

Mr Marshall - NAD

Call on the Secretary of State by the
American Ambassador

Ambassador Louis, taking up an invitation from Lord Carrington to drop in for a chat, duly did so this afternoon. The conversation was informal and lasted just over an hour. The Ambassador was not accompanied.

Poland and Measures against the Soviet Union

Lord Carrington emphasised his concern about existing contracts and the position of John Brown in particular, adding that he had mentioned the matter to Mr Haig and hinting that it might have to be taken up at the Prime Minister/President level. Lord Carrington made it clear that in his judgement the Europeans would go ahead with the pipeline anyway, and he suggested that the Americans might with advantage explore the possibility of a trade off between the pipeline and a more forthcoming response from western Europe on other possible measures towards the Soviet Union. For our part, he was confident that we would be able to come up with a respectable package, though it would of course be difficult for us to get out ahead of the other Europeans.

I am not sure how far the Ambassador took in the point about the possible trade off, although he asked for it to be repeated. He was however briefed on the question of existing contracts and he indicated personal agreement with what the Secretary of State had said. The US Embassy have apparently taken the question up in Washington.

In more general discussion about Poland the Secretary of State explained why measures in the field of industrial trade hurt Europe more than the United States; described the state of the debate in the European Community on food sales to Poland; and sketched out the difficult assessment which would have to be made if, as he expected, Jaruzelski introduced measures which appeared superficially to meet the three points which had been put to the Polish government by the West. Finally, there was a discussion of consultation in which the Secretary of State sought tactfully to distinguish consultation and prior information. (The Ambassador received this with an indication of sympathy.)

Day of Solidarity with Poland

The Ambassador did not seem to know very much more about who was in charge than we, but he confirmed that private organisations on the American side were expected to make the running. Indeed, he hoped that the American television networks, churches and unions had already been in touch with

/their

their British opposite numbers. There was no suggestion that HMG as such should be playing a more active part, and the Ambassador was pleased to hear that we had recommended to the Prime Minister that she agree to respond positively to a request for a message.

Middle East

The Ambassador asked the Secretary of State for his views on Camp David and the prospects for the autonomy talks. Lord Carrington replied on standard lines making it clear that he had never opposed Camp David as such (which, indeed, had worthwhile achievements to its credit) and that he accepted that the Americans had no alternative but to pursue the autonomy talks. But he went on to spell out the difficulties he foresaw. Ambassador Louis implied that the Americans saw European policy as crowding in on Camp David. Lord Carrington replied that this had not at all been the intention, and explained what we had been doing to remove one of the two major obstacles to effective negotiations: the unwillingness of the PLO to express publicly and unequivocally even a conditional recognition of the rights of Israel. The Ambassador intervened only to pick up a reference to Al Fatah whom he thought to be a terrorist group.

In a brief discussion of the Sinai MFO, the Secretary of State made it clear that he looked forward to receiving from Mr Haig an account of what had passed during his visit to Tel Aviv. As far as we were concerned, we saw no need for a reply to the communication which the four European participants had given to the Government of Israel.

Salvador Elections

The Ambassador mentioned that he had discussed the matter with Lord Trefgarne. The Secretary of State said that we would like to help if we could, though it seemed clear that there would not be much of a response on the part of our European partners. He would be giving further thought to other possibilities, such as a visit by members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and/or a team under Commonwealth Caribbean auspices. He had certainly not thrown the idea out of the window, but the fact remained that it would be highly embarrassing if a team of observers in which we were involved were to arrive at a different assessment of the elections than the American observers (Lord Carrington mentioned in this context the differences which had arisen between the Commonwealth and the United Nations observers during the Zimbabwe elections).

US-UK Relations

i. Messages from Haig

The Ambassador by implication invited the Secretary of

/State

State to say that he was getting too many. Lord Carrington tactfully declined the gambit, making it clear that he would rather have too much than too little. He added that no-one could have done more than Mr Haig to keep his European partners informed (a remark which the Ambassador should not have regarded as over-riding the distinction between information and consultation).

ii. Relations between the Secretary of State and Mr Haig.

The Ambassador trod not very lightly over the ice of last November, and made no mention, if he was aware of it, of the meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Haig over breakfast at the NATO meeting in December. Lord Carrington went out of his way to assure the Ambassador that, if there had been difficulties, they were not of his making and were in any case in the past.

iii. Visit by President Reagan.

The Ambassador produced almost as a new idea the thought that President Reagan might visit the United Kingdom immediately after the Paris Summit of the Seven, and seemed unaware that he had already been formally invited to do so. He also appeared to think that the idea of the President staying at Windsor was something that we had dreamt up for security reasons rather than evidence of an invitation from The Queen. The Secretary of State explained how we saw the matter, and the Ambassador went on to ask where it might be most appropriate and effective for the President to make a public speech. Lord Carrington said that he saw attraction in the idea of an address to both Houses of Parliament in Westminster Hall, but added that he would wish to reflect on the matter and would come back to the Ambassador. [I shall be grateful if you will advise whether anything more need be done about the invitation to President Reagan in the light of this not altogether reassuring conversation, and if you will also let me know what you think about the idea of an address in Westminster Hall and possible alternatives.]

iv. Embassy Security

The Ambassador said that the Embassy, and the Defence wing in particular were very concerned about their security in the light of the killing in Paris. The Secretary of State said that we would let the Embassy know immediately if our assessment of the threat had in any way changed. [Grateful if Security Department would put action in hand].



(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

18 January 1982

Distribution:

PS

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/Mr Luce

PS/PUS

Mr Bullard

Lord Bridges

Mr Day

Mr Moberly

Mr Evans

Mr Ure

Hds of NENAD

EESD

Planning Staff

Security Dept

News Dept