



Prime Minister. (1)

Agree that if the US +  
the E-77 accept this text we  
also should go along?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1981

Dear National

Global Negotiations

You will wish to be aware of recent developments concerning the Global Negotiations and of the possibility that a rapid decision may be required.

Informal consultations have been taking place in New York. The Iraqi President of the General Assembly, Kittani, has made it clear that he favours the passage of a short, simple resolution, recording a decision to convene a UN Conference for Global Negotiations, before the present General Assembly ends on 15 December. Informal consultations have led to the emergence of the text I enclose as Annex A. This would achieve a quick launch but would postpone the difficult procedural issues and the settlement of the agenda to the Conference itself.

The <sup>US</sup> ~~UN~~ Permanent Representative at the UN has participated actively in the preparation of the present text. However, we believe that some senior officials in the State Department are opposed to its acceptance and it remains quite possible that the Americans will decide to press for significant improvements to the resolution. If so, we shall urge the Community to take the opportunity of the reopened discussion to press for further protection for the Specialised Agencies. A commentary on the text is at Annex B.

On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that Mrs Kirkpatrick will persuade Secretary Haig and/or the White House that it would be tactically better to launch the Global Negotiations now and fight the battles on Agenda and Procedures at the opening of the negotiations themselves (which would be next spring).

Meanwhile, the position of the developing countries is unclear. They will probably await the Americans' reaction and are likely to accept the text if the Americans do. In these circumstances, there would be intense pressure on us - not least from our Community partners - to join a consensus in favour of the text. The Germans (with whom we shall continue to keep in close touch) would almost certainly succumb to such a pressure and we would find ourselves isolated if we sought to resist.

Lord Carrington considers that in this situation we would have no alternative but to acquiesce in this text.

/He therefore



He therefore proposes to give Sir A Parsons instructions to join a Community position in favour of the text if at the meeting of Kittani's group (arranged for 2130 tonight) the American and G77 spokesmen indicate concurrence. Delay would risk incurring gratuitous criticism domestically and in the Third World and there would be nothing to gain from appearing more royalist than the King on this issue.

The Treasury have been consulted on the above at official level, and I am sending a copy of this letter to John Kerr in the Chancellor's office. I am also sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Trade, Industry and Energy, and to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (who will have received New York's telegrams).

*9 Mrs. [unclear]*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'B J P Fall', written in a cursive style.

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

GRS 300

ANNEX A

UNCLASSIFIED

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010211Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1406 OF 30 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS WASHINGTON UKMIS GENEVA UKDEL OECD.

MIPT:

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT "C" OF 30 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE ITEM ENTITLED QUOTE LAUNCHING OF THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE,

REAFFIRMING RESOLUTION 34/138,

1. DECIDES TO CONVENE A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT FROM ..... 1982;
2. DECIDES THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL FIRST ESTABLISH THE PROCEDURES AGENDA AND TIME-FRAME FOR THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS;
3. DECIDES THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL FUNCTION THROUGHOUT AND REACH AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS;
4. DECIDES THAT THE CONFERENCE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WILL EXERCISE THE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THAT CONTEXT WILL ENTRUST SPECIFIC AGENDA ITEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE OBJECTIVES AND GUIDANCE, TO SPECIALIZED FORA WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR COMPETENCE, FUNCTIONS AND POWERS, OR TO SUCH AD HOC GROUPS IT MAY CREATE IF NECESSARY;
5. DECIDES TO ACCORD HIGH PRIORITY TO THE CONFERENCE IN RELATION TO OTHER UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES EXCEPT THOSE OF THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS ESTABLISHED BY THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN RESPECT OF FACILITIES AND SERVICES, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION TO THE CONFERENCE;
6. DECIDES THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION.

ENDS

PARSONS

STANDARD  
ERD  
ES & SD  
MAED  
TRED  
ECD  
UND  
ESID

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NORTH/SOUTH

1. We see the following inter-related difficulties about text C:-

- (a) It does not provide explicit protection for the Specialised Agencies.
- (b) It does not define in advance the Agenda and Procedures to be followed.
- (c) In particular, there is no clarity about the final stage of the conference where the result of work in the Specialised Agencies will be considered and where the risk to their autonomy is greatest.

2. Our Community partners (and Mrs Kirkpatrick) would argue:-

- (a) That there is overriding political advantage in launching the Global Negotiations now and sorting out the Agenda and Procedures at the opening of the conference (as provided for in para 2).
- (b) The rule of consensus (para 3) gives us some protection.
- (c) The reference to the UN Charter (in para 4) brings into play the agreements that already exist defining the relationship between the General Assembly and the Specialised Agencies; thus reducing the risk of interference.

VN

JU



Secretary of State for Industry

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11 December 1981

Brian Fall Esq  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for  
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Dear Brian

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

My Secretary of State has seen your letter and enclosures to Michael Alexander of 2 December about the above. He agrees that we should proceed as you suggest.

Copies go to Michael Alexander (No 10), John Kerr (HMT), John Rhodes (DoT), Julian West (DEN) and Kate Timms (MAFF).


Yours ever

Richard

RICHARD RILEY  
Private Secretary

AR 14/12  
h.a.

74 DEC 1981



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 December 1981

Global Negotiations

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 2 December on this subject. She is content that we should proceed as you propose.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury), John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry), Julian West (Department of Energy) and Kate Timms (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food).

M. Q. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Fall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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