



FROM: THE RT HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

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12th November, 1981.

*Parsons*  
*Don King met,*

*R16*

I was in South Africa in the second part of October and had talks with Ministers in Pretoria as well as businessmen and others in Johannesburg.

I put down below a few thoughts on some of the main issues in Southern Africa.

#### Namibia

South African Ministers appreciate that the Reagan administration is the most friendly American Government they are likely to find. They will accordingly cooperate sincerely with Washington, though that doesn't mean that they won't fight their own corner hard.

The Namibia issue is not simple as you will know. Agreeing constitutional principles is almost as difficult as agreeing a detailed constitution. In what they ~~ask~~ *call* "Phase II" the administrative problems - status of Civil Servants, relations with UN, provision for law and order etc. - bristle with difficulties. I should be surprised if the timetable for "independence" could be completed even in theory, before the early summer of 1983. And, of course, the local SWA parties may prove difficult and can count on a good deal of support within the Nationalist Party itself.

Basically this is a tougher problem than Rhodesia. The FCO wanted to get rid of the Rhodesia problem. The South Africans don't really want to get rid of Namibia and will try to avoid doing so until it seems a reasonably safe proposition.

Then there is the question of how to enforce constitutional safeguards even if they are agreed. A lot here will depend on the wider context under which Independence comes about. To risk a SWAPO victory in SWA while neighbouring Angola remains a one-party state, virtually occupied by the Soviets and Cubans, could be very dangerous for South African and indeed *Western* interests. Short of a South African reconquest of the territory, there would be little to stop a SWAPO Government calling in Cubans or other Soviet allies from Angola.

If, on the other hand, the Soviets and Cubans were withdrawn from Angola, if, moreover, the Angolan Opposition parties - UNITA and FNLA - were recognised in some form or other a SWAPO victory in Namibia would not present much of a danger to South African or to other interests generally and any subsequent SWAPO regime could be controlled or contained.





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This issue, of course goes beyond the remit of the 5 power Contact Group and will be mainly for discussion between Washington and Pretoria. I suspect however, that in practice, progress over Namibia may well depend, as far as Pretoria is concerned, on how far we can move towards the decolonisation of Angola. It is, to say the least, a little odd to insist on free elections in Namibia and the withdrawal of "foreign" troops when Angola has never had elections of any kind and is occupied by Warsaw Pact and Cuban forces.

For my own part, I think it would be to our advantage to link the two questions of Namibia and Angola. If we could get the Soviets out of Angola militarily and politically, this would be a great gain. If we cannot, it might well be better to let Namibia go on as it is.

#### Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

I did not go to Zimbabwe but discussed the situation with both South Africans and Rhodesians like Harold Hawkins and Peter Walls. Their general impression was pretty pessimistic. The whites have been leaving to and through South Africa in even larger numbers than the published figures suggest. The farmers of course have to stay because they cannot liquidate their assets and many older people choose to stay. The main drain is among the under 50s, particularly technicians, skilled workers and civil servants. The effect on the economic and administrative infrastructure is already visible.

This process seems likely to continue as the Mugabe regime adopts policies and strikes attitudes increasingly unfriendly to the whites. Nkomo and his friends are equally unhappy at the prospect of a one party state. Muzorewa and Sithole may already be in personal danger. The advent of North Korean arms and instructors has inevitably increased the sense of uncertainty.

I don't believe the South Africans are deliberately seeking to destabilise Zimbabwe. But they could do so and have made it plain that they will not tolerate any practical support for the African National Congress. They are prepared for everyday cooperation but on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect. They are not prepared to accept alleged internal political pressures on Mugabe as justifying unfriendly rhetoric or gestures.

How Zimbabwe will develop may well turn on how the Namibia problem is solved. If it is accompanied by the Soviet/Cuban withdrawal from Angola the prognosis could be hopeful. Otherwise a steady deterioration seems more likely.



General


The South African economy remains very strong and its growth rate impressive. Notable growth areas, I was told, are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Phillipines. Trade with Black Africa continues to grow, and increasingly openly.

Inspite of many previous disappointments the South Africans seem convinced that their rapprochement with the United States is for real, because dictated by genuine strategic and economic considerations.

Discussion about internal reforms continue but are bogged down at the moment by the boycott of Coloured and Asian councils by their community leaders. The Prime Minister is also under growing pressure from his breakaway right. But he, Pik Botha, and General Malan make up a strong team.

Looking ahead I have a hunch that South Africa may move away from the Westminster type to a more presidential system. This would enable the President to nominate ministers and officials from other races without undermining the basic structure of white supremacy.

Ted Heath's speech in South Africa was coldly received, so I was told by half a dozen people who heard it. The more sophisticated assessed it as directed to Social Democrat and Liberal opinion in Britain. Ministers resented that he had been their guest the day before but gave no indication of what he was going to say. Even opponents of the Government regretted his demand for "one man one vote". Coming from a former Tory PM it was bound to give the impression that the much lesser but still substantial reforms now under discussion would earn South Africa no good will abroad.

  
Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

PS. Sorry for the delay in sending this letter but I had to go to Poland between drafting and signing it.





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*Confidential*

19th November, 1981.

*Dear Margaret,*

I was in Cairo at the weekend with Bill Mclean and Robert Cranborne. We went at the invitation of the Foreign Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali. His invitation apparently followed a speech I made on 5th November in the foreign affairs section of the debate on the Address.

We had very cordial and full talks first with President Husni Mubarak whom I knew only slightly and later with the Foreign Minister whom I have known for some time. As the whole problem of the Middle East is very much on the agenda, I have thought it right to let you have fairly detailed records of these talks based on notes taken by Bill McLean and Robert Cranborne at the time. We had a short but helpful meeting with our Ambassador Michael Weir and paid a courtesy call on the Empress Farah of Iran who is an old friend of mine.

Our visit received extensive coverage on Cairo television and in their press. This went well beyond the intrinsic interest of anything I had to say. It probably indicates the importance the Egyptian Government attach to demonstrating to their public that they have friends in Europe who share their broad approach to the Middle East problem. It may also be their way of signalling to other countries where they stand.

The broad if necessarily tentative conclusions which I reached at the end of our visit are as follows; and here I would stress that they are <sup>purely</sup> my interpretation of what was said to us the record of which is attached.

1. The Egyptians attach paramount importance to securing the final withdrawal of the Israelis from the Sinai by April 25th 1982. They believe the Israelis to be firmly committed to this withdrawal but recognise that there are sections of Israeli public opinion which would like to go back on the agreement or postpone its fulfilment ~~and perhaps over-estimate their importance.~~ They would welcome our participation in the Sinai multinational force and see some positive merits in Prince Fahad's plan. They are, however, very anxious to avoid any initiatives or declarations which could be seen as superceding Camp David and might thus interfere with the withdrawal process e.g. by incurring an Israeli veto on the composition of the multi national force.
2. The Egyptians do not expect to get a detailed agreement on autonomy for the West Bank or Gaza before April 1982. They hope, however, to have constructed a framework which would enable Palestinian representatives to emerge in the occupied territories. It would then be for these representatives and the Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement, to take over the business of negotiations with Israel. The Egyptians would



continue to give their support but would no longer play a primary role. Other Arab countries must resort to negotiation as they had done rather than confrontation.

3. The Egyptians believe the Saudis will mend their fences with Egypt progressively. At the moment there is a truce in the war of words. Once the Sinai phase of Camp David is completed they believe the Saudi position will come much closer to their own. They and other Arabs will have to accept that negotiation pays and confrontation does not.

4. They accept the principle of Palestinian self-determination. But they do not believe that the moderates in the PLO can decide PLO policy so long as the Syrians remain in the Lebanon and thus have the main body of the PLO under their physical control and so indirectly that of Moscow. Accordingly they see two possibilities of achieving a settlement. One would be by bringing the Soviets into the peacemaking process. To this, they, and I imagine the USA would be strongly opposed. The other would be to secure the withdrawal of the Syrians from the Lebanon and some disarmament of the PLO with a consequent change of regime in Damascus.

5. Resistance to Soviet Imperialism remains their prime objective and they see close cooperation with the United States as the best way of organising it. They are indeed impatient to see the United States build up extensive military stockpiles and servicing facilities in Egypt itself as well as within the general area of the Gulf.

6. I am always sceptical of assessments of personalities. Sadat, after all, was Nasser's man until Nasser died and Sadat overthrew his policies. I do not know President Husni Mubarak at all well. He struck me, however, as more down to earth and more concerned with the practical problems of reorganising the Egyptian economy and administration than either of his predecessors. There was certainly little of the wideranging and perhaps unrealistic geopolitical vision which characterised my conversation with Sadat or for that matter Nasser. Internal pressures may lead the new President - as they so often have in the past - to seek an external role. If so, my guess would be that he would seek it in the Nile Valley, the Red Sea and North Africa more than in the Asian Middle East. But this can only be a guess. "Dissimulation" as Disraeli wrote (apologies for coded language!) is the secret of oriental policy."

In conclusion I would venture to suggest that we should consider paying more attention to Egypt than we have done in the recent past and put the Palestinian problem on the backburner at least until April 1982. It may prove easier to solve once the success of Sadat's policies where Egypt is concerned have been established beyond doubt.

*Ev's cover*  
*Julian*  
Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

P.S. ....



P.S.

As the records of the talks are rather long I have sidelined what seem to be the more significant sections.

I am copying this letter to Peter Carrington and to John Nott.



Confidential

Note of a talk with Major General Kamal Hassan Ali at the  
Foreign Ministry, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 1.30 p.m.

Present:

The Deputy Prime Minister and  
Foreign Minister, Major General  
Kamal Hassan Ali

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.  
Colonel Neil McLean  
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

The Minister's Private Secretary

After recalling earlier conversations and expressing regret over the murder of President Sadat, Mr. Amery wondered whether it was not the Arab world that was isolated from Egypt rather than the other way round? The Minister agreed warmly and quoted with approval a leading article which had just appeared in Al Madina, a Saudi owned paper, published in Kuwait, which had ~~agreed~~ <sup>argued</sup>: "peace with Israel is inevitable". The Minister thought many of the Arab states were now drawing closer to the Egyptian position. The war of words in the press and on the radio had practically stopped. The peace process would continue to grow.

The Minister welcomed the proposal for a European contribution to the multi-national force in Sinai and thought the Fahad plan was encouraging in its implicit recognition of Israel. But the Europeans must be careful not to create difficulties which might upset Israel and slow down or even stop the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

He was frankly worried about Israel which he described as suffering from "unlimited suspicion". He had noted press reports of the possible formation of a coalition Government in Israel and recalled that the Israelis only went in for coalitions when they faced some grave national difficulty. He thought ~~the~~ coalition government might mean one or 3 things.

1. A decision to evict Israeli settlements in Sinai by force. This might involve bloodshed.
2. A decision not to withdraw from Sinai by April 1982. He



thought this unlikely but as a soldier had to take account of the worst case.

3. A political preparation for an attack on South Lebanon with the object of ejecting the Syrians and breaking up the PLO military organisation.

The Minister repeated his view that he thought it unlikely that Israel would postpone their withdrawal. Israel had made a pact to withdraw from Sinai not only with Egypt but with the rest of the world. An attack on the PLO and Syrians in South Lebanon would be more understandable. It would be a preemptive bid, rather in the style of 1967, to knock out the increasing strength of the PLO and the Syrian presence in the Bekkaa Valley. It would be a limited war. The Israelis would not go as far as Damascus. But if they were successful, which he seemed to assume, this would probably lead to the fall of the Assad Government and the end of the Alawite supremacy in Syria.

If Israel adopted the third course, Egypt would not interfere. Indeed its non intervention would be Egypt's first test of its commitment to the Camp David agreement. Egypt would keep faith with Israel.

The Minister then turned to the autonomy talks. These had been very disappointing. The initiative in raising the talks to ministerial level had come from the Israeli side. In the event the Israelis had had nothing new to propose. Presumably they had failed to reach agreement in their own cabinet before the meeting.

There were important differences between Israel and Egypt about the concept of autonomy.

1. The first concerned the structure of the representative body.

This was important because the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were an educated people and such a people had to have representative government. Egypt wanted to see about 100 representatives who would elect a council of 13 to 17 members ~~into the administration.~~ *as an administrative body.*



2. The Egyptians wanted autonomy to be based on the whole area of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis wanted it based on the population as distinct from the land. Of the (?)100,000 hectares in question, about one third was state land, mostly mountainous and rocky and partly settled by Israelis already. The second third belonged to Palestinians who had emigrated or to the WAKF. The final third belonged to existing inhabitants. In the Israeli view autonomy only applied to them.
3. There was the problem of Jerusalem. Of its 400,000 inhabitants, 115,000 were Arabs. In the Egyptian view these should also be represented in the autonomous institutions. Israel disagreed.

Egypt could not compromise with Israel on these three points (i.e. the size of the representative body, its constituency, and Jerusalem).

Egypt's objective however, was to establish a framework within which further negotiations could take place after the final Israeli withdrawal <sup>from Sinai</sup> in April 1982. Thereafter Egypt's responsibility must diminish. It would be up to the Palestinians and Jordanians to discuss <sup>with Israel the issues</sup> ~~the details~~ of internal security, foreign affairs and defence which were separate subjects to any rights secured under autonomy. This would involve simultaneous recognition between Israel and the Palestinians and so, presumably, the PLO.

The PLO, however, was severely fragmented. The larger part, as much as 80%, was moderate. The others owed allegiance to more extreme Arab states. The question was would the activist tail wag the dog? The moderate bulk of the PLO depended on Syria and thus on the Soviets, because their main body and armed forces were situated in the Lebanon which was under Syrian control. They could do nothing without Syrian and so Soviet approval.

The Foreign Minister regarded the PLO as an essential ingredient in any settlement. He believed that the problem



4.

*The Israelis could not help withdrawing in the end. If they*

should be solved within 2-3 years. ~~If Israel~~ tried to absorb Gaza and the West Bank there would be more ARabs than Jews in Israel. This prospect would oblige Israel to be as flexible as Egypt had been.

But there was one cause for concern. Prince Saud bin Faisal had made an offer to the Russians to approve Prince Fahad's plan and join in discussing it. The Soviets unexpectedly had said "yes". This could be interpreted in one of two ways. Perhaps the SAudis were nodding in Moscow's direction to obtain Libyan and Syrian support at the Arab Summit. Alternatively the Soviets were trying to get in on the act by the back door. The question was, who was pulling whose leg? If it were a purely tactical manoeuvre on the part of the Saudis there would be no harm. But the Minister did not want to see the Soviets brought back into the Middle East.

The conversation then turned to Chad. The Minister was not convinced that the Libyans had in fact withdrawn. He thought they would probably try and stay in the uranium rich northern province. They might, however, have withdrawn from the capital in order to secure the arms deal they were negotiating with the French. Ghadaffi had unbounded ambitions but his support for the Polisario was not an expression of Libyan expansionism but came purely from a desire to destroy King Hassan of Morocco.

Turning to the Horn of Africa the Minister said that although the Ethiopian regime was a Soviet puppet they were now fairly quiet in their relations with the Sudan. They had not tried to stir up the South Sudanese. Eritrea was also quiet. There was still a problem between Ethiopia and Somalia but President Ziad Barre had proved himself a great survivor.

Looking across the Red Sea the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating steadily and could be a danger to the Saudis unless they developed a more positive policy. The Americans understood this but had so many points of relative friction with



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the Saudis that they hesitated to press them where the Yemen was concerned.

In conclusion the Minister expressed the view that the American military capability in the area would develop quite rapidly once they had established effective stockpiles and servicing arrangements in Egypt.



Confidential

Note of a meeting with President Husni Mubarak at the Presidential Palace, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 11.30 p.m.

Present:

President Husni Mubarak

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.  
Colonel Neil McLean  
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

After an initial exchange of courtesies, the President explained that he had just received Khalid Mohieddin, the left wing leader. Mohieddin had come to protest against martial law and the restrictions on the press and to explain his opposition to certain aspects of Camp David. The President had told him that martial law was necessary particularly for his sake. Without it the Fundamentalists would "break your neck first of all because they look on you as a Communist". The President went on to say that he did not regard Mohieddin as a Communist but that he had contacts with the Soviets and was indeed pro-Soviet. He had made it clear to him that he would not allow anyone to act as a channel for foreign propaganda. He was not going to sit on his hands and allow the Soviets to come back and dominate Egypt. The President added that on Camp David he had told Mohieddin that there was no other way in which the Sinai could have been recovered. It could not have been done by war. So why was Mohieddin complaining? What would he have done? Mohieddin apparently agreed but said that he could not say so publicly since he had opposed Camp David in public from the beginning.

The President went on to say that the autumn had been a time of great trouble for Egypt but now things were much quieter and the universities were open again. A number of people had been arrested and were awaiting interrogation. When this was completed the Government could decide what further steps to take. But as at present advised, he did not think that foreign powers had been directly involved in President Sadat's assassination.

Mr. Amery asked whether relations with Saudi Arabia were improving. The President replied that he had good unofficial



contacts with the Saudis and had received private messages of condolence after the murder of President Sadat. Mr. Amery recalled that President Sadat had told him that Egypt could make friends with the Saudis whenever it wanted to. Had the time come? The President said that he preferred to move slowly. The essential thing was to complete the Camp David agreements and not give the Israelis any reason to go back on or postpone their withdrawal from the Sinai. Both Mr. Begin and Mr. Peres had assured him that they would stick to the Agreement and he believed them. "War has been erased from the Israeli/Egyptian vocabulary" Nevertheless, there were voices raised in Israel urging at least postponement of withdrawal.

The President went on to speak of the autonomy talks. He did not expect to reach a detailed agreement by April 25th 1982 but he hoped there might, by then, be a framework within which more detailed negotiations with Israel could be carried on by Palestinians and Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement. Egypt would naturally do what it could to help. But the Egyptians could not be expected to assume the main responsibility. This must be left to the parties directly concerned. The Egyptians could not be expected to fight other Arab states battles for them. When the Israelis had bombed the Bagdad reactor some Arab Governments had called on Egypt to take action against Israel. But what had they done themselves? All Iraq had done had been to refer the question to the UN! So why should Egypt fight Iraq's battles for her?

The President went on to talk about the PLO. This was a mixture of different groups divided into a pro-Syrian, pro-Iraqi and pro-Libyan faction - and all paid for by the moderate Arab states! The PLO could only follow a united line of policy if its three backers were in agreement. Of the three Syria was the most important because it had physical control of the main PLO bases in South Lebanon.

The President doubted whether the PLO leaders were really very keen on peace with Israel. If a Palestinian state were



established, financial contributions from Saudi Arabia would go to the new State and not to individual leaders, to the detriment of their Swiss Bank accounts. The President did not regard the Fahad proposals as a serious or effective plan but rather as a possible starting point for talks. The Venice initiative too had some merit. But the PLO could only negotiate seriously if the Syrians, and so the Russians, gave them the green light.

Mr. Amery mentioned that Lord Carrington was trying hard to involve the PLO in the peace process. The President commented "God help him", this in a tone that conveyed exasperation rather than benison. For his part he was inclined to doubt whether the Palestinian question would be settled for "50 years". But that, he added, was a purely private view. He went on to say that he had been told, also privately, by "a senior member of the Saudi Arabian Royal family" that the Saudis were not really all that interested in a settlement for the Palestinians. They would agree to terms with Israel if a solution could be found for Jerusalem. He believed this view was shared by other Saudis and perhaps some of the Gulf rulers.

Turning to Syria, the President doubted whether the Syrians really wanted a settlement of the Palestinian problem as this would end their chances of extracting money from the rich Arab states. The Golan Heights were worthless land but provided a reason for keeping the Syrian army on the alert and so for extracting money from the Saudis. Golan was really "a furnished flat for which the rich Arabs pay the rent".

The President expanded at some length on the mercenary character of the Syrians. He claimed that earlier this year Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had paid the Syrians \$500 million just to withdraw from the Jordan border which they had never really intended to attack. They had apparently even mentioned the sum of \$16 billion as their price for pulling out of Lebanon!



Nevertheless, after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, Hafiz Assad could be in a tight corner. Assad's Government had pursued a policy of confrontation with Israel. Egypt had opted instead for negotiation. All Sinai would shortly be in Egyptian hands. The Syrian people would begin to realise the mistakes of what was anyway a very unpopular and minority government. This might well prove fatal to Assad's regime.

Colonel McLean asked what sort of regime would follow? The President thought that on balance it would be another pro-Soviet regime. If it were an anti Russian regime this would be a great defeat for the Russians, too great perhaps for them to accept, though obviously desirable.

Turning to Jordan the President said that King Hussein could expect a great deal of trouble from the Palestinians. Nevertheless, after the return of Sinai, King Hussein must be associated with the next phase of talks about the West Bank. But it would be very difficult to pin King Hussein down. "He is very clever but you can never catch him. Even when you have him in your grasp he slips out". He accompanied this remark with a graphic gesture as of one trying to grip an eel.

The President then turned to Libya. He thought that President Ghadaffi was experiencing some difficulty at home because of a shortage of liquid cash. He had, however, received private assurances from Ghadaffi that Libya would not attack Egypt. Ghadaffi had also sent him a private message, just after President Sadat's murder, but the timing of it had been in such contrast with Ghadaffi's public statements as to be "impolite". Anyway he did not want to negotiate with Libya "while this madman is at the helm". When Mr. Amery remarked that it would be constructive if Egypt had access to Libya's oil resources, the President smiled appreciatively but said "Yes, but that is something we cannot discuss".

The President discounted reports of concentrations of Libyan troops on the Chad/Sudan border. The country was too inhospitable



to sustain the presence of an army for long. He also thought the reports of fighting between the troops of the Chad Defence Minister and the Chad Foreign Minister were false. They might have been invented to give the Libyans an excuse to return to Chad should Gaddafi later wish to do so.

On the subject of the Soviet stockpile of arms in Libya, the President said that this stockpile was indeed substantial. Gaddafi had bought the arms at a time when he believed the Americans were stockpiling arms in Israel. He had planned himself to establish a parallel stockpile for a pan Arab war against Israel. The President, however, predicted that Libya would find that there was a desperate shortage of spare parts. He had had some experience of Soviet methods when commanding the Egyptian air force. He had found, then, that there were not even spare tyres or engines for Russian supplied Migs. It was the classic Russian technique for keeping control of weapons they supplied.

He personally had a poor opinion of the Libyan armed forces. "We gave them a good drubbing when we bombed Tobruk in 1977 and destroyed the airport facilities and some aeroplanes on the ground". He believed some Russian advisers had also been among the casualties.

Mr. Amery asked how the President saw the outlook in Iran. He thought the opposition to Khomeini strong but very divided. There was not much hope of doing anything until a strong man arose inside the country, probably from the armed forces. His own guess was that the Soviets would strike next in Poland which would be "very bad for Europe" but he himself was more seriously concerned about Iran. It was the Middle Eastern country most vulnerable to Soviet expansion.

Colonel McLean asked about the situation in Yemen. Here the President was very critical of the Saudis for having no positive policy. He spoke with disapproval of a Saudi prince



who had told him that the Saudis had no quarrel with Aden and this at a time when the Russians were building a major new airfield and expanding their naval facilities. He thought the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating seriously and that this could be disastrous for the Saudis.

Mr. Amery said how much he had been encouraged by President Reagan's general approach to the international situation. The President agreed warmly. He found the Americans <sup>had</sup> reacted much faster than they had under President Carter who had been rather slow. He liked General Haig very much. In particular he was grateful to the Americans for their swift reaction to the murder of President Sadat. He was very pleased with the "Bright Star" manoeuvres which had just started, though he had not yet had any detailed report about them.

Strategically he thought it essential that there should be an American presence in the area of the Gulf and judged that Mascara could serve very well for this purpose. He was, however, doubtful about the present American military capability in the area. But this could be greatly improved once they began to establish stockpiles of war materials in Egypt and facilities for servicing weapons. He did not want American bases on Egyptian soil but would give them all facilities.

He welcomed the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia as evidence of American determination to defend Western oil supplies. He could not understand why the Israelis had made such a fuss about the AWACS planes. As an air force officer he knew that they would remain under effective American control with American technicians on board and on <sup>the</sup> ground installations. If the Saudis had not bought them the Americans would have stationed them there anyway. The only difference was that the Saudis had paid \$10 billion for what they could have had for free!



Alan - really not for CF!  
see record of 1979  
will  
Korn  
Hussein  
President  
Nubarak  
Key  
26/11



Zimbabwe

jd

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 November 1981

Dear Julian

Thank you for your letters of 12 and 19 November about South Africa and the Middle East. I am, as always, most grateful to you for letting me have the benefit of your views.

signed

MT

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

jfh