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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 192330Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1289 OF 19 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, UKMIS
GENEVA.

MY TELNO 1274: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TOLD ME THIS EVENING (19 NOVEMBER) THAT HE HAD CONTACTED ALL THE CANDIDATES BUT HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY REPLIES TO HIS QUESTION WHETHER THEY WISHED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT BALLOT.

2. HE HAD ALSO CONSULTED ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO), ALL HAD AGREED TO WHAT HE WAS DOING, WITH THE GLOSS FROM THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WOULD NOT WISH TO VOTE ON AN EXPANDED LIST OF CANDIDATES BEFORE 27 NOVEMBER. WITH MUNOZ LEDO, WHOM HE HAD SEEN LAST, HE HAD HAD A FLAMING ROW. MUNOZ LEDO HAD BEGUN BY COMPLAINING THAT SLIM SHOULD NOT HAVE CONTACTED THE CANDIDATES WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE COUNCIL. SLIM REPLIED THAT ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAD AGREED: IN ANY CASE HE WOULD BE REPORTING HIS CONSULTATIONS IN DETAIL TO THE COUNCIL; MUNOZ LEDO SAID THAT IN THAT CASE HE WOULD NOT COME TO THE NEXT MEETING.

3. MUNOZ LEDO HAD THEN ASKED WHO THE CANDIDATES WERE. SLIM PRODUCED THE LIST HE HAD GIVEN ME YESTERDAY (GOULDING'S LETTER 431/2 OF 18 NOVEMBER TO WILLIAMS). WHEN HE SAW CASTANEDA'S NAME, MUNOZ LEDO EXPLODED: HOW HAD SLIM DARED TO INCLUDE THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER AS A CANDIDATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE (KOH)? SLIM POINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL HAD AGREED THAT CANDIDACIES COULD BE PUT FORWARD BY ANY MEMBER OF THE UN, BUT HE AGREED TO CIRCULATE A REVISED NOTE ON CASTANEDA WHICH WOULD STATE THAT ACCORDING TO MUNOZ LEDO, KOH'S COMMUNICATION DID NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. SLIM HAD DULY DONE THIS BUT HAD OF COURSE INFURIATED KOH, WHO HAD CHECKED WITH CASTANEDA'S CHEF DE CABINET THAT ALTHOUGH HIS CANDIDACY HAD NOT YET BEEN PRESENTED FORMALLY CASTANEDA WOULD BE A CANDIDATE ("BUT NOT AN ACTIVE ONE") IF SALIM WAS NO LONGER THERE.

4. I REPORT THIS GROTESQUE EPISODE AT LENGTH TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEPTHS TO WHICH THIS CONTEST HAS SUNK. MUNOZ LEDO'S RAGE IS OF COURSE DUE TO HIS OWN AMBITIONS TO BE A CANDIDATE WHICH ACCORDING TO SLIM HAVE BEEN VETOED BY LOPEZ PORTILLO. IT SEEMS THAT OUT OF SPITE MUNOZ LEDO IS NOW TRYING TO BLOCK CASTANEDA'S CANDIDATURE. WITH LUCK THIS EPISODE SHOULD MEAN THAT WE SHALL NOT BE ASKED TO VOTE ON EITHER CASTANEDA OR MUNOZ LEDO.

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* In my view he is probably
the best candidate in my case.

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5. DE PINIES (SPAIN) CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT ALL THE LATIN AMERICAN CANDIDATES WILL DECLINE TO BE INCLUDE IN THE NEXT BALLOT. HE SEEMS TO HAVE DECIDED TO PROMOTE SADRUDDIN'S CANDIDACY AND HAS URGED MY JORDANIAN COLLEAGUE TO TELL SADRUDDIN, WHO ARRIVES IN NEW YORK TOMORROW, THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR HIM TO MAKE HIS MOVE: HE SHOULD, AS A MATTER OF HONOUR, INFORM WALDHEIM THAT HE WAS DOING SO: HE SHOULD THEN SEE THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE: UNLESS EITHER OF THEM WAS ABSOLUTELY NEGATIVE, HE SHOULD ASK TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT BALLOT. DE PINIES CALCULATES, IN MY VIEW *
RIGHTLY, THAT SADRUDDIN WOULD HAVE A CHANCE OF GETTING ELECTED STRAIGHT AWAY.

6. WALDHEIM ASKED TO SEE ME THIS EVENING. HE RAISED THE IDEA OF A TERM SPLIT BETWEEN HIM AND SALIM, WHICH HE SAID WAS NOT HIS IDEA BUT ONE PUT TO HIM BY THE AFRICANS. I TOLD HIM FIRMLY THAT I THOUGHT THIS WAS A BAD IDEA. FIRST, IF I WAS RIGHT IN THINKING THAT THE CHINESE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN THEIR VETO, THE SPLIT TERM COULD ONLY RESULT FROM A DEAL IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH WOULD MEAN A DANGEROUS SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE ASSEMBLY AND THE COUNCIL. SECONDLY, THE IDEA WAS IMPRACTICAL: HOW COULD GOVERNMENTS BE ASKED TO AGREE NOW THAT SALIM SHOULD BECOME SECRETARY GENERAL IN 1984 OR 1985, BY WHICH TIME SALIM MIGHT BE DEAD, MAD OR IN PRISON AND HIS COUNTRY AT WAR WITH ALL AND SUNDRY IN AFRICA? THIRDLY, I BELIEVED THAT A SPLIT TERM WOULD UNDERMINE WALDHEIM'S AUTHORITY FROM THE OUTSET: INEVITABLY THE SECRETARIAT AND MEMBER STATES WOULD START PAYING COURT TO THE MAN THEY KNEW WAS TO BECOME SECRETARY GENERAL IN TWO OR THREE YEARS' TIME. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO VOTE FOR WALDHEIM. MY EFFORTS TO GET THE FIELD OPENED DID NOT IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION: MY CONCERN HAD BEEN TO MAINTAIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL IN THIS MATTER AND TO PREVENT THE INITIATIVE SLIPPING TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: ALSO TO GET AWAY FROM THE GRIM SINGLE COMBAT WHICH, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, WAS BEGINNING TO DAMAGE HIS AUTHORITY BOTH NOW AND, EVEN IF HE WON IN THE END, IN THE FUTURE.

7. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER WHEN WE KNOW HOW THE CANDIDATES HAVE REPLIED TO SLIM.

PARSONS

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR A ACLAND
LORD BRIDGES
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DESKBY 190900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 182356Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1274 DATED 18 NOVEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA
UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1262: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS DECIDED TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. HE SAW LEPRETTE (FRANCE) AND ME TOGETHER THIS AFTERNOON (18 NOVEMBER) AND HAS SEEN OR WILL BE SEEING ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INDIVIDUALLY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD DECIDED THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO HAVE FURTHER ROUNDS OF BALLOTING BETWEEN SALIM AND WALDHEIM ALONE. HE THEREFORE INTENDED TO SPEAK TO ALL SIX CANDIDATES OF WHOSE INTEREST HE OR HIS PREDECESSOR HAD BEEN NOTIFIED ON A CONDITIONAL BASIS. THESE WERE ORTIZ DE ROSAS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SONNY RAMPHAL, JORGE ILLUECA, SADRUDDIN KHAN AND JORGE CASTANEDA. HE THOUGHT THAT KENNETH DADZIE MIGHT ALSO EMERGE AS A CANDIDATE (APPARENTLY ON THE BASIS OF REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO MRS KIRKPATRICK BY REUTERS). HE ASKED LEPRETTE AND ME TO LET HIM KNOW OF ANY OTHER CANDIDATES WHO MIGHT COMMAND RESPECT. HE SAID THAT NEITHER THE PREVIOUS PRESIDENT NOR HE NOR THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED ANY COMMUNICATION ABOUT THE CANDIDACY OF RAMPHUL (MAURITIUS).
2. HE WOULD SAY TO ALL THE SIX CANDIDATES THAT, IF THEIR CANDIDACIES WERE SERIOUS, THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT ROUND OF BALLOTING. IF THEY DECLINED TO BE INCLUDED, HE WOULD TAKE IT THAT THEY WERE NOT SERIOUS CANDIDATES. HE WOULD ARGUE THAT, AFTER VEToes HAD MADE 16 BALLOTS INCONCLUSIVE, A NEW SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED WHICH SHOULD "LIBERATE THEM FROM THEIR CONSCIENCES". HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO MY PANAMANIAN, ARGENTINE AND GUYANESE COLLEAGUES, WOULD BE SEEING THE PERUVIAN LATER TODAY AND WOULD CONTACT SADRUDDIN IN GENEVA. THERE WAS A COMPLICATION ABOUT CASTANEDA'S CANDIDACY: IT HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO HIM BY TELEPHONE BY THE SINGAPOREAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE BUT MY MEXICAN COLLEAGUE CLAIMED TO KNOW NOTHING ABOUT IT EXCLAM
3. SLIM SAID THAT NONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN SO FAR HAD RAISED OBJECTION TO THIS PROCEDURE. WITH THE CHINESE HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT, IF THEY DID NOT WANT WALDHEIM TO SERVE ANY LONGER, IT WAS IN THEIR INTERESTS TO LET SOME THIRD CANDIDATE BE APPOINTED: OTHERWISE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD IN THE END EXTEND WALDHEIM'S TERM (CF PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). IF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OBJECTED, HE WOULD CALL A FORMAL MEETING, REPORT THE OUTCOME OF HIS CONSULTATIONS AND, IF CHALLENGED, PUT HIS PROPOSED PROCEDURE TO THE VOTE. ASSUMING THIS ALL WORKED, HE HOPED TO HOLD THE NEXT ROUND OF BALLOTING ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, 23 NOVEMBER ON AN EXPANDED LIST OF CANDIDATES.

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4. LATER THIS AFTERNOON, DE PINIES (SPAIN) CONVENED A MEETING OF THE FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PLUS JAPAN. HE ARGUED, WITH SOME VIGOUR, THAT SLIM'S INITIATIVE WAS A NON-STARTER. ALL THE LATIN AMERICAN CANDIDATES WOULD TELL SLIM THAT THEY DID NOT WANT THEIR NAMES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT ROUND OF BALLOTING AS ALL THEIR CANDIDACIES WERE, TO GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT, CONDITIONAL ON SALIM'S WITHDRAWAL OR DECLARATION BY THE COUNCIL THAT A DEADLOCK EXISTED. THE ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION HE HAD WAS THAT UNCONVINCING ONE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD FIND SOME EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT WHO WOULD NOT BE BOUND TO ANY GOVERNMENT OR REGIONAL GROUP.

5. THE REST OF US TOOK THE LINE THAT DE PINIES MIGHT WELL BE RIGHT ABOUT THE LATIN AMERICANS BUT THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO BE BLACKMAILED BY THE AFRICANS AND THE NON-ALIGNED. IT WAS FOR THE COUNCIL, NOT THE CANDIDATES, TO DETERMINE ITS PROCEDURES. OTUNNU'S PRESIDENCY WAS APPROACHING. THE COUNCIL MUST THEREFORE TAKE ACTION TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE. SLIM HAD TAKEN A COURAGEOUS STEP TO CALL THE CANDIDATES' BLUFF AND WE SHOULD SUPPORT HIM. OTHERWISE THE PROSPECT OF SOME KIND OF SPLIT TERM LOOMED. DE PINIES WAS RELUCTANTLY BROUGHT TO SUBSCRIBE TO THESE VIEWS.

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED VARIOUS WAYS FORWARD IF THE EXISTING CANDIDATES ALL DECLINED TO BE VOTED ON WHILE SALIM AND WALDHEIM REMAINED CANDIDATES. IT WAS AGREED THAT IN THAT CASE SLIM SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CALL A FORMAL MEETING AND PROPOSE FROM THE CHAIR THAT HE SHOULD WRITE A FORMAL LETTER TO EACH OF THE CANDIDATES WHICH WOULD TAKE NOTE OF THEIR REPLIES TO HIS ENQUIRY AND SAY THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NO LONGER CONSIDER THEM AS CANDIDATES AND WOULD BE LOOKING ELSEWHERE (THE OBJECT OF COURSE BEING TO CALL THEIR BLUFF). IF THIS PROCEDURE WAS CHALLENGED, THE CHALLENGE SHOULD BE PUT TO THE VOTE AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FAIL TO OBTAIN 9 VOTES.

7. SLIM'S INITIATIVE OFFERS SOME HOPE OF BREAKING THE DEADLOCK. MY OWN HUNCH, WHICH IS SHARED BY MOST OF THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IS THAT A FORMAL COMMUNICATION OF THE ABOVE KIND FROM SLIM WOULD CALL SOME OF THE CANDIDATES' BLUFF, THOUGH ALL OF THEM WILL BE RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. IF SOME OR ALL OF THE CANDIDATES RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SLIM'S ORAL APPROACH, WE COULD BE VOTING ON A WIDER LIST ON 23 NOVEMBER. I DO NOT NEED INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS STAGE BUT WILL TELEGRAPH MY RECOMMENDATIONS AS SOON AS THE CANDIDATES ARE KNOWN.

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PS|LPS
PS|MR HURD
PS|MR LUCE
PS|LORD TREFGARNE
PS|PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR A. ACLAND
LORD BRIDGES
MR DAY
MR GOODISON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO

MR BERMAN, LEGAL ADVISER

DESKBY 180900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 172323Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1262 DATED 17 NOVEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA,
UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1228: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE COUNCIL HELD EIGHT FURTHER BALLOTS THIS MORNING (17 NOVEMBER). THEY WERE INCONCLUSIVE BUT SERVED THE PURPOSE OF CONFIRMING THAT A DEADLOCK UNDENIABLY EXISTS. BEFORE THE MEETING ADJOURNED I AND MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONSIDER INCLUDING IN FURTHER BALLOTS THOSE CANDIDATES WHO WERE KNOWN TO HAVE DECLARED A CONDITIONAL INTEREST. NO DATE HAS BEEN FIXED FOR A FURTHER MEETING.

2. THE RESULTS OF THE EIGHT BALLOTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

BALLOT NO	SALIM			WALDHEIM		
	YES	NO	ABST	YES	NO	ABST
9	10	1	4	11	4	0
10	9	1	5	10	4	1
11	8	1	6	9	4	2
12	8	3	4	9	4	2
13	8	3	4	9	4	2
14	8	3	4	9	4	2
15	8	3	4	9	4	2
16	8	4	3	9	4	2

THE VOTES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS REMAINED CONSTANT THROUGHOUT: 2 - 1 - 2 FOR SALIM AND 4 - 1 - 0 FOR WALDHEIM. THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF MOVEMENT IN THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS' VOTES, WITH BOTH SALIM AND WALDHEIM DECLINING FROM AN EARLY HIGH OF 10 AND 11 FAVOURABLE VOTES RESPECTIVELY. AFTER THE 14TH BALLOT, WHEN THE PATTERN HAD REMAINED CONSTANT FOR THREE SUCCESSIVE ROUNDS, THE MEXICAN PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A BREAK. SPAIN, FRANCE AND IRELAND SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO FURTHER BALLOTS TO CONFIRM THAT THE PATTERN WAS FROZEN. AS YOU WILL SEE, THESE TWO FURTHER BALLOTS PRODUCED ALMOST NO CHANGE.

3. BEFORE THE MEETING ADJOURNED, I SUGGESTED, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, THAT THE COUNCIL WAS IN A DEADLOCK AND TIME WAS BEGINNING TO PRESS: SHOULD WE NOT CONSIDER INCLUDING IN FUTURE BALLOTING THOSE WHO HAD PRESENTED CONDITIONAL CANDIDACIES, IF THEY SO WISHED? THE PRESIDENT (SLIM, TUNISIA) AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO ALL CANDIDATES WHO WANTED TO COME FORWARD; THE CANDIDATES THEMSELVES SHOULD INFORM HIM OFFICIALLY IF THAT WAS THE CASE. MRS KIRKPATRICK ARGUED THAT, GIVEN THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES,

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IT SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN VOTING ON OTHER "KNOWN CANDIDATES"; THERE WAS AMPLE PRECEDENT FOR THIS. THERE WAS NO DISSENT FROM THESE PROPOSALS AND A NUMBER OF NODS OF APPROVAL ROUND THE TABLE. THE COUNCIL THEN ADJOURNED LEAVING THESE UNRESOLVED ISSUES TO BE PURSUED FURTHER IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

4. WALDHEIM HAD TELEPHONED ME AT LENGTH AT HOME LAST NIGHT. WE COVERED MUCH FAMILIAR GROUND. BUT HE LEFT ME WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE IS HANKERING AFTER A SHORTENED OR SPLIT TERM AS A LAST RESORT. CONVERSATIONS WITH COLLEAGUES TODAY SUGGEST THAT HE NOW ACCEPTS THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OF GETTING THE CHINESE TO LIFT THEIR VETO AND THAT HIS NEW TACTIC FOR CLINGING TO OFFICE MAY BE TO GET THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO EXTEND HIS TERM FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS. HIS IDEA SEEMS TO BE THAT, IF THE DEADLOCK IN THE COUNCIL PERSISTS FOR ANOTHER THREE OR FOUR WEEKS, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COULD BE MOVED TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION EXTENDING HIS TERM, ON THE PRECEDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY'S ACTION WHEN THE RUSSIANS BLOCKED THE RE-APPOINTMENT OF TRYGVE LIE IN 1950 (G.A. RESOLUTION 492(V)). HE CALCULATES THAT THE AFRICANS WOULD SUPPORT THIS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IF THEY BLOCKED THE RESOLUTION IN THE ASSEMBLY THE PROBABLE OUTCOME WOULD BE A LATIN AMERICAN, WHO WOULD KEEP THEM OUT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP FOR TEN YEARS; IF ON THE OTHER HAND THEY ALLOWED WALDHEIM TO BE EXTENDED, THEY COULD FIGHT AGAIN IN 1983 OR 1984. THIS SCENARIO SOUNDS ALL TOO PROBABLE.

5. IF WALDHEIM DECIDES TO PURSUE THIS PLOY, BOTH HIS CAMP AND THE AFRICANS WILL BE OPPOSED TO ANY OPENING OF THE FIELD TO OTHER CANDIDATES, ALTHOUGH HITHERTO HE HAS BEEN IN FAVOUR OF THIS. HE MAY NOT THEREFORE BE ENTIRELY HAPPY ABOUT WHAT MRS KIRKPATRICK AND I SAID IN THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING. BUT WE HAVE FULFILLED OUR UNDERTAKING TO VOTE FOR HIM THROUGH THICK AND THIN AND I DO NOT MYSELF THINK THAT OBLIGATION SHOULD EXTEND TO FOLLOWING HIM IN ALL HIS TWISTS AND TURNS IN HIS DESPERATION TO RETAIN HIS OFFICE. INDEED I AM JUST BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER, AFTER HIS UNDIGNIFIED, AND IN CHARTER TERMS INDEFENSIBLE, BEHAVIOUR OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS, HIS ABILITY TO CONTINUE AS AN EFFECTIVE SECRETARY GENERAL MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED. I WILL KEEP A CAREFUL EYE ON THIS ASPECT.

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COPIES TO:
MR BEEHAN. LEGAL ADV:

PARSONS

LIMITED

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PS

PS/LPS

PS/MA HURD

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TRIGGARNE

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

SIR A ACHAND

LORD BRIDGES

MR DAY

MR GOODISON

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 121930Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1228 OF 12 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON DARESSALAAM VIENNA PARIS UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1207: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. I SAW THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (SLIM, TUNISIA) THIS MORNING (12 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT HIS CONSULTATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT A MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL WERE IN FAVOUR OF RESUMING BALLOTING EARLY NEXT WEEK, THOUGH QUOTE THREE OR FOUR DELEGATIONS UNQUOTE WERE UNHAPPY (I THINK THESE PROBABLY INCLUDE UGANDA, BECAUSE FURTHER BALLOTING MIGHT CONFIRM THE DEADLOCK AND OPEN THE WAY FOR THIRD CANDIDATES: THE CHINESE, BECAUSE THEY FIND IT EMBARRASSING TO HAVE TO GO ON VETOING; AND THE RUSSIANS WHO NOW SEE THAT A ROUND OF INTENSIVE BALLOTING MIGHT LET IN THIRD CANDIDATES AND FORCE THEM TO START VETOING).
2. SLIM ACCORDINGLY INTENDS TO CONVENE THE COUNCIL TO RESUME BALLOTING ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 NOVEMBER, WITHOUT PRIOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. HE EXPECTS THAT AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OR TWO SOMEONE WILL CALL FOR A FURTHER ADJOURNMENT. BUT HE ASSUMES THAT THIS WOULD BE CHALLENGED AND (I THINK RIGHTLY) THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE 9 VOTES IN FAVOUR OF ADJOURNMENT, AT ANY RATE AT THE BEGINNING.
3. SLIM WENT ON TO SAY, SPEAKING AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF TUNISIA, THAT THERE WAS MUCH CONFUSION ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE OAU AND NAM ENDORSEMENTS OF SALIM. HE DID NOT APPROVE OF EITHER AND HE HAD TOLD SALIM AND THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AFTER THE FIRST SIX BALLOTS THAT, FOLLOWING SALIM'S FAILURE TO GET ELECTED, HE NO LONGER FELT BOUND TO HIM. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ENDORSED THAT POSITION. SLIM MORE OR LESS INVITED ME TO PASS ROUND THE WORD THAT OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND SALIM'S OTHER CHAMPIONS HAD NO RIGHT TO TRY TO FRIGHTEN OTHER CANDIDATES FROM ENTERING THE CONTEST.

PARSONS

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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MR. GOODISON

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MR DAY

MR BULLARD

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 110041Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY P.C.O. OFFICER PA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1207 DATED 10 NOVEMBER 81
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, PARIS, UKMIS GENEVA

(196)

MY TELNO 1170: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (SLIM, TUNISIA) IS CONTINUING TO SEE INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS BUT HAS NOT SCHEDULED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE OR A RESUMPTION OF BALLOTING. HE SAW LEPRETTE (FRANCE) AND ME TOGETHER THIS MORNING (10 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT MY CHINESE COLLEAGUE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN CHINA'S POSITION: IT WAS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE: CHINA WANTED A SECRETARY GENERAL FROM THE THIRD WORLD. SLIM CONCLUDED THAT IF THE UNITED STATES ALSO MAINTAINED THEIR VETO (AND HE WAS TO SEE MRS KIRKPATRICK LATER TODAY), HE COULD SEE NO POINT IN FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. HE HAD SEEN SALIM YESTERDAY, HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS EMBARRASSING HIS FRIENDS BY STAYING IN THE RACE AND HAD URGED HIM TO WITHDRAW. SALIM HAD REJECTED THIS CRITICISM AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO REMAIN IN THE RACE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.
2. LEPRETTE AND I URGED ON SLIM THAT THE ONLY WAY FORWARD WOULD BE FOR THE COUNCIL TO HOLD A FULL HALF DAY OF BALLOTING, WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, WHICH WOULD PERMIT PERHAPS 15 OR 20 BALLOTS. THIS WOULD EITHER INDICATE A TREND OR (MORE LIKELY) DEMONSTRATE CONVINCINGLY THAT WE WERE DEADLOCKED. ONCE THAT HAD HAPPENED, MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO DENY THAT A DEADLOCK EXISTED AND THE WAY COULD BE OPEN FOR THIRD CANDIDATES TO ENTER THE CONTEST. WE TOLD SLIM THAT OUR OWN CONSULTATIONS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO THE USSR, TO JAPAN AND TO SEVERAL NON-ALIGNED. SLIM PROVED RELUCTANT, HOWEVER, TO ACCEPT THIS ADVICE, FOR REASONS THAT ARE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR.
3. SALIM ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON. HE REHEARSED HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU IN MELBOURNE, DESCRIBED SIR P MOON'S MEETING WITH NYERERE ON 9 NOVEMBER (DAR ES SALAAM TELSNOs 333 AND 334) AND REPEATED NYERERE'S REQUEST THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO STOP VETOING HIM. I GAVE HIM NO REASON TO HOPE THAT WE WOULD INTERVENE WITH THE AMERICANS AND WENT ON TO TELL HIM FRANKLY WHY WE PREFERRED WALDHEIM TO HIM. THIS CAUSED NO OFFENSE, THOUGH HE DID SAY THAT THE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION WAS THAT THERE COULD BE NO AFRICAN SECRETARY GENERAL UNTIL THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA HAD BEEN RESOLVED.
4. I PUT TO SALIM THE IDEA OF AN INTENSIVE ROUND OF BALLOTING AS THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THAT, WHILE NOT INVITING THIRD CANDIDATES TO ENTER THE RACE, HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THEIR DOING SO. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS MESSAGE SEEMED NOT TO HAVE REACHED THE THIRD CANDIDATES CONCERNED: HE DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER.

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/HE WAS

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HE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A ROUND OF INTENSIVE BALLOTING, PREFERRING TO CLING TO THE HOPE THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER THE AMERICANS COULD BE GOT TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. I TRIED TO DISCOURAGE HIM FROM OPTIMISM ON THIS SCORE AND BY THE END OF THE CONVERSATION I THINK THAT HE HAD BECOME MORE AMENABLE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT A ROUND OF ~~TELEPHONE BALLOTING~~ ^{INTENSIVE BALLOTING} MIGHT BE THE BEST WAY FORWARD, IF IT LED TO A WIDENING OF THE FIELD. THIS WOULD CARRY RISKS FOR HIM (I.E. ONE OF THE THIRD CANDIDATES MIGHT GET ELECTED). BUT IF THE VOTING REMAINED INCONCLUSIVE, A NEW SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN PRODUCED IN WHICH THE AMERICANS (OR OF COURSE, AS I POINTED OUT, THE CHINESE) MIGHT COME TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

5. WITHOUT CREATING THE IMPRESSION OF A BRITISH INITIATIVE, I WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE IDEA THAT THE WAY FORWARD LIES IN A ROUND OF INTENSIVE BALLOTING. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE AND OTHERS ARE DOING LIKEWISE.

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PS/PUS
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
SIR A ACLAND
MR GOODISON

THIS TELEGRAM
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DESKBY 050500Z RIYADH

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050045Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1170 OF 4 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, UKMIS GENEVA

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MY TELNO 1162: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HELD TWO FURTHER INCONCLUSIVE ROUNDS OF BALLOTING BETWEEN SALIM AND WALDHEIM THIS EVENING (4 NOVEMBER) THE RESULTS WERE AS FOLLOWS (PM = PERMANENT MEMBER).

BALLOT 7	SALIM			WALDHEIM		
	YES	NO	ABST	YES	NO	ABST
PM'S	2	1	2	4	1	-
NON PM'S	7	1	2	6	3	1
TOTAL	9	2	4	10	4	1

BALLOT 8

PM'S	2	1	2	4	1	-
NON PM'S	6	2	2	6	3	1
TOTAL	8	3	4	10	4	1

SALIM THUS MANAGED TO GET UP TO 9 VOTES ON THE 7TH BALLOT BUT SLIPPED BACK TO 8 ON THE 8TH. THE US AND CHINESE NEGATIVE VOTES REMAINED FIRM.

2. AFTER THE 8TH VOTE OTUNNU (UGANDA) PROPOSED AN ADJOURNMENT OF AT LEAST A WEEK. AFTER DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL WOULD INVITE DELEGATIONS TO SEE HIM INDIVIDUALLY NEXT MONDAY (9 NOVEMBER) AND THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD THEN MOVE INTO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE, EITHER THAT DAY OR ON 10 NOVEMBER. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR THE COUNCIL TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF OTHER CANDIDATES, AT LEAST ONE OF WHOM (IE RAMPHUL) HAD FORMALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY APPLIED. BUT WAS NOT TAKEN UP BY OTHER DELEGATIONS.

3. THERE IS INCREASING RESTIVENESS AMONGST THE TWO LATIN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AT THE STRANGLEHOLD THE AFRICANS HAVE IMPOSED ON THE PROCEEDINGS. MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO) INTENDS TO SEE SALIM TOMORROW AND OBVIOUSLY HOPES THAT HE WILL WITHDRAW. BUT I THINK THAT THE AFRICANS WILL STAND FIRM AND THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO SIGN OF WALDHEIM CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWAL.

PARSONS

LIMITED

UND	PS	PS/PUS
EAD	PS/LPS	SIR A ACLAND
NAD	PS/MR LUCE	MR GOODISON
NEWS D	PS/LORD TREFGARNE	

CONFIDENTIAL

THE BANK OF AMERICA
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38103

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
TO THE DIRECTOR
OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: JAMES EARL RAY
ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN PASSPORT
FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE
ON APRIL TWENTY TWO LAST (SEE ENCL. ONE TO BUREAU DATED APRIL TWENTY TWO LAST) AND TO SECURE A PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE ON APRIL TWENTY TWO LAST (SEE ENCL. TWO TO BUREAU DATED APRIL TWENTY TWO LAST).

ON APRIL TWENTY TWO LAST, THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ADVISED THAT JAMES EARL RAY HAD CONTACTED THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE ON APRIL TWENTY TWO LAST.

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THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ADVISED THAT JAMES EARL RAY HAD CONTACTED THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE ON APRIL TWENTY TWO LAST.

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UKMIS GENEVA

GR 650

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

Hd UND
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Ci A Auland
Mr Goodison
RC

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 040900Z

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 032352Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1162 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS DARESSALAAM VIENNA UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1146: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. SLIM (TUNISIA), THIS MONTH'S PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WANTS THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO HELP THE COUNCIL FIND A WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE. AFTER CONSULTING EACH OF US INDIVIDUALLY, HE ARRANGED FOR MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA), LEPRETTE (FRANCE) AND ME TO MEET PRIVATELY BEFORE THIS AFTERNOON'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL.

2. THE THREE OF US AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO A FURTHER SERIES OF BALLOTS BETWEEN SALIM AND WALDHEIM. THIS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT A DEADLOCK EXISTED. WE HAD SOME INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW THE FIELD COULD THEN BE OPENED FOR OTHER CANDIDATES, IF THE AFRICANS CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT SALIM WAS THE CANDIDATE OF AFRICA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND TRIED TO FRIGHTEN OFF OTHER POTENTIAL CANDIDATES. WE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO TRY TO PUSH THINGS ALONG (AND LEPRETTE REPORTED THAT TROYANOVSKY (USSR) TOOK THE SAME VIEW). WE WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL, PERHAPS DORR (IRELAND) OR THE LATINS, TO GET THE FIELD OPENED. WE ALSO AGREED THAT IF POSSIBLE THE ELECTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE 1 DECEMBER WHEN OTUNNU (UGANDA) ASSUMES THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK REPORTED THAT SALIM WAS PRESSING THE AMERICANS HARD TO LIFT THEIR VETO AND HAD VISITED WASHINGTON FOR THAT PURPOSE. HE EXPECTED HIS VOTE TO CONTINUE TO RISE. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT ENJOYING QUOTE TAKING THE RAP UNQUOTE FOR BLOCKING SALIM: QUOTE PERHAPS THE LATTER WAS RIGHT IN CLAIMING THAT THE U S MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN CHINA UNQUOTE. SHE HERSELF WAS AMBIVALENT. BUT SHE WENT ON TO LIST THE REASONS WHY THE U S WOULD NOT WANT SALIM ELECTED (BUSH'S DISTASTE FOR HIM, THE RISK THAT HE WOULD BE A PRISONER OF THE AFRICANS - AS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS CURRENT BEHAVIOUR, HAIG'S RELUCTANCE TO HAVE AN AFRICAN SECRETARY GENERAL WHEN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE IN THE BAG ETC).

THE COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. SLIM CONFIRMED

TARY GENERAL WHEN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE IN THE BAG ETC).

4. WHEN THE COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, SLIM CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE STILL ONLY TWO CANDIDATES. DORR SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF MAURITIUS SEEKING IRISH SUPPORT FOR RAMPHUL'S CANDIDATURE IN TERMS WHICH INDICATED THAT THAT CANDIDATURE WAS NOT CONDITIONAL IN ANY WAY. SLIM DENIED THAT HE OR HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED ANY SIMILAR NOTIFICATION. DE PINIES (SPAIN) CONFIRMED THAT ALL THE POSSIBLE CANDIDATURES NOTIFIED TO HIM DURING HIS PRESIDENCY WERE CONDITIONAL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE EXISTING CANDIDATES. NISIBORI (JAPAN) SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WAS IN DEADLOCK, THOUGH IT WAS RELUCTANT TO ADMIT IT, BUT THE ONLY CONCLUSION HE DREW WAS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD PRESS ON WITH FURTHER BALLOTING. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT 2230Z ON 4 NOVEMBER. NO ONE INCLUDING SLIM SUGGESTED THAT RAMPHAL'S NAME SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE BALLOTING ON 4 NOVEMBER. SLIM TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT HE THOUGHT IT TOO ABSURD TO TAKE SERIOUSLY.

PARSONS

NNNN



(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Premier Minister.

mt

U.N. Secretary General.

Two more ballots to-day produced no new candidates & no significantly different results. Waldheim's vote remains steady at 10/11 with one veto; Salin has climbed back up to 8 with one veto.

There will probably be no new ballot until Friday: the Americans are arguing for an even longer pause for reflection.

And 28/x

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CM

SECRETARY OF STATE

UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. We need authority to despatch this telegram of further instructions to Tony Parsons before you and the PM are tied up with Hussein.
2. The telegram does not refer to Ramphal. It is by no means certain that Ramphal will be a candidate in the next round of voting. Our experts have hitherto not rated his chances highly because he is not well known in UN circles.
3. If you wish, we could:
 - a. emphasise to Tony Parsons that we are very keen to avoid having Ramphal as Secretary General, though not to the point of casting our veto;
 - b. suggest that Tony should do some discreet lobbying against Ramphal, with the object of encouraging the Americans to veto him;
 - c. spread a little dirt with US officials here or in Washington.
4. However, on balance I think it would be a mistake to do b. and c., and that a. would therefore be otiose. We face the awkward question of explaining our own unwillingness to veto. It is very likely that news of our lobbying would get back to Ramphal. If he is elected, we shall have to live with him as Secretary General (and I suspect that he might not be as awful as we now think). If he is not elected, we must continue to live with him as Commonwealth Secretary General. If the senior Commonwealth member was perceived as having stymied Ramphal's chances, Ramphal would certainly do all he could to whip up feeling in the Commonwealth against us.
5. I propose to consult Michael Alexander before despatch of the telegram, unless you want to have a word with the PM at 11.45.

RWJL

28 October 1981

28 OCT 1981

