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7



(Covering Secret)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 April 1981

Dear Michael,

Call by Mr Haig on the Prime Minister on  
10 April (4.30 pm)

At the talks at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office tomorrow morning (and over lunch), Lord Carrington and the Lord Privy Seal will obviously concentrate to a considerable degree on the Middle East and East/West relations. They will also probably have time to discuss Southern African questions in some depth, following Mr Crocker's tour of Africa. Lord Carrington will also describe his own recent visit to Asia and the Far East.

/ I enclose the briefs on the Middle East and East/  
West Relations. Given the length of Mr Haig's call, I have  
/ not burdened you with the briefing on other subjects (list  
enclosed), though this is of course readily available if  
required.

yours ever  
Roderic Lyne


(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

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10 Downing St

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TALKS WITH MR HAIG ON 10 APRIL 1981

LIST OF BRIEFS

1. Substantive briefs on:-

- a) Arab/Israel and Lebanon (Points to Make and Essential Facts)
- b) Defence Policy in The Gulf (Points to Make)
- c) Namibia (Points to Make and Essential Facts)
- d) East/West Relations: Poland (Points to Make and Essential Facts)

2. Brief talking points on subjects we wish to raise:-

- a) Proposed French Wheat Sale to USSR \*
- b) United Nations Law of the Sea \*

3. Brief points to make on subjects raised by the Americans:-

- a) Afghanistan/Pakistan
- b) Caribbean \*
- c) Belize/Guatemala \*
- d) International Terrorism \*
- e) Energy Security \*
- f) Western Dependence on Soviet Supplies
- g) Cyprus Initiative
- h) Gibraltar

\* = Background material circulated to officials attending

VISIT OF MR HAIG: 10 APRIL 1981

EAST/WEST RELATIONS: POLAND

POINTS TO MAKE

Parliament

1. Polish Parliament meets today. What will Jaruzelski say? Rumoured earlier that he would declare state of emergency, but difficult to do this when situation is so quiet. Perhaps will ask for special powers and make this an issue of confidence?
2. If the latter, he may decide for tactical reasons to justify request on economic rather than political grounds.

Western Reaction

3. Western reaction must depend in part on response of Polish people. My message made this point. Important none of the allies should take up premature public positions. Over-reaction could give Russians pretext to intervene.
4. NATO's attitude even more important. Good case for NATO doing nothing! But useful to us to be able to say that Council will be meeting to reach an agreed assessment and to keep situation under review. Permanent Representatives could meet privately beforehand to agree on handling and especially press line.

Possible Soviet Intervention by Invitation

5. Russians will calculate that if internal measures fail Jaruzelski will be forced to invite them in. This would mean that technically their intervention would not breach UN Charter or Helsinki Final Act.

Western Economic Assistance

6. Until/unless internal repression or external intervention occurs, we must continue to assist Poles economically. Hope creditors' meeting in Paris today reaches agreement on long term debt-rescheduling.

SECRET

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. At the NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meeting in Bonn earlier this week, Mr Weinberger pressed for a joint statement on Poland (separate from the NPG communique). We resisted this on the grounds that the NPG was the wrong forum, and the Russians could use such a statement as a pretext for intervention. A compromise was reached whereby it was agreed that Mr Luns should make an agreed oral statement on behalf of Ministers.

Eastern European & Soviet Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

LORD CARRINGTON'S TALKS WITH MR HAIG ON 10 APRILARAB-ISRAEL AND LEBANONPOINTS TO MAKEARAB/ISRAEL

1. Interested in Mr Haig's impressions. Remain convinced that dispute greatest single threat to regional peace and that Middle East policy must have a Palestinian dimension sufficient to attract moderate Arabs.
2. European efforts continuing in low key, but opportunities may arise in latter part of 1981. Europe and US must work together to take them.
3. No illusion about PLO but it cannot be left out of account. Acknowledge its undesirable involvement elsewhere but wonder about importance of this and how far it is a coherent policy.
4. Worried that Israeli settlements rapidly making negotiated peace impossible.

LEBANON

5. We have spoken to the Syrians urging restraint and asked the Saudis to do likewise. The Syrians have told us that they will do what they can to calm the situation, but they are heavy handed and this will prove very difficult. The Ten have now agreed further demarches in Damascus and Tel Aviv (on South Lebanon).

ESSENTIAL FACTSARAB-ISRAEL

1. Mr Haig's exploratory visit to Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia appears to have gone reasonably well, although Lebanon has inevitably proved a distraction. He stressed the Soviet threat particularly in Egypt and Israel, but also reaffirmed US commitment to the peace process (while avoiding a specific commitment to speedy resumption of the autonomy talks). He also discussed arrangements for the Sinai peace keeping force; it is increasingly accepted by all concerned that a UN force is impossible and that an alternative multinational force with a significant US component will have to be put together. There still seems to be little sign that we and other members of the Ten will be asked to participate.

2. The Jordanians and Saudis appear to have stressed their opposition to Camp David and support for Palestinian self-determination and the PLO. The Egyptians reinforced the point we had earlier made to Haig about the need to press the Israelis on settlements but we do not know that he raised it in Jerusalem.

3. Telegrams from Cairo, Tel Aviv and Amman are attached.

4. Spokesmen for the US Administration continue to stress concern about the PLO's involvement with terrorism and much is being made of its involvement in El Salvador. We remain sceptical of the scale of PLO involvement. The US response when we raised this with them (Washington telno 1122) did nothing to dispel our doubts.

5. Mr Haig is reported to have described Syrian military activities in Lebanon as 'brutality' and 'unacceptable by measures of international conduct'. He was also quoted as saying it was possible that the USSR had pushed the Syrians into attacking the Christians in Lebanon to create a diversion from possible Soviet action against Poland.

- 2 -

6. We have no evidence of any deliberate Syrian attempt to start the current fighting. The origins of the latest rounds in both Zahle and Beirut are not clear but in both cases the trouble seems to have started with changes in the status quo on the ground (in Beirut movement of Lebanese troops on the Green line and in Zahle opening up by the Phalangists of a supply route not under Syrian control). The Syrian reaction has been excessive but it is not the first time they have used brute force in their 'peacekeeping' role. We do not see any alternative to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and the situation would be a good deal worse without them.

7. Over the weekend the Americans asked for our support in demarches to the Syrians and others to urge restraint. The Syrians told us they would do what they could to calm the situation. They claimed provocation for their own involvement (the position in Beirut is obscure but certainly in Zahleh they have an understandable interest in preventing the Phalangists from controlling their line of communication to Damascus). Khaddam has since visited Beirut and returned speaking of new arrangements being agreed for an end to the fighting. As of 7 April the Saudis had not formally replied to our demarche; they have issued a vague appeal for restraint.

8. The Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee is reported to have concluded on 6 April that there were no grounds at present for Israeli intervention.

9. The Political Committee on 7 April agreed on a concerted demarche in Damascus (urging restraint in the north) and in Tel Aviv (urging cooperation with UNIFIL in the south).

NEAR EAST & NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT

8 April 1981

CONFIDENTIAL



LORD CARRINGTON'S TALKS WITH MR HAIG ON 10 APRIL 1981

POINTS TO MAKE

Defence Policy in the Gulf

1. Interested to hear Mr Haig's first-hand assessment of Arab leaders' current thinking on Western defence policies on the Gulf, including the Rapid Deployment Force. As we have seen, the Arabs tend to be embarrassed by public discussion. This reflects their often genuinely ambivalent attitude towards Western motives. But in private they must know, and sometimes admit, that only the United States has the power to save them from deliberate Soviet attack. They also seem to welcome the prospect of limited British involvement. It is increasingly clear, too, how important is our existing programme of bilateral military assistance to the Gulf states: we are taking steps to intensify our efforts. And we are giving the Gulf plenty of Ministerial attention at the moment, culminating in the Prime Minister's visit. King Khaled is due/a<sup>on</sup> State Visit in June (not yet announced).

2. Glad to be kept in touch with evolution of Administration's strategy on the RDF. For credible deterrence implicit support of local states seems required. Too much development of local facilities seems likely to be resisted.

3. We ought to encourage - but discreetly - recent moves towards regional co-operation. Publicly the Gulf states have not acknowledged a defence/security dimension. Therefore avoid rushing the defence aspects.

4. Encourage support from other Western governments. Encourage (discreet) discussions in NATO and other fora. Burden sharing?

Defence Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

8 April 1981