos water. And again on Monday  
and after. It was a desperately anxious time  
for everyone. H.M.S. ~~Argentine~~ Antelope was very  
seriously damaged and then H.M.S. Indefatigable.  
Thanks to brave rescue operations - the loss of  
life was less than might otherwise have been.  
Many Argentine planes were shot down but there  
were many more to come. Tuesday & Wednesday  
the 20<sup>th</sup> & 21<sup>st</sup> May were especially bad days.

I was at the house working in my room when  
John Nolt came in to say that H.M.S. Coventry

had been the subject of attacks by a wave of  
aircraft - six or more had continuously  
bombarded her and she was sinking.

He had to be on T.V. within half an hour  
and as he appeared the news had got through  
although the name of the ship was not known.  
It was thought better not to reveal it, until we  
had more details about losses. Whether  
the decision was right or wrong I do not  
know - the effect was that every navy was  
anxious. The loss was announced next day

That same evening, later, when I went into  
the office to find the latest news about  
Overby, the duty clerk told me that  
Atlantic Conveyor had been hit by two missile  
was on fire and orders had been given to  
abandon ship. How many more tragedies could  
there be? How many losses could we suffer.  
I knew also that about the Atlantic Conveyor  
had been 19 Harrier - reinforcements that were



Only needed. Were they still on board?  
If so, and we had lost them - could we  
carry on. And she was also carrying helicopters  
which we should need for bringing supplies to  
the troops as they moved forward from San Carlos.  
To add to our dismay, there was news that  
Innocente had been hit and received some  
damage. Perhaps that was the worst night  
of all. And somewhere east of the Falklands  
was the QEII carrying 3,000 troops.

Early next morning I waited for news.  
A remarkable rescue for Corcoran and the  
Marko Loney or although as we discovered later  
her remarkable captain was lost. Fortunately  
the 19 Hannis had previously been flown on  
to HMS Innocente (which flooded over me at  
that news - we were not fatally wounded)  
We had lost 8 helicopters but the military chief

assured me that we had stored supplies  
to expect some losses. And we had lost  
4,500 winter tents - many of them to  
accommodate prisoners of war. And the  
news that Inuvik was hit/damaged was  
totally false. So - we leaved the  
deep sorrows of war, but we had to go on  
to complete the tests.

Stores were being unloaded with a  
San Carlo. Some landing & supply craft were  
hit and there were unexploded bombs - most of  
which were defused. Our 'hospital' at San  
Carlo was hit - but the doctors carried  
on manfully. The local people had  
given our hosts an enormous welcome and  
couldn't do enough for them. One of the  
best young men (who I met later) had taken  
his brother and shown our boys the way

to Teal Island and across to Mont Horden  
of the entrance to Port Stanley. Only when I  
flew over the ground did I realize what a  
long 'Yomp' it was. And how remarkable that  
the natives and mainwain guards had achieved it.

It had been several days since the  
landing. On T.V. there had been discussions  
about whether the next route would be through  
Teal to Stanley or through Darwin.

We were all concerned that there appeared to  
be little movement out of the bridgehead and  
yet we knew the decision had to be taken  
by the local commander according to his stores  
the weather, his reconnaissance and his  
judgment. A vessel from here had not yet  
arrived at San Carlos.

We remained gravely concerned at the

naval bases and aware that the surface Argentine navy had retreated into 12 mile territorial waters. As two of our ships had been sunk in our territorial waters we lectured the A-6 - could we not make them in their territorial waters. There were parts of the coast where the water was deep enough for our submarines to operate. But how would you the A-6 said No. Once they moved out - into the direction of Falklands - yes - but not unless. Our submarine commanders were left prowling up & down the line, very frustrated. And we knew their navy could make a sudden rally - and we might not - their first then quickly enough to stop the harm they could do.

In the Committee we turned our political attention to the large - low times. We

to deal with P.O.W's. How to secure a  
permanent cessation of hostilities. What  
stage did we call on the Argentinean commander  
to surrender.

By the weekend Dawson & Green  
had been taken. It was a bitter and  
difficult battle. The positions of the enemy  
were very well prepared and dug in. Our forces  
had to advance over a narrow isthmus in face  
of heavy fire. More paid it seemed  
impossible to break through. At that time it  
made his famous courageous advance. His  
Victoria Cross life was lost - but his bravery  
was the turning point in the battle. His  
second in command took over and eventually  
secured the surrender. It had not been easy  
for him because at one time a white flag was

waved for the Argentine henchmen and when  
two of our boys went forward in response - they  
were shot at and lost their lives. Finally our  
Commander sent two Argentine P.O.s forward with  
a message to surrender - saying they could  
have a parade if they did but they must  
lay down their arms ~~and~~ surrender. They did.  
They laid up their <sup>about their first</sup> others harangued them (but  
they surrendered. The people of Cook Green  
who had been perched in the community hall  
for 3 weeks were released. And a few  
decisive military battles was won. To-day there  
is a memorial to the Paras on the ridge  
near Cook Green.

The press had reported that Newari  
had been taken 2 days before the victory.  
Can there ever have been an army that  
led to fight its battles against media  
reporting like that? I had been very

angry when I heard on early morning  
B.B.C. radio that Q.B. 57 was near  
South Georgia. What time was to 3 ships.  
The Carbone, Norland and others. I lined this  
was planned but it was devastating to  
hear the report at about the time it was due  
to take place. Within 9 hours of that  
broadcast reconnaissance planes were over  
South Georgia searching. They had not been  
there for weeks. Fortunately they did  
not find the ships - the sea is a big place.  
One of our the Carbone went into  
San Carlos with her precious cargo and  
one of our she slipped out unharmed.

At Look Green - loads of napalm  
bombs were discovered.....

By early June, Spain & Panama had letted  
Cessagui resolutions in the Security Council.  
There had of course been efforts, initially in our  
own House of Commons for me to leave our  
rejection terms 'on the table' and after a landing.  
This I absolutely refused to do. How could we  
ask our own Armed Forces to risk their lives  
only to contemplate a withdrawal if the  
Americans wanted to play it that way. Once we  
went in, we went in to complete the task.

But the U.N. was at it again. A  
cessagui was called for. I was constantly  
saying a cessagui must be accompanied by  
a total withdrawal of American troops. Tony  
Parron fought our case splendidly - but  
new resolution was certainly under way.

There was a feel-move to urge us to spread  
to Calicut to withdraw before the final  
assault - but Henry O. to pause before we  
made that assault. It seemed to me this could



Put our boots in an intolerable position.  
We were in the middle of winter and it  
was essential to repress with all possible  
speed and to wait for nothing.

By 4<sup>th</sup> June all Argentine P.O.W.  
from Cook Green were on board M.V. Norland  
waiting to be repatriated. Some had been  
treated in our ~~for~~ military hospital at San Carlos.  
Our doctors had been very critical of the field work  
of their doctors.

That weekend began the Versailles  
Economic Summit, attended by the Charullo, the  
F-S and myself. I went to Paris first to  
see President De Gaulle who was staying at the U.S. Lindall.  
We had quite a talk together a dinner as he  
preferred it. I thanked him for the  
enormous help we had received from the U.S.  
and asked that the U.S. vote should

follows our other family? Council and whether  
the U.S. could give us any help with  
repatriating American P.O.W. after the  
relating of Port Stanley. I also asked him  
what he wanted out of the summit. It was  
plain that, above all, he wanted an agreement  
about trade with the Soviet Union on both  
unsubsidized interest rates and a lower % of  
the orders to be provided by credit. I thought he  
could help on both by supporting him. The question  
of the John Brown business to the Siberian  
gas pipeline had already arisen several times and  
there was an understanding that if we agreed  
the President's interest & credit terms for trade  
with the U.S.S.R. then contracts already agreed  
would go ahead. As it went happened  
things went badly wrong on that score. All F.R.S.  
and Foreign Ministers had agreed a limit on the  
first day of variables, which was initially what  
the President wanted. It came before heads of gov-

## 10 DOWNING STREET

The second day with President Nasser in the chair. He didn't like it and proceeded to unpack the whole deal. I was trying to get a retroceding compromise the whole time but it wasn't possible. To add to our troubles, that morning the Israelis had invaded the Lebanon and Al Haqi, who was sitting next to me was trying to arrange a visit to Tel-Aviv that night or the next day.

After my talk with President Reagan in Paris we all arrived at Versailles where we were staying in the Petit Trianon. That evening after dinner (all heads of gov. dined together) we had a long discussion about Falklands. I could not indicate how long it would require to take Port Stanley but said I hoped within the month. They thought this a long time - longer than they had required from the viewpoint of sanctions

## 10 DOWNING STREET

However they were most helpful about what they could do to get a permanent cease-fire. I explained about plans for P.O.W.'s and suggested that, as under the Geneva convention we did not have to return them until hostilities had ceased, it might be possible to return them until Argentina had agreed to a permanent cessation. Helmut Schmitt thought that ~~the~~ present might help to that end. If we kept in touch, possibly all four could join in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina. I left the evening feeling pleased with their co-operation and duly reported their conversation to officials. We had sent (delegation) been allocated a sitting room. This had previously been the King's bedroom and had had the bed removed. It was a large nicely furnished room with windows straight-out on to the terrace.

We had only been sitting there talking for

10 DOWNING STREET

about fifteen minutes when a message came from the F.O. Tony Parsons that a vote was about to be taken in the Security Council and the Japanese were voting against us. As they were the ninth vote (required for the resolution to pass) that was particularly vital. So much for the previous co-operation. We tried very hard to get on to Suzuki who could not possibly have gone to bed in such a short time, to get him to reverse the decision and at least abstain - but we were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, more political drama. Mrs Kibretse had received instructions from Haij to follow us with her vote. She had done so. Then, from Versailles, Haij had phoned telling her to withdraw that vote. She applied to change it, but was not able to do so. Feathers were ruffled all round. The lead was that Mr Haij had succeeded to pressure from other Latin American countries.

I tackled Durkin the following morning who gave me a very lame explanation 'As the notion had misinterpreted so they thought it would lead to Argentina withdrawal'! We had lunch in the Palace - heads of jobs and foreign secretaries all together. Before we started the T.V. cameras were allowed in. Inevitably the U.S. interviewer asked a question to President Reagan asking he what had happened to the vote at the U.N. the previous evening. Poor Ron - he knew nothing about it to my amazement - he just said 'I'm afraid you've got me there. I don't know anything about that one'. The interviewer turned to me; well as I was doubtful I wasn't going to have a row on the media so merely said I didn't give interviews over lunch! But when it all went out over the world's T.V. set to check a very bad impression.

Which was very good about Falklands war - as Viscountess was President Thatcher. Summary of the Press conference the next day - he agreed absolutely with

what he had done. Britani must recover her  
islands. He was most understanding and splendid  
throughout.

There was a grand and beautiful banquet  
in the Hall of Mirrors which I attended but left  
before the opera and the fireworks. I had to get  
home and it would not have been right to stay so  
much revelry. All my thoughts were of sketches  
happening in the South Atlantic.

By this time General Moon was in  
charge for his headquarters in San Carlos  
and his problem was to get enough equipment  
and ammunition forwards before the final assault  
on the ridge of mountains which protected Port  
Stanley.

On the Monday morning 7<sup>th</sup> June there was  
much to attend to. I had to report the  
Versailles proposal that other forts were prepared  
to help in putting pressure on Argentina for a permanent

10 DOWNING STREET

cession of hostages and that the U.S. was quite anxious to help with the logistics of evacuating P.O.W's. There had been some military matters. Our Vulcan had been trying to knock out some very well established Argentine radars that were reporting all our aircraft movements and could pinpoint the position of the aircraft carriers. The Vulcan's had been carrying special anti-radar weapons. One had failed to release - it had not been released and the refuelling probe had broken on the return to America. The Vulcan had  $\therefore$  landed in Brazil and been impounded with its weapon. There were also reports from an Ambassador in Chile about Chilean troop movements - which turned out to have no significance at all.

Dster has finally been questioned by French & Swedish jets - had refused to answer and we  $\therefore$  agreed to repatriate him by air to Argentina





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Lately that week we had another terrible  
head-rending hazard of war. General Moore had  
sent Sir Timotei Aris Gulehead with men, equipment-  
and munitions round to Thull Cove and Fil-way.  
They would normally have gone by helicopter but the  
weather was not sufficiently good to get enough  
quantities of stores unimpeded in time. The ships  
arrived in Fil-way and were unloading in the Rapner  
valley to protect from air attacks. The clouds  
cleared and there was a sudden surprise air-attack  
which scored a direct hit on Sir Gulehead causing  
great loss of life and terrible fires & burns. The Welsh  
Guards took the brunt of it. There are "if only's"  
throughout life and if only the men had been taken  
off and dispersed first - the casualties would never have  
been suffered to that extent. General Moore was  
grief-stricken. I was up at Northwood a day after -  
we all felt - how many more. Once again we had



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Very difficult decisions to make about releasing news of casualties. Rumours of very large numbers - several hundreds - spread like wildfire and relatives were naturally alarmed & frustratedly worried. We had to hold up details for days. We knew from intelligence that the Japanese thought the casualties were several times worse than they were and that the blow would hold up our attack on Port Stanley. In spite of criticism we refused to reveal the numbers but as far as we could we informed all next of kin. We knew the attack on Mount Harnden. Two killed and Warden Ridge was due to begin on Friday night and surprise was vital.

Friday night (11<sup>th</sup> June) came. Early on Saturday morning the Duty Clerk came up to the flat with a note in his hand. I almost seized it



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THE PRIME MINISTER

from him expecting news that the attack had begun. But it was more bad news. H.M.S.

Clamorgan had been bombarding the Admiralty positions in Port Stanley and on the hills prior to battle (We had agreed that the Admiralty in Port Stanley would be 'sanctuary' but not all the people went there and three civilians were killed)

Clamorgan had been hit by a land-based crowd and was on fire. She was steaming away from the scene of battle at 12 knots. Casualties - some killed - had been suffered. It is impossible to describe the depth of feeling at these times. It is quite unlike anything else I have ever experienced. In fight for liberty - we lose our bravest and best. Hon. unjust and heart-breaking. Now we know the sacrifices that previous generations made for us. And at No. 10 one was protected and safe - one felt so guilty



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THE PRIME MINISTER

at the concert.

That day (Saturday) the Colours were Trooped for the Queen's Birthday. It poured with rain and somehow, that seemed fitting although unpleasant for the Guards. I wore black - there was much to mourn.

John Nott arrived shortly before we were due to take our place on the stand. Had he any news I enquired? None - beyond what I had. But he thought we would have known if the attack had not started. Mrs. Hunt and Mrs. Hunt were with us - all anxious for news.

We went to the Trooping and came in with all possible speed for news afterwards. All the guests were dripping wet - we dried out before the fire as best we could. Shortly before 1 pm. we heard that all objectives had been achieved, but there had been a stiff battle



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THE PRIME MINISTER

for Two Sisters. The plan had been to press on to Tumbledown but it was decided to wait a time. I went up to Northwood in the afternoon to hear precisely what had happened.

There was better news about Alamogora. She had got the fire under control and was steaming at 20 knots.

The next stage was for the Devils Guards - Tumbledown, and then the Chimneys - Pappers Hill, the last hill before Port Stanley.

The Committee met on Monday morning 14<sup>th</sup> June - too early for news except that we knew the battle was in progress. It was indeed fiercely fought - just how fiercely I learned when I visited it nearly seven months later and walked



## 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

The ground in early morning in the during  
rain and wind. The whole area is covered  
with outcrops of rock which make natural  
fortifications. I was there at first light. They  
looked it by night and in the dark and snow  
A stupendous feat. And once again at a  
critical stage in the battle, the future depended on  
the courage and professionalism of the officer in charge.

What happened later that day seemed  
like a miracle. The Argentines retreated not only  
from Tumbledown but from Sappers Hill as well.  
They threw down their arms and were seen  
picking their way through their own minefields  
into Port Stanley. Ours followed them and Colonel  
Rose went to see Navarro about a complete



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Remembrance of West & East Falklands.

We received news The White Flag are flying over Port Stanley. We dared not hope too much too soon. I wrote out a brief statement for the House. By the time I wrote at 10 p.m. on a point of order, we knew that General Moore had reached Government House and was rejoicing with Remembrance.

The House cheered, Downing Street was full of people, young people. It was their generation who had done it. Today's heroes Britain still breeds them.

As I went to sleep very late that night I felt an enormous burden had been lifted from my shoulders and future worries would be small.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Compared with those of life or death  
which had been with us constantly for  
eleven weeks. It was a miracle wrought  
by ordinary men and women with extraordinary  
qualities.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

There were many things yet to be discussed and decided

- The Argentine P.O.W.'s. The fact was we couldn't look after them properly on Falklands - the tents we had intended for use went down on the Atlantic Conveyor. We had to return them to Argentina as soon as proper arrangements could be made. Any bargaining about permanent cessation proved fruitless.

Liverpoolly we counted 11,848 prisoners and put them aboard Canberra Island. Argentine a good deal wanted for them to go to Puerto Madryn. The Argentinians still had one of our P.O.W.'s or 3 British journalists - Pl. Lt. Glover



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

- Southern Shrike had to be re-captured. This was done without a shot being fired. The Argentinians had not been engaged in scientific activities other than meteorological observations.
- Arrangements had to be made to repatriate the bodies of seamen killed on Falklands for those relatives who wished it. A number including H's widow wished the bodies to remain in the Falklands.
- Offer to Argentina to repatriate their dead.
- Return of Rex Shrike and some lectures - Falklanders who had been in Britain as soon as possible.
- We made it clear that S.C. Resolution 502 was dead because the Argentines had not implemented the operative parts. There was no objection on our side with that.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

- After we had evacuated the vast majority of the prisoners some 560 officers & staffed men remained including General Durrant. Some helped to make the minefields which were and will remain a major hazard for years. We captured large amount of equipment - but only some of it was usable.
- By 24<sup>th</sup> June - although we had released 10,000 P.O.W's, Fl. Lt. Glover had still not been released.
- We had to recover the Shrike (rocket) missile from Brazil. The Vulcan was returned to Aberdeen.
- Abdul Woodward - General Durrant had to be released - replaced
- Ships with aircraft carrier had to come home - to a heartless welcome.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I went to meet Hermes. She is a fantastic ship. To go below and see how the Harrier and helicopters had been packed in was a great experience. The men who worked on maintenance had kept more aircraft flying than we ever imagined was possible.

And the hospital ward, where men from Sheffield coming had been taken was its own miracle chapter. Capt Middleton himself was an inspiration.

- Rehabilitation work - Prefab houses, army units, building equipment, rock crushers, supplies of every kind, money for compensation for the Falklanders - all had to be arranged and put in hand.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

- and of course the same of Thanksgiving  
and Remembrance in St. Pauls. This had  
its own difficulties because of its ceremonial  
nature. No parade was allowed to the  
Cathedral, no colour to the altar and  
it was as much as we could do to persuade  
the Church authorities to allow anyone who  
had taken part in the Flanders campaign to  
take part in the service. Eventually after a  
lot of to-ing & fro-ing they agreed that  
2 Union members of the Home Front  
should speak some sentences and the  
Paro-chaplain should take part by reading  
a lesson.  
The Thanksgiving part was virtually dropped  
from the service. But because of the presence  
of the Queen and all the Royal Family & the  
Sept Regiments of the military band &  
Unopposed, the service was a great  
comfort to the bereaved and their relatives near



10 DOWNING STREET

It was also indicated that certain of the clergy would not take part if members of the Armed Forces read the lessons.

THE PRIME MINISTER

I threatened to make this known in Parliament and in public.

than anything else.

At one time it was suggested that the Service should contain elements so apt to attract opinion! Such as the Lord's Prayer in Spanish.

- arrangements for a South Atlantic Fund on charitable terms which involved the established Service churches and which avoided the criticism of the Fund which occurred over the Peace Relief disaster.

- Restoration and improvement of the airfield with the 'materiel' we had purchased from the U.S.

The Royal Engineers did a superb job as I discovered when I visited them.

- Pl. Lt. Cloon was repatriated to Montevideo on 8th July. We were



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

arranged to return the rest of the Argentines  
- something is achieved very soon after.

Following that - financial restrictions  
were lifted but the Argentines refused to  
allow flights to Buenos Aires as part of  
the package.

Following these matters the Franks  
Committee was set up with the agreement  
of the opposite parties and reported within  
6 months.

Within one year we had arranged  
for some 500 of the bereaved to  
visit the Falklands - a traumatic  
and profound experience for them. To  
overcome evil requires the bravest of men.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Note 30<sup>th</sup> April - Permission for  
S-Brigade - under command  
of Lt Col [unclear]

17<sup>th</sup> May  
3000 men  
2300 tons ammunition  
110 vehicles  
79 trailers  
19 helicopters  
6 guns

Qc in - £100,000 per day  
North Ferry Day 20<sup>th</sup> May  
Deltic Ferry  
Atlantic Airways