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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 261345Z SEP
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1126 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO UKDEL VIENNA
PRETORIA LUSAKA MAPUTO

INFO SAVING EAST BERLIN BUDAPEST WARSAW BUCHAREST SOFIA PRAGUE

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR GROMYKO

RHODESIA

1. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED OUR APPROACH TO THE RHODESIAN CONFERENCE. MR GROMYKO SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DID NOT QUESTION OUR SINCERITY, BUT HAD THEIR OWN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION. THE MAJORITY MUST BE GIVEN POWER, IN RHODESIA AS IN NAMIBIA AND ALSO IN SOUTH AFRICA, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE THE LATTER WAS A SOVEREIGN STATE. THE UNITED KINGDOM CALLED THE PRESENT RHODESIAN REGIME QUOTE A GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE (SIC), BUT UNTIL THE MAJORITY GAINED POWER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DO SO. IT WAS CLEAR THAT BRITAIN HAD NOT FOUND A COMMON LANGUAGE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. BUT EVEN SUPPOSING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT UNDER WHATEVER PRESSURES OR INFLUENCES WERE EVENTUALLY TO COME TO SOME AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE THEIR OWN ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION. AT PRESENT HOWEVER THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR VIEWS AND THOSE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS.

2. LORD CARRINGTON EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT MR GROMYKO'S ANALYSIS: WE WERE SENT ON ACHIEVING PRECISELY WHAT HE HAD DESCRIBED, NAMELY A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY. HE ASKED MR GROMYKO TO TAKE AN OBJECTIVE LOOK AT WHAT HE HAD TERMED OUR QUOTE SUBJECTIVE UNQUOTE ATTITUDE.

3. MR GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT THERE HAD CLEARLY BEEN SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND OURSELVES. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT MR GROMYKO WAS UNDER A MISUNDERSTANDING: THE CONFERENCE HAD NOT BROKEN UP. MR GROMYKO INSISTED THAT HE HAD

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READ ABOUT WIDENING DIVERGENCES BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN THE AMERICAN PRESS. HOWEVER HE ADMITTED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE SHORT OF INFORMATION: THEY GOT VERY LITTLE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM AND WOULD LIKE MORE. LORD CARRINGTON UNDERTOOK TO MAKE THIS AVAILABLE.

THE ARMS RACE

4. REFERRING TO LORD CARRINGTON'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MR GROMYKO SAID THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO FRIGHTEN EACH OTHER INTO INCREASING ARMS PRODUCTION. THE SOVIET UNION QUOTE WAS DOING NOTHING NUMERICALLY OR OTHERWISE TO INCREASE THEIR ARMS, AND HAD NO PLANS TO DO SO UNQUOTE. OUR INFORMATION WAS CLEARLY DEFECTIVE. HE COULD ONLY SUPPOSE THAT WE WANTED TO SCARE THE TAX-PAYER INTO FINANCING AN INCREASE IN THE DEFENCE BUDGET. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE WERE NOT PRIVY TO SOVIET MOTIVES, BUT COULD ONLY GO BY THE FACTS. WE NOTED THE INCREASED CAPACITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES, SOVIET DEFENCE SPENDING AND THE BACKFIRE AND SS20. WE COULD HARDLY BE BLAMED FOR WONDERING WHAT ALL THIS WAS FOR. MR GROMYKO SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD SCRAP OUR INFORMATION ON THE SS20 AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER. AFTER PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN THE AMERICANS HAD AGREED THAT THE LATTER WAS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON. (IN THAT CASE, SAID LORD CARRINGTON, IT WAS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS TO WESTERN EUROPE). THE AMERICANS MOREOVER HAD VAST AMOUNTS OF ARMS AND AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE AIMED AT THE SOVIET UNION. THE RUSSIANS DID HOWEVER WANT TO CONTINUE WITH MBFR, DESPITE THE WEST'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR AN AGREEMENT. THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROGRESS IN VIENNA HAD NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED. PERHAPS MORE FREQUENT AND MORE DETAILED EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UK WERE NEEDED IN THIS WHOLE FIELD.

5. LORD CARRINGTON REFERRED TO THE OUTSTANDING INVITATION TO MR GROMYKO TO VISIT THE UNITED KINGDOM: SUCH A VISIT MIGHT HELP HIM TO UNDERSTAND OUR ATTITUDES. WE TOO HOPED THAT MBFR WOULD HELP TOWARDS A PROPER ASSESSMENT OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE. MR GROMYKO ASKED BRITAIN TO REFLECT ON THE FACT THAT OUR CRITICISMS OF SOVIET DEFENCE POLICY WERE MADE BY A COUNTRY WHOSE ENTIRE STRATEGIC FORCES WERE LEFT INTACT BY THE SALT II TREATY.

SOVIET DISSIDENTS

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT MR GROMYKO HAD REFERRED IN

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HIS SPEECH TO THE NEED FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT. BUT HE WOULD BE LESS THAN CANDID IF HE DID NOT MENTION THE PROBLEM WHICH SOVIET TREATMENT OF CERTAIN JEWISH CASES AND CAMPAIGNERS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT POSED FOR US. THESE CAUSED CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC PRESSURE AND TENDED TO SOUR OUR RELATIONS. MR GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE WAS INDEED SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS, PROVIDED BRITAIN DID NOT CONCENTRATE ON JETTIFOGGING ISSUES. THERE WAS NO QUOTE JEWISH PROBLEM UNQUOTE IN THE SOVIET UNION. ALL JEWS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE WERE ALLOWED TO DO SO FREELY EXCEPT WHEN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS APPLIED. WHY DID WE NOT EXPLAIN TO PUBLIC OPINION THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF JEWS WERE NOW ALLOWED TO LEAVE?

BILATERAL RELATIONS

7. FINALLY GROMYKO SAID THAT BRITAIN SHOULD TAKE A MORE SERIOUS ATTITUDE TO ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS. WE HAD BEEN ALLIES IN TWO WORLD WARS IN WHICH WE HAD BOTH MADE SACRIFICES. THERE WERE GREAT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TRADE AND ECONOMIC FIELDS, ALTHOUGH BRITISH POLICIES CHANGED AS OFTEN AS THE WEATHER. THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED GREATER CONTACT. AS REGARDS HIS OWN VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF AGREEING THE RIGHT TIME. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO WELCOME LORD CARRINGTON IN MOSCOW. HE ASKED WHEN IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT FOR HIM TO COME TO LONDON? LORD CARRINGTON INDICATED THAT ANY TIME AFTER THE RHODESIAN CONFERENCE WOULD BE SUITABLE. HE REFERRED TO THE FORTHCOMING ANGLO-SOVIET ROUND TABLE IN LONDON AND SAID THAT HE HOPED THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEND A HIGH-POWERED TEAM.

8. THE MEETING LASTED AN HOUR AND A QUARTER.

FCO PASS SAVING EAST BERLIN BUDAPEST, WARSAW, BUCHAREST, SOFIA, PRAGUE.
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MR P N MOBERLY
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
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Prime Minister

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FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

TALK WITH GROMYKO.

1. THIS WAS ONLY MY SECOND MEETING WITH GROMYKO AND IT LEFT ME IN NO HURRY FOR THE THIRD. HE HAD EARLIER DELIVERED A SPEECH OF EVEN MORE THAN THE USUAL CYNICISM TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, POOHPOOHING TALK OF A SOVIET-CUBAN THREAT, ACCUSING OTHERS OF MEDDLING IN AFGHANISTAN AND TABLING A PORTENTOUS ITEM ON THE OUTLAWING OF HEGEMONISM. WITH ME HE WAS BY TURNS JOCOSE, HECT-ORING AND DISAGREEABLE, SWITCHING TO BONHOMIE ONLY RIGHT AT THE END AND THEN WITH HEAVY QUALIFICATIONS. BUT HE SEEMED SINCERE ABOUT TAKING UP HIS OLD INVITATION TO VISIT BRITAIN AND I INTEND TO TAKE HIM AT HIS WORD ON THIS. IT IS OBVIOUSLY HIGH TIME HE INHALED SOME FRESH IDEAS.

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MR FERGUSSON

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Prime Minister

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH

1. THERE WERE FEW SURPRISES IN GROMYKO'S LENGTHY STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING.

2. HE SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF DETENTE, BUT SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY SOME PEOPLE STILL MADE QUOTE A WRY FACE AT THE WORD DETENTE, LIKE A HUNGRY CAT IN A KITCHEN GARDEN AT THE TASTE OF CUCUMBER UNQUOTE. HE REJECTED QUOTE FALSEHOODS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE PROPAGANDA UNQUOTE AGAINST CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION.

3. HE DESCRIBED SOVIET/FRENCH CO-OPERATION AS BEING ON THE INCREASE AND SAID THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE FRG HAD BEEN FOLLOWING A POSITIVE TREND. ON THE UK, HE SAID QUOTE WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE CONSISTENT DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET/BRITISH RELATIONS. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THERE IS A DESIRE FOR THIS IN BRITAIN TOO UNQUOTE.

4. ON THE CTB NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID QUOTE WE WOULD EXPECT THAT NO COMPLICATING ELEMENTS WILL BE INTRODUCED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY OUR PARTNERS AS UNFORTUNATELY IS THE CASE EVEN TODAY UNQUOTE.

(presumably a reference to N.S.S.)

5. HE INTRODUCED AS THE ANNUAL SOVIET INITIATIVE A RESOLUTION ENTITLED QUOTE ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF A POLICY OF HEGEMONISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL QUOTE SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS ITSELF AGAINST HEGEMONISM UNQUOTE. IT WOULD BE A QUOTE GOOD IDEA SUBSEQUENTLY TO COUCH THE RENUNCIATION BY STATES OF A POLICY OF HEGEMONISM IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN TERMS OF A BROAD INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT UNQUOTE.

6. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS TO UN DEPARTMENT BY TODAY'S BAG. WE WILL SEND TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HEGEMONISM AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

PARSONS

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