



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

You may like to have
these additional briefs
by you when you see

London SW1A 2AH

11 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

Dr Waldheim but there is no need to
wade through them all. *JSW*

Visit of the UN Secretary-General: 12 July

As promised in my letter of 6 July submitting briefs for the Prime Minister's use in talking to Mr Waldheim on Thursday, I enclose copies of the briefs prepared for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's talk with him.

We understand from the UN Information Centre that Mr Waldheim is expecting to discuss Namibia, Middle East, and Cyprus with Lord Carrington. Lord Carrington will also wish to raise the issue of refugees and we know that Dr Waldheim expects to discuss the Geneva Conference with the Prime Minister. We have added defensive briefs on certain other subjects which might arise.

*For ever,
Stephen*

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street



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11 JUL 1979

RESTRICTED

CALL BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SECRETARY OF STATE:
12 July

LIST OF BRIEFS

- 1 Namibia
- 2 Middle East
- 3 Cyprus
- 4 North/South (including aid cuts and energy)
(defensive)
- 5 Law of the Sea (defensive)
- 6 Reform of General Assembly procedures (defensive)
- 7 Peacekeeping (defensive)
- 8 Personality note on Dr Waldheim

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO: 1: NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Five trying to break the impasse by appointing an envoy to negotiate with the South Africans, and perhaps if necessary thereafter with SWAPO and the Front Line States. Plan to announce this before OAU summit..
2. Partners wanted a British envoy. He will work to a joint brief.
3. African patience running out. Hope Dr Waldheim will urge participants in Monrovia to accept that implementation still possible, that UK at one with the Five.
4. Sanctions would be folly while hope of agreement remains.
5. Best hope of solution may still be SWAPO giving up claim to bases inside Namibia and South Africans dropping insistence on UNTAG monitoring outside. But other variants may need discussion.
6. Would you ask the Angolans when in Luanda next week whether they could contemplate giving details of how they will ensure observance of the agreement by SWAPO forces in Angola?

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Essential Facts

[May be mentioned as necessary]

1. The Five may be ready to announce the name of the envoy at about the time of Dr Waldheim's visit.
2. The Five agree that he should talk first to P W Botha and South African Government officials. The Five will then decide whether there is a need for him to talk to the internal parties, the Front Line, SWAPO, Mr Ahtisaari (Dr Waldheim's Special Representative for Namibia) and others. The envoy will consult the New York Contact Group before going to South Africa.

[Not to be revealed]

3. The Five may ask the Secretary of State to put particular points to Dr Waldheim. If so, the Department will provide a supplementary brief.
4. Dr Waldheim may be sensitive about suggestions that "amendments" or "alternatives" will be needed to paras 11-12 of his Report of 26 February on bases and monitoring. To avoid this the Five hope to present whatever compromises might be worked out as voluntary, thus not requiring any formal change in the Waldheim Report.
5. Mudge (DTA) has privately offered to a member of the Embassy in Pretoria to seek Pik Botha's agreement to a compromise involving (a) no SWAPO bases inside Namibia and (b) no UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO outside provided that Angola and Zambia explain how they will do the monitoring themselves. It is too early to tell Dr Waldheim of this but he might be urged to begin exploring Angolan attitudes to such a deal when he goes to Luanda.

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 2: MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Concerned about Israeli policy, particularly on settlements and South Lebanon. But success in the autonomy negotiations would bring a comprehensive settlement nearer. Would like a return to multilateral negotiations eventually, but difficult to see how this can be brought about. Would Dr Waldheim be prepared to revive his proposal for a conference of all the parties if necessary?

2. Middle East likely to be troublesome at the UN in the near future. Concerned that peace efforts should not be undermined and that UN role, while helping to keep up pressure on Israel, should be constructive. Extreme resolutions will not help the peace process, the Arab cause or the UN's reputation.

3. Could be a case for a new Security Council resolution giving more concrete expression to Palestinian rights.

UN forces in Sinai

4. What are the prospects for use of UN forces to supervise Israeli withdrawal, which we support as in line with UN views and peacekeeping role? If UNEF is ruled out by Soviet opposition, UNTSO would be an acceptable substitute.

Question of Palestine

5. Hope discussion will be constructive when it resumes. Could not accept condemnation of the treaty or call for sanctions against Israel.

Israeli settlements

6. A strong resolution acceptable to all would help to keep up the pressure on Israel, but danger of an unacceptable call for sanctions.

Lebanon/UNIFIL

7. Appreciate UNIFIL's efforts and will continue to urge Israel to cooperate and rein in Haddad. Risks of Israeli-Syrian clash remain high. But little scope for effective action beyond established diplomatic

SS IAL FACTS (May be used unless indicated)
 (No for use)

1. Dr Waldheim has taken a generally negative view of Camp David and the peace treaty. He has expressed doubts about their compatibility with UN decisions and their ability to lead on to wider peace. He favours a return to multilateral negotiations but has not so far produced new proposals or renewed the call he made after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 for a conference of all the parties under UN auspices.

UN FORCES IN SINAI

2. The Arabs have called on the Secretary-General not to allow the UN to be involved in any way and the Russians have made clear they will oppose any attempt to use UNEF (which would need to be redeployed) to supervise Israeli withdrawal. They would apparently prefer UNEF to be folded up without a formal debate, since they are unwilling to be seen to be publicly opposing peacekeeping machinery in the Middle East. There have been hints that they would not necessarily oppose use of UNTSO.

3. The UK will be President of the Security Council when the UNEF mandate is due for renewal (24 July). The Secretary-General's report will be issued shortly. We do not yet know what it will contain, but it is likely to steer a carefully neutral course.

QUESTION OF PALESTINE

4. At Arab request, a Security Council debate was formally opened on 29 June and then adjourned until the end of July or the beginning of August. The Arab representative on the Security Council is apparently hoping to negotiate a resolution which others, including the Americans, will be able either to accept or abstain on. However, the PLO representative in New York had told us previously that the intention was to introduce a resolution similar to that vetoed by the Americans in January 1976 and, following the expected further US veto, then to call

either for a special session or an emergency session of the General Assembly. They would try at such a session to get a resolution adopted condemning the Egypt/Israel treaty and calling for sanctions against Israel. The Security Council debate, when it resumes, is likely to prove difficult for the West whatever Arab tactics.

[Not for use]

5. The Egyptians have told us that the Americans are considering again a resolution which would reaffirm 242 and go on to recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. This might produce from the PLO a statement in debate recognising Israel's existence. It would be important not to tamper with the text of 242 since this might provoke Israel to withdraw acceptance of it. But in addition to it is worth consideration.

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

6. The three-member Investigating Commission established in March and led by Portugal is expected to report back in mid-July. Their report will almost certainly come out strongly against Israeli policy. A strongly-worded resolution unanimously accepted would reinforce the international pressure on Israel. The Commission's report will however give further ammunition for those calling for action against Israel, possibly under Chapter VII. We are not prepared to support sanctions against Israel.

LEBANON

7. Although the mandate of UNIFIL has recently been renewed for six months, further clashes in the South could bring the issue back to the Security Council. If there are further Syrian/Israeli clashes over Lebanon following that of 27 June, the Syrians may also ask for a meeting. But there is little more the Security Council can do in the Lebanese context but continue to condemn Israeli obstruction and urge further diplomatic pressure on Israel.

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 05 JULY 79
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST : MR HURD'S CALL ON WALDHEIM ON 4 JULY
MY 2 IPTS (NOT TO ALL)

1. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD REFUSED TO AGREE TO A RENEWAL OF THE UNEF MANDATE DESPITE CARTER'S INTERVENTION WITH BREZHNEV AT VIENNA. THEY WANTED, HOWEVER TO AVOID USING THEIR VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEIR TACTICS, WHICH WERE BEING COORDINATED WITH THE SYRIANS, APPEARED TO BE TO MANOEUVRE THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO A POSITION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT NO AGREEMENT OR RENEWAL HAD BEEN REACHED. WALDHEIM WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT INFORMING THE COUNCIL THAT HE HAD NO OPTION BUT TO TERMINATE THE UNEF OPERATION.

2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY OPTICAL SINCE UNEF WAS NOT NOW NEEDED TO KEEP THE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT CARE ABOUT UNEF'S WITHDRAWAL AND HAD PROPOSED THE ALTERNATIVE OF COMBINED FRONTIER PATROLS TO EGYPT. BUT THIS WAS EMBARRASSING TO THE EGYPTIANS WHO DESPERATELY WANTED THE UMBRELLA TO CONTINUE. WALDHEIM EXPECTED SADAT TO PURSUE THE MATTER IN MONROVIA WHEN HE SAW HIM THERE IN TEN DAYS TIME.

3. THE RUSSIANS WERE BEING EVASIVE OVER THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE CONTINUATION OF UNTSO'S OBSERVER ROLE, BUT HAD SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY TOOK THE SAME LINE AS WITH UNEF. WALDHEIM COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD NEED FRESH AUTHORITY IF UNTSO OBSERVERS WERE BEING USED TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT.

MURRAY

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 3 ; CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. Congratulate Waldheim on skill and determination at Nicosia meeting on 18/19 May when Kyprianou and Denktash finally agreed on a basis for resumed negotiations. How does he see prospects?
2. Talks off to a sticky start. Fragility of Ecevit Government evidently a factor. Doubts over animus negotiandi.
3. UK giving UN general support; close touch in Nicosia and New York. But UN should retain the lead. Interference by outsiders with little leverage unlikely to be decisive. UN strength in reluctance of both sides to be blamed for breakdown.

UNFICYP

4. UK agreed to maintain contribution to December 1979. Costs £10m p.a. Pressures for reduction, especially if talks fail.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Intercommunal Talks

1. Kyprianou/Denktash meeting with Waldheim on 18/19 May. Waldheim pushed them into 10-point agreement on resumption of negotiation.
2. Talks resumed on 15 June, adjourned by UN when near deadlock over Turkish demand for Greek Cypriot commitments on "bizonality" and "security". UN searching for a formula. Ecevit tottering and vulnerable to accusations of a sell-out on Cyprus. May ease up now Turkish Parliament in recess.
3. UK and others (including Nine) supporting UN but reluctant to undertake specific suicide missions at this early stage.

UNFICYP

4. Mandate just renewed. Canadians restless. Threat of withdrawal provides some leverage on Greek Cypriots but none at all on Turks.

UN Team

5. The principal UN officials involved:

Perez de Cuellar (Peru)	- Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs
Galindo Pohl (El Salvador)	- Waldheim's Special Representative in Cyprus
Gorgé (Switzerland)	- Deputy to Galindo Pohl

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 4 : NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE, INCLUDING ENERGY AND UK AID

POINTS TO MAKE

NORTH/SOUTH GENERAL

1. Oil price rises hit non-oil developing countries worst of all. And they make an adequate response from us more difficult. North/South relations can hardly prosper in this situation.

TOKYO SUMMIT

2. Our most important preoccupation now is to get the world economy on the right course again. The energy measures agreed at Tokyo are a vital first step. We are limiting our imports, seeking more orderly arrangements on the oil market, and hastening our work on conservation and alternative energy sources. This is not a task for the West alone. OPEC countries have important responsibilities. So do COMECON countries whose contribution to the North/South Dialogue has been inadequate so far.

UNCTAD V

3. UNCTAD in Manila made some modest advances. Agreement on the need to avoid protectionism was made. There was a welcome absence of rancour. More dramatic results were hardly to be expected against current difficult economic background.

NEW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

4. This is not the time for grand designs. The negotiations on a new IDS for the 1980s and beyond will be a test of the good sense of all concerned. The targets it contains must be realistic and coherent.

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

5. The COW has still not fulfilled its promise. We support Chairman Stoltenberg's effort to make it a forum for informed discussion between developed and developing countries of world economic problems.

/THE

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THE UN AND ENERGY

6. We favour producer consumer contacts about oil supply and demand. European Council and Tokyo Summit have said so. But we are cautious about using the UN as a forum for these contacts. We need to keep away from a bloc to bloc confrontation between developed and developing countries with energy as a bargaining lever. This was tried at the CIEC and was why it ground to a halt.

UK ATTITUDE

7. Main task of HMG is to put UK economic house in order. We shall encourage trade with and investment in the developing countries. And we shall maintain a substantial aid programme, though it cannot be exempt from public expenditure cuts which go right across the board.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

TOKYO SUMMIT

1. The Declaration is annexed.

WORLD ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

2. Preliminary calculations indicate that the new OPEC prices of \$20-23.50 (with Saudi Arabian light at \$18) will:
 - (a) add about \$20 billion to OECD oil import bill; and over \$5 billion to non-OECD oil import bill;
 - (b) increase inflation in OECD countries by 0.75% after one year;
 - (c) reduce growth in industrial world by 0.5-0.75% after one year;
 - (d) increase OECD current account deficit by over 10 billion over a full year (of which \$5 billion might fall to US);
 - (e) add over \$20 billion to OPEC revenues.
3. We do not yet have a similar estimate for the increase in the deficit of the non-oil LDCs though it could be well in excess of \$40 billion as compared with \$32 billion in 1978. This burden, which will be unequally shared, will be a heavy one for some developing countries to bear.

UNCTAD V

4. UNCTAD V met in Manila from 3 May to 3 June. Consensus results were adopted on a number of matters including protectionism, commodities, resource transfers, the least developed, the UN Liner Code, technology transfer and economic co-operation between developed countries (ECDC). The G77 forced through some other resolutions on, eg civil aviation, a study of a new Complementary Financing Facility, for which the Germans voted, international monetary reform and bulk shipping. Various other questions on which no agreement was reached were remitted for further consideration in UNCTAD or other international bodies, eg the outcome of the MTNs, GSP, debt etc. But there was no breakdown and little rancour. Group B displayed a useful degree of unity: G77 were divided between the various regional groups and

above all, over the oil issue which the OPEC countries refused to have discussed.

NEW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

5. The next major North/South argument will be over the International Development Strategy for the 1980s and beyond (due to be adopted by a special session of the UN General Assembly in 1980). The LDCs will want specific targets for economic and social sectors and by implication concessions from the developed countries in pursuit of the NIEO. We shall emphasise the need for flexibility and the shared responsibilities of both developed and developing countries.

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

6. Set up by the UN General Assembly in 1977 as a forum for discussion of the whole range of North/South issues. Depressing tendency so far to get into ritualistic confrontations over competing texts. Two meetings in 1978 under Algerian Chairman were not a success. Things have improved under State Secretary Stoltenberg of Norway. The next meeting takes place from 10-14 September to review the results of UNCTAD. Level of UK representation not yet fixed but will be appropriately senior.

THE UN AND ENERGY

7. UK has welcomed proposed Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy in 1981. European Council has also given a cautious welcome to Mexican President's proposals for discussion of energy in UN. Our main concern is to avoid energy being used as a bargaining lever of other North/South issues. We are opposed to any suggestions of a new CIEC format because this would recreate a link between energy and other North/South problems. Energy discussions should focus solely on energy matters. See paragraph 10 below.

UK AID

8. The UK Aid Programme in 1979/80 will be higher in both cash and real terms than the Programme for 1978/79, even after the £50 million

reduction. As a percentage of GNP we will be well above FRG, Japan and USA. We continue to support a substantial replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA6) and a general capital increase of the World Bank.

COMECON AID

9. COMECON ODA amounts to only 0.1% of GNP compared with the DAC (OECD) average of 0.33%. The developing countries are becoming increasingly critical of this poor performance.

DR WALDHEIM'S POSITION

10. Dr Waldheim has from time to time suggested a wider role for the UN in co-ordinating energy discussions. He reverted to his idea of an energy institute in his opening address to the Economic and Social Council in Geneva on 4 July, with support from the Italians.

FINANCIAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
5 JULY 1979

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 5: UN LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

POINTS TO MAKE [Defensive]

1. Conference has achieved much. But greater realism from the G77 and the land-based producers is necessary over deep seabed mining. Their present financial demands for access to deep seabed minerals are too high.
2. Like others, we hope to arrive at signature of generally agreed Convention next year. But would not want that objective to be reached at expense of legitimate national interests.

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 5: UN LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Eighth session of conference resumes in New York on 19 July-24 August. During first part of session (Geneva 19 March-27 April) Dr Waldheim sent a message calling for every effort to conclude negotiations (in progress since 1974).
2. There is substantial agreement on all subjects except deep seabed mining. Main problem here is G77 insistence, based partly on the interests of competing land-based producers, on exorbitant financial terms in contracts for mining, and unacceptably high financial contribution from industrial countries to the proposed UN mining "Enterprise".
3. Procedure allows for agreement to be reached by consensus. But there is a possibility that the G77 will try to force through a seabed text which is not generally acceptable, simply in order to meet the objective of signature of a Convention at Caracas in early 1980.

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 6: REFORM OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROCEDURES

POINTS TO MAKE (defensive)

1 Agree that the General Assembly's work should be better organised. The Secretary-General's recent report is a useful compilation of proposals.

2 The UK joined other delegations in New York to study the question. We shall continue to work for practical measures to promote efficiency. Worth trying, but not optimistic that much will happen.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS (may be used as necessary)

- 1 With an increase in the number of delegations and in agenda items, successive General Assemblies have become increasingly unmanageable. The 1978 General Assembly, an organisational shambles, overran its time into January 1979.
- 2 An informal working group of delegates from all regional groups, meeting under the Chairmanship of the Canadian Permanent Representative (the "Barton Group"), produced an informal paper on UN procedures. The UK played an active part. In parallel, the Secretary-General has reported to the General Assembly on rationalisation of its procedures and organisation. There is much common ground in their suggestions for reform, covering the role of the General Committee, reduction and rationalisation of the agenda, organisation of work, documentation, budgetary questions, conduct of meetings and presiding officers.
- 3 Interested delegations in New York will consider the Secretary-General's report and hope to agree on proposals which might, if the will for compromise exists, be implemented at the next General Assembly (September to December in New York).

United Nations Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6 July 1979

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 7: PEACEKEEPING

POINTS TO MAKE (defensive)

1 Support UN's peacekeeping and peacemaking roles.
We are part of UNFICYP and give logistic support to UNIFIL.

2 Not yet possible to complete studies of what detailed British policies might be. /If asked whether HMG will confirm Dr Owen's commitment of September 1978/. Too early to decide in detail how we shall support peacekeeping. /If pressed/ we must see how to reconcile it with our national defence capability, and with our public expenditure cuts.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 In his speech to the General Assembly of 27 September 1978, Dr Owen made a revised offer of UK support for UN peacekeeping, which included the offer of a battalion or marine commando group for up to six months at seven days' notice. A decision on whether to modify this commitment or let it stand may hinge on competing pressures on our defence forces (eg reinforcing Hong Kong) and on public expenditure levels (FCO would have to pay, at least initially).

2 This offer replaced an (unpublished) commitment of September 1973, made direct to the Secretary-General, for a brigade unit with logistic support (ie up to 5,000 men). This in turn replaced a commitment, announced in the House of Commons by Mr Stewart in 1965, of provision of logistic support for a UN peacekeeping force of up to six battalions.

3 There are UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, Sinai, Golan Heights and Lebanon, and peacekeeping observer missions on the Israeli borders and Kashmir.

4 The UK is a major contributor to UNFICYP in Cyprus - a battalion, logistic support for the entire force and a major financial contribution. The UK also supports UNIFIL in the Lebanon through provision of logistic support from the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, and provided transport and equipment for the Fijian and Nepalese contingents.

United Nations Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Department

6 July 1979

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WALDHEIM, KURT

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Austrian. Born 1918. University of Vienna (Doctor of Jurisprudence).

Austrian Diplomatic Service 1945-64. Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs 1968-70. Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations 1971-72. Elected Secretary-General of the United Nations 1972 and re-elected in 1976 (second term expires 1981).

Mr Waldheim is a painstaking and cautious man who sees his role primarily as a conciliator. He is touchy about the authority and prestige of the UN and appreciates recognition of his unique position in world politics. He has sought, with some success, to promote the wider involvement of the UN in issues of international peace and security as well as economic and social development.

Although he was aware when first elected that the UK had reservations about his candidature, he trusts and likes Britain and his relations with the UK Mission have been consistently good and helpful.

Married, two children (one son living in London).
Interests - horses and the UN.

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

ESSENTIAL FACTS: UNITED NATIONS

1. 151 member states.
2. UN regular budget for 1978 and 1979 about \$986 million. UK assessed contribution 4.5 %; £9 million in 1978. Additional UK contribution to UN funds and agencies in 1978 £72 million.
3. Under the UN Charter, the principal organs are:-
 - a) The General Assembly, comprising all UN members and meeting in regular session from September to December each year. Emergency or special sessions may also be held.
 - b) The Security Council. 15 members. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UK has permanent membership under the Charter).
 - c) The Economic and Social Council. 54 members. Concerned with economic, social, cultural, health, and related matters and human rights. (UK has consistently secured re-election).
 - d) The Trusteeship Council. 5 members. Concerned with trust territories of which only the US trust territory of the Pacific remains (UK is a member under the Charter).
 - e) The International Court of Justice. The principal judicial organ.
 - f) The Secretariat.

4. Under provision for a Secretariat, the Charter provides for a Secretary-General (to be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council) and such staff as the organisation may require. Headquarters staff now number about 5,700, worldwide UN staff about 18,300.

5. There are in addition a number of intergovernmental agencies related to the UN by special agreements. They include the International Labour Organisation, The Food and Agriculture Organisation, The World Health Organisation and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation is the only specialised agency based in London.

6. The UN is represented in London by the UN Information Centre headed by Mr Michael Popovic (British).