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FM WASHINGTON 280724Z FEB 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 707 OF 27 FEBRUARY 1981

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO PARIS BONN THE HAGUE UKREP BRUSSELS
CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN JEDDA MODUK

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR HAIG:
MIDDLE EAST

1. HAIG SAID THAT THE EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD REVEALED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE U S AND EUROPEAN VIEWS, THE TWO SIDES WERE TO SOME EXTENT OF A SINGLE MIND. HE WOULD BE VISITING THE MIDDLE EAST - CAIRO, JERUSALEM, RIYADH AND AMMAN - IN EARLY APRIL, WITH TWO AIMS: QUOTE TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINUING MOTION, AND TO LEARN UNQUOTE. HIS VISITS TO CAIRO AND JERUSALEM HAD BEEN PARTLY ARRANGED IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF VISITS BY EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI LEADERS UNTIL AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, A POINT WHICH BOTH HAD ACCEPTED.

2. HAIG WAS SENSITIVE TO THE DISLIKE OF CAMP DAVID BY THE ARABS, AND ALSO TO ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES. HE SAW THE RISKS OF OVER-EMPHASIS ON THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AND ESPECIALLY ON THE NAME ITSELF, AND HAD BEEN TRYING TO QUOTE BROADEN THE NOMENCLATURE UNQUOTE.

3. HAIG ASKED THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT PRESENT THE U S WITH ANY SURPRISES. HE RECOGNISED THAT QUOTE THE CANDLES WERE BURNING UNQUOTE AND THAT THE UK WOULD ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY IN JULY.

4. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT NO ONE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE ANY MOVEMENT BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. THEN THERE WOULD BE THE SUMMER HOLIDAYS. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT WOULD OCCUR IN EUROPE BEFORE SEPTEMBER. HE HOPED THAT ANY MOVEMENT THEN WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE UNITED STATES. HE EMPHASISED THAT AT THIS POINT THE EUROPEANS HAD NO PRECISE PLAN IN MIND, NOR DID THEY SEE THEMSELVES AS COMPETING WITH THE U S. RATHER, OUR EFFORTS WOULD AIM TO BE COMPLEMENTARY.

5. TURNING TO THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE, LORD CARRINGTON REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BEING HELD AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE PLO, POSSIBLY EVEN AS CHAIRMAN ON THE ARAB SIDE. BRITAIN FELT THAT EUROPE MIGHT BE ABLE TO EXACT A PRICE FOR AGREEING TO SUCH A MEETING, BY REQUIRING AS A CONDITION OF

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IT THAT PLO SHOULD MOVE SIGNIFICANTLY TO ACCEPT THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND ITS RIGHT TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE BOUNDARIES. EVEN IF PLO ACCEPTANCE OF THIS WERE ONLY CONDITIONAL, IT MIGHT OPEN THE WAY FOR SOME DEAL WHICH WOULD MAKE SUCH A MEETING WORTHWHILE. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER SOME OF OUR PARTNERS COULD BE BROUGHT TO AGREE TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

6. HAIG SAID THAT IN BRIEFING THE PRESS, HE WOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT EUROPE HAD AN INTEREST AND A ROLE TO PLAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THAT THE U S HOPED THAT ITS ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE AMERICANS' OWN INITIATIVES.

7. THE PUS NOTED THAT BEFORE THE VENICE DECLARATION, SOME IN EUROPE HAD ALREADY MOVED FAR AHEAD IN WAYS THAT WERE REALLY DAMAGING TO AMERICA. THE DECLARATION AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES HAD HAD THE VIRTUE OF REINING THEM IN.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, OTTAWA AND MOSCOW

HENDERSON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

NEWAD	MAED
MED	ES & SD
NAD	ERD
UND	ESID
ERESD	CONS D
EGD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE
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