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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1981

(2)

Handwritten scribbles and initials: "Prime Minister" with a line through it, "Rich", "Rich", and "Rich".

Dear Michael,

26th Congress of the CPSU: Brezhnev's Speech

You asked for an assessment of Brezhnev's Report to the Party Congress. I enclose a short note by the Department, covering telegrams from Moscow containing Sir C Keeble's first reactions and a summary of the points of foreign policy interest. There may be points to add when we have been able to study the full text of the speech.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION:
BREZHNEV'S SPEECH

- A
B
1. We have not yet seen the complete text. Sir C Keeble's first reactions are in Moscow telno. 62 and the foreign policy section of the speech is summarised in Moscow telno. 63. We agree with Moscow's overall assessment that the speech 'was essentially what was to be expected, a re-statement and justification of existing policies.'
 2. There will be more to say on the economic and domestic policy aspects of the Congress when Prime Minister Tikhonov has made his report on the guidelines for the 5 Year Plan, and there may be points of interest also in other speeches. But the general line will clearly be business as usual, with no sign of a major economic reform. The proposed revision of the CPSU Programme (the present one dates back to 1961 and includes Krushchev's claim that by 1980 the Soviet Union will have overtaken the United States economically and be on the threshold of full communism) may give rise to some interesting internal debate, but the event is unlikely to prove of much practical importance.
 3. On foreign policy, we agree generally with Sir C Keeble's assessment but the following points are worth noting:
 - i. Poland: While the commitment to preserving socialism in Poland goes no further than the Warsaw Pact declaration of last December, Brezhnev's statement that 'the enemies of socialism, with the support of outside forces, are creating anarchy and endeavouring to channel events along a counter-revolutionary path' endorses, at the highest level, a disturbing trend in recent Soviet propaganda.
 - ii. US/Soviet: The suggestion of a summit meeting with President Reagan, and the references to SALT, CBMs and TNF, seem designed to make the Soviet Union appear reasonable and to put pressure on the United States to respond quickly and in kind or accept the consequences in terms of public relations, more especially in Europe.
 - iii. Western Europe: Predictable attempts at wedge-driving, which will no doubt be developed as occasion arises. We, in particular, must expect to hear more of Brezhnev's statement that British/Soviet relations are stagnating and that the Soviet Union is not to blame.

/iv. Middle East



- iv. Middle East: The idea of an international conference does no more than restate in a slightly different form the long-standing Soviet thesis that a solution can only be found with their participation.
- v. The Gulf/Afghanistan: Brezhnev's statement that 'we do not object to questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed together with questions of Persian Gulf security' seems to be primarily a way of resisting pressure for a conference on Afghanistan alone. Brezhnev went on to say that 'internal Afghan affairs could not be discussed in such a context.
- vi. Third World: The mixture as before. The disclaimer of any intention to export revolution is not only balanced by the references to support for national liberation movements, the rejection of counter-revolution and the promise of military support where it was wanted, but must be seen against the background of existing Soviet policy.

4. We did not expect any radical change of course and none is foreshadowed.

East European & Soviet Department
24 February 1981

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FM MOSCOW 231640Z FEB 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 062 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO

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IMMEDIATE

Mr Bullard
Mr Leiguer
~~Mr. ESTP~~
Mr Newson

X3.

(FCO/WH)

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PARTY CONGRESS

1. BREZHNEV PRESENTED THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT ON 23 FEBRUARY. IN CONTRAST TO THE PRACTICE AT THE LAST CONGRESS ONLY THE FIRST AND LAST FEW MINUTES OF A THREE AND THREE QUARTER HOUR SPEECH WERE CARRIED LIVE ON TV AND RADIO, THE REMAINDER BEING READ BY AN ANNOUNCER. BREZHNEV MAY IN FACT HAVE DELIVERED AN ABBREVIATED VERSION, BUT HE LOOKED IN GOOD ENOUGH FORM.

2. THE REPORT WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT WAS TO BE EXPECTED, A RE-STATEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION OF EXISTING POLICIES. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF TENSION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, DISTURBANCE IN POLAND AND IMMOBILITY INTERNALLY, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THERE SHOULD BE MORE CAUTION THAN ADVENTURE IN IT. THE PRINCIPAL INTEREST IS IN THE SECTION ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHICH IS SUMMARISED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, WITH QUOTATIONS FROM AND UNOFFICIAL TASS TRANSLATION. THE POINTS WHICH STRUCK ME IN THAT SECTION WERE :

(A) THE APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ARMS CONTROL.

IN STRESSING THE SOVIET DEVOTION TO PEACE AND ATTACKING IMPERIALIST COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL TENSION BREZHNEV WAS LESS STRIDENT THAN HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN. HE MADE HIS DOUBTS ABOUT THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION CLEAR ENOUGH, BUT ALSO MADE CLEAR THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS FOR THE VAVOPNUTTOT

RELATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND HIS DESIRE FOR A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE REFERENCE TO THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WAS SOMEWHAT MORE POSITIVE THAN RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS (''CONTINUE THE RELEVANT NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT DELAY PRESERVING ALL THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS THAT HAVE SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED'') THIS AND THE OTHER ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS ARE INTENDED TO BE SEEN AS A MAJOR FEATURE OF THE REPORT, BUT THE ONLY WHOLLY NEW ELEMENTS ARE THE EXPRESSED READINESS TO HAVE CBM'S EXTENDED TO ALL EUROPEAN RUSSIA AND THEIR INTRODUCTION TO THE FAR EAST. THE PRINCIPAL SOVIET INTEREST IS OF COURSE TO STABILISE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AS IT NOW STANDS AND THIS IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROPOSED MORATORIUM ON TNF DEPLOYMENT, WHICH IS A REWORKING OF BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 1979. THE PROPOSAL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AT THEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL TO INCLUDE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES SEEMS LIKE A DEVELOPMENT OF LAST MAY'S PCC DECLARATION CALLING FOR A WORLD SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

(B) EUROPE

BREZHNEV DID NOT CONTRAST WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEREST IN DETENTE AND A U.S. COMMITMENT TO CONFRONTATION AS MUCH AS HE MIGHT HAVE DONE, THOUGH I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THIS THEME WILL BE MADE MUCH OF IF PUBLIC REACTIONS IN THE WEST PROVIDE ANY OPENING. HE HAD PARTICULARLY WARM WORDS FOR THE FRENCH AS IN 1976. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONS WITH THE FRG BUT MADE A LITTLE MORE OF THE DIFFICULTIES AND, AS IN 1976, CALLED FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE BERLIN AGREEMENTS. HE CSAID THE STANDSTILL IN RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN REGRETTABLE, BUT CLAIMED IT WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

(C) THIRD WORLD

THE SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WAS STANDARD. THE DISCLAIMER OF ANY EXPORT OF REVOLUTION WAS BALANCED WITH A REJECTION OF COUNTER REVOLUTION AND A PROMISE OF MILITARY SUPPORT WHERE IT WAS WANTED, BUT I FOUND HERE A SLIGHT IMPLICATION THAT WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THE SOVIET UNION ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE THIRD WORLD. I DO NOT THINK THE SUGGESTION OF A CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS PUT FORWARD WITH MUCH EXPECTATION OF EARLY PROGRESS AND IT IS NOT AMONG THE PROPOSALS SINGLED OUT BY BREZHNEV AT THE END OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE REPORT.

THE END OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE REPORT. ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF BREZHNEV HAD NOTHING SIGNIFICANTLY NEW EXCEPT THE OFFER OF LINKED NEGOTIATIONS, A CLEAR RESPONSE TO WESTERN LINKAGE OF THE TWO PROBLEMS.

(D) THE LENGTHY PASSAGE ON INTER-PARTY RELATIONS WAS DEFENSIVE IN TONE. THE THEME WAS THAT THERE COULD AND HAD TO BE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTIES AS REGARDS TACTICS; BUT THAT ALL COMMUNISTS SHARED A COMMON APPROACH AND THAT ABOVE ALL CRITICISM OF OTHER PARTIES SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE. DISCONTENT WITH THE ITALIAN AND SPANISH PARTIES WAS APPARENT.

(E) THE COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING SOCIALISM IN POLAND IS CLEAR BUT GOES NO FURTHER THAN THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION OF LAST DECEMBER. BREZHNEV LAID CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR UNITY IN THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH, THE BENEFITS OF COMECON COOPERATION AND THE RESOLUTE DEFENCE OF SOVIET INTERESTS IN THAT SPHERE.

3. THE SECTION OF THE REPORT DEVOTED TO ECONOMIC AFFAIRS REFLECTED THE ALREADY PUBLISHED PLAN GUIDELINES. IT ADDED LITTLE EITHER BY WAY OF POLICY OR OF DETAIL. ALTHOUGH BREZHNEV REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR GREATER FREEDOM IN DECISION MAKING BY MANAGEMENT THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF MAJOR REFORM. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING A SUFFICIENT SUPPLY OF FOODSTUFFS AND CONSUMER GOODS TO THE POPULATION, BUT HIS CRITICISMS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE WERE LESS STRONG THAN THOSE HE UTTERED AT THE OCTOBER PLENUM (MY SAVING TEL NO 26 OF 22 OCTOBER) LAST YEAR. I SHALL DEFER FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL WE HAVE TIKHONOV'S SPEECH LATER IN THE WEEK.

4. ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS BREZHNEV DISTRIBUTED PRAISE AND BLAME IN TIME HONOURED FASHION BUT HAD LITTLE NEW TO SAY. HIS REFERENCES TO THE PLACE OF TRADES UNIONS IN SOVIET SOCIETY WERE UNEXCEPTIONABLE, ALTHOUGH HE URGED THEM TO MAKE GREATER USE OF THE RIGHTS THEY ALREADY ENJOYED. HE CONFINED HIMSELF TO GENERALITIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS, NATIONALISM, YOUTH AND INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES. DESPITE HIS CLAIM THAT THE ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION HAD INVIGORATED THE SOVIET PEOPLE, BREZHNEV'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO RESTRUCTURE THE PARTYS IDEOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA MACHINERY IMPLIED SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF POPULAR COMMITMENT. BREZHNEV CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT MARXISM/LENINISM SHOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRESENT CPSU PROGRAMME, WHICH DATES

BY STATING THAT THE PRESENT CPSU PROGRAMME, WHICH DATES FROM 1961, SHOULD BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE. HIS PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES IN ADVANCING THIS IDEA WERE PRESUMABLY TO PUT HIS OWN IMPRINT ON ONE OF THE SURVIVALS OF THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA AND TO TRY TO ENSURE THE CONGRESS HAS AT LEAST ONE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT TO POINT TO ON THE INTERNAL FRONT.

F C O PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

KEEBLE

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FM MOSCOW 231645Z FEB '81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 063 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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MR Bullard .

~~MR Ferguson~~HY ~~EFP~~

HY Newell

HY Planning Staff

(FCO/WH)

M.I.P.T.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT TO 26TH PARTY CONGRESS: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH BEGAN WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL SITUATION. ON THE INTERNAL SIDE, THE TASKS SET AT THE 25TH CONGRESS HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY FULFILLED. ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS HAD BEEN ROUGH AND COMPLICATED. THE POWER, ACTIVITY AND PRESTIGE OF THE SOVIET UNION HAD GROWN. THE SPHERE OF IMPERIALIST DOMINATION HAD NARROWED, BUT THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF IMPERIALIST POLICY HAD INCREASED ACUTELY.

2. BREZHNEV DEALT INITIALLY WITH RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE STRESSED THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION WITH THE GDR, WITH A SPECIAL WORD FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SKILLS DEVELOPED BY HUNGARY (AGRICULTURE), THE GDR (THE RATIONALISATION OF PRODUCTION), CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EVEN BULGARIA. THIS EXPERIENCE SHOULD BE STUDIED AND UTILIZED. CONDITIONS WERE GETTING MORE COMPLICATED HOWEVER WITH THE DETERIORATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND SPIRALLING PRICES: "THE SLOWING OF THE DETENTE PROCESS AND THE ARMS RACE IMPOSED BY THE IMPERIALIST POWERS ARE NO SMALL BURDEN FOR US AS WELL". THE IDIOLOGICAL STRUGGLE HAD SHARPENED, AND IMPERIALISTS WERE SYSTEMATICALLY CONDUCTING HOSTILE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. WHEN SUCH ACTIVITY WAS COMPOUNDED WITH "MISTAKES AND MISCALCULATIONS IN HOME POLICY" AS IN POLAND, ANTI-SOCIALIST ELEMENTS APPEARED. THE POLISH COMRADES WERE, HOWEVER, ENGAGED IN REDRESSING THE CRITICAL SITUATION. THE DECEMBER MEETING IN MOSCOW HAD RENDERED

CRITICAL SITUATION. THE DECEMBER MEETING IN MOSCOW HAD RENDERED POLAND IMPORTANT POLITICAL SUPPORT. "WE WILL NOT ABANDON FRATERNAL SOCIALIST POLAND IN ITS HOUR OF NEED." EVENTS IN POLAND HAD UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A PARTY TO HEED THE VOICE OF THE MASSES. AFTER REFERRING TO PAST DIFFICULT TIMES IN THE HISTORY OF WORLD SOCIALISM, HE WENT ON "LET NO ONE DOUBT OUR COMMON DETERMINATION TO SECURE OUR INTERESTS AND TO DEFEND THE SOCIALIST GAINS OF THE PEOPLES".

3. ON CHINA, BREZHNEV CLAIMED THAT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS HAD SHOWN WHERE DISTORTIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALISM LED. CHANGES WERE NOW UNDER WAY BUT ONLY TIME WOULD SHOW WHAT THESE MEANT. THERE WERE NO GROUNDS TO SPEAK OF CHANGES FOR THE BETTER IN PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY. THE US, JAPAN AND NATO WERE ATTEMPTING TO USE CHINA'S HOSTILITY TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR THEIR OWN ENDS, BUT THIS WAS A HAZARDOUS GAME. THE SOVIET UNION STOOD FOR NORMALISING RELATIONS.

4. TURNING TO "NEWLY-FREE COUNTRIES", BREZHNEV REFERRED TO SOVIET ECONOMIC AID AND EXPRESSED READINESS TO "STRENGTHEN THEIR DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY" IF REQUESTED. "WE ARE AGAINST THE EXPORT OF REVOLUTION, AND WE CANNOT AGREE TO ANY EXPORT OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION". THE "UNDECLARED WAR" AGAINST THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION HAD CREATED A DIRECT THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN ONCE THE INFILTRATION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GANGS HAD CEASED AND DEPENDABLE GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERVENTION HAD BEEN GIVEN. THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN WAS COMPLEX AND CONTRADICTIONARY, BUT ESSENTIALLY ANTI-IMPERIALIST. THE SOVIET UNION RESPECTED RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS. ISLAMIC SLOGANS COULD EITHER BE USED IN THE BATTLE FOR LIBERATION, OR MANIPULATED BY REACTION; WHAT MATTERED THEREFORE WERE THE AIMS BEING PURSUED BY A MOVEMENT. THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR WAS SENSELESS AND AN ADVANTAGE ONLY TO IMPERIALISM. THE SOVIET UNION WAS STRIVING TO FACILITATE AN END TO THE WAR. A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST REQUIRED A "COLLECTIVE SEARCH" E.G. IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SPECIALLY CONVENED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AND TO JOIN WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDING THE PLO AND ISRAEL TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. ON THE SUBSTANCE, THERE SHOULD BE AN END TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ALL ARAB TERRITORIES CAPTURED IN 1967, A STATE FOR THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE AND MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA INCLUDING ISRAEL. THE STRENGTH OF THE NAM STEMMED FROM ITS "ORIENTATION AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM". THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO

COLONIALISM''. THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUITABLE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

5. BREZHNEV THEN TURNED TO RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTIES. HE NOTED THAT DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND DISSIMILAR OPINIONS WERE NATURAL. THE ''LEADERSHIPS OF A FEW COMMUNIST PARTIES'' HAD ENERGETICALLY DEFENDED THE RIGHT TO SPECIFICALLY NATIONAL NATIONAL WAYS OF BUILDING SOCIALISM, ALL THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CARRIED OUT REVOLUTION IN THEIR OWN WAY AND NO-ONE WAS IMPOSING ANY STEREOTYPES. THE SOVIET UNION HEEDED ''COMRADELY CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM'' BUT OPPOSED CRITICISM WHICH DISTORTED SOCIALIST REALITY OR AIDED IMPERIALIST PROPAGANDA (THE ITALIAN AND SPANISH PARTIES WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE EXAMPLES GIVEN OF PARTIES WITH WHOM THE CPSU HAD FRIENDLY RELATIONS). THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED CO-OPERATION WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND OTHER PEACE LOVING FORCES. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY HAD CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL WEIGHT AND COULD DO MORE TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BUT ''SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERS DO NOT ALWAYS ACT ALONG THESE LINES'', AND SOME WERE ''AFFLICTED WITH THE VIRUS OF ANTI-COMMUNISM''.

6. TURNING TO THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, BREZHNEV REFERRED TO THE AGGRAVATION OF THE GENERAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM, LEADING TO A SCRAMBLE FOR MARKETS AND SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS AND THE PURSUANCE OF NARROW AND SELFISH GOALS. MILITARY EXPENDITURE HAD RISEN UNPRECEDENTLY. THERE WERE ATTEMPTS TO DELUDE PEOPLE THAT NUCLEAR WAR COULD BE LIMITED, BUT A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR WOULD MEANT THE DESTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN CIVILISATION AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ESCAPE. THE UNITED STATES PROCLAIMED SPHERES OF ''VITAL INTERESTS'' AND THERE WAS TALK OF EXTENDING THE FUNCTIONS OF NATO. BY CONTRAST, THE SOVIET UNION HAD PROPOSED AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR THE PERSIAN GULF WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF ALL SIDES AS WELL AS THE SECURITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS. ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS, BREZHNEV ACCUSED THE U.S. OF DESTROYING POSITIVE ELEMENTS ACHIEVED IN THE PAST. SINCE THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION THERE HAD BEEN ''BELLICOSE CALLS AND STATEMENTS'' DESIGNED TO POISON THE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIET UNION HOPED THAT THE U.S. LEADERSHIP WOULD BECOME MORE REALISTIC. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT SOUGHT AND WOULD NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY ''TO THE OTHER SIDE''; NEITHER WOULD IT ALLOW SUPERIORITY OVER IT TO BE BUILT UP. AN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN STRATEGIC AND MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE EXISTED. THERE WAS INDEED A WAR DANGER FOR THE UNITED STATES, AS FOR ALL OTHER COUNTRIES. IT DID NOT ORIGINATE FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY MYTHICAL SOVIET SUPERIORITY; BUT FROM THE ARMS RACE AND WORLD TENSION.

SOVIET SUPERIORITY: BUT FROM THE ARMS RACE AND WORLD TENSION.
"WE ARE PREPARED TO COMBAT THIS TRUE AND NOT IMAGINARY DANGER
HAND IN HAND WITH THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE COUNTRIES OF
EUROPE, WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD IT IS
UNIVERSALLY RECOGNISED THAT IN MANY WAYS THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION DEPENDS ON THE POLICY OF THE USSR AND THE USA. AS
WE SEE IT, THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AT PRESENT AND
THE ACUTENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS REQUIRING A
SOLUTION NECESSITATE A DIALOGUE, AND AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE, AT
ALL LEVELS. WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE THIS DIALOGUE. EXPERIENCE
SHOWS THAT THE CRUCIAL LINK HERE IS MEETINGS AT SUMMIT LEVEL.
THIS WAS TRUE YESTERDAY AND IS STILL TRUE TODAY".

7. ON RELATIONS WITH OTHER CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, BREZHNEV POINTED
TO THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH FRANCE. "ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT
AGREE WITH ALL THAT FRANCE IS DOING ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE",
RELATIONS REMAINED A MAJOR FACTOR OF DETENTE. RELATIONS WITH
THE FRG HAD ON THE WHOLE SHAPED FAVOUR^{ABLY}, THOUGH THERE WERE
IMPORTANT FIELDS WHERE POSITIONS DIVERGED SUBSTANTIALLY
(CIRCUMVENTION OF QA, ATTEMPTS TO DISREGARD GDR SOVEREIGNTY).
ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS HAD STAGNATED. THIS WAS "NOT THROUGH
ANY FAULT OF OURS" AND WAS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF EITHER.
DEPLOYMENT OF MODERNISED TNF WAS BOUND TO AFFECT SOVIET RELATIONS
WITH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, "TO SAY NOTHING OF HOW THIS WILL
PREJUDICE THEIR OWN SECURITY". NEGATIVE ELEMENTS WERE GAINING
PROMINENCE IN RELATIONS WITH JAPAN THOUGH THERE WAS STILL HOPE
DTHAT FAR SIGHTEDNESS WOULD PREVAIL.

8. FOLLOWING A BRIEF SUMMARY OF KNOWN SOVIET POSITIONS ON
DISARMAMENT, THIS SECTION OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH CONCLUDED WITH
A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS AN "ORGANIC
CONTINUATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PEACE PROGRAMME" :-

on site inspection?
A) THE SOVIET UNION HAD PROPOSED EXTENSION OF CONFIDENCE
BUILDING MEASURES TO INCLUDE NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES
AND ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF LARGE SCALE TROOP MOVE-
MENTS. IT NOW PROPOSED THAT THESE SHOULD APPLY "TO
THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR, PROVIDED THE
WESTERN STATES TOO EXTEND THE CONFIDENCE ZONE ACCORD-
INGLY":

B) THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO HOLD CONCRETE NEGOT-
IATIONS ON CBM'S IN THE FAR EAST (WHERE CHINA, JAPAN
AND THE USSR BORDERED ON EACH OTHER AND THE U.S. HAD
HAD BASES).

C) THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT OBJECT TO THE QUESTIONS

- C) THE SOVIET UNION "DID NOT OBJECT TO THE QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH AFGHANISTAN BEING DISCUSSED TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS OF PERSIAN GULF SECURITY "BUT THIS APPLIED ONLY TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM AND NOT TO INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS.
- D) LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS WAS A PARAMOUNT PROBLEM. THE SOVIET UNION WAS "PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE RELEVANT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE US WITHOUT DELAY, PRESERVING ALL THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS THAT HAD SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS AREA", THOUGH IT WOULD NOT CONSENT TO AN AGREEMENT GIVING THE U.S. UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO COME TO TERMS ON LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SUBMARINES OF THE OHIO TYPE BY THE U.S. AND SIMILAR ONES BY THE SOVIET UNION" (HE MENTIONED THE TYPHOON IN HIS PREAMBLE).
- E) "A MORATORIUM SHOULD BE SET ON THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE WEAPONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT IS TO FREEZE THE EXISTING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LEVEL OF THESE WEAPONS NATURALLY INCLUDING THE U.S. FORWARD BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS REGION". A MORATRRIUM COULD ENTER INTO FORCE AT ONCE AND LAST UNTIL A PERMANENT TREATY WAS CONCLUDED. THE TWO SIDES WOULD STOP ALL PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING PERSHING II AND GLCM'S.
- F) A "COMPETENT INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE" OF SCIENTISTS SHOULD BE SET UP "TO DEMONSTRATE THE VITAL NECESSITY OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE ", AND IT WOULD BE "USEFUL TO CALL A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE TOP LEADERS OF ITS MEMBER STATES IN ORDER TO LOOK FOR KEYS TO IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND PREVENTING WAR. IF THEY SO WISH LEADERS OF OTHER STATES COULD EVIDENTLY ALSO TAKE PART IN THE SESSION". THOROUGH PREPARATION WOULD BE NEEDED.

F C O PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

KEEBLE

24 FEB

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