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INFO PARIS BONN PRETORIA OTTAWA CAPETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING MAPUTO LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE SALISBURY LUSAKA
LAGOS ADDIS ABABA

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR HAIG:
NAMIBIA

1. HAIG SAID THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WERE TAKING A CAREFUL LOOK AT THE COMPLEX OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS. THEY QUOTE SENSED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF HEAT UNQUOTE AND HAD ALREADY TRIED AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING TO CALM DOWN THE FRONT LINE STATES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD ALREADY REFERRED IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AMERICAN SPECIAL MISSION OR EMISSARY BEING SENT TO NAMIBIA IN ORDER TO BUY TIME, AND TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE FOR AN EARLY VOTE ON SANCTIONS. HAIG WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THIS FURTHER. HE WAS ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA AS A PIECE OF BENEFICENT THEATRE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES INCLUDING INCREASED EXPECTATIONS OF A NEW HIGH PROFILE ROLE FOR THE US WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY WANT TO ADOPT.

2. HAIG CONTINUED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD STRONG PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. THE ADMINISTRATION FEARED THAT THE INSTALLATION OF A COMMUNIST REGIME UNDER UN AUSPICES IN NAMIBIA COULD PUT A STOP TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RESISTANCE IN ANGOLA, ALLOWING THE CUBANS AND RUSSIANS TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENCE THERE, AND COULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNALS TO SOUTH AFRICA. THE U S WOULD ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENTS TO THE NORTH, WHICH WERE POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS. NOTING FRENCH CONCERN ON THIS SCORE, HAIG REFERRED TO THE QADAFI PROBLEM AND THE FRAGILITY OF THE PRESENT REGIMES IN CENTRAL AFRICA.

3. HAIG CONCLUDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT WANT TO BE FORCED TO VETO SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD DO SO IN THE LAST RESORT. THEY EXPECTED AND WOULD WANT THE UK TO DO THE SAME. SOME WAY TO AVOID THIS NEED SHOULD BE FOUND.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT THE LATEST OAU DRAFT RESOLUTION (ADDIS TELNO 55) AIMED TO SECURE A DECISION ON SANCTIONS BY MID-APRIL. WE THEREFORE HAD SOME BUT NOT MUCH TIME TO PLAY WITH. IN A RECENT DISCUSSION, P W BOTHA HAD INDICATED THAT HE SAW A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE ANGOLAN AND NAMIBIAN SITUATIONS. LORD CARRINGTON WONDERED WHETHER THIS MIGHT IMPLY

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THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME DEAL BETWEEN THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA AND THE REMOVAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U S, AND TO WITHDRAW FROM THEIR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT SAVIMBI IN ANGOLA.

5. HAIG, NOTING THAT SUCH A DEAL MIGHT BE RELATED TO FUTURE PRESSURE WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD WANT TO EXERT AGAINST CUBA IN THE CARIBBEAN CONTEXT, ACCEPTED THAT THE IDEA SHOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER AND UNDERTOOK TO HAVE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE UK AS SOON AS AMERICAN THINKING HAD EVOLVED. STOESEL REPORTED THAT HE HAD YESTERDAY URGED THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR TO PERSUADE HIS GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN A LOWER PROFILE AND NOT TO INITIATE FRESH ACTIVITIES SUCH AS RAIDS INTO ANGOLA.

6. REFERRING TO LORD CARRINGTON'S VIEW THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD NOT GIVE UP WALVIS BAY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HAIG SUGGESTED THAT WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RIGHT TO REMAIN THERE MIGHT BE THE ONLY LEVERAGE AVAILABLE TO US. LORD CARRINGTON COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD LEAVE NAMIBIA WITHOUT A SATISFACTORY PORT.

7. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NIGERIA, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S RECENT VISIT, LORD CARRINGTON NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE IN PRIVATE OF THE LIKELY EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS, COUPLED WITH PUBLIC DENUNCIATIONS OF THE WEST FOR FAILING TO PUT SUFFICIENTLY STRONG PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MAPUTO LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE
SALISBURY LUSAKA LAGOS ADDIS ABABA

HENDERSON

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