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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

LAST PAPER

Sir Alan Campbell KCMG  
ROME

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09FEB	31 January 1979
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Dear Alan,

ITALIAN EXCLUSION FROM QUADRIPARTITE AND OTHER SMALL GROUPS

1. Many thanks for your letter of 18 January setting Italian resentment about their exclusion from Guadeloupe and other similar meetings in its historical context. Thank you too for your helpful suggestions as to what we might do to pre-empt such resentment in the future.
2. You will meanwhile have seen FCO telegram number 18 reporting Ducci's call on Frank Judd on 23 January. I was encouraged to see that Ducci paid tribute to the quality of John Hunt's briefing on Guadeloupe and also that the last paragraph of the Note which he left with the Minister of State said in terms that the Italian Government did not wish to over-emphasise the issue. We are nevertheless well aware from your own and other reports and from remarks made by Ruggiero when he was here the other day that Andreotti is still considerably annoyed about the handling of the Guadeloupe meeting.
3. The difficulty arises very largely from an awkward contradiction. Quadripartite consultations have proved their worth several times over as a way of getting business started with some assurance that the US and the European partners will be able to work together. This function of quadripartite meetings is at its most useful when the quadripartite meetings themselves are kept quiet and not publicised; but unpublished quadripartite meetings are of relatively little interest to Heads of Government. The latter wish the world to know that they have been sitting together dealing with the world's affairs. It is precisely the publicity which riles the Italians and others.
4. My conclusion from this is that Britain, France, Germany and the US will have to go on organising quadripartite work among themselves and we shall simply have to put up with the fact that every so often the quadripartite whale will break surface and blow, for all to see. When the Italians and others get their harpoons out, the only remedy for the whale will be to dive and disappear again for a while.
5. You will not need me to review the useful work which has been done quadripartitely, recently, for example, on the problems in the north of Scandinavia around Svalbard, or on Yugoslavia, or even on Cyprus (although the French and Germans prevented the Cyprus initiative from being brought through the quadripartite machinery into the Nine).

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
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This sort of quadripartite work will continue discreetly and I do not think there can be any question of bringing the Italians into it. On the other hand I hope that there will be no question of the Italians obtaining hard evidence that such work goes on - or perhaps it is not so much a question of hard evidence as evidence to which they cannot turn a blind eye without political embarrassment. When slips do occur over quadripartite meetings at official level it is always possible to take refuge in the Berlin cover-story. The argument would be that officials were really talking about Berlin and happened to mention some other subject in passing. No-one believes this story but it inhibits non-quadripartite partners from making a fuss.

6. To an extent the Italians seem to recognise that they are fighting a lost cause, and I agree with you that it simply would not make sense to try to include Italy in another "Guadeloupe". Nor is there any need for me to go over the arguments which Tony Duff set out in his letter to you of 3 January about trilateralism. Reports from other sources which I have seen suggest that - with some exceptions - Italian appraisals of the reasons for the composition of the Guadeloupe Summit and of other similar groupings are realistic. But I quite agree with your point about making use of Italian expertise on the Horn of Africa, and we shall also bear in mind your suggestion for blurring any appearance of quadripartitism which emerges at Tokyo in the summer.

7. If and when another Guadeloupe occurs, we shall try to remember the importance of finding some means of showing special considerations to the Italians as suggested in paragraph 8 of your letter.



Michael Palliser

cc: P Jay Esq  
Washington  
Sir Nicholas Henderson GCMG  
Paris  
Sir Oliver Wright GCVO KCMG DSC  
Bonn



of whether we have anything to learn from our three allies in the matter of placating the Italians (and others) - cp para 8 of Sir Alan Campbell's draft. You refer to this in your minute of 26 Jan. But if telephone calls are out - what about special messages / promises etc?

Do you think we might

- a) draw any more formal conclusions from this episode;
- b) add anything to the draft-reply?

RA Evans  
30/31





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(6)

Sir R Hibbert  
PS/PUS

#### ITALIAN EXCLUSION FROM QUADRIPARTITE AND OTHER SMALL GROUPS

1. As far as the particular instance of the Guadeloupe meeting is concerned, I do not believe that the Italians are as fussed with us as they were with the Americans and the French, because we were clearly not in the lead and, as Sir A Campbell says, the Prime Minister wrote "a nice letter". Since President Giscard was the host, it was only right that the French should make special arrangements over the briefing, and I do not think that we should have duplicated those efforts. As for the Americans, the trouble is that time and again they break the rules of confidentiality, and there seems to be no stopping them. Of course, the Germans are nearly as bad. (There was serious embarrassment at Puerto Rico in summer 1976 because American clumsiness made sure that the Italians knew that a Quadripartite meeting was taking place from which they were excluded - the PUS will remember the details - and Chancellor Schmidt then disclosed that the Italian internal situation had been under discussion!) Perhaps the conclusion is that we should not be "Honest John". On the other hand, in the longer run, I think that we gain to the extent that we preserve a reputation for discretion.
2. As for more formal conclusions, I would only say that whenever briefing meetings for future restricted meetings of this kind take place, the issue of how to handle excluded partners, perhaps especially the Italians, should be faced squarely. The PUS is perhaps best placed to do this. The personality of the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister is a major element, and different faces might bring different habits. (Nevertheless, I suspect that we do not always know of the occasions when the Prime Minister picks up the telephone!)

/3.



*Li Rimini*  
*PS/Rus.*

Mr Ferguson ✓

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ITALIAN EXCLUSION FROM QUADRIPARTITE AND OTHER SMALL GROUPS

1. I submit a draft letter from the PUS to Sir A Campbell in reply to his letter of 18 January about Italian exclusion from Guadeloupe and other similar meetings. The draft takes account of the call paid by the Italian Ambassador on the Minister of State on 23 January to report further disquiet on the part of the Italian Government over the Guadeloupe Summit (FCO telegram 18 to Rome); and also of reports from other sources. The PUS has, I think, seen the latter and they are not attached. But they are available in the department if the PUS wishes to see them again.

*A D S Goodall*

A D S GOODALL  
Western European Department

26 January 1979

cc. PS/Sir A Duff  
Mr Butler  
Mr Fretwell  
Mr Moberly  
EID(E)  
FRD  
Defence Department  
NENAD

I have no comment on the draft; the paragraph 8 of the letter brings out clearly an important difference in the way 'Confidential' Ministers operate from that of our own - that is the frequency of their informal telephonic contact. This point has been made to us, rather early, not very long ago by, I think, the Danes. And I fear that is not a very nice topic.

*Edg*  
-261.

Minute

The Guyanese.

CO 25 do his - which

will let you see pp which you should

Mr Forghesson have seen!

Sir R.H has gone off to meetings for most of the afternoon. He asks if you could look at the paragraphs he has put together. If you agree them, perhaps WED. can somehow fit them in to the draft. (He's not sure quite where they would fit)

S.  
29/1