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TO PRIORITY ROME
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FROM: SECRETARY JIC

THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXTRACT (PARAS 1-6) FROM THE WEEKLY SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE, WSI(80)25 DATED 19/6/80.

ITALY - SECRET UK/US EYES ONLY - DELICATE SOURCE (UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED)

1. THE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY, WHICH SERVE AS A MEASURE OF GOVERNMENT POPULARITY, HAVE STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF MR COSSIGA'S GOVERNMENT PARTICULARLY BY REASON OF THE SUPPORT GIVEN TO THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI), ITS MAIN COALITION PARTNER. THE RESULTS ARE A SETBACK FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) BUT PROBABLY NOT AS BAD AS IT HAD FEARED. A FEATURE WAS THE HIGH PROPORTION (17 PER CENT) OF ABSTENTIONS, AND SPOILED AND BLANK VOTES.
2. THE ELECTIONS ON 8-9 JUNE WERE HELD IN MOST OF ITALY'S REGIONS, PROVINCES AND COMMUNES. IN THE REGIONS THE RESULTS, SHOWING A TREND WHICH WAS GENERALLY CONFIRMED IN THE PROVINCES AND COMMUNES, GAVE 36.8 PER CENT OF THE VOTE TO THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (DC), COMPARED WITH 35.4 PER CENT IN 1975 AND 38.1 PER CENT IN THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE SAME REGIONS= 31.5 PER CENT TO THE PCI, (33.4 PER CENT IN 1975 AND 31.8 PER CENT IN 1979)= AND 12.7 PER CENT TO THE PSI, (12.0 PER CENT AND 9.9 PER CENT). THE OTHER SMALL CENTRE PARTIES MAINTAINED THEIR POSITIONS. THE TURN-OUT WAS 88.5 PER CENT, DOWN 3 PER CENT ON THE 1975 LOCAL ELECTIONS AND LOW BY ITALIAN STANDARDS. THE HIGH NUMBER OF ABSTENTIONS AND SPOILED AND BLANK VOTES MAY HAVE BEEN SWOLLEN BY THE RADICAL PARTY'S CALL TO ITS SUPPORTERS TO CAST BLANK VOTES, BUT ALSO SUGGESTS SOME DISILLUSIONMENT AMONG THE ELECTORATE WITH THE CHOICES ON OFFER TO THEM. THE ULTIMATE EFFECT ON LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS WILL BE DECIDED BY INTER-PARTY BARGAINING, BUT THE ELECTIONS WERE WIDELY SEEN AS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
3. COSSIGA'S PERSONAL POSITION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED. HE WENT INTO THE ELECTIONS UNDER THE CLOUD OF A SCANDAL CAUSED BY ALLEGATIONS THAT HE WARNED HIS PARTY COLLEAGUE CARLO DONA-CATTIN THAT THE LATTER'S SON, MARCO, WAS ABOUT TO BE ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH MEMBERSHIP OF A TERRORIST GROUP. A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION VOTED ONLY NARROWLY TO DROP PROCEEDINGS AGAINST COSSIGA, WHO HAS DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS, AND THE PCI IS PUSHING FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION BY BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE SUCCESSFUL AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE SUMMER RECESS. THE ELECTION RESULTS SHOW THAT COSSIGA'S SUPPORT WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE SCANDAL, AND HE MAY EVEN HAVE RECEIVED SOME SYMPATHY VOTES= HIS CREDIBILITY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN HELPED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT SUCCESSFUL ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES.
4. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE VOTE FOR THE PSI WILL BE SEEN AS AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE TACTICS OF THE PSI'S LEADER CRAXI AND A SETBACK FOR THE LEFT-WINGERS WHO ARE OPPOSED TO THE COALITION WITH THE DC. THOUGH CRAXI MAY SEEK TO CAPITALISE ON THE PSI'S GAINS BY PRESSING FOR GREATER PSI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE HIM TO ACHIEVE HIS AMBITION OF BECOMING PRIME MINISTER, PARTICULARLY AS THE PSI ALREADY HOLDS THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC.
5. THOUGH THE PCI RECOGNISES THAT THE RESULTS CONFIRM THAT IT CONTINUES TO LOSE VOTES, THE OUTCOME IS NOT AS BAD AS PARTY SECRETARY-GENERAL BERLINGUER AND OTHER LEADERS FEARED. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE POST-ELECTION DEBATE WITHIN THE PARTY, THE PCI POLICY OF AIMING TO ACHIEVE POWER THROUGH A POLITICAL CONSENSUS (+THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE+) IS BOUND TO COME UNDER ATTACK= THE DC'S RECENT REJECTION OF CO-OPERATION WITH THE PCI SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ENDORSED BY THE ELECTORATE, AND THE CENTRE-LEFT DC-PSI AXIS TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED. THERE IS THEREFORE A GROUP WITHIN THE PCI WHICH BELIEVES THAT EVENTS ARE WORKING AGAINST THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE +HISTORIC COMPROMISE+ AND THAT THE PARTY MAY HAVE TO RETHINK ITS STRATEGY.
6. WHILE THE PCI CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT THE DONA-CATTIN AFFAIR FOR ALL IT IS WORTH, WE THINK IT UNLIKELY ON PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE SCANDAL WILL LEAD TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE COSSIGA GOVERNMENT. THE ELECTIONS HAVE IMPROVED THE SHORT TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE COALITION, BUT HAVE NOT CHANGED THE

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UGANDA - SECRET UK/US EYES ONLY - DELICATE SOURCE (UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED)

7. SINCE THE RETURN OF EX-PRESIDENT MILTON OBOTE ON 27 MAY, THE PACE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY HAS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY, BUT NO DEFINITE DATE HAS YET BEEN SET FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL AND GENERAL ELECTIONS.

8. THE SUMMIT MEETING AT ARUSHA ON 6 JUNE BETWEEN PRESIDENTS NIMEIRI AND NYERERE AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UGANDAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT MILITARY COMMISSION, PAULO MUWANGA, WENT BADLY AND ACHIEVED LITTLE. ACCORDING TO THE SUDANESE, NIMEIRI SPOKE OUT STRONGLY AGAINST THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF EX-PRESIDENT BINAISA AND INSISTED THAT THE 13,000 STRONG TANZANIAN MILITARY CONTINGENT IN UGANDA SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. IF SO, HE SEEMS TO HAVE MADE NO IMPRESSION ON NYERERE OR MUWANGA. PRESIDENT MOI, WHO APPARENTLY SHARES NIMEIRI'S VIEWS, DECIDED AT THE LAST MINUTE NOT TO ATTEND THE MEETING.

9. NYERERE WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. HE FEARS THAT THE SUDAN AND KENYA ARE TRYING TO ENSURE THAT OBOTE WILL NOT BE ELECTED PRESIDENT AND HAS WARNED MUWANGA THAT HE MAY WITHDRAW HIS TROOPS IF THE ELECTIONS ARE NOT HELD IN SEPTEMBER. THERE IS NO SIGN AT THE MOMENT OF ANY PLAN TO REDUCE FURTHER THE TANZANIAN PRESENCE IN UGANDA. MUWANGA HAS PROMISED THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER + IF HUMANLY POSSIBLE+. HE HAS SAID THAT COMMONWEALTH OR ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVERS MAY BE INVITED BUT THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT IN THE ORGANISATION OF THE ELECTIONS.