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FM WASHINGTON 280800Z FEB 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 714 OF 27 FEBRUARY 1981

INFO ISLAMABAD KABUL MOSCOW NEW DELHI UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BONN

INFO SAVING PEKING DACCA JEDDA

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR HAIG:
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE, REFERRING TO AN EARLIER DISCUSSION, EXPLAINED THAT ZIA HAD WRITTEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER ASKING HER TO SEEK MORE U S SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN. LORD CARRINGTON WOULD BE THERE AT THE END OF NEXT MONTH. THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF ZIA AND AGHA SHAHI, BUT THERE SEEMED NO RISK AT THE MOMENT THAT PAKISTAN'S POSITION WOULD CHANGE MARKEDLY.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW NO UTILITY IN THE PROPOSED MEETING BETWEEN AGHA SHAHI, AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES AND DE CUELLAR, SINCE THIS WOULD NOT COVER THE ONLY POINT OF INTEREST TO US - SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. THE GISCARD INITIATIVE OFFERED A GREATER PROSPECT OF SUCCESS, WHETHER OR NOT THIS HAD BEEN THE MOTIVE FOR IT.

3. HAIG DID NOT THINK THAT THE US WOULD BE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS APPROACH. HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING AFGHANISTAN WITH WALDHEIM NEXT WEEK. THE DOMINANT FACTOR FOR THE US WAS THE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN HURT BY THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THEIR INVASION. RECENT US VISITORS TO THE SOVIET UNION HAD RETURNED WITH URGENT PLEAS THAT THE PAKISTANIS SHOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE, WHICH IN TURN (IT WAS CLAIMED) WOULD ALLOW A PROMPT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. THIS SHOWED WHAT THE RUSSIANS WERE HOPING FOR.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING PEKING DACCA JEDDA

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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