

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY, 20 MAY 1980, AT 1630 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister
Sir Donald Maitland
Sir Anthony Parsons
Sir Antony Acland
Mr Peter Marshall
Mr Simpson-Orlebar
Mr Alexander
Mr Anson

Dr Kurt Waldheim
Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
Mr Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

1. In welcoming Dr Waldheim, the Prime Minister recalled that much of their discussion in July last year had been about Indo-China. She suggested that on this occasion, they might concentrate on Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East.

Iran

2. Dr Waldheim said he had wanted to resume direct talks with Iran. It was necessary to revive the negotiating process in order to avoid another military effort: such efforts would not solve the problem. He had telephoned Mr Bani Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh from New York and talked to the latter in Belgrade. Mr Qotbzadeh was very receptive but wanted the Commission to present its report. When the Iranian Parliament convened, it could act on the basis of this report. Dr Waldheim had explained that the Commission could not present its report until the second part of its mandate had been fulfilled. The plan had been that the Commission would see the hostages and obtain their transfer out of the US Embassy compound to the authority of the Iranian Government, along with the 3 hostages in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; after that, they would have been sent back to the United States. The plan had failed because the Ayatollah had not supported Mr Bani Sadr.

3. Dr Waldheim had explained that, if the Iranians wanted a report, the Commission would have to return to Iran; he had suggested he should first send a confidential emissary to prepare for their return and had chosen the Syrian member, Mr Adib Daoudi (a Sunni) in whom both sides had confidence. Mr Qotbzadeh had now said in public that Mr Daoudi

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should visit Iran only to deal with the report, not to discuss the hostages issue.

4. Dr Waldheim realised he had to protect himself against criticism from the radicals by not appearing too conciliatory and did not intend to make an issue of this unless it was exploited against him. In reality, it had been agreed that Mr Daoudi could prepare the ground in private with Messrs Bani Sadr and Qotbzadeh and with Ayatollah Beheshti. He had kept closely in touch with Mr. Muskie and agreed the text of his statement with him. Mr. Qotbzadeh had assured him the hostages were fit and healthy; some were still in the compound. But he was afraid of what would happen if even one of them were to come to harm.

5. The Prime Minister assumed that Beheshti was now dominating Khomeini. Dr. Waldheim agreed that the Ayatollah's religious entourage were making the decisions. He would be giving Mr. Daoudi his instructions in Geneva on Saturday and sending a personal message to Beheshti, pleading for his co-operation. After his own experience of Tehran he did not expect too much from this initiative, but it was another effort to break the ice. If no concessions were promised, such as an offer to reassemble the hostages in Tehran under the Iranian Government's authority he would think twice about sending the Commission back.

6. The Prime Minister said that, as a Parliamentarian, she would be surprised if the Majles' first act were to order the release of the hostages. This did not ring true. She would expect them to begin with something very nationalistic. Since Beheshti controlled over 50% of the seats, a decision of the Majles was unlikely to be helpful. What incentive was there for the Iranians to give up the hostages, apart from recovering international respectability? Was this a high priority? The UK had bought no Iranian oil since the beginning of April. BP and Shell had declined to buy at the new price of \$35 per barrel, provided the Federal Republic and Japan did the same. Iran could find alternative markets in Eastern Europe, but this gave them no hard currency. This was hurting most of all. Sanctions were being applied on arms, spare parts and future contracts - this was all the British Parliament would accept - and we were quietly doing quite a bit financially. Sanctions would not

release the hostages, but solidarity with the United States was important for us. She had no intention of criticising the Americans for their rescue operation. But if the Americans attempted military action, e.g. any mining of the Straits or a blockade, they would not keep the support of Europe, because of the repercussions elsewhere. But it was hard to criticise without offering an alternative. She agreed that Mr. Daoudi should not go to Tehran unless he could do a proper job. It might be easier to solve the problem if it could be forgotten for 6 months. The wives of the hostages, who had visited her 24 hours before the rescue attempt, were a stabilizing force. Their attitude was very sensible. They were prepared to wait, rather than jeopardise their husbands' lives.

7. Dr. Waldheim said that, so long as the power struggle continued in Iran, he expected no solution before the late summer, or even later. Agreeing, the Prime Minister considered the prospect of the internal disintegration of Iran very worrying. The siege of the Iranian Embassy in London had highlighted the bad deal which Arabistan was getting from Khomeini. This fertile ground for subversion was being exploited by Iraq. The hostages might be regarded as a unifying factor: this was one reason why they continued to be held. Hatred unified. We must continue with our diplomatic initiatives, but not so as to court a rebuff. Unless we were seen to be active, the pressures on President Carter to take military action would increase.

8. Sir A. Parsons commented that, in speaking to audiences all over the United States, he had in general encountered an eagerness to settle the affair quietly and peacefully. The pressures in Washington were self-induced. Dr. Waldheim agreed: the American people understood the difficulties and saw that military operations could not solve the problem. If Mr. Daoudi reported no change in the Iranian position, he agreed that the Commission should not go back. The Prime Minister said it would then be necessary to think of something else. Sir D. Maitland commented that the Red Cross and others had played a role, but the Commission looked the best bet. Dr. Waldheim said that Archbishop Capucci and Mr. MacBride had tried, but the latter's idea of a Nuremberg-style tribunal would not solve the problem. He had been disappointed to hear that Mr. MacBride was now being invited by Mr. Bani Sadr, along with other leftist representatives, to a meeting on 2-5 June. /This was

This was likely to end up with a resolution accusing the US and would produce no results.

Afghanistan

9. The Prime Minister said the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thought the Russians might be looking for a way out, possibly seeking to withdraw their troops, provided they could leave behind a regime which would be their puppet. She took the more cynical view that the Russians would remain for a very long time. They were bringing in their families. All their activity was designed to get us to accept the present situation. They disliked criticism, however: we should continue to stress with the non-aligned that the Afghan people had the right to choose their own destiny but that they would never be allowed to do so by the Russians. The best hope was that Afghanistan might become another Finland, not that they had very much in common historically. The Chinese were glad to think that the Russians were bleeding to death in Afghanistan and Cambodia: these great haemorrhages might suit China, but we took a different view. The Russians wanted us to go to Madrid; if we did, she would want to be pretty outspoken.

10. Sir A. Acland suggested that the new proposals did not represent anything very new. They talked about the frontiers with Pakistan and Iran, but said nothing about the Afghan/Soviet or Chinese frontiers. Sir D. Maitland thought it was astute of the Russians to suggest that they would get out if only the Afghan/Pakistan frontier could be controlled: neither Britain nor Pakistan had ever been able to control the mountainous tribal area, where people could come and go. There had been a disquieting reference in Mr. Gromyko's talk with Lord Carrington in Vienna to the social changes that would be needed in Afghanistan, but there were some points on which it was worth seeking clarification. We should maintain the pressure, but ask some questions. The Prime Minister said we could test the seriousness of the Soviet position by asking if they were ready to name a date for withdrawal. Sir A. Acland suggested the answer might be that certain conditions must be fulfilled first. The Prime Minister noted that the Russians had annexed one state about every 10 years; more frequently if you counted those taken over by proxy. It was only a question of time before they marched into another.

/Dr. Waldheim

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- 5 -

11. Dr. Waldheim shared the Prime Minister's view. He was convinced the Russians would not leave so long as there was no solid Afghan Government to support their policy. The occupation was a firm decision of the Politburo, as had been the invasion of Czechoslovakia. When he had asked Mr. Gromyko to explain the latest proposals, Mr. Gromyko had said there were 1/2 million Afghans in Pakistan supported by the Western powers and that so long as this new aggression was being prepared, there was no reason for the Russians to withdraw. The Prime Minister thought it an astounding proposition that Afghans could not return to Afghanistan, except for those of whom Mr. Gromyko approved. She was disturbed that the action being taken was largely confined to diplomacy. The Germans and French were keeping up their trade contacts. Despite American efforts on wheat, this was still getting through to the Soviet Union. The UK had not had much success in reducing the supply of technology. The Olympics would not be real but, apart from words and condemnation in the UN, little else had been done. The Russians must be seen to be isolated. If people said we must talk, the last card would have gone. Dr. Waldheim was encouraged by developments at the UN on both Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The non-aligned, under Yugoslav leadership, had switched positions. The Prime Minister said this was the most important thing which had happened. Cuba's chairmanship of the non-aligned movement had been wholly frustrated, nowhere more so than at the UN. This should be kept up. The picture would change if nothing was done and Afghanistan and Pakistan were allowed to fall.

/Middle East

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Middle East

12. Dr Waldheim thought it his duty as Secretary-General to say he was very worried about the situation in the Middle East. The autonomy talks had collapsed. The Americans were paralysed, the Europeans hesitant. In the vacuum, many things could happen. The radical Arabs could make trouble. The Israelis were not cooperative. Major Haddad, supplied by the Israelis, was bombing UNIFIL's headquarters and killing Irish soldiers. Now was the moment for Europe to play a constructive role. He heard a lot of talk in the media about a European initiative. One option was to seek to amend Security Council Resolution 242 so as to give the Palestinians their political rights, i.e. self-determination. If this was not feasible - and a US veto would seem certain before the Presidential election - the Arabs would ask for a Special Session of the General Assembly. Mr Arafat might wait if a European initiative was in prospect, otherwise he would call for a Special Session in June or July. There would be a tough resolution, which could be opposed by the United States, but which if not too radical might get some other Western votes.

13. The Prime Minister said that at Luxembourg the Nine had decided not to discuss the options until 26 May, by which time they had thought the Camp David process would be exhausted. They were to discuss the problem at the Venice Summit, but it now looked as though the process might still be alive at the point; she was doubtful about action which would cut across the Americans. She questioned what was meant by self-determination for the Palestinians. There was no such animal in constitutional law. What were they to determine? Did their land really belong to Jordan? There were many Palestinians in Syria and the Lebanon: where were they to go? King Hussein had indicated he might be ready for some loose federation of the West Bank with Jordan: would they still be Jordanian citizens?

14. Mr Urquhart said there were no real answers to these questions. No-one had discussed with the inhabitants what all this meant. The Israelis and Palestinians, dealing only through intermediaries, had a nightmare view of each other. They could never discuss the future, only the past. There was the prior question of recognition. The Palestinians had inched forward on this. Mr Arafat was more reasonable

in private contacts that he was in public. Sir A Parsons believed that only two powers, the UK and Pakistan, had ever recognised Jordan's title to the West Bank. The only way to answer the Prime Minister's questions was for someone to talk to all the parties.


15 Mr Urquhart suggested that some half-governmental/half-unofficial enterprise might break down the barriers. The Prime Minister asked if Europe could work this out? Sir D Maitland suggested that in the present vacuum only Europe could be active, not to achieve dramatic results, but to keep discussion going. The Prime Minister thought that something more was required: exactitude. Sir D Maitland said we could draw up a questionnaire and put it to the Israelis, the Egyptians and the PLO. Agreeing, Sir A Parsons pointed out that none of the studies of the options since 1967 had been written as a result of consultation with the parties. Europe could talk to all the parties; a questionnaire could help to provide the exactitude the Prime Minister was seeking. To mount a resolution at the UN this year would be a waste of time; inevitably, the Americans would veto.

16 Dr Waldheim believed that no concrete solution was possible before November. Meanwhile, there should be a revival of talks in one way or another.

The Prime Minister believed that the vacuum would extend beyond November. Both sides in the Presidential election would be courting the Jewish vote; there would be a year's delay.

Namibia

17 Dr Waldheim said he was doing his best to deal constructively with South Africa. Mr Botha's reply was not too constructive. The Prime Minister said it could have been worse. The best thing we could give South Africa was time. They had absorbed Mr Mugabe's election and were reassessing their own future. Mr Waldheim hoped the process would not take too long. The Africans were already talking about sanctions and a return to the Security Council. The Prime Minister urged that this should be resisted.



22 May, 1980

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note~~
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

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PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

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CAVEAT.....

Present

The Prime Minister
 Sir Donald Maitland
 Sir Anthony Parsons
 Sir Antony Acland
 Mr. Peter Marshall
 Mr Simpson-Orlebar
 Mr Alexander
 Mr Anson

Mr Kurt Waldheim
 Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
 Mr Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

1. In welcoming Mr Waldheim, the Prime Minister recalled that much of their discussion in July last year had been about Indo-China. She suggested that on this occasion, they might concentrate on Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East.

Iran

2. Mr Waldheim said he had wanted to resume direct talks with Iran; it was necessary to revive the negotiating process in order to avoid another military effort: such efforts would not solve the /problem.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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Mr Alexander
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Mr Alexander
No 10
type as amended.
20/5
Paul

problem. He had telephoned Mr Bani Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh from New York and talked to the latter in Belgrade. Mr Qotbzadeh was very receptive but wanted the Commission to present its report. When the Iranian Parliament convened, it could act on the basis of this report. Mr Waldheim had explained that the Commission could not present its report until the second part of its mandate had been fulfilled. The plan had been that the Commission would see the hostages and obtain their transfer out of the US Embassy compound to the authority of the Iranian Government, along with the 3 hostages in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; ^{after that,} they would have been ~~tried~~ ~~and then~~ sent back to the United States. The plan had ^{failed} ~~not worked out~~ because the Ayatollah had not supported Mr Bani Sadr. ^{3.} Mr Waldheim had explained that, if the Iranians wanted a report, the Commission would have to return to Iran; he had suggested he should first send a confidential emissary to prepare for their return and had chosen the Syrian member, Mr Adib Daoudi (a Sunni) in whom both sides had confidence. Mr Qotbzadeh had now said in public that Mr Daoudi should visit Iran only to deal with the report, not to discuss the hostages issue.

4. Mr Waldheim realised he had to protect himself against criticism from the radicals by not appearing too conciliatory and did not intend to make an issue of this unless it was exploited against him. In reality, it had been agreed that Mr Daoudi could prepare the ground in private with Messrs Bani Sadr and Qotbzadeh and ^{with} Ayatollah Beheshti. He had kept closely in touch with Mr Muskie and agreed the text of his statement with him. Mr Qotbzadeh had assured him the hostages were ^{fit} ~~sound~~ and healthy; some were still in the compound.

But he was afraid of what would happen if even one of them were to come to harm.

15. The Prime Minister assumed that Beheshti was *now* dominating Khomeini, ~~now~~. Mr Waldheim agreed that the Ayatollah's religious entourage were making the decisions. He would be giving Mr ~~Daudi~~²⁴ his instructions in Geneva on Saturday and sending a personal message to Beheshti, pleading for his cooperation. After his own experience of Tehran he did not expect too much from this initiative, but it was another effort to break the ice. If no concessions were promised, such as an offer to reassemble the hostages in Tehran under the Iranian ~~(some were still in the compound)~~ Government's authority, he would think twice about sending the Commission back.

6. The Prime Minister said that, as a Parliamentarian, she would be surprised if the Majles' first act were to order the ~~release~~ of the hostages. This did not ring true. She would expect the ~~in first act~~ to *begin with* something very nationalistic. Since Beheshti controlled over 50% of the seats, a decision of the Majles was unlikely to be helpful. What incentive was there for the Iranians to give up the hostages, apart from recovering international respectability? ~~Was~~ this a high priority? The UK had bought no Iranian oil since the beginning of April. BP and Shell had declined to buy at the new price of \$35 per barrel, provided the Federal Republic and Japan did the same. Iran could find ~~some~~ alternative markets in Eastern Europe, but this gave them no

hard currency. This was hurting most of all. Sanctions were being applied on arms, spare parts and future contracts - this was all the British Parliament would accept - and we were quietly doing quite a bit financially. Sanctions would not release the hostages, but solidarity with the United States was important for us. She had no intention of criticising the Americans for their rescue operation. ^(Military action) ~~Military~~ ^{But if the Americans attempted} ~~action had a different definition.~~ ^{Any mining of the Straits or a blockade,} ^{they} ~~would not help~~ ^{to keep the supplies of} Europe, because of the repercussions elsewhere. But it was hard to criticise without offering an alternative. She agreed that Mr Daudi should not go to Tehran unless he could do a proper job. It might be easier to solve the problem if ^{it} ~~he~~ could be forgotten for 6 months. The wives of the hostages, who had visited her 24 hours before the rescue attempt, were a stabilizing force. Their attitude was very sensible. They were prepared to wait, rather than jeopardise their husbands' lives.

7. Mr Waldheim said that, so long as the power struggle continued in Iran, he expected no solution before the late summer, or even later. ^{Agreeing,} ~~The~~ Prime Minister considered ^{prospect of the} the ^{ie} internal disintegration of Iran very worrying. The ^{ie} siege of the Iranian Embassy in London had highlighted the bad deal which Arabistan was getting from Khomeini. This fertile ground for subversion

/was

^{Explosives}
 was being ~~aided~~ by Iraq. The hostages might be regarded as a unifying factor: this was one reason why they continued to be held. Hatred unified. We must continue with our diplomatic initiatives, but not so as to court a rebuff. ~~Our secondary objective in doing so was that,~~ Unless we were seen to be active, the pressures ^{to take} urging military action on President Carter would increase. ⁸ Sir A Parsons commented that, ^{Speaking to audiences all over} in ~~his travels round~~ the United States, ~~all his audiences~~ ^{he had in general circumstances an eagerness} had been ready to settle the affair quietly and peacefully. The pressures in Washington were self-induced. Mr Waldheim agreed: the American people understood the difficulties and saw that military operations could not solve the problem. If Mr Daudi ^{ou} reported no change in the Iranian position, he agreed that the Commission should not go back. The Prime Minister said it would then be necessary to think of something else. Sir D Maitland commented that the Red Cross and others had played a role, but the Commission looked the best bet. ^{that Archbishop Capucci and} Mr Waldheim said Mr MacBride had tried, but ^{the latter's} ~~his~~ idea of a Nuremberg-style tribunal would not solve the problem. He had been disappointed to hear that ^{Mr MacBride} ~~he~~ was now being invited by ^{representatives} Mr Bani Sadr, along with ~~some~~ other leftist ~~people~~, to a meeting on 2-5 June. This was likely to end up with a resolution accusing the US and would produce no results.

/Afghanistan

Afghanistan

9. The Prime Minister said the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thought the Russians might be looking for a way out, possibly seeking to withdraw their troops, provided they could leave behind a régime which would be their puppet. She took the more cynical view that the Russians would remain for a very long time. They were bringing in their families. All their activity was designed to get us to accept the present situation. They disliked criticism, however: we should continue to stress ^{with} ~~that~~ the non-aligned ^{that} ~~(supported)~~ the Afghan people ^{had the} ~~'s~~ right to choose their own destiny, ^{but} ~~something~~ which they would never get ^{be allowed to do so by} ~~from~~ the Russians.

~~Lord Carrington thought the new Kabul proposals might not be so far apart from our ideas for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, and we ~~must~~ look at ~~these~~ to see if there was any ~~likelihood of withdrawal~~.~~

The best hope ~~she saw~~ was that Afghanistan might become another Finland, not that they had very much in common historically. The Chinese were glad to think that the Russians were bleeding to death in Afghanistan and Cambodia: these great haemorrhages might suit China, but we took a different view. ^{that should} ~~The Russians wanted~~ us to go to Madrid; if we did, she would want to be pretty outspoken. ^{that}

10. Sir A Acland suggested ~~the new proposals did not add a great deal.~~ ^{to represent anything very new.} They talked about the frontiers with Pakistan and Iran, but said nothing about the Afghan/Soviet or Chinese frontiers. Sir D Maitland thought it was astute of the Russians to suggest that they would get out if only the Afghan/Pakistan frontier

could be controlled: neither Britain nor Pakistan had ever been able to control the mountainous tribal area, where people could come and go. There had been a disquieting reference in Mr Gromyko's talk with Lord Carrington in Vienna to the social changes that would be needed in Afghanistan, but there were some points on which it was worth seeking clarification. We should maintain the pressure, but ask some questions. The Prime Minister said we could test the seriousness of the Soviet position by asking if they were ready to name a date for withdrawal. Sir A Acland suggested the answer might be that certain conditions must be fulfilled first. The Prime Minister noted that the Russians had annexed one state about every 10 years; more frequently if you counted those taken over by proxy. It was only a question of time before they marched into another. ~~Pakistan would be a tricky case - a régime which knew nothing about democracy.~~

17. Mr Waldheim shared the Prime Minister's view. He was convinced the Russians would not leave so long as there was no solid Afghan Government to support their policy. The occupation was a firm decision of the Polit ^{buro,} Bureau, ^{as had been the mission of} like Czechoslovakia. When he had asked Mr Gromyko to explain the latest proposals, ~~he~~ ^{Mr Gromyko} had ^{said} ~~complained~~ there were 1/2 million Afghans in Pakistan supported by the Western powers ^{and said that,} so long as this new aggression was being prepared, there was no reason for the Russians to withdraw. The Prime Minister ^{an} thought it/astounding proposition that Afghans could

not return to Afghanistan, except for those of whom Mr Gromyko approved. She was disturbed that the action being taken was largely confined to diplomacy. The Germans and French were keeping up their trade contacts. Despite American efforts on wheat, this was still getting through to the Soviet Union. The UK had not had much success in reducing the supply of technology. The Olympics would not be real, but, apart from words and condemnation in the UN, little ^{else} had been done. The Russians must be seen to be isolated. If people said we must talk, the last card would have gone. Mr Waldheim was encouraged by developments at the UN on both Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The non-aligned, under Yugoslav leadership, had switched positions. The Prime Minister said this was the ^{most important} ~~biggest~~ thing which had happened. Cuba's ~~Chairmanship~~ of the non-aligned movement had been wholly frustrated, nowhere more so than at the UN. This should be kept up. ~~But~~ The picture would change if nothing was done ^{and} ~~about~~ Afghanistan and Pakistan were ^{allowed} to fall.

Middle East

12. Mr Waldheim thought it his duty as Secretary-General to say he was very worried about the situation in the Middle East. The autonomy talks had collapsed. The Americans were paralysed, the Europeans hesitant. In the vacuum, many things could happen. The radical Arabs could make trouble. The Israelis were not cooperative. Major Haddad, supplied by the Israelis, was bombing UNIFIL's headquarters and killing

Irish soldiers. Now was the moment for Europe to play a constructive role. He *heard* a lot of talk in the media about a European initiative. One option was to seek to amend Security Council Resolution 242 so as to give the Palestinians their political rights, i.e. self-determination. If this was not feasible - and ^a ~~the~~ US veto would seem certain before the Presidential election - the Arabs would ask for a Special Session of the General Assembly. Mr Arafat might wait ^{if} ~~for~~ a European initiative, ^{there was respect,} ~~but~~ otherwise *he would* call for a Special Session in June or July. There would be a ^{rough} ~~drastic~~ Resolution, ^{which would be} ~~opposed~~ by the United States, ^{but} ~~which~~ if not too radical might get some other Western votes.

13. The Prime Minister said that at Luxembourg the Nine had decided not to discuss the options until 26 May, by which time they had thought the Camp David process would be exhausted. They were to discuss ^(of the problems) ~~at~~ the Venice Summit, but ^{if now looked as though} ~~the process~~ might still be alive ^{at} ~~the point;~~ ^{she was doubtful about} ~~any~~ ^{which would} ~~cutting~~ across the Americans. She questioned what was meant by self-determination for the Palestinians. There was no such animal in constitutional law. What were they to determine? Did their land really belong to Jordan? There were many Palestinians in Syria and the Lebanon: ~~Where~~ were they to go? King Hussein had indicated he might be ready for some loose federation of the West Bank with Jordan: would they still be Jordanian citizens? ^{14.} Mr Urquhart said there were no real answers to these questions. No-one had discussed with

the inhabitants what all this meant. The Israelis and Palestinians, dealing only through intermediaries, had a nightmare view of each other. They could never discuss the future, only the past. There was the prior question of recognition. The Palestinians had inched forward on this. Mr Arafat was more reasonable in private contacts than he was in public. Sir A Parsons believed that only two powers, the UK and Pakistan, ^{had ever} ~~did~~ recognise ^{fit to} Jordan's ~~occupation of~~ the West Bank. The only way to answer the Prime Ministers's questions was for someone to talk to all the parties. ¹⁵ Mr Urquhart suggested that some half-governmental/half-unofficial enterprise might break down the barriers. The Prime Minister asked if Europe could work this out? Sir D Maitland suggested that in the present vacuum only Europe could be active, not to achieve dramatic results, but to keep discussion going. The Prime Minister thought that something more was required: exactitude. Sir D Maitland said we could draw up a questionnaire and put it to the Israelis, the Egyptians and the PLO. Agreeing, Sir A Parsons pointed out that none of the studies of the options since 1967 had been written as a result of consultation with the parties. Europe could talk to all the parties; a questionnaire could ^{help to} provide the exactitude the Prime Minister was seeking.

To mount a ~~Resolution~~ at the UN this year would be a waste of time; inevitably, the Americans would veto.

¹⁶ Mr Waldheim believed that no concrete solution ~~could~~ ^{was} ~~be~~ possible before November. Meanwhile, there should be a revival of talks in one way or another.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister believed that the vacuum would extend beyond November. Both sides in the Presidential election would be courting the Jewish vote; there would be a year's delay.

Namibia

18. Mr Waldheim said he was doing his best to deal constructively with South Africa. Mr Botha's reply was not too constructive. The Prime Minister said it could have been worse. The best thing we could give South Africa was time. They had absorbed Mr Mugabe's ^{own} and were reassessing their/future. Mr Waldheim hoped the process would not take too long. The Africans were already talking about sanctions and a return to the Security Council. The Prime Minister urged that this ~~sh~~ould be resisted.

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21 MAY 1980

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United
Nations

22 May, 1980

Visit of UN Secretary-General

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's discussion with the Secretary-General of the UN, Dr Kurt Waldheim, which took place here on Tuesday, 20 May.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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GENEVE 181/172 23 2044 PAGE 1/50

HER EXCELLENCY THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER M.P. PRIME
MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
LONDONS W1

P.O. INTERNATIONAL
TELEGRAPHS, LONDON
24 MAY 1980
EC3/SW1 AREA OFFICE
ST BOTOLPHS
ENQUIRIES DIAL 01-836
1222 Ext 2068

MAY 24 00 37 '80

LFS1200

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MSC4446 MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER I WISH TO THANK YOU
MOST WARMLY FOR ALL YOUR KINDNESS AND HOSPITALITY DURING
OUR VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM I GREATLY APPRECIATED
THE OPPORTUNITY

COL MSC4446

JAD19096 HER EXCELLENCY THE RT PAGE 2/50

TO TALK WITH YOU AT LENGTH ON THE MANY PROBLEMS
WHICH PREOCCUPY US AND IT WAS MOST VALUABLE FOR ME
TO KNOW YOUR VIEWS ESPECIALLY CONCERNING POSSIBLE
FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION MAY I SAY ONCE
AGAIN HOW GRATEFUL I AM FOR YOUR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT
IN SO MANY OF OUR

JAD19096 HER EXCELLENCY THE RT PAGE 3/50


ENDEAVOURS I LOOK FORWARD TO KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH
WITH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT MY WIFE AND I PARTICULARLY
APPRECIATED THE DELIGHTFUL DINNER YOU GAVE FOR US AND THE
THOUGHTFULNESS WITH WHICH YOU HAD BROUGHT TOGETHER SO
MANY OLD FRIENDS IT WAS A CHARMING AND
WARMHEARTED EVENING WHICH WE SHALL

JAD19096 HER EXCELLENCY THE RT PAGE 4/22

LONG REMEMBER WE EXTEND TO YOU AND MR THATCHER OUR
WARMEST THANKS AND GOOD WISHES

YOUR SINCERELY

KURT WALDHEIM SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS



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Ref: CPS/vpm

21 May 1980

R23P
Mr
Mr
Prime Minister
Mr - 23/5
Dear Prime Minister,

My wife and I are most grateful to yourself and Mr. Denis Thatcher for the privilege of being included among your guests at the Dinner yesterday evening in honour of Dr. and Mrs. Kurt Waldheim. This was an extremely pleasant and memorable occasion for us.

I feel very grateful also for your kind interest in the activities of this Organization, which is the only Specialized Agency of the United Nations system dedicated solely to maritime affairs. This Organization, ever since its inception, has been nurtured by the United Kingdom Government and we have continuously received very generous and powerful support. In recent years, the membership of the Organization has grown rapidly. It now totals 117 states, covering practically all countries with maritime interests. British maritime expertise has been of the greatest help in the development of global safety and pollution prevention standards and the generosity of the Government in providing host country facilities has always greatly assisted our work. We are very much looking forward to moving to our new Headquarters premises as soon as they are ready. The Organization is most happy to have its Headquarters in London, the focal point of the world's maritime activities. For all these reasons we feel greatly beholden to Her Majesty's Government. Your interest in our work will be a source of inspiration and we shall continue our endeavours to promote worldwide co-operation among Governments in order to enhance the safety of world shipping and to prevent the pollution of the sea from ships.

With renewed thanks and expressions of profound regards and respects,

Yours sincerely,

C.P. SRIVASTAVA
Secretary-General

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, S.W.1.

223/5

Prime Minister (2)



Am

**UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

3 WHITEHALL COURT LONDON SW1 A/2 EL 01-930 2931/2

21 MAY 1980 ^{F.4} Am

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

Thank you for welcoming Christine and myself
to Downing Street yesterday evening.

MB

It was good of you to invite UNA Leaders
to the Reception where they enjoyed meeting
Dr Waldheim and other UN or Government Leaders.

I was moved by your solicitude for
our President, Lord Noel Baker, as he was leaving.

Be assured of our critical support
and uncritical prayers.

Yours sincerely,

David J. Harding

REVD DAVID J. HARDING
DIRECTOR U.K. UNA.