

NENAD

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON WEDNESDAY 16 APRIL AT 10AM

Present:

Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP

Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP

Mr Murray

Mr J Moberly

Mr Simpson-Orlebar

Mr Wickstead

Mr Kurt Waldheim,  
UN Secretary-General

Mr Abdulrahim Farah, USG for  
Special Political Affairs

Mr Michael Popovic, Acting DG  
UN Information Centre, London

UNIFIL

Mr Waldheim said the situation in Lebanon was very serious. The way UNIFIL was being treated by Major Haddad, supported by the Israelis, was humiliating and dangerous. The Irish incident had been highly embarrassing. The UN HQ had been almost completely destroyed, along with their four Italian helicopters. How could he accept this? In the informal consultations of the Security Council last Sunday (c.f. UKMis New York telno 599), he had warned that he would be obliged to propose either the Force's withdrawal that it should be authorised to use its arms in a more convincing way: the troops must be able to stop themselves from being taken prisoner. Mr Hurd asked whether Mr Waldheim wanted the Security Council's Resolution to give him a direct mandate to change the rules. Mr Waldheim said that was not the problem. Under the present Police operation, UNIFIL could already use its arms in 'self-defence'; Chapter 7 enforcement operation on the Korea model was out of the question. The problem was that the Haddad forces were much better equipped: they had artillery, tanks and rockets. Given the impossibility of reaching agreement in the Council and the complication of the US Presidential election, the only answer might be for him to authorise the Force internally to acquire more effective weapons, perhaps artillery and even tanks. Sir Ian

/Gilmour

Gilmour said that UNIFIL was composed of infantry units: would not this mean that different troops would be needed? Mr Waldheim said he would have to discuss all this with the troop contributors. He was aware of the dangers of attempting to change the whole structure, but how long would the troop contributors put up with the present situation?

2. Mr Waldheim said he had asked the Americans to speak to Mr Begin about the attacks on UNIFIL. He had written himself to Mr Begin, receiving an evasive reply. Sir Ian Gilmour asked whether the Israelis wanted to get rid of UNIFIL. Mr Waldheim was not sure: the Israelis wanted a shield. They accused UNIFIL of cooperating with the PLO. This was not true, though some infiltration was inevitable. He did not think there were more than 300-500 Palestinians within the UN area. On the whole, they were cooperative, especially Arafat. The latter was not responsible for the last attack on the Israeli kibbutz. There were indications the terrorists might have mounted this attack from inside Israel via the shore, and not come through the UN lines. Mr Hurd asked whether the UN could not site their HQ outside Haddad territory. He had talked to General Erskine about this. Mr Waldheim said they had tried hard to find another site, without success. Sir Ian Gilmour asked about the chances of the Lebanese army doing more. Mr Waldheim said the UN were trying to replace some Irish troops with regular Lebanese forces, but the latter preferred to operate under the UN umbrella.

#### Arab/Israel

3. Mr Waldheim said that the Lebanese problem could only be solved within the context of a general agreement on the Middle East. There were no illusions in Washington about an imminent breakthrough on this. He welcomed the role of the Nine. Sir Ian Gilmour said that if the Europeans did not do something in the UN or

/elsewhere

elsewhere before the US elections, there would be more Arab activity in the UN. Mr Waldheim said the possibilities were for some addition to Resolution 242, or for some kind of conference; the Arabs wanted this to be under the UN umbrella. President Sad had told him he was not against an international conference; on the other hand, the Syrian member of his 5-man Commission on Iran had told him the Arabs would be in favour of a conference, but without the Egyptians being present. Sir Ian Gilmour said Israel would not attend any gathering outside the Camp David framework. They were trying to gain time and building up their settlements. Mr Waldheim thought it would be a long process. We should have to await developments after the US elections and in Israel.

#### Iran

4. Sir Ian Gilmour said the Nine were in consultation on President Carter's requests. We had grave doubts about whether these would succeed, but the need to preserve solidarity was very important. We must be seen to do something. Mr Waldheim said the problem, which he had experienced personally, was that we were all negotiating with people who lacked power. There could be no progress until we convinced Khomeini.

#### Afghanistan

5. Mr Waldheim was worried by the reactions of the media and certain governments. He was reminded of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when he had been Austrian Foreign Minister and there were fears that Soviet tanks would drive for Yugoslavia and the warm Mediterranean ports. He was convinced the Russians would not start an open war against Pakistan. If they wanted to reach the Gulf or Indian Ocean, they had other means. We should try to calm the hysteria. Sir Ian Gilmour expressed surprise at the reference to hysteria. He thought there was almost too much apathy. The Russians might not be about to invade Pakistan, but

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their occupation of Afghanistan was serious enough. Mr Hurd said our problem lay in keeping the facts before public opinion. There might be no imminent danger of an attack on Pakistan or Iran, but there might be opportunities and the temptation to make use of them in the coming weeks. Mr Waldheim protested that he was aware of the dangers. The question was how to stop it. No-one today wanted a nuclear war. He was in favour of a conference to negotiate the future of Afghanistan. Lord Carrington's proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was excellent: Afghanistan had always been a buffer zone. He had discussed the idea with the Russians who did not want it in the form proposed. He doubted whether the Indian proposal for a regional conference would have much of a better chance. Mrs Gandhi had asked him to tell President Zia that she wanted good relations, this being the best way to keep the big powers out. Sir Ian Gilmour said we, too, had talked to the Russians. They had certainly not embraced our proposal, but neither had they rejected it. Mr Murray suggested there were two pointers. Not only was Afghanistan traditionally a buffer zone, but it had declared its neutrality <sup>around</sup> on ten occasions since 1914. Even after the 1978 revolution, Tاراقي had said Afghanistan was a neutral and non-aligned state. We were not therefore asking for anything new. Secondly, the proposal was becoming more and more interesting for the non-aligned and Islamic states. There had been a very good conversation when the Lord Privy Seal received Mr Chatty.

6. Mr Waldheim said that Mr Kreisky had discussed with him the idea of a 'control commission' composed of non-aligned and neutral Western countries acceptable to the Russians (eg Algeria and Sweden), which should undertake the monitoring of foreign infiltration in exchange for a Soviet undertaking to withdraw within six months. Mr Murray recalled Mr Kreisky's similar suggestion, at last July's Geneva meeting on Indo-China, of a neutral body for Cambodia,

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which the Swedes had refused to support. Mr Waldheim said we would have to see if the Russians wanted a face-saver on these lines.

#### Namibia

7. Offering his congratulations on the Rhodesian outcome, Mr Waldheim asked what effect this might have on Namibia. The UN Mission's report was not very encouraging. Sir Ian Gilmour said we wanted to slow things down as much as possible to allow the South Africans to get used to a Mugabe-led Zimbabwe. We should aim to avoid presenting them with stark choices, but there was impatience elsewhere. Mr Waldheim said it had been explained to the South Africans that the UNTAG operation ought to start in the first half of June for climatic reasons. He needed their answer by then. The South Africans had simply taken note. They accepted the concept of the DMZ but wanted clarification on the selected locations and no SWAPO bases in Namibia. It ought to be possible to find a solution, but there was a chicken and egg situation. The South Africans should be influenced by Mr Mugabe's statesmanship. If the present initiative failed, the solution would take a long time.

#### North/South

8. Mr Waldheim said that President Lopez Portillo and Mr Kreisky were discussing the idea of a limited and informal summit gathering, on the Manley model, before or after the General Assembly Special Session. It would be linked to the Brandt Report.

9. The meeting ended at 10.45 am.

/Distribution

Distribution

PS

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/PUS

PS/Sir D Maitland

Sir A Acland

Mr Bullard

Mr Murray

Mr J Moberly

Mr Fergusson

Lord N Gordon Lennox

UND to enter

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