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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 May 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Official Visit by the United Nations Secretary-General, 20-23 May 1980

Further to my letter of 16 May, enclosing briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Waldheim at 4.30pm tomorrow (Tuesday), I now enclose supplementary briefing on Indo-China (Brief No 6) and Afghanistan (Brief No 3), together with an additional brief on Cuban refugees (Brief No 13), in case the subject comes up in the course of discussions. The Prime Minister may also wish to be aware of Mr Waldheim's talks with President Giscard (Paris Telno 444 attached). *with briefing annexed to file*

I shall be letting you have supplementary briefing on Namibia tomorrow morning.

Mr & Mrs Waldheim will now arrive at Heathrow at 13.10 tomorrow from Geneva. I attach two copies of the printed programme.

*yours ever  
P Lever*

*pp* (P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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FM PARIS 161635Z MAY 80.

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 444 OF 16 MAY 1980.

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW.

INFO SAVING TEHRAN

VISIT TO FRANCE BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. DURING HIS BRIEF VISIT TO PARIS, MR WALDHEIM HAD TALKS WITH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, M FRANCOIS-PONCET, ON THE EVENING OF 13 MAY AND WAS RECEIVED TO LUNCH BY PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 14 MAY. ACCORDING TO THE QUAI AND THE ELYSEE, THE CONVERSATION ON BOTH OCCASIONS WAS LIMITED TO A GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON. THE ONLY SUBJECT WHICH THE FRENCH HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL WAS IRAN, WHERE THEY HOPED TO PERSUADE WALDHEIM TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE AGAIN. THEY SAID THAT WALDHEIM SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO DO SO.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TEHRAN.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

JAMES

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

FILES

WED

UND

MED

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

SIR A. ACLAND

LORD N.G. LENNOX

SIR D. MAITLAND

MR J.C. MOBERLY

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 May 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Official visit by the United  
Nations Secretary-General,  
20-23 May 1980

*I set in folder attached to file*

/ I attach two sets of briefs for the  
Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Waldheim from  
4.30 pm on Tuesday, 20 May. These may need  
to be supplemented in the light of  
developments between now and 20 May.


*Yours ever*  
*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

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16 MAY 1980



## VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: 20-23 MAY 1980

## LIST OF BRIEFS

1. Steering Brief
2. Role of Secretary-General
3. UN Institutions:
  - a) Assaults on the Constitution
  - b) UN Secretariat
  - c) Finance and Budget
4. Iran
5. Afghanistan
6. Indo-China
7. Middle East
  - a) Arab/Israel
  - b) Lebanon
8. Southern Africa
  - a) Namibia
  - b) South Africa
9. Cyprus
10. North/South
11. The Falklands
12. Belize

## VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

## BRIEF NO 1: STEERING BRIEF

## MR WALDHEIM'S VISIT

1. Mr Waldheim is to call on the Prime Minister for about an hour from 1630 on 20 May and be entertained by her at dinner that evening. He will call on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for an hour at 1030 on 21 May, followed later (with Mr Waldheim's Audience of The Queen intervening) by a working lunch. He will have a separate talk with the Minister for Overseas Development but no longer, as originally proposed, with the Secretary of State for Energy (who will be abroad: Mr Waldheim may wish to cover energy during his meeting with Lord Carrington).
2. Personality Notes on Mr Waldheim and his party are attached, as are his programme and essential facts on the United Nations (Annexes A, B and C).
3. Mr Waldheim will arrive in London from Geneva, where he has family and UN business. He was previously in Vienna for the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. After leaving London, Mr Waldheim will address a UN ministerial level meeting on humanitarian aid to Indo-China, to be held in Geneva on 26/27 May.

/AGENDA

AGENDA

4. There is no formal Agenda for the meetings with the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Mr Waldheim will want a tour d'horizon of the international political and economic scene with the Prime Minister; this would touch on major issues active at the UN, including Iran, Afghanistan, Middle East, Indo-China, Southern Africa, Cyprus and North/South. Briefs are provided on these issues; they are summarised in paras 7-20 below. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be able to pursue these and other issues in more detail at his subsequent meeting. A list of briefs is at Annex D.

UK OBJECTIVES

5. (a) To reinforce the good UK working relationship with the Secretary-General;
- (b) to bring home to Mr Waldheim UK concern at Third World efforts to change the balance of UN institutions;
- (c) to reinforce our interest in obtaining satisfactory UK representation in the UN Secretariat;
- (d) to ascertain Mr Waldheim's intentions in respect of Iran/hostages;
- (e) to explain UK/Nine's proposals for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, and to seek Mr Waldheim's views on a possible UN role;
- (f) to encourage greater interest by Mr Waldheim in achieving a political solution in Indo-China;
- (g) to persuade Mr Waldheim to consult front line states and South Africa before preparing his reply to Mr Botha on Namibia.

MR WALDHEIM'S PROBABLE OBJECTIVES

6. (a) to ascertain our thinking on the international situation; and particularly UK/EC intentions with regard to a UN initiative on the Middle East;

- (b) to reinforce his credentials with an eye to the 1981 elections to the Secretary-Generalship;
- (c) to seek assurances regarding the level of UK voluntary contributions to UN bodies.

### RESUMÉ OF MAJOR BRIEFS

#### Role of Secretary-General (Brief No 2)

7. We should express appreciation of Mr Waldheim's achievements, but not commit ourselves over the 1981 elections: Mr Waldheim is clearly out to seek election for a third 5-year term, but at this stage no-one has formally declared himself a candidate.

#### UN Institutions (Brief No 3)

8. Assaults on the Constitution. We are concerned by efforts by the developing country majority to change the balance of UN institutions, to the detriment of Western interests and the effectiveness of the UN: eg proposed enlargement of the Security Council; // attacks on the veto; // allocation of Secretariat jobs by nationality rather than competence; // attempts to revise the method of assessing financial contributions; increased politicisation of technical bodies.

9. British representation in the UN Secretariat; succession to Mr Urquhart. Although we cannot complain about the numbers of Britons in the Secretariat, our overall representation is unbalanced and patchy. The most senior Briton is Mr Brian Urquhart, Under Secretary-General for special political affairs and the key figure in UN peacekeeping operations, who will accompany Mr Waldheim to the UK. Mr Waldheim should be reminded of the importance we attach to effective UK representation in the Secretariat and - subject to last minute advice from Sir A Parsons who will be seeing Mr Urquhart on the evening of 19 May - of our interest in the succession to Mr Urquhart when he retires.



10. Finance. We should commend and encourage Mr Waldheim's efforts to achieve restraint in the UN's budget; and reassure him that reduction in UK contributions to UN development and humanitarian programmes arises from financial stringency, not lack of confidence.

Iran (Brief No 4)

11. The UN may well offer the best prospects for negotiating the release of the hostages. Does Mr Waldheim plan to revive his Commission or take any further initiatives?

Afghanistan (Brief No 5)

12. It would be worth giving Mr Waldheim a further explanation of the UK/Nine proposals on Afghanistan. We hope that the concept will be supported by Islamic and non-aligned countries. Does Mr Waldheim expect further UN involvement?

Indo-China (Brief No 6)

13. International relief has made major strides, but instability and warfare continue to threaten Thailand. Mr Waldheim is unwilling to take further political or humanitarian initiatives. We would like him to show greater interest in achieving a political solution.

Middle East (Brief No 7)

14. Arab/Israel. Mr Waldheim will be interested in our ideas, including a possible Security Council resolution to supplement Resolution 242. UN could be a useful forum to promote progress to a settlement, but credibility undermined by too many one-sided resolutions.

15. Lebanon. The troop contributors are deeply concerned about the situation. UK proposing a more active role for the Nine: useful to ascertain Mr Waldheim's reaction.

Southern Africa (Brief No 8)

16. Namibia. How does Mr Waldheim assess the South African reply on the demilitarised zone (DMZ) proposal? We think it constructive, in respect both of the UN Secretariat's negotiations and possible proceedings in the Security Council.

17. South Africa. Hope that Mr Waldheim will join in persuading the Africans and others to encourage present moves towards peaceful change in South Africa: which is best achieved by persuasion rather than ostracism.

Cyprus (Brief No 9)

18. Intercommunal talks. Latest reports indicate UN determination to reconvene the stalled intercommunal talks by June, with or without prior agreement of the parties; we wish to strengthen Mr Waldheim's resolve.

19. On UNFICYP, we expect a serious review from the Secretariat, either leading to substantial reductions in the force, or showing convincingly why they are impossible.

North/South (Brief No 10)

20. Afghanistan and Iran have underlined the need for sound North/South relations. UK has constructive approach to proposed global negotiations. We look for useful discussions on energy in the negotiations, but are openminded whether a permanent UN energy forum will be needed afterwards (a favoured project of Mr Waldheim's). What are his views on the proposal for a limited Summit?

Other issues

21. Defensive briefs are provided on the Falklands (Brief No 11) and Belize (Brief No 12).

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## PERSONALITY NOTES

WALDHEIM, KURT

Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Austrian. Born 1918. Military service with German army 1938-42 (medical discharge after service on Eastern front). Graduated from University of Vienna as Doctor of Jurisprudence 1944 (but prefers to be addressed as 'Mr' rather than 'Dr'). Austrian Diplomatic Service 1945-68; Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs 1968-70; Permanent Representative to the UN 1970-72. Elected UN Secretary-General in 1972; re-elected 1977. Term expires December 1981.

Although his outlook has broadened in recent years, Waldheim's values and perceptions remain those of old style Austrian diplomacy; he is fundamentally decent, disciplined and somewhat paternalistic. He retains a strong belief in the provisions of the UN Charter and is staunch in defence of the authority and prestige of the UN and the office of the Secretary-General.

He works long hours but is not regarded as a good manager of business or staff. He has a painstaking approach to problems and is cautious about taking initiatives which might court unpopularity. Not an outstanding Secretary-General, but has succeeded in maintaining the authority of the United Nations

/and has

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and has been more active than is frequently recognised through quiet diplomacy and use of the Secretary-General's 'good offices'. Though aware that when first elected the UK had reservations about his candidacy, he trusts and likes Britain.

Speaks English, French and Italian. Interests are horses and the UN. Autobiography ('The Challenge of Peace') recently published.

MRS WALDHEIM

Elizabeth Charlotte. Austrian. Born 1922. She met Mr Waldheim when studying law, and worked at the Civil Court 1943-45. Married 1944 and accompanied Mr Waldheim on postings to Paris, Ottawa and New York. She is active in social work; interests include art, antiques, education, needlework and music. Enjoys political conversation. Excellent English.

Three children - Liselotte, Gerhardt and Christa. (Gerhardt and his family were resident in England last year while he attended a banking course).

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URQUHART, BRIAN EDWARD

Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

British. Born 1919. Educated at Christ Church, Oxford. Has made his career in the UN which he joined in 1945. He was Personal Assistant to the first Secretary-General from 1946-49. He subsequently held various posts in the Secretariat, mostly on the Secretary-General's staff as well as undertaking special missions to the Congo where he served as UN representative, Katanga, from 1961-62. Author of a biography on Hammarskjold published in 1972.

One of the outstanding international civil servants of his generation. A unique modest and thoroughly good man. He is the first to have risen through the ranks to the level of Under Secretary-General (and, given the fact that senior appointments in the Secretariat are increasingly made on the basis of national secondments, he is likely to be the last). He made his name by the way he restored some order out of the chaos of the UN's peacekeeping operation in the Congo in 1961. Since then he has concentrated on the UN's peacekeeping role, notably in the Middle East and Cyprus. Urquhart has loyally served all his Secretaries-General and they have come to rely on his judgement and good sense. Urquhart's influence upon the UN has been pervasive and for the good. His political sense is thoroughly realistic. After a generation at the UN, he remains devoted to its ideals and retains an impartial approach to his job. His influence and refusal to be brow-beaten have often made him the object of hostility and suspicion on the part of the Russians and jealousy on the part of the second-rate. None of this seems to bother him unduly.

Urquhart's office is, on the political side, the cutting edge of the Secretariat. It runs the various UN peacekeeping operations and advises the Secretary-General on the use of his 'good offices' in relation to areas of international tension and conflict.

He speaks French and German. His second wife, Sidney, is American.

(See also Brief no.3 (UK representation in the Secretariat) on the succession to Urquhart).



ROHAN, Albert

D.2. Director of the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General.

Austrian. Born 1936. Secondary education and further studies in Austria, France and Belgium. Service with the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1963 - 1977 (including service in London from 1968 - 1975). Took up present UN appointment in 1977.

An efficient and punctilious operator; inclined to formality. Speaks excellent French and English. An accomplished bridge player.

RESTRICTED

## VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: 20 - 23 MAY 1980

## OUTLINE PROGRAMME

Tuesday 20 May

AM	Arrival at London Heathrow
1630 - 1730	Call on the Prime Minister
1930 for 2000	Dinner at No 10 Downing Street hosted by the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher
2145	Reception at No 10 Downing Street

Wednesday 21 May

1030	Call on Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
1200	Audience of The Queen [Mr and Mrs Waldheim]
1230	Working lunch hosted by Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary [Lunch for Mrs Waldheim hosted by Lady Carrington]
1430	Call on the Minister for Overseas Development
1510	Meeting with the Rt Hon Peter Shore MP
1600	Press Conference
1645	Meeting with UN Association
1930	Theatre/supper party hosted by the Lord Privy Seal

/Thursday 22 May

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Thursday, 22 May

Visit to Keele University to receive  
an honorary degree from Chancellor,  
Princess Margaret.

Evening

Private engagement (arranged by  
Lord Weidenfeld).

Friday, 23 May

AM

Departure

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## VISIT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL, MAY 1980

## ESSENTIAL FACTS: UNITED NATIONS

1. 152 member states.
2. UN regular budget for 1980 and 1981 about \$1247 million *per annum*.  
UK assessed contribution 4.46% = £32.9 million in 1979. Additional  
UK contribution to UN funds and agencies in 1979 £65.2 million.
3. Under the UN Charter, the principal organs are:-
  - a) The General Assembly, comprising all UN members and meeting in regular session from September to December each year. Emergency or special sessions may also be held.
  - b) The Security Council. 15 members. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UK has permanent membership under the Charter).
  - c) The Economic and Social Council. 54 members. Concerned with economic, social, cultural, health and related matters and human rights. (UK has consistently secured re-election).
  - d) The Trusteeship Council. 5 members. Concerned with trust territories of which only the US trust territory of the Pacific remains (UK is a member under the Charter).
  - e) The International Court of Justice. The principal judicial organ.
  - f) The Secretariat.
4. Under provision for a Secretariat, the Charter provides for a Secretary-General (to be appointed by the General Assembly on  

/the recommendation



the recommendation of the Security Council) and such staff as the organisation may require. Headquarters staff now number about 5,700, worldwide UN staff about 18,300.

5. There are in addition a number of intergovernmental agencies related to the UN by special agreements. They include the International Labour Organisation, The Food and Agriculture Organisation, The World Health Organisation and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation is the only specialised agency based in London.

6. The UN is represented in London by the UN Information Centre headed by Mr Michael Popovic (British).

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 2: ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

POINTS TO MAKE

MR WALDHEIM'S ACHIEVEMENTS

1. Welcome the initiatives you have taken eg the meeting on Indo-Chinese refugees (Geneva, July 1979; called in response to the Prime Minister's proposal) and your visit to Tehran (January 1980).

FUTURE ROLE

2. Understand limitations on your freedom of action. We shall support constructive use of your office. Any new areas of concern?

ELECTIONS TO THE SECRETARY GENERALSHIP (if raised by Mr Waldheim)

3. Thank you for telling us your intentions.

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 2: ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

CAREER AND PERSONALITY

1. See biographical note (Annex A to Steering Brief).

MR WALDHEIM'S ACHIEVEMENTS

2. Mr Waldheim sensitive to criticism that he does not play a more active role. Under Article 99 of the UN Charter, 'the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'. Mr Waldheim last year used this Charter provision (over Iran); more usually relies on 'good offices'. Has done more in this field than he is generally given credit for. In addition to Iran and Cambodia, record includes initiatives over Korea, despatch of enquiry missions to examine human rights in Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, and intervention to secure release of French hostages held by the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.

ELECTIONS TO SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP

3. Mr Waldheim's second five-year term as Secretary-General expires in December 1981. He is expected to stand for a third term, though he has not publicly announced this and is unlikely to seek UK support at this stage. Strongest likely competitors: Ambassador Salim A Salim of Tanzania, current President of the General Assembly, and Mr Sonny Ramphal, Commonwealth Secretary-General. Mr Waldheim appears already somewhat obsessed by the prospects of a fight for re-election; this may affect his judgement as well as his workload.

/4.

INCIDENTS AT HEATHROW AND SALISBURY

4. Mr Waldheim also sensitive about his personal dignity and that of his office. Last month he travelled via London to Salisbury for Zimbabwe's independence ceremonies. All the passengers on his flight to Salisbury, which included 117 VIPs (37 delegations), were subjected at London Airport to body searches at the request of the airline, who were understandably taking special security precautions (the search turned up 4 undeclared firearms). In Salisbury Mr Waldheim was also unhappy with the arrangements, which were inevitably a bit rough and ready and which put the Secretary-General (who is not in protocol terms a Head of State or Government) in second place after the many Heads of State or Government present. He made a vigorous complaint to Sir A Parsons, but appears to have been mollified by a written expression of regret from Lord Carrington.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 MAY 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980  
BRIEF NO.3(a): UN INSTITUTIONS: ASSAULTS ON THE CONSTITUTION

POINTS TO MAKE

ATTACKS ON THE CHARTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE UN

1. We are concerned at continuing Third World efforts to erode the Charter and the established structure of the United Nations, eg

- pressures for Security Council enlargement
- threats to upset agreement on the allocation of seats on other UN bodies
- attacks on the Permanent Members' right of veto
- pressures to fill Secretariat posts on the basis of nationality rather than competence
- attempts to revise the method of assessing financial contributions.

2. We are receptive to the legitimate interests of Third World countries, but this must be a two-way process. Western countries, who are the major contributors to the UN budget (71%), can only be alienated by attempts to force through significant changes in the UN structure by majority vote rather than consensus.

POLITICISATION OF UN BODIES

3. We deplore the way certain UN bodies are used to pursue political and propaganda campaigns unrelated to the business in hand. This brings the UN into disrepute and wastes time and money.

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VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(a): UN INSTITUTIONS: ASSAULTS ON THE CONSTITUTION

ESSENTIAL FACTS

ATTACKS ON THE CHARTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE UN

1. Third World countries are pressing for changes in the structure, organisation and business of the UN, to reflect their numerical majority. Moves during the last two General Assemblies included:

- an Indian proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council;
- a Jamaican/Argentinian proposal for the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
- a Libyan proposal to abolish the veto.

All of these involve attempts to amend the Charter of the UN. There have also been

- a Third World resolution forcing through a change in the composition of a UN body;
- attacks on fundamental financial principles;
- attempts to change the composition of the Secretariat.

2. Taken together, these proposals have serious implications for Western interests at the UN; given our permanent membership of the Security Council, they have a direct bearing on UK interests.

/POLITICISATION OF UN BODIES

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POLITICISATION OF UN BODIES

3. Third World priorities are economic development, Southern Africa and the Middle East. UN agendas, debates and resolutions reflect these. In some bodies this emphasis is legitimate; in others, like the specialised agencies, the introduction of political issues inhibits productive work (eg attempts to focus on health conditions of West Bank Palestinians in the World Health Assembly). The Russians and their allies are always ready to stir the pot.

4. See Briefs 3(b) and (c) for further material on Third World attacks on Western levels of representation in the Secretariat and Western rates of assessed contributions to the UN budget.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1  
15 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(b): UN INSTITUTIONS: UN SECRETARIAT

POINTS TO MAKE

BRITISH REPRESENTATION

1. Attach importance to UK continuing to be well represented; so-called 'over-representation' surely reflects quality/ability of British subjects who have sought employment with UN.
2. British contingent in Secretariat now rather old. Hope more promising young Britons will be recruited into junior professional grades. What about competitive examination, as just organised with the French?
3. Hope UK under-representation in some important departments will be remedied, eg Administration and Management; Political and Security Council Affairs.

SUCCESSION TO MR BRIAN URQUHART(a member of Mr Waldheim's party)


[Subject to last-minute advice from Sir A Parsons. Only suitable for communication to Mr Waldheim in tête-à-tête conversation, not overheard by other members of the Secretariat.]

4. Do not know Mr Urquhart's personal plans. Hope he will stay as long as possible, but that a Briton will succeed him when he retires. Our historical experience qualifies us well for the role he fills.

ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE COMPOSITION OF SECRETARIAT

5. Disturbed by recent attacks on contribution factor, as prime factor used to determine 'desirable ranges' for level of each country's representation in the Secretariat. Oppose radical alteration of existing criteria based on long-standing consensus. Understand Western position explained in recent joint démarche.

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(b): UN INSTITUTIONS: UN SECRETARIAT

ESSENTIAL FACTS

BRITISH REPRESENTATION

1. UK national interest requires good spread of able British officials at all levels of UN Secretariat. Pace Article 100 of UN Charter, which proscribes attempts to influence the Secretary-General or his staff, we should be prepared to do so in some cases. Senior appointments nearly always involve political battles, which Waldheim accepts.
  
2. Particular difficulties for UK:
  - 1) British 'over-representation' in Secretariat as a whole;
  - 2) concentration of UK nationals in comparatively unimportant posts;
  - 3) increasing age of British contingent; many entered UN in its early days;
  - 4) low calibre of some UK nationals in the Secretariat;
  - 5) good candidates deterred by difficulty of getting in, Secretariat's bad reputation, etc.
  
3. Prime long term need is to ensure that more able young Britons enter Secretariat at or near the bottom of the ladder.

/SUCCESSION

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SUCCESSION TO MR BRIAN URQUHART

4. Mr Urquhart's post as Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs uniquely important. His personal standing helps UK influence on political direction of UN and redounds to our credit throughout the organisation. Strong British interest that post should be retained for UK when Urquhart retires, probably 1984/85.

5. No British subject now in the UN system with right qualities to succeed Urquhart: a nominee from outside therefore required. Urquhart confirms this should be someone with background in administration; politician would not be right. Trawl now under way.

6. We may need in due course to lean heavily on Secretary-General. At this stage, only necessary to remind Waldheim of UK interest (Mr Callaghan mentioned it to him in 1977), in such a way as not to embarrass Urquhart.

ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE COMPOSITION OF SECRETARIAT

7. UK, like some other developed countries, 'over-represented' in terms of 'desirable ranges' ie guidelines prepared by Secretariat for level of each country's representation (UK 'desirable range' 72-98: actual number of staff in 1979 - 129). These guidelines being transformed into rigid quotas: against Article 101 of UN Charter, which requires Secretary-General to employ most suitable candidate.

8. At 34th General Assembly, Trinidad led challenge to the formula on which 'desirable ranges' calculated (equation based on size of contribution to UN budget, membership of UN,

/population

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population - weighted in that order of importance). Result was one-sided resolution (34/219) - which 33 developed countries of East and West voted against - calling for studies of how contribution factor could be reduced in importance, membership factor increased. This could reduce 'desirable ranges' of major contributors, including UK, in favour of developing countries; virtually impossible for UK nationals to get jobs with UN for years to come.

9. Permanent representatives of US, UK, France, FRG, Japan made joint démarche to Secretary-General on 8 May with following points:

- (a) Resolution 34/219 opposed by 33 Member States, which together contribute nearly 90% of the UN budget;
- (b) Distribution of places in Secretariat should continue to rest on consensus. Secretary-General should therefore propose compromise solution at 35th UNGA;
- (c) Secretary-General should look for other solutions eg more places for all Member States.

SOVIET PRESSURES ON SECRETARIAT

10. All Soviet nationals in Secretariat are there to promote Soviet interests; many also involved in intelligence work. Particular Soviet pressure in personnel field; most notorious case that of Mr Dneprovsky appointed head of Personnel Department in Geneva in 1978, despite UK/US protests to the Secretary-General that he was known intelligence officer. Pending further analysis and consultation with friendly Governments, general approach to Mr Waldheim by Ministers probably inadvisable at this stage.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1

15 May 1980.

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(c): UN INSTITUTIONS: FINANCE AND BUDGET

POINTS TO MAKE

PROGRAMME BUDGET 1980-1981

1. Concerned to see real growth restrained. Commend your efforts to achieve restraint. Keep it up.

GENERAL

2. We would like to see zero real growth in budgets of UN bodies over next 5 years.
3. New or expanded UN programmes should be funded from more efficient redeployment of existing resources.
4. The budgets of Specialised Agencies should not be allowed to grow without control.

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN REGULAR BUDGET

5. Cannot support any suggestion to amend method of calculating assessments which would jeopardise continuing application of fundamental principle of capacity to pay. [Defensive: Reduction of UK assessment in new scale irrelevant.]

USE OF THE REGULAR BUDGET

6. UN Regular Budget should be used solely to finance administrative expenses of the Organisation which benefit all members. Other activities best met from voluntary contributions.

UK CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN AID SYSTEM (Defensive)

7. Britain among major contributors to UN development system. Unfortunately have to reduce our efforts, due to public expenditure constraints. Cannot promise increasing level of support yet.

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VISIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON,  
20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(c): UN INSTITUTIONS: UN FINANCE AND BUDGET

ESSENTIAL FACTS

PROGRAMME BUDGET 1980-81

1. Following calls for restraint from major contributors, proposed 1980-81 Programme Budget showed substantially lower rate of real growth than in previous years. However, large additional expenditures approved during 34th General Assembly, mostly by majority vote of developing countries: not offset by elimination of obsolete and ineffective programmes.

2. We and other major Western contributors, including US, abstained in the vote on the budget as a whole. Would have voted against had we had necessary minimum company.

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

3. Under new scale of assessments for 1980-82, UK's assessed contribution reduced from 4.52% in 1978/79 to 4.46% in 1980/82. UK 6th largest contributor, paying £32.9m. in 1979 assessed contributions (and £65.2m in voluntary contributions).

4. General Assembly called for study of means of 'increasing fairness and equity of scale of assessments'. Intention to overturn fundamental criterion (applied since 1946) of relative capacity to pay, measured by net national income. System sought by OPEC countries would cause UK to pay more than our fair share.

/USE OF THE REGULAR BUDGET

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USE OF THE REGULAR BUDGET

5. UK voted against Section 24 (Technical Assistance) of the Budget at 34th General Assembly.

AID

6. UN system<sup>a</sup>/major channel of economic aid to Third World: programmes financed predominantly by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). British aid programme gives voluntary financial support to UNDP, other UN economic/humanitarian programmes. In 1978/79 UK contributed £60m to UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO Research. 1980/81 figure likely to be about £45m following public expenditure constraints, change in emphasis of UK aid policy.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1  
15 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON ON 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 4: IRAN

POINTS TO MAKE

MR WALDHEIM'S INITIATIVES

1. Appreciate Mr Waldheim's efforts to resolve hostage problem: personal mission to Tehran in January; UN Commission in Tehran 23 February to 10 March.

FUTURE UN ACTION

2. Must keep up the pressure on Iran. We understand Mr Waldheim discussed revival of the UN Commission with Qotbzadeh in Belgrade. We would support any such moves which could well hold out the best prospects of resolving the matter. What are Mr Waldheim's intentions about this? What are his views on its chances of success?

ICJ JUDGEMENT

3. ICJ final judgement on Iran expected 15 May. Likely to condemn Iranian action. We do not know what United States intends as next step. How does Mr Waldheim view chances of a return to the Security Council?

HOSTAGES

4. Now dispersed. We wish to find out where they are held and will press for regular visits. International Committee of the Red Cross may be best means of achieving this.

MOOD IN IRAN

5. There are indications that many leading Iranians now wish to find a way out, without too much loss of face. This seems therefore a particularly opportune time to reactivate the UN Commission, although a final decision must probably still await the Majles.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SANCTIONS

6. Our sanctions, together with the Nine, and Japan, are intended

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- 2 -

to continue to bring pressure against Iran in support of the United States, but balancing this with a wish not to alienate those in Iran who want to get the hostages released.

#### IRANIAN ELECTIONS

7. Second round of elections held on 7 May. So far Islamic Republican Party has gained about half the seats. More results expected. Too soon to judge exact composition of Parliament. Timing on convening Assembly now put at 28 May.

#### NEW IRANIAN CABINET

8. Bani Sadr planned to appoint a Prime Minister and a new Cabinet in advance of Assembly convening. But decision deferred. Issue now referred to Revolutionary Council.



VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON ON 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 4: IRAN

ESSENTIAL FACTS

HOSTAGES [Not to be divulged to Mr Waldheim]

1. Series of meetings between EC Ambassadors in Tehran on 11-12 May with Qotbzadeh, Bani Sadr and other leading politicians, who seem committed to resolving problem. Have put forward three ideas, all linked to preparing a report which would persuade the Majles to make a favourable decision:

- (a) Revival of UN Commission of Enquiry;
- (b) Seminar of Non-Aligned, European Parliament delegation, and other organisations in Tehran. This meeting now postponed from original 15-17 May timing;
- (c) Message from Khomeini to the Majles being drafted by Bani Sadr and Khomeini's son.

It is important these ideas should not be divulged at this stage. If they become known, they may kill any chances of success.

FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 May 1980

  
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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN  
POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Soviet Union must withdraw from Afghanistan. We continue to see the proposal for a neutral and non-aligned status as the best prospect for achieving this. We put it forward; the Islamic Conference now seem to be taking it forward.
2. The Cubans may have been embarrassed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in that it impeded them from exploiting the Chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement and may have cost them their Security Council seat. But we do not believe that they have any real freedom of action. Before Malmierca, the Cuban Foreign Minister, began his rounds of visits, he went first to Moscow. The Cubans have been silent about this particular trip but it was no doubt to obtain instructions.
3. The Afghan 5-Point Plan on 17 April was also presumably drafted by the Russians. It makes no mention of Russian withdrawal.
4. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the countries of the region dismiss Cuban efforts. The Islamic countries will look to their own Conference, not to Castro, nor is Mrs Gandhi likely to tolerate Cuban interference.
5. We hope that Islamic and non-aligned countries will support the proposal for neutral and non-aligned status.
6. Does Mr Waldheim expect further UN involvement?

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN  
ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Further UN involvement would be one option for the furtherance of neutral and non-aligned status proposals. But the Soviet Union is unlikely to welcome a return to the UN and we have deliberately kept options open. We can see that if it is agreed that there should be international observers at Afghan frontiers as part of a settlement, a UN team of observers might be required.
2. The Prime Minister and Secretary of State will need no more briefing on this subject with which they are thoroughly conversant other than any information available about the outcome of the Islamic Conference, 14-18 May. A separate note will be submitted as soon as a report is received.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
13 MAY 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980 BBRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN  
POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Soviet Union must withdraw from Afghanistan.
2. Kabul proposals announced on 14 May
  - (a) amplify Kabul proposals made on 17 April but their main intent still seems to be to obtain international recognition for Babrak Karmal regime and confirmation of status quo.
  - (b) They allocate role to Karmal out of scale with degree of support he enjoys (1 million refugees).
  - (c) They say nothing about Afghan frontier with Soviet Union.
  - (d) also silent about China.
  - (e) 'Guarantees' of non-interference from Pakistan neglects difficulty of controlling frontier with Afghanistan. Minor incidents could enable Soviets to argue 'guarantees' had not been met and, therefore, provide pretext not to withdraw troops.
3. The Warsaw Pact proposal is no advancement. Indeed on Afghanistan the formula is that initially used with us by Lunkov.
4. Timing of announcement was a tactical ploy with Vienna and Islamic Conference in mind. All should stand firm in their demands for Soviet withdrawal and refusal to have dealings with Karmal regime.
5. However, willingness of Soviet Union to contemplate political solution is to be welcomed. So is willingness to talk about a Non Aligned Afghanistan (but this must be genuine).
6. Outcome of Islamic Conference must be taken into account as we consider how to advance pressure for acceptable political settlement.
7. Does Mr Waldheim expect further UN involvement?

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY -GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN  
ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Further UN involvement would be one option for the furtherance of neutral and non-aligned status proposals. At Vienna, when interviewed on leaving, Lord Carrington said he would have thought the United Nations was the forum to talk about peace.
2. But the Soviet Union is unlikely to welcome a return to the UN and we have deliberately kept options open. We can see that if it is agreed that there should be international observers at Afghan frontiers as part of a settlement, a UN team of observers might be required.
3. If Kabul proposals of 14 May appear from summary accounts including TASS report to propose:
  - (a) Talks with Iran and Pakistan to normalise relations, and to secure undertakings not to permit armed acts from the territory of one against the other:
  - (b) Afghan refugees invited home under an amnesty and offered rehabilitation, their return to be facilitated by the Government of Pakistan and discussions to be held about those not willing to return:
  - (c) The US and USSR to give guarantees that no interference or subversive activities against Afghanistan will take place:
  - (d) The Government of Afghanistan to ask for the withdrawal of Russian troops when relations with neighbours normalised and 'external interference' has ceased:
  - (e) Talks about peace in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The timing of this revamping of the Afghan proposals clearly owes much to the Islamic Conference and to the Muskie/Gromyko meeting.
4. The 17 April Kabul 5 Point Plan was:
  - (1) To hold bilateral talks between Afghanistan and Iran

/and

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and between Afghanistan and Pakistan in a move to discuss matters concerning the normalisation of Afghanistan's relations with Iran and Pakistan.

- (2) To hold a conference, without any pre-conditions, to discuss the normalisation of situation in the region and work out a treaty for peace and security and co-operation between the countries of the region.
- (3) To hold talks by the countries of the region on matters pertaining to reduction of military expenditure, limitation of arms and armed forces under a respective international guarantee for the security of the countries of the region.
- (4) To hold talks to take measures for relaxation of tension and elimination of lack of confidence in the activities carried by the mass media of the countries of the region and creation of a desirable atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding.
- (5) To hold advisory talks between the countries of the Indian Ocean region and Persian Gulf on renewal of talks about turning the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf into a region of peace under international guarantee and reduction of military presence of other countries.

5. Main differences are therefore (c) and (d).

6. Vienna telno 177 gives an account of the Secretary of State's meeting with Mr Gromyko in Vienna (attached).

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
19 MAY 1980

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 17 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MOSCOW BONN PARIS ROME UKDEL NATO  
UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD PEKING  
AND KABUL

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY:

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR GROMYKO

1. LORD CARRINGTON MET MR GROMYKO FOR JUST OVER AN HOUR THIS M MORNING. HE BEGAN BY ASKING GROMYKO ABOUT SOVIET IDEAS ON CSCE AND THE MADRID MEETING. THE SOVIET UNION HAD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ON CBM'S AND DISARMAMENT WHICH WERE NOT DISSIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE FRENCH. PERHAPS WE COULD ALL MAKE A STEP FORWARD ON THIS BASIS, THOUGH PROGRESS WOULD ALSO BE NEEDED ON OTHER BASKETS. HE AGREED WITH THE SOVIET VIEW THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED AT MADRID UNLESS SOMETHING USEFUL SEEMED LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING. GROMYKO SAID THAT MADRID MUST BE WELL PREPARED, AND HELD IN A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT WOULD GIVE AS GOOD AS SHE GOT IF OTHERS USED THE MEETING FOR DEMAGOGIC DECLARATIONS, AS HAD HAPPENED IN BELGRADE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED

WHAT IT CALLED A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT, BUT COULD CONCEIVE OF A TWO STAGE MEETING, THE FIRST ON CBM'S AND MILITARY DETENTE AND THE SECOND ON DISARMAMENT. MADRID MIGHT GIVE LIFE TO THIS IDEA, THOUGH HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMETHING CONCRETE BEING PUT FORWARD AT MADRID ITSELF. IF NOT, A MANDATE COULD BE GIVEN BY THE MADRID MEETING TO AN ENSUING CONFERENCE. SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD INJECT SOME WARM AIR INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE.

2. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT MADRID WOULD BE LESS WARM IF A SOLUTION WERE NOT FOUND OVER AFGHANISTAN. THE HISTORICAL BACK-  
-GROUND SHOWED THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS A NATURAL BUFFER STATE, AND THAT THE ONLY ANSWER TO THAT COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS WAS TO ENSURE THAT NO POWER EXERCISED INFLUENCE THERE TO THE DETRIMENT OF OTHERS. BUT THERE WAS NOW A REVIVAL OF FEARS IN THE WEST AND ESPECIALLY THE US (BRITAIN WAS SELF SUFFICIENT) ABOUT OIL AND THE GULF. HENCE OUR PROPOSALS FOR A NEUTRAL AND NON-  
-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN BADLY RECEIVED IN THE THIRD WORLD. WE HAD ALSO LOOKED CAREFULLY AT THE RECENT AFGHAN PROPOSALS TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD BE BUILT ON. THERE SEEMED TO BE A GERM OF AN IDEA IN ALL THIS. A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WITH GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE, MIGHT SUIT BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST.

13. GROMYKO

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3. GROMYKO DISMISSED WESTERN OPEN QUOTES PROPAGANDA CLOSE QUOTES OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN OIL PRODUCING AREAS AS OPEN QUOTES SHEER NONSENSE CLOSE QUOTES. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO INTENTION OF AFFECTING THE OIL INTERESTS TO THE US, BRITAIN OR ANYONE ELSE IN THAT AREA, THOUGH EVERYONE WAS ENTITLED TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO SEE IRAN AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IF BRITISH NEUTRALITY PROPOSALS MEANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN, (AND THERE SEEMED TO BE A STRONG DOSE OF THIS IN THEM) THEY WERE UNACCEPTABLE. BUT IF WE MEANT RESPECT FOR THE PRESENT INDEPENDENT REGIME, THAT WAS A DIFFERENT MATTER.

4. LORD CARRINGTON WELCOMED AND TOOK NOTE OF GROMYKO'S ASSURANCES ON THE GULF AREA. YET THE SCALE OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN HAD AROUSED CONCERN. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER WE ACCEPTED THE PRESENT AFGHAN LEADERSHIP, OR WHETHER WE WANTED TO CHANGE IT? LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE BABRAK REGIME ONLY EXISTED BECAUSE OF SOVIET SUPPORT. IF IT WERE SHOWN THAT THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES WANTED IT, THAT WAS FINE, THOUGH A MILLION REFUGEES SEEMED TO HAVE VOTED WITH THEIR FEET. GROMYKO SAID THAT WE COULD BELIEVE WHAT WE WANTED. BUT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WITH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES ON NON-INTERFERENCE. THIS WOULD CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS. WE WOULD THEN SEE THAT THE AFGHANS COULD MANAGE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. HE DENIED CATEGORICALLY THAT SOVIET TROOPS WERE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN, OR INTERFERING THERE IN ANY WAY. BUT THERE MUST BE POLITICAL GUARANTEES ON NON INTERVENTION BEFORE THEY COULD BE WITHDRAWN. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT ALL OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE MUST STOP. BUT AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW TROOPS MUST BE REACHED AT THE SAME TIME. WE WOULD OBJECT TO CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE CONTINUED.

5. GROMYKO REPEATED THAT THERE MUST BE PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN, AND ALSO BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN (THOUGH THERE WERE LESS ARMED INTRUSIONS FROM IRAN) ON THE CESSATION OF ALL INTERFERENCE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL GUARANTEES. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT OPPOSED TO OTHER STATES TAKING PART IN SUCH GUARANTEES, IF THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED CONSIDERED THIS NECESSARY. HE KNEW THE PAKISTANIS HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR FRONTIER WITH AFGHANISTAN, AND THIS PROBLEM MUST ALSO BE RESOLVED. WE MUST GET IT INTO OUR HEADS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DEFINITELY WITHDRAW ONCE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD HOWEVER BE A PROCESS IN ITSELF, AND COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AS QUICKLY AS THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. BUT THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL TOO WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATION, AND COULD BE RAISED

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BY PAKISTAN IN TALKS WITH AFGHANISTAN. A NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WOULD SUIT THE SOVIET UNION. MUSKIE HAD NOT OBJECTED TO IT, AND IT SHOULD SUIT US TOO. WE SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE PAKISTAN LEADERSHIP THE NEED FOR TALKS WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS NO WAY TO SETTLE THE SITUATION IN THE REGION WITHOUT SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT A GUARANTEE OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS HAD TO GO HAND IN HAND. IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO WITHDRAW, BUT THE DECISION TO DO SO COULD BE TAKEN IN A FEW SECONDS. SOME PEOPLE MIGHT BE SUSPICIOUS IF THERE WERE A DELAY BETWEEN THE SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THE AFGHANS MUST BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE WHO THEY WANTED TO GOVERN THEM AND THERE SHOULD BE NO SOVIET INTERFERENCE EITHER THROUGH TROOPS OR POLITICAL ADVISERS. WE WANTED A TRULY NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN.

7. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT SOVIET FORCES HAD ENTERED AFGHANISTAN BY REQUEST UNDER AN AGREEMENT WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, AND COULD ONLY BE WITHDRAWN BY AGREEMENT WITH THAT GOVERNMENT, AND NOT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. BUT BOTH THE SOVIET AND AFGHAN GOVERNMENTS HAD SAID THAT THE TROOPS WOULD GO FOLLOWING AN AGREEMENT WITH POLITICAL GUARANTEES, LORD CARRINGTON SURELY HAD NO DOUBTS IN HIS OWN MIND: WHY THEREFORE WAS HE MAKING DIFFICULTIES?

8. IN A BRIEF PRIVATE EXCHANGE AT THE END OF THE MEETING, LORD CARRINGTON TOLD GROMYKO THAT OUR POSITIONS MIGHT NOT BE AS FAR APART AS THEY SEEMED, THOUGH SIMULTANEITY WAS IMPORTANT. GROMYKO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH.

9. THE ONLY OTHER SUBJECT RAISED WAS THE PROPOSED MEMORIAL IN LONDON TO THE OPEN QUOTES VICTIMS OF YALTA CLOSE QUOTES. GROMYKO AFFECTED AMAZEMENT THAT HMG SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN A PROJECT OF THIS NATURE, GIVEN THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD PARTICIPATED AT YALTA. HE GATHERED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAD AGREED TO ITS ERECTION. HE COULD ONLY REGARD THIS AS A HOSTILE ACT, OF WHICH DUE ACCOUNT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVEMENT WAS LIMITED TO THE DECISION NOT TO WITHHOLD PERMISSION FOR THE MEMORIAL TO BE ERECTED ON CROWN LAND. SOME OF HIS FELLOW COUNTRYMEN INTERPRETED HISTORY RATHER DIFFERENTLY FROM MR GROMYKO.

GORDON

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6 : INDO-CHINA

POINTS TO MAKE

CAMBODIA: POLITICAL

1. Progress on emergency relief encouraging, but still no signs of political solution. Scope for personal moves in exploring prospects for Vietnamese withdrawal. At present the prospect is of open-ended conflict in Cambodia (which China for one would seem to welcome) and years more suffering for the Cambodians.

CAMBODIA: RELIEF CONFERENCE

2. Doubt whether Geneva meeting (26 - 27 May) will achieve much. Sir R Jackson doing well but co-ordination of agencies difficult, and operation a political minefield. UK hope to announce further pledge, which with share of EC pledge, is about \$10 million.

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

3. Impartial or international Chairman preferable.
4. [Supplementary Point to make will be necessary if Lord Carrington is directly approached.]

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6 : INDO-CHINA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

CAMBODIA: POLITICAL

1. [Not for use] Mr Waldheim has been reluctant to involve himself in South East Asian problems since calling and chairing the Geneva Refugees meeting last July and getting the Cambodia relief operation under way last November. This probably reflects his absorption by Iran and Afghanistan, sensitivity to African complaints that too much is being done for South East Asian refugees, and Soviet refusal to co-operate in any 'peace keeping' initiatives such as the Thai call for UN observers or 'safe havens' for refugees. The fighting in Cambodia is now stalemated, but with Vietnamese troops in effective control of nearly all Cambodia. Time is on their side, but a solution on Vietnamese terms (ie international acceptance of their puppet regime, perhaps with some cosmetic adjustments) could set a very undesirable precedent, eg for Afghanistan. Anyway China would not stand for this.

2. [Can be freely used] The EC-ASEAN Political Statement of 7 March made clear our view that Cambodia was essentially a political problem. In spite of his understandable reluctance to involve himself in further humanitarian initiatives, Mr Waldheim should keep the need for a political solution in mind. He cancelled a visit to Hanoi and Bangkok in January. It might be useful to reinstate it now.

CAMBODIA: RELIEF CONFERENCE

3. We see the real requirement of the Geneva meeting on 26 and 27 May as to reassure Thailand. The Thais might react badly (repatriations etc) if the world appears to ignore their interests. This is a general interest: but Thailand's need is as much moral /and political

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and political as a real need for further relief assistance, whether financial or in acceptance of refugees. Our judgement is that Sir Robert Jackson has these operational aspects well in hand.

4. The meeting is badly thought through by ASEAN and poorly prepared, but it should be able to achieve that result without unduly complicating the relief situation. But with luck, and probable additional relief pledges, the meeting should succeed in giving the Thais the necessary boost to their morale for a further period.

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

5. [Not for use] A particular problem is that Mr Waldheim, by having the meeting called under ECOSOC rules of procedure, has ruled himself out as chairman. ASEAN have approached at least one prospective EEC Foreign Minister unsuccessfully (M Francois Poncet) and we understand they are now on the point of asking Lord Carrington.

6. [Can be used freely] The Nine consider that Western Chairmanship would give the meeting an inappropriately political slant, and make it even more unlikely to produce necessary improvements in distribution and management inside Cambodia.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6: INDO-CHINA

SUPPLEMENTARY POINTS TO MAKE

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

1. Conference ought to have an independent chairman of acknowledged international stature. ASEAN Heads of Mission asked Lord Carrington to accept chair, told that in our view not in best interests of conference and its sponsors (would give occasion a partisan character).
2. Hope Mr Waldheim will reconsider his position, and allow himself to be drafted, if, as seems likely, ASEANS fail to find an acceptable participant.
3. If not, can Mr Waldheim suggest other candidates from United Nations system? Chairman of General Assembly? or of ECOSOC?
4. [If raised] Operative paragraph 3 of ECOSOC Resolution ("to the extent relevant and applicable") is clearly designed to allow the meeting to adopt other procedures where appropriate (and in any case the meeting is master of its own procedures).

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

19 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6: INDO-CHINA

SUPPLEMENTARY ESSENTIAL FACTS

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

1. ECOSOC resolution calling Geneva meeting specifies (operative paragraph 3).

'Decides further that, to the extent relevant and applicable the proceedings.... shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure for United Nations Pledging Conferences (...)'

Rule 5 provides that 'the Conference shall elect a President.... from among the representatives (sc. of States)'

Any Conference can of course vary or suspend its procedures and this set of Rules is in no way binding on the meeting.

2. Mr Waldheim has indicated that this formulation (suggested by his Secretariat) rules him out as a possible Chairman. This reflects his notorious unwillingness to continue to take the leading role in meetings which raise funds for South East Asian refugees (for which the Africans have criticised him).

3. The ASEAN states have subsequently approached Mr Francois-Poncet, who has evidently refused, and we believe that the ASEAN Heads of Mission in London will ask for Lord Carrington to do so when they call on Mr Blaker on 20 May. The US Embassy has already lobbied in support.

4. Other 'international' figures might be the General Assembly President Salim (Tanzania, and a prospective rival of Mr Waldheim for Secretary General) or the ECOSOC Chairman, Mavrommatis (Cyprus). A third alternative might be Mr Waldheim's 'Special Representative for Co-ordinating Humanitarian Relief for the Kampuchean People', Sir Robert Jackson (an Australian) although he might not be prestigious enough in ASEAN eyes.

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 7 (a) MIDDLE EAST: ARAB/ISRAEL

Points to Make

1. See no future in autonomy talks. Situation too dangerous to leave alone. Europe could fill the gap, at least until 1981.
2. UN could be valuable forum for peace efforts, but credibility destroyed by too many one-sided resolutions.
3. Nevertheless a new Security Council resolution supplementing 242 among options. Could provide a better basis for peace efforts.
4. If a new resolution were passed, would the Secretary General see any possibility of attempting mediation under his auspices on the basis of it?




## Essential Facts

1. The Americans appear to have concluded that they must keep the autonomy talks going after 26 May. Begin and Sadat share this view. Nevertheless there is no present reason to suppose that the gap between the position of Israel and Egypt can be bridged. We have made clear that Europe may be able to help maintain the momentum of peace efforts in a US election year.
2. Two Arab/Israel issues have recently come before the Security Council:

(i) Palestinian rights: an Arab draft resolution calling for the establishment of an independent state and containing vague language about assuring the security of all states in the area was vetoed by the US on 30 April. We and the other three West European members of the Council abstained on grounds of timing, without considering the substance. There is a general awareness of our interest in the possibility of a new resolution supplementing 242 by associating its principles with Palestinian political rights, but we have not revealed our thinking in any detail except, informally, to other members of the Nine. A new resolution is only one of a number of options to be considered by the Nine. There are problems about the US attitude: they may be inclined to veto any resolution, no matter how well drafted, in an election year. Our hope would be to trade a US abstention on the resolution for PLO commitment to its terms. If a resolution were passed, one possibility would be for the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative, on the lines of the Jarring initiative, to explore the possibilities for new negotiations on its basis.

(ii) Expulsion from the West Bank: On 8 May the Security Council passed a resolution calling on Israel to readmit three West Bank notables expelled following the terrorist incident in Hebron when six Israelis were killed. We voted in favour of it. The three were not accused of complicity in the incident and the expulsions were carried out without regard to established procedures and international law. Efforts by the three to return to the West Bank have been prevented by the Israeli authorities. Jordan and the PLO are pressing for further UN action to force



the Israelis to reverse their decision but have not specified what they have in mind.

3. Mr Waldheim has taken an active interest in the Middle East and has been quick to criticize Israel on several occasions, eg. over settlements. He showed interest last year in the possibility of a new UN-sponsored peace conference with all parties, including both superpowers present, but did not pursue the idea in the face of lack of enthusiasm from the parties with whom he discussed it.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 May 1980

BRIEF NO. 7b

VISIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO. 7b: LEBANON

Points to MakeUNIFIL

1. Fully support UNIFIL. Collapse could affect stability of region as a whole. Deplore the continuing harassment of the force.
2. As long as Haddad receives support and shelter from Israel little hope of UNIFIL performing effectively. Could a deal be agreed which would involve Palestinian withdrawal to north of the Litani in return for Israeli withdrawal of support for Haddad?
3. Do not wish to cut across action by troop contributors or the Secretary-General. Can the Nine help with mediation?
4. What are the prospects for the renewal of UNIFIL mandate in June?

[If raised] APPEAL FOR FUNDS FOR SUSPENSE ACCOUNT

5. We are considering the Secretary-General's appeal and hope to be able to reply shortly.

## VISIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO. 7b: LEBANON

Essential Facts

1. The attacks on UNIFIL by the Israeli-backed Haddad militia have had a serious effect on UNIFIL's morale. The Dublin meeting of UNIFIL contributors resulted in an exhortatory statement but little more.
2. UNIFIL has performed a valuable stabilising role in the South and we fully support its presence. At present the force of about 6,000 is composed of units of about battalion strength from Netherlands, Ireland, Senegal, Fiji, Nigeria, Norway, Nepal and Ghana with a French logistic unit and Italian helicopter unit. UNIFIL is however unable to fulfil its mandate while the Israelis and Haddad prevent it deploying up to the border. The mandate is due for renewal on 19 June. The Nepalese have notified their intention to pull out and others have threatened to do so.
3. We would welcome any steps which would enable UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate and lead to the ultimate and complete restoration of the Lebanon Government's authority in the area. We may, therefore, propose to the Nine that they should be more active in attempts to mediate between Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians. The objective would be a trade off which would allow the Lebanese Army to deploy in Tyre, and obtain withdrawal of Palestinian armed elements north of the Litani River in return for Israeli agreement to ditch Haddad. The chances of success cannot be rated high. We would have little to lose and much to gain.
4. The Secretary-General discussed Lebanon with the Lord Privy Seal on 16 April. The record of the meeting is attached.

NENAD

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON WEDNESDAY 16 APRIL AT 10AM

Present:

Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP

Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP

Mr Murray

Mr J Moberly

Mr Simpson-Orlebar

Mr Wickstead

Mr Kurt Waldheim,  
UN Secretary-General

Mr Abdulrahim Farah, USG for  
Special Political Affairs

Mr Michael Popovic, Acting DG  
UN Information Centre, London

UNIFIL

Mr Waldheim said the situation in Lebanon was very serious. The way UNIFIL was being treated by Major Haddad, supported by the Israelis, was humiliating and dangerous. The Irish incident had been highly embarrassing. The UN HQ had been almost completely destroyed, along with their four Italian helicopters. How could he accept this? In the informal consultations of the Security Council last Sunday (c.f. UKMis New York telno 599), he had warned that he would be obliged to propose either the Force's withdrawal that it should be authorised to use its arms in a more convincing way: the troops must be able to stop themselves from being taken prisoner. Mr Hurd asked whether Mr Waldheim wanted the Security Council's Resolution to give him a direct mandate to change the rules. Mr Waldheim said that was not the problem. Under the present Police operation, UNIFIL could already use its arms in 'self-defence'; Chapter 7 enforcement operation on the Korea model was out of the question. The problem was that the Haddad forces were much better equipped: they had artillery, tanks and rockets. Given the impossibility of reaching agreement in the Council and the complication of the US Presidential election, the only answer might be for him to authorise the Force internally to acquire more effective weapons, perhaps artillery and even tanks. Sir Ian

/Gilmour

Gilmour said that UNIFIL was composed of infantry units: would not this mean that different troops would be needed? Mr Waldheim said he would have to discuss all this with the troop contributors. He was aware of the dangers of attempting to change the whole structure, but how long would the troop contributors put up with the present situation?

2. Mr Waldheim said he had asked the Americans to speak to Mr Begin about the attacks on UNIFIL. He had written himself to Mr Begin, receiving an evasive reply. Sir Ian Gilmour asked whether the Israelis wanted to get rid of UNIFIL. Mr Waldheim was not sure: the Israelis wanted a shield. They accused UNIFIL of cooperating with the PLO. This was not true, though some infiltration was inevitable. He did not think there were more than 300-500 Palestinians within the UN area. On the whole, they were cooperative, especially Arafat. The latter was not responsible for the last attack on the Israeli kibbutz. There were indications the terrorists might have mounted this attack from inside Israel via the shore, and not come through the UN lines. Mr Hurd asked whether the UN could not site their HQ outside Haddad territory. He had talked to General Erskine about this. Mr Waldheim said they had tried hard to find another site, without success. Sir Ian Gilmour asked about the chances of the Lebanese army doing more. Mr Waldheim said the UN were trying to replace some Irish troops with regular Lebanese forces, but the latter preferred to operate under the UN umbrella.

#### Arab/Israel

3. Mr Waldheim said that the Lebanese problem could only be solved within the context of a general agreement on the Middle East. There were no illusions in Washington about an imminent breakthrough on this. He welcomed the role of the Nine. Sir Ian Gilmour said that if the Europeans did not do something in the UN or

/elsewhere

elsewhere before the US elections, there would be more Arab activity in the UN. Mr Waldheim said the possibilities were for some addition to Resolution 242, or for some kind of conference; the Arabs wanted this to be under the UN umbrella. President Sad had told him he was not against an international conference; on the other hand, the Syrian member of his 5-man Commission on Iran had told him the Arabs would be in favour of a conference, but without the Egyptians being present. Sir Ian Gilmour said Israel would not attend any gathering outside the Camp David framework. They were trying to gain time and building up their settlements. Mr Waldheim thought it would be a long process. We should have to await developments after the US elections and in Israel.

#### Iran

4. Sir Ian Gilmour said the Nine were in consultation on President Carter's requests. We had grave doubts about whether these would succeed, but the need to preserve solidarity was very important. We must be seen to do something. Mr Waldheim said the problem, which he had experienced personally, was that we were all negotiating with people who lacked power. There could be no progress until we convinced Khomeini.

#### Afghanistan

5. Mr Waldheim was worried by the reactions of the media and certain governments. He was reminded of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when he had been Austrian Foreign Minister and there were fears that Soviet tanks would drive for Yugoslavia and the warm Mediterranean ports. He was convinced the Russians would not start an open war against Pakistan. If they wanted to reach the Gulf or Indian Ocean, they had other means. We should try to calm the hysteria. Sir Ian Gilmour expressed surprise at the reference to hysteria. He thought there was almost too much apathy. The Russians might not be about to invade Pakistan, but

/their

their occupation of Afghanistan was serious enough. Mr Hurd said our problem lay in keeping the facts before public opinion. There might be no imminent danger of an attack on Pakistan or Iran, but there might be opportunities and the temptation to make use of them in the coming weeks. Mr Waldheim protested that he was aware of the dangers. The question was how to stop it. No-one today wanted a nuclear war. He was in favour of a conference to negotiate the future of Afghanistan. Lord Carrington's proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was excellent: Afghanistan had always been a buffer zone. He had discussed the idea with the Russians who did not want it in the form proposed. He doubted whether the Indian proposal for a regional conference would have much of a better chance. Mrs Gandhi had asked him to tell President Zia that she wanted good relations, this being the best way to keep the big powers out. Sir Ian Gilmour said we, too, had talked to the Russians. They had certainly not embraced our proposal, but neither had they rejected it. Mr Murray suggested there were two pointers. Not only was Afghanistan traditionally a buffer zone, but it had declared its neutrality <sup>around</sup> on ten occasions since 1914. Even after the 1978 revolution, Taragi had said Afghanistan was a neutral and non-aligned state. We were not therefore asking for anything new. Secondly, the proposal was becoming more and more interesting for the non-aligned and Islamic states. There had been a very good conversation when the Lord Privy Seal received Mr Chatty.

6. Mr Waldheim said that Mr Kreisky had discussed with him the idea of a 'control commission' composed of non-aligned and neutral Western countries acceptable to the Russians (eg Algeria and Sweden), which should undertake the monitoring of foreign infiltration in exchange for a Soviet undertaking to withdraw within six months. Mr Murray recalled Mr Kreisky's similar suggestion, at last July's Geneva meeting on Indo-China, of a neutral body for Cambodia,

/which



which the Swedes had refused to support. Mr Waldheim said we would have to see if the Russians wanted a face-saver on these lines.

#### Namibia

7. Offering his congratulations on the Rhodesian outcome, Mr Waldheim asked what effect this might have on Namibia. The UN Mission's report was not very encouraging. Sir Ian Gilmour said we wanted to slow things down as much as possible to allow the South Africans to get used to a Mugabe-led Zimbabwe. We should aim to avoid presenting them with stark choices, but there was impatience elsewhere. Mr Waldheim said it had been explained to the South Africans that the UNTAG operation ought to start in the first half of June for climatic reasons. He needed their answer by then. The South Africans had simply taken note. They accepted the concept of the DMZ but wanted clarification on the selected locations and no SWAPO bases in Namibia. It ought to be possible to find a solution, but there was a chicken and egg situation. The South Africans should be influenced by Mr Mugabe's statesmanship. If the present initiative failed, the solution would take a long time.

#### North/South

8. Mr Waldheim said that President Lopez Portillo and Mr Kreisky were discussing the idea of a limited and informal summit gathering, on the Manley model, before or after the General Assembly Special Session. It would be linked to the Brandt Report.

9. The meeting ended at 10.45 am.

/Distribution

Distribution

PS

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/PUS

PS/Sir D Maitland

Sir A Acland

Mr Bullard

Mr Murray

Mr J Moberly

Mr Fergusson

Lord N Gordon Lennox

UND to enter

NENAD

MED

SAD

EESD

SAfD

FRD

Chanceries: UKMis New York

UKMis Geneva

Beirut

Tel Aviv

Cairo

Washington

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 8: SOUTHERN AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

A NAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY OF 12 MAY TO MR WALDHEIM ON DEMILITARISED ZONE

- 1 Five and UN should build on the several positive elements of the reply. Area of disagreement narrowed. What is left should be negotiable given Front Line flexibility.

MR WALDHEIM'S RESPONSE TO SOUTH AFRICA

- 2 Five and Secretariat must work together on UN response. Essential for prior clearance with Front Line and SWAPO, and above all with South Africans. Must respond to South African demand for UN to treat all parties equally: ie (a) assurances of UN impartiality and (b) suspension of UN publicity and funding for SWAPO. Neither UN nor South African Administrator-General should help either side after cease-fire.

B SOUTH AFRICA

- 3 Keep doors open to South Africans to encourage Mr P W Botha's moves towards peaceful change. Best achieved by persuasion rather than ostracism. Would welcome any restraining influence by Mr Waldheim on Africans and others.

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 8: SOUTHERN AFRICA

ESSENTIAL FACTS [May be drawn on freely]

A Namibia

South African reply of 12 May to Mr Waldheim on demilitarised zone

1 Reply contains following new and positive points:

- a) outstanding problems are few and negotiable;
- b) precise arrangements for monitoring SWAPO outside Namibia no longer a problem;
- c) promise to implement if specified problems solved - for the first time.

Mr Waldheim's response to South Africa

2 We have urged our partners in the Five and the Secretariat not to rush the response and to make it as detailed and constructive as possible by discussing the issues fully with the Front Line States and SWAPO. We want preparation to be slow and careful in order to make sure, if possible, that it will have sufficient meat to enable the South Africans to go ahead. There are signs that both our partners and the Secretariat are more sceptical than we are about whether the South Africans will ever be brought to an agreement. They suspect the South Africans of wishing <sup>only</sup> to buy time and avoid a confrontation at the UN over sanctions.

/Mr



- 3 Mr Waldheim pays great attention to African opinion. The first reaction of African representatives in New York is favourable. They are concerned that negotiations should not be strung out indefinitely, but have so far resisted pressure for a Security Council debate.

#### UN support for SWAPO

- 4 The South Africans have asked Mr Waldheim to "refrain from giving effect to recognition by the General Assembly of SWAPO as 'sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia'" and to cut off funds voted for SWAPO by the Assembly eg for its office in New York. We have suggested to the Five and the Secretariat ways in which South Africa might be met half way by informal suspension of some UN activity on SWAPO's behalf. It will not be possible for Mr Waldheim to set aside UN resolutions unilaterally, it will have to be done with African agreement which would not be forthcoming if South Africa is not seen to be committed to early implementation.

#### Role of the Five

- 5 Mr Waldheim (and the Africans) are likely to call on the Five to continue their activities and to obtain South African agreement to implementation.

#### B South Africa

##### Internal Politics

- 6 There are still doubts about how firmly Mr P W Botha remains committed to his programme of reform. Nevertheless some recent developments give grounds for cautious optimism:

/a)

- a) following the recent coloured schools boycott Mr P W Botha publicly committed himself to the long-term goal of equal education for all races;
- b) the Government has accepted the interim report of the Schlebusch Commission which proposed the setting up of a Presidential Council consisting of coloured, whites, Indians and Chinese and a separate Consultative Committee for blacks.

Mr Botha has survived the threat of an extreme right-wing backlash in the recent Fauresmith by-election but still has to tread carefully for fear of the right wing within his own party.

#### James Mange

- 7 The UN has expressed interest in James Mange, a member of the ANC condemned to death for treason in South Africa. He has been granted leave to appeal. We therefore consider that it would be premature to decide at this stage whether to make any representations on his behalf.

#### South Africa's Nuclear intentions

- 8 Mr Waldheim will report soon on the US satellite recording of possible nuclear event on 22 September 1979. South Africa or Israel possible culprit if test took place. HMG has said it has no evidence to offer. Absence of usual corroborative evidence suggests no explosion took place. US Government takes similar view on examination of data so far available. Report should reflect these conclusions. Unsubstantiated criticism of South Africa may prejudice French/US efforts to persuade South Africa to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty. Slight progress recently on this point.

"/UK

UN Arms Embargo

- 9 UK fully committed to meet obligations under the mandatory arms embargo. Pressure to extend embargo and work of Committee misplaced. Should concentrate on more effective examination of well documented allegations of breaches.

Sanctions

- 10 Hope question of sanctions not arise in Security Council. Will not persuade South Africa to be more cooperative on Namibia or press ahead with internal reforms. Sanctions cause further isolation of South Africa: rule out peaceful progress and reassert position of hardline right-wingers within the country, not rule out sanctions under all circumstances (eg another Soweto). We have told US, France and South Africa that they should not count on us acting alone over Namibia. Sanctions against Iran a different issue. To meet short term problem and limited objective of freeing US hostages.

Apartheid at the UN

- 11 HMG opposed to apartheid. Sympathises with constructive criticism of apartheid regime. Violent language of resolutions prevents UK voting for them. Brings UN into disrepute.

15 May 1980

Southern African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 9: CYPRUS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

CYPRUS PROBLEM: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. Following Denktash/Kyprianou agreement in May 79, intercommunal talks resumed in June, and promptly adjourned because of Turkish Cypriot insistence on prior clarification of concepts of "bizonality" and "security" (ie de facto Turkish Cypriot autonomy). Strongly pro Greek Cypriot UNGA resolution on which West abstained, (November 79), provided for establishment of (thoroughly unhelpful) UNGA committee if no progress soon. UN have since been sucked into prolonged pre-negotiation of scenario for resumption of talks, enabling both sides, especially Turkish Cypriots, to stall indefinitely. We want talks resumed to consider practical confidence building measures, and Lord Privy Seal, in message following his recent visit to Cyprus, has urged Waldheim to be bolder.

UNFICYP

2. UN force present since 1964. De facto partition of island relatively stable since 1974. UK contribute largest contingent (£6 million per year), which Treasury seek to reduce. We consequently sought a review of UNFICYP by all troop contributors aimed at cost reductions; Secretariat have countered with undertaking to carry out their own review in consultation with us. Given reluctance of other troop contributors to argue the point, we have accepted this; but are convinced scope for reductions exists without destabilising island if UN will resist military and other vested interests.



VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 9: CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

CYPRUS PROBLEM

1. Further pre-negotiation seems pointless; sooner or later, it would seem better simply to summon the parties to resume the talks, in effect daring them to refuse.

2. But judgement is for you; you know we support your efforts fully.

UN FORCE (UNFICYP)

3. Your review must be rigorous. We must have from it either substantial savings or really convincing reasons why these are impossible.

VISIT OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON 20-23 MAY

BRIEF NO 10: NORTH/SOUTH MATTERS  
POINTS TO MAKE

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF LDCS

1. Recognise serious economic problems of LDCs.
2. Responsibility of each country to adjust to higher oil prices and to reduce inflation.
3. But some of the poorest are bound to need help. Western effort already considerable.
4. Need for practical consideration of real problem - not ritual discussion of draft resolution.

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

5. Global Negotiations must not cut across the competence of existing institutions, especially IMF/IBRD.
6. Energy the key to LDCs medium term economic future. Hope for serious discussion. Open minded about permanent UN energy body.

BRANDT COMMISSION REPORT

7. Study nearing completion. Full Parliamentary debate promised for early June.
8. Notable success in drawing attention to problem of Third World. Welcome stress on mutual benefits.

NORTH/SOUTH SUMMIT

9. Interesting idea. Need careful preparation. Spring 81 would be better than this summer.
10. If Summit takes place, UK would wish to attend. What is Mr Waldheim's latest information?

BRIEF NO 10: NORTH/SOUTH MATTERS  
ESSENTIAL FACTS

11. Relations between North and South have assumed a new importance since Afghanistan.
12. 1980 current account deficit of LDCs expected to be about \$70 bn. Likely to worsen and persist.
13. Global Negotiations due to start January 81 and last about eight months. They will cover major issues in the fields of energy, raw materials, trade, development, money and finance. They will be formally launched by Special Session of General Assembly in August. Preparations underway in Committee of Whole (COW). Still at an early stage but difficulties over agenda and procedure seem likely.
14. Brandt Report will be discussed by Ministers next week. Foreign Secretary has recommended positive tone but selective approach to substance.
15. Proposals for a North/South Summit making some progress. Mexican President Portillo and Chancellor Kreisky have been working for an 18 nation Summit in August 1980. They are now thought to prefer early 1981. Waldheim believed to favour the idea but cannot take active role as it would be invidious for him to be involved in selecting participants.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
15 MAY 1980



VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 11 : FALKLAND ISLANDS (DEFENSIVE)  
ESSENTIAL FACTS

Talks with the Argentines

1. Mr Ridley met the Argentine Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Comodoro Cavandoli, on 28/29 April in New York.
2. First exchanges under the Conservative Government. Exploratory. Both now reporting to own Governments. Hope to continue exchanges.

Informing the United Nations Secretary-General

3. The UK and Argentine missions in New York will separately send copy of Communique (attached) to Mr Waldheim, under short covering letters to notify him of the meeting. This is standard practice.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
8 MAY 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN NEW YORK AFTER ANGLO/ARGENTINE TALKS

In accordance with separate announcements in London and Buenos Aires on April 15th 1980 by the Argentine and UK Governments, a Ministerial meeting was held in New York on 28 and 29 April to discuss the Falkland Islands question and related issues in the South Atlantic within the negotiating framework referred to in relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The British and Argentine delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and Comodoro Carlos R Cavandoli, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires.

The discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit.

The two Governments intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO LONDON : 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 12

BELIZE

POINTS TO MAKE (DEFENSIVE)

1. It was announced by News Department on 15 May that: " The Minister of State at the FCO, The Hon Nicholas Ridley MP, with a team of officials, will meet Senor Castillo Valdez, Foreign Minister of Guatemala, and a team of Guatemalan officials in Bermuda on 19 May to reopen negotiations over the Crown Colony of Belize. The aim of these talks is to achieve a settlement which will clear the way for early and secure independence for Belize".

2. Mr Waldheim may ask about progress made at these talks. As the negotiations will be concurrent with his visit to London, their outcome will not be known before his departure.

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 13: CUBAN REFUGEES

POINTS TO MAKE

GENERAL

1. Exodus has become flood, posing great humanitarian problems especially for the US.

BRITISH ROLE

2. Have joined with US and Costa Rica in Ad Hoc Group with aim of persuading Cuban government to organise departure of its citizens in orderly and humane manner. Also working for support by European Community. We want unnecessary suffering to cease.

ROLE FOR UN?

3. May at some stage be role for UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). What does he think?

CUBAN REFUGEES TO UK?

4. We may take a small number.

CONFIDENTIAL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

GENERAL

1. Nearly 50,000 Cubans have already reached Florida in small boats. President Carter has declared this must stop and that the US is ready to organise an air and sea lift of Cuban refugees who are qualified to enter the US or other countries as soon as Castro allows them to be screened and processed in Cuba in a legal and orderly way.

BRITISH ACTION

2. Mr Ridley represented UK at meeting of Ad Hoc Group in Bermuda on 18 May. US and Costa Rica pressed for joint demarche to Cuban government as soon as possible, "not later than Tuesday morning (20 May)". Mr Ridley replied we hoped to carry our European partners with us in this exercise. He hoped it would be discussed on 20 May by Political Directors and undertook to do what he could to get a speedy and positive decision. Meanwhile, EC Ambassadors in Havana have reported doubts whether Cuba would be willing to receive representatives of the Ad Hoc Group as envisaged by the Americans <sup>and</sup> have advanced the counter recommendation that an approach should be made by the EC to the UNHCR and to the UN Commission of Human Rights - but the latter will not meet in early future.

ROLE FOR UN

3. Support by us for any initiative at UN may lead to pressure to take more refugees than we want (and to make financial contribution).

CUBAN REFUGEES TO UK

4. We do not expect to take more than 100. We have announced we would consider sympathetically applications from Cuban refugees from the Peruvian Embassy who have reached country of first asylum and who have ties or other connections making the UK the natural country of resettlement.