

From: Mr N A Fuller

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10 February 1982

*Dear Rickett*

As you will be aware Geoffrey Pattie, will be attending the annual Wehrkunde Conference in Munich on 12th - 14th February 1982. The theme of the conference this year is 'Arms Race or Arms Control', and Mr Pattie will be delivering a paper entitled 'Public Opinion and Security'.

... In view of the interest which was shown in Mr Pattie's paper for the conference last year, I attach for your information copies of both the Minister's paper and supporting speech which he is to give on this occasion.

A press release covering the Minister's speech and paper will be issued (under embargo until 14th February) this coming Friday.

*Yours sincerely,  
 Nigel Fuller.*

(Private Secretary)

W Rickett Esq  
Private Secretary  
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Opening Remarks by Geoffrey Pattie MP

1. The topic of public opinion and security is particularly appropriate for discussion at this conference. The general theme of "Arms Race or Arms Control" may not at first sight appear to have a great deal of relevance to public opinion, but in fact what we are talking about is how best to assure our security. And I hope that my paper has demonstrated the importance of public opinion to our security policy as a whole.

2. I should like, in introducing the paper, to emphasise the structural difficulties in terms of coherent presentation of Alliance policies caused by the geographical separation of its members. Perceptions vary greatly according to which side of the Atlantic one is placed. Europe is three thousand miles away from North America, and it is also worth noting that the fact that it is 6,000 miles away from California has assumed far greater significance since the shift of the political and industrial centre of gravity of the United States to the South and West, a shift reflected in the coming to power of the Reagan administration. The constituent of an American senator may complain that his welfare benefits are being reduced to pay for a defence programme which is designed around the prominent role that the United States has to play in the NATO Alliance; he may cite anti-American sentiment in Europe to question whether Europe is worth defending - particularly at a personal cost to himself. The constituent of a European politician, on the other hand, is anxious lest strong American leadership of the Alliance should prove less rather than more likely to strengthen his own security;



he may fear that the United States is hell-bent on seeking a super-power confrontation and heightening international tension - which could lead to a war resulting in the destruction of a large part of the continent of Europe, on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Misconceived though both these sets of sentiments are, one cannot lightly dismiss them; <sup>and</sup> particularly in Europe, and certainly in Britain, the second set come from people whose instincts are robust and who appreciate the dangers we face and the need to guard against them - but are becoming increasingly concerned about the prospects for peace.

3. In this context, it is worth remarking that it is almost impossible for a United States Administration, of whatever political or foreign policy persuasion, ever to win complete public support in Europe. If they attempt to exercise firm leadership of the Alliance they are accused of being belligerent and dangerous; if they take the greatest care to consult their Allies on matters of mutual security they are accused of weakness.

4. I have argued in my paper that we do not take sufficient account of the implications for the Alliance of these simple facts of geography - implications which are plainly evident to the Russians since they would otherwise not make such a good job of exploiting them. And we need to take account of them in two main ways - first in evaluating our perceptions of the behaviour and attitudes of our Allies and second in judging the best way of explaining our security policy to the publics of the Alliance. There must be a two-way street in attitudes as well as in hardware.



5. Let us take first the problem of perceptions. I have much sympathy with the (perhaps average) American citizen who is becoming increasingly disenchanted with the behaviour of the European members of the Alliance. Indeed, some of the remarks and proposals which one hears in the nuclear debate currently underway in Europe cannot do other than infuriate any rational American. Let me give an example from my own country. Some supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament advocate the abandonment of the United Kingdom's independent nuclear capability, and the expulsion of all United States bases from our territory, while retaining British membership of NATO. In other words, they are apparently content to see us remaining under the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States to NATO as a whole, while at the same time refusing to play any part in NATO's nuclear strategy. There is, of course, no moral justification for such a stand - indeed I would go so far as to say such a programme is morally repugnant. And, as I have said, the irritation of Americans who hear this sort of thing seriously propounded as a programme of non-nuclear defence is entirely justified and understandable. But the average American should also perhaps be a little more understanding. He should realise that the weekends when there are not anti-nuclear and anti-American demonstrations throughout the capitals of Europe are the vast majority - but they do not make news headlines. Europe is not in a constant ferment of anti-Americanism and anti-nuclear sentiment. For example, 69% of the population of my country are in favour of our retention of nuclear weapons.

6. Equally, we in Europe must try to be more understanding



of the attitudes of the American people. As with any other nation, they embrace a wide range of attitudes; but we should not forget that they are living through a period in which they see their superiority over the Soviet Union being eroded gradually, and parity between the super-powers if not already achieved, at least in prospect. This strand of perception, and its possible effects upon national confidence, should not be overlooked.

7. In considering the differences in perceptions among members of the Alliance, we should also be mindful of the basic historical facts. No-one under the age of 40 can have any real recollection of the Second World War. And the fact that in that War, in which virtually all the destruction was caused by what are now comfortably known as 'conventional' weapons, over 50 million people lost their lives is not readily brought to mind by the great majority of the population when they are invited by anti-nuclear groups to contemplate the horrors of nuclear war. Despite times of tension such as the Berlin crisis, and Soviet repression campaigns in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and most recently, albeit in a different way, in Poland there has been a general sentiment of relatively stable relations between the European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. And this feeling of relative security has persisted even through such Soviet actions as the invasion of Afghanistan -- which, I dare say, many Europeans could not place on the map though we British know it very well. Ungrateful as it may seem, the majority of European publics seem to have forgotten the role played by the United States in restoring the territorial integrity



of much of Western Europe at the close of World War II and the sacrifices made by the United States, through the Marshall Plan, to restore their economies to at least an embryonic health. This neglect of the historical background has perhaps made it more easy for the anti-American tide to have gained the hold it has.

8. Contrast this with the American perception of the Soviet threat. For Americans the Soviet Union is much further away than it is for Europeans. Both for this reason and because the United States and the Soviet Union are the two major strategic nuclear powers, the United States perceives the Soviet threat in terms of nuclear devastation rather than territorial aggression. This was brought very close to home at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation of grave danger which may have had a very significant effect upon American perceptions of the threat.

9. Against such a background, I should like to suggest briefly some ways in which the Alliance collectively might try to convey more successfully to its publics the fact that the continuing existence of the NATO Alliance and, in the absence of dramatic achievements in arms control both conventional and nuclear, the devotion of what are by any standards massive resources to defence forces are essential to our security.

10. Firstly, I believe that Europeans should make an effort to remind their populations of the role of the United States in



securing their peace, prosperity and freedom over the last three decades. Against such an historical perspective, the claims of the disarmers that Cruise and Pershing II missiles are designed to keep a nuclear war against the Soviet Union limited to Europe can be seen to be absurd. Although it is true that limited technology prevented the American homeland being involved in the last World War - the American conventional and nuclear presence in Europe today - which is voluntary - guarantees their involvement in any conflict even to the extent, with modern weaponry, of risking nuclear attacks on their homeland. As to the Pershings and Cruise missiles, the Russians have made clear that they would regard any attack on the Soviet Union by American nuclear weapons, wherever based, as if it were an attack from the United States itself. Had it been made clearer that the December 1979 decision to modernise NATO's intermediate range nuclear capability was intended to recouple rather than to decouple, it might have been less susceptible to the caricatures we have seen. In this context I must also remark that the arms control aspect of the 1979 "double decision" was badly mishandled - particularly by the Europeans. In effect it was lost from view and it has taken NATO until now, with President Reagan's "zero option" offer, to regain the lost ground. Naturally the decision of the participating countries to accept the stationing of Cruise and Pershing missiles was newsworthy - but so also was the first attempt to negotiate nuclear arms control measures at less than the strategic level.

11. In making clear the fundamental objective of the Alliance's strategy we have to accept that odd phrases and half-



sentences will always be taken out of context and used to manufacture scare-mongering headlines. I have in mind here the fuss that was engendered last year by President Reagan's remarks which were misinterpreted as meaning that the United States contemplated the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe. This was, of course, closely followed by the apparent disagreement between Secretaries Haig and Weinberger as to the role, if any, of the nuclear "warning shot" in NATO's strategy. All of us, myself included, must seek to avoid giving hostages to fortune of this kind.

12. As well as ensuring that explanations of NATO's strategy do not lend themselves to selective and headline-seeking quotation, we also need to take care that the actual hardware involved in nuclear deterrence is itself set in context. Context is also important in explaining developments and refinements of Alliance strategy; the way that news of Presidential Directive 59 emerged into the public domain made it particularly difficult to refute charges that the United States, and NATO as a whole, had moved from a strategy of deterrence to one of planning to fight and win a nuclear war, even a nuclear war involving strategic exchanges. It was not sufficiently understood that a warfighting capability is a necessary ingredient of a strategy of deterrence. Of course, it is difficult to try and deal with the background to the more arcane aspects of deterrence theory on every occasion that one speaks about nuclear issues, but I believe that with a little more care and forethought we could manage considerably better than we now do.

13. These are my prescriptions for improving our public



image. They are not a plea for propaganda, just for balanced and sensible presentation of our policies to our publics. And we should always bear in mind that we should be able to explain our policies with no great difficulty - they are, after all, only based on the commonsense precept that the aggressor does not pick upon the man who can stand up for himself. One would expect to find a natural inclination and willingness to accept this everyday truth, which is learned by most in the school playground.

14. Finally, I must stress the urgency of tackling the problems. If the current so-called "peace" movements continue to grow rapidly, we might find ourselves in a position similar to that of the early 1930s when more than 11 million people in Britain signed the "peace pledge" - we all know what consequences the spirit of appeasement visited upon the continent of Europe. We must not get into the position where the will to maintain our security is undermined either by the affects of Russian propaganda or by our own assessment of the threat leading us, like a rabbit, to feel mesmerised by the danger we face. We must not let this happen. There are encouraging signs that we may be gaining some ground. The efforts of my colleagues in the United Kingdom in making speeches and producing literature explaining our policies now seem to be bearing fruit - for example a movement called 'youth for Peace' is being formed to counter the propaganda of the unilateralists. A small enough sign in itself, but one that may be indicative of a larger feeling. There is no doubt a long way still to go, both within Britain and the remainder



of the Alliance. But we must make the effort, for if our collective security policies become unsustainable because our will to maintain them has been eroded, our peoples will face the loss of their peace and freedom. They will learn too late that we are the real Peace Movement.



PUBLIC OPINION AND SECURITY

BY

GEOFFREY PATTIE MP

1. A distinguished strategic analyst said recently "Security, like electricity, must be on hand when you need it. But also, like electricity, it is almost impossible to store, and every generation must make its own"(1). In this paper I propose to address the role of public opinion as one of the indispensable foundations of security in the Western world, and the particular problems of public opinion facing Western Governments at the present time.

2. I shall be concentrating mainly on public opinion within the member countries of NATO, as being one of the most problematic areas facing the Alliance at the moment. But it would be wrong to ignore completely the effects on international security of what might loosely be termed "international public opinion". The codes of international conduct which have evolved over centuries have reached the position of the near-universal renunciation of aggressive war embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Charter has often been breached, it is at least arguable that its mere existence has a beneficial effect on international security. The need for a nation to justify its behaviour in the international community against such a standard must have some moderating effect upon its policies.

3. Insofar as this "international public opinion" has as its means of expression such institutions as the United Nations it is for the most part a reflection of the views of the member Governments of the organisation. But it would be over-simplistic to conclude that in trying to influence this body of opinion one must operate solely on the official views of Governments, for example through the well-established diplomatic channels. Irrespective of how far their political institutions conform to the norms of Western democracy, most governments have to pay some heed, and in turn seek actively to influence, public opinion in their countries. If public opinion throughout the world is to have a real understanding of the security policies of the NATO Alliance, peoples as well as Governments must appreciate the basic facts and have a sound grasp of the issues involved. We cannot always expect, or trust, the Governments of non-aligned nations to put over the Alliance's case as we would wish, and the end result is the caricaturing of NATO as simply a Western equivalent of the Soviet bloc; an added frill to the whole panoply of super-power confrontation. In its very understandable concern about public opinion within its member nations, the Alliance must not lose sight of the need to present its case adequately before the forums of world opinion.

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Footnote:

(1) Professor Laurence Martin in the 1981 Reith Lectures (BBC Radio)



## Public Opinion within the NATO Alliance

4. I take it as axiomatic that no security policy can be sustained for very long within the free societies of the West without the general support of the populations concerned. Quite apart from the pressures exerted on Governments of democratic societies by the discipline of the ballot box, and changes of Government which may result, there remains the basic fact that the maintenance of the security policy of a nation depends upon the willingness of at least some of its people to carry it out - in the most tangible form to be members of its Armed Forces. If a nation's people were not well disposed towards its security policy, it is unlikely that sufficient men and women would be found willing to serve in its forces. Apart from the inclinations of the potential recruits themselves, the social pressures against military service would be enormous if the security policy did not command a broad measure of acceptance by the population at large. These considerations are of course more pressing for a nation with all-volunteer forces, but the United States' experience of draft-dodging in the Vietnam era shows that conscription cannot automatically be assumed to guarantee the means to carry out a security policy, or at least parts of it, if public support cannot be sustained. And Vietnam holds other lessons for us. In speaking of the necessity for "broad support" for a security policy if it is to be sustained, one must remain mindful that the support of a simple numerical majority of the population at large is not always enough. Relatively small groups of extremely vociferous dissenters can sometimes succeed in challenging a policy to the extent that they render it unsustainable. This latter point is particularly relevant, and worrying, in the context of the current debate over the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy, to which I return later.

5. Having recognised the importance which public opinion must play in enabling each generation to make its own security, let us now consider the state of public opinion within the NATO Alliance. And within the Alliance, I shall concentrate on the European members, for it is in Europe that public debate over NATO's security policy has been most vigorous in recent years.

6. The United States' International Communications Agency (USICA) sponsored an opinion poll in July 1981 in five West European countries (the Netherlands, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy). The summary of the poll's findings reported "Support for NATO continues to predominate in West Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. Italians are almost evenly divided between NATO and neutrality, while a French plurality, in a reversal since March, prefer neutrality to 'belonging to the Western Alliance'." On the face of it, this could be described as a good result from NATO's point of view. But the figures are less reassuring. Of those polled, support for NATO membership ran at 56% in the Netherlands, 64% in the FRG, 59% in the United Kingdom and 49% in Italy (I exclude the figure for France in this context). And, perhaps even more significantly, the poll found that neutralist sentiments, although held by minorities (except in France) appeared to have increased between March and July 1981. That increase was of the order of 10% except in the FRG where it ran at 4%.

7. So while the poll showed general support for NATO in the countries polled, those in favour of Alliance membership were by no means a large majority in any country, and neutralist sentiment



seemed to be on the increase. In order better to grasp the roots of the problem, it is useful to go on to consider some of the other findings of this poll. Majorities in Italy (65%), the United Kingdom (64%), France (58%) and the Netherlands (54%) preferred that their Governments did "everything possible to stay out of disputes between the US and USSR even if they involved their country's important interests". West Germans were divided on the issue, with 41% preferring to stay out of superpower disputes and 45% wanting their Government to side with the US. Among neutralists, a number of separate strands of thought emerged. Lack of confidence in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe was one of several factors strongly related to a preference for neutralism over NATO. Others were the desire to avoid super-power disputes, the belief that deployment of modernised long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) made a Russian attack on Europe more likely, a desire for unilateral force reductions and a preference for capitulation rather than making war.

8. Underlying all these strands of thought in the neutralist position is one simple belief: that NATO's strategy of deterrence will not succeed in keeping the peace. It is only on the supposition that deterrence is likely to fail that one can believe, for example, that the presence of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe will make an attack on it more likely, or that super-power confrontation, which would draw the European members of the Alliance into conflict, is in some way inevitable.

9. This of course begs the question whether a policy of neutralism is any way more likely to avert oppression or to preserve Western freedoms. However, before considering how it is that we have reached the sorry state in which such large numbers of the populations of NATO's European members have such grave misgivings about the Alliance's strategy, I should like briefly to touch upon a related, but separate, problem of public opinion within the Alliance as a whole. But perhaps "specialist" opinion would be a better characterisation of the area which I am addressing. There has been increasing attention in the informed media and elsewhere, on both sides of the Atlantic, focussed on "The Health of the Alliance". The attitudes expressed in discussion of the topic, quite naturally, differ in Europe and the United States. Some European commentators who express doubts as to the continuing cohesion of the Alliance cite in evidence what they portray as an overbearing (and perhaps naive) American Administration determined to impose its own vision as to the best way forward on a reluctant Europe. By contrast, some in the United States believe that the European members of the Alliance have "gone soft" and are no longer willing to accept the risks and burdens involved in the collective commitment to mutual defence. Some even go so far as to doubt whether it is still worthwhile for the United States to



continue to make such a predominant contribution to the defence of Europe. (1)

10. In the eyes of the less informed, and particularly in those of a number of "peace" movements which have grown up in Europe in recent years, the United States now seems to be preparing to fight and win a nuclear war against the Russians, and to do so, at first at any rate, within the European continent. And within the European "peace" movements, the December 1979 decision to modernise NATO's LRTNF is seen as striking evidence of such plans, ensuring that the super-power confrontation will be resolved by proxy in the cockpit of Europe. Reaction in the United States to such protestations is understandably aggrieved; the LRTNF modernisation programme is designed precisely to achieve the reverse of what is claimed by these critics. It is designed to avoid any "de-coupling" of the American strategic guarantee; it was requested by the Europeans, and not forced upon them.

11. The problems of public opinion within the Alliance, then, seem to be at least twofold; there are doubts in Europe as to whether the Alliance's policies are the best way of preventing war on that continent, together with doubts as to the intentions of the United States, and there is a potential transatlantic split, with some in the United States fearing that Europe has lost the will to contribute significantly to its own defence, and is therefore no longer worth defending.

#### United Kingdom Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons

12. There is no doubt that one of the major causes of concern within the publics of the European members of the Alliance has been fear of a nuclear arms race in general and in particular of a nuclear war confined to Europe. And the upsurge in anti-nuclear sentiment in Europe resulted in large part from the December 1979 decision; in retrospect we must conclude that the public presentation of the rationale for this decision was less than a conspicuous success! I will cite some experience in the United Kingdom which may provide some pointers as to how the Alliance might improve public perceptions of its policies in general.

13. A recent (October [1981]) opinion poll in the United Kingdom for 'The Observer' newspaper, reported that 53% of those questioned believed that United States bases should be removed from their

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#### Footnote:

(1) A particularly strident example of this tendency is contained in an article in Armed Forces Journal of November 1981 entitled "Theatre Nuclear Weapons and the Crisis in Europe's Leadership". A typical passage is "We [the United States] do not exist as a nation to help the Prime Minister of Germany maintain his coalition; to help Belgium and the Netherlands decide on their respective national identities; or to protect the British Labor Party from its more lunatic left wing. We do not exist to try to help you make up for the failure to explain to your students, your clergy and your political activists the reasons for the NATO Alliance, and how they can best sustain your deterrence and defense."



country: But in the same poll, more than two thirds (67%) of those questioned favoured the retention by the United Kingdom of an independent nuclear deterrent. In considering these results, it is worth bearing in mind that the most prominent anti-nuclear campaigning organisation in the United Kingdom has had two major planks to its platform - unilateral disarmament by the UK and closure of American nuclear bases in the country (including the abandonment of plans for the stationing of cruise missiles in the UK). (I should perhaps add for the sake of completeness that, more encouraging than the USICA poll, the "Observer" poll showed 73% of those questioned wanted the UK to remain in NATO). As always, different polls yield different results. And, in the case of the UK, we have recently (November 1981) had a further poll, commissioned by the BBC for use in Professor Laurence Martin's Reith Lectures from which I quoted earlier. This reported that only 31% of those questioned believed that United States nuclear weapons should be stationed in the United Kingdom, but that 52% believed the United Kingdom should retain her nuclear deterrent. Again, as I have said, polls vary. But I believe it is possible, in the case of the United Kingdom, to draw a conclusion from the results of these polls. The conclusion is that, while the anti-nuclear campaigners have directed their attacks against both American bases in the country and the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent, their views are reflected by a larger proportion of the population in the first case than in the second. The United Kingdom's own nuclear weapons are more acceptable to its population than those of the United States. Such a conclusion may seem less than surprising: it is perhaps entirely understandable that one should put more trust in one's own armed services than those of an ally, however long the association with that ally might have been. And yet, even if understandable, such a reaction to the presence of United States nuclear-capable forces in the United Kingdom, and indeed in the countries of the other European members of the Alliance, is disturbing.

14. A number of factors no doubt underlie the increasing anti-American sentiment in Europe. Firstly, there is the fact that those who point out the dangers we face are never the most popular of friends, particularly when their prescription is that we should, collectively, spend more of our scarce resources in order to prevent the potential dangers ever becoming actual. Secondly, and intimately connected with this is the heritage of the free countries of the West. As Laurence Martin has said "Conditioned by its ideals to feel guilty about the use of force, democratic opinion is addicted to crusades: if not against some foreign foe, on whom we project all the blame for our being in conflict, then against the idea of armed force itself".<sup>(1)</sup> In its role as the leader of the Western Alliance, the United States finds itself, however unwillingly, cast in the role of the villain. It is the United States that comes to be seen to stand for a policy in favour of the use of armed force.

#### Formation of Public Opinion within the Alliance

15. But these somewhat parochial and instinctive anti-American reactions are not the sole determinants of public opinion within the Alliance. It must be recognised that there has been a

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Footnote:

(1) Reith Lectures 1981 (BBC Radio)



lamentable failure to put across to the publics of the Alliance the purpose of nuclear weapons within the deterrent strategy. A major stumbling block to the successful presentation of this strategy is the basic paradox of deterrence itself - that in order successfully to deter war, one must make clear to the potential aggressor that one has both the means and the resolve to withstand any aggression on his part. The primary role of nuclear weapons, as of any weapons in the armoury of a defensive Alliance, is the contribution they can make to deterrence. The use to which they would be put in any conflict resulting upon the failure of deterrence is essentially secondary. But the paradox of deterrence when considering nuclear weapons is made the more stark simply by the appalling destructive power they could unleash. It is therefore very tempting to allow emotion to cloud our thoughts when considering the role that nuclear weapons play in NATO's deterrent posture. And it is upon this emotion that the anti-nuclear movements play.

16. Yet there is no difference in principle between the role that nuclear weapons and any other weapon play in the deterrent strategy of the Alliance. In order not to have to use them, we need to keep a potential aggressor persuaded that we are both ready and willing to use them. In order that they should be able to do this, Governments must at the very least make it clear that they have not ruled out the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. In consequence, their servicemen must be equipped, trained and prepared to use nuclear weapons. When they receive a properly authenticated order to release their nuclear weapons they must do so. Were they to waver, or to be thought likely to waver, the deterrent effect of those nuclear weapons, which, as I have said, is the primary effect, would be in danger of being lost.

17. At the same time, it must be recognised that the adoption of the strategy of deterrence, carrying with it as it does the preparedness to use nuclear weapons in the defence of the Alliance, is very easily misrepresented in public. Let us take as an example the December 1979 decision to modernise the Alliance's long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) by the introduction of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe. In the light of the fact that this decision, and its subsequent characterisation by its opponents to the publics of the European members of the Alliance, seems to have been one of the major causes of the recent upsurge in anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiment within the Alliance, it cannot remotely be described as a public relations success for the NATO nations. What went wrong?

18. The nomenclature of long-range theatre nuclear force modernisation programme was perhaps entirely understandable from the point of view of the experts who were concerned with the development of the programme itself. It must be remembered that this programme was largely a response to European fears about the "de-coupling" of the American guarantee from the European theatre. In retrospect, however, the characterisation of the programme as a modernisation of the long-range nuclear forces to be deployed within the "theatre" of the continent of Europe has been less than happy. For those within Europe who are not familiar with the jargon of the strategic analysts, the term "theatre" has the wrong



connotations. The "theatre" involved is that of Europe as a whole, Western and Eastern - it excludes the North American members of the Alliance. And this theatre embraces the Western parts of the Soviet Union, the remainder of the Warsaw Pact and the European members of NATO. The impression gained currency that the LRTNF modernisation programme was a way for the United States to use the "theatre" of Europe as a battlefield in which a conflict with the Soviet Union might be contained. While the missiles might be "theatre nuclear forces" so far as the analysts were concerned, they were certainly strategic to the peoples of Western Europe.

19. The second problem the NATO European countries encountered in explaining the LRTNF modernisation programme to their publics was that, in trying to explain that the retention of the ability to strike the Soviet homeland with nuclear weapons from Europe was an essential part in the Alliance's capability to respond flexibly, they did not explain sufficiently that this was not in some way a surrogate for strategic exchange. It was another part of flexible response, none of which would be credible without the strategic guarantee of the United States. Instead, the opponents of NATO's nuclear policy again made capital. They claimed that the United States and the Soviet Union would attempt to export a nuclear war beyond their own countries - they would hope to fight it in Europe by proxy without involving their own homelands. Cruise and Pershing missiles were "first-strike" weapons. By some opponents, the modernisation programme was entitled "Euro-strategic" - the implication of an American intention to fight a "limited nuclear war" in Europe was underlined.

20. We have, perhaps, learned some part of the lesson from this episode. The LRTNF programme is now called the "Intermediate Nuclear Force" programme. European members of the Alliance are beginning to make some progress in getting over the message that far from being an easy way of allowing the super-powers to fight a sub-strategic nuclear war within Europe, the modernisation programme is designed precisely to ensure that the Russians do not believe that such a war is conceivable, let alone one which could be won. Indeed, in the terms of their own declaratory policy any American nuclear weapon delivered upon Russian soil would be viewed as coming from the continental United States, and would invite an immediate reply at the strategic level. In terms of the Russians' own policy, the LRTNF modernisation programme could not have provided a more certain means of ensuring that there was no "de-coupling" of the American strategic nuclear guarantee from the defence of Western Europe. Little wonder that their opposition to it has been so forceful.

21. But we must recognise that any progress which we have been making in explaining the rationale behind the LRTNF (INF) modernisation programme has only been to recapture some of the ground that was lost. The question remains as to why so much ground was lost in the first instance.

22. Without doubt, the Soviet propaganda machine has been instrumental in driving wedges between the countries of the Alliance. It is instructive to review some of their efforts over recent years. A major factor in formulation of public perception of the defensive strategy of the NATO Alliance must



be the free media. And in freedom of the press, television and other media resides one of the most precious freedoms of the Western world. It is in sharp contrast to the media censorship which is practised throughout the Soviet bloc. Yet the freedom of the media in the West brings with it some major problems. In a recent article smuggled out of the closed Russian city of Gorky, the exiled dissident Andrei Sakharov said that the pluralistic nature of Western democracies was both a strength and a weakness when confronted by the totalitarian, expansionist East. "How easily pro-Soviet propaganda initiates mass, one-sided campaigns against the basing of American rockets in Europe at a time when in this part of the world a breach of the military balance, including nuclear missiles, is quite obvious". There is no doubt that the so-called "peace" movements in Europe have gained extensive public support. This would not have been secured without the extensive coverage they have received in the media of the free world. The West, on the contrary, has no opportunity to put its own view to those living behind the Iron Curtain.

23. Sakharov, more than most, has good reason to know the techniques of propaganda and distortion practised by the Soviet leadership. And the Governments of the Alliance countries should remain constantly mindful of the huge resources the Soviets are prepared to devote to securing extensive coverage of their views in the free media of the West. There is the World Peace Council (WPC), which consistently backs Soviet alleged "initiatives" for peace. This is the leading Soviet-controlled international front organisation, based in Helsinki. Its activities were endorsed by President Brezhnev at the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1981. The WPC, a disguised instrument of Soviet foreign policy, was founded in Paris in 1949 as the World Committee of Partisans for Peace. In 1951 it was expelled from Paris by the French Government for "fifth column activities". It moved first to Prague and then to Vienna, until banned by the Austrian Government in 1957 for "activities directed against the interests of the Austrian State", although it continued to operate in Vienna until 1968 under cover of the International Institute for Peace (IIP). In 1968 it moved to Helsinki, leaving the IIP behind in Vienna as a WPC subsidiary. The WPC is perhaps too transparent a front organisation. It is now generally known among informed observers that it is "in the hands of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party" (1). The WPC's campaigns against the cause of freedom have been relentless. In the 1950s it led the opposition to the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and since the 1960s it has strongly opposed the deployment of nuclear missiles by the West. In March 1950 the WPC launched the first Stockholm Appeal demanding an absolute ban on the atomic bomb, a ban which the Soviet leader had effectively prevented in 1948 by opposing a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly for total nuclear disarmament under international auspices while continuing its own nuclear weapons programme. The text of the New Stockholm Appeal, launched in June 1975 under the slogan "to make detente irreversible, stop the arms race" indicated its one-sided nature: "the arms race, the stockpile of weapons in the hands of the imperialists, incite and encourage the forces of aggression, militarism and fascism, colonialism and racism ....." In 1977

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Footnote:

(1) India Today 1-15 January 1980



the WPC launched a major campaign against the deployment by NATO of modernised LRTNF. Subsequently the Nordic Peace Conference in Aalborg, Denmark in May 1981 (convened by the Danish WPC affiliate) argued that Scandinavia should become a nuclear weapon-free zone<sup>(1)</sup>, a proposal which the Soviet delegate said his country and its allies "would fully support". Whether the apparent sincerity of the Soviet commitment to the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone will withstand the public reaction to the incursion of the nuclear-armed "Whiskey" class submarine into Swedish waters in 1981 remains to be seen.

24. The World Peace Council has also secured extensive coverage in the Western media for such items as the "appeal" by five NATO ex-Generals calling for arms control negotiations and questioning the need for the NATO LRTNF modernisation programme. The fact that three of these Generals had formal connections with the WPC did not receive such extensive coverage.

25. Another Communist front organisation is the World Federation of Trade Unions which organises conferences such as the "World Trade Union Conference on Socio-Economic Aspects of Disarmament" which took place in Paris in December. But there are also covert weapons in the Soviet propaganda armoury. The expulsion from Denmark in November 1981 of Vladimir Merkulov, a Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, drew attention to extensive Soviet involvement with peace organisations in that country. This involvement was particularly directed towards those opposing Denmark's NATO membership and favouring a "Nordic nuclear-free zone". Following similar activities in the Netherlands, in April 1981 the Dutch Government withdrew the residence permit and press card of the Tass representative, Vadian Vasilyevich Leonov. According to an interview<sup>(2)</sup> Leonov, believed to be a KGB officer, said that his most important task had been maintaining contact with leading personalities in the Dutch anti-nuclear movement.

26. Many other examples could be cited of Soviet propaganda campaigns which take advantage of the free media of the West. The intention is clear. The Soviets are determined to lose no opportunity to put forward views in their favour on the whole range of security issues facing the world. The media of the West give them an ideal vehicle for the dissemination of these views. And because of total state control in their countries they are in no fear of the views expressed in their own media-- quite the contrary.

27. Against this background, it is relatively easy to see how the Soviets have gained such a propaganda advantage against NATO. A number of their claims have been taken up by the anti-NATO and anti-nuclear movements in Western Europe, and the growth of anti-Americanism has certainly been fostered by the general tenor of the claims issuing from Moscow and its sympathisers. But we should also be alive to the problems of public presentation which the Alliance has itself caused, or allowed to be caused, within the media of the West.

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Footnotes:

(1) Peace Courier June 1981

(2) Reported in Reformatorsch Dagblad 15 July 1981



28. Thus far, we have looked at the less than perfect way in which the Alliance has put forward its own policies, particularly its nuclear policies, and the potential and means which Soviet propaganda have to exploit the differences. But it is not only in the set-piece presentations of NATO policy that the Alliance's case has been less than well served. Attempts by commentators, official and unofficial, within the Alliance, to explain its policies to its peoples do not always result in resounding success. A significant number of cases where such attempts have gone awry result, I believe, from insufficient attention being paid to the dynamics of public opinion throughout the Alliance. Given the length of time during which the Alliance has been in existence, we should surely have learned the lesson that public perspectives, and public reactions, differ markedly between countries separated by the Atlantic. To the average American citizen, the Soviet Union may seem a remote, mysterious and sinister nation which seems determined to match, if not outstrip, American power and influence throughout the world. The Warsaw Pact, and Eastern Europe in general, is no more than a collection of puppet states under Soviet domination. To a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany, by contrast, the Warsaw Pact is composed of a number of countries with whom his country has had extremely long historical associations, sometimes amicable, sometimes inimical, but nevertheless there has always been contact of some sort. The citizen of the Federal Republic is also very conscious of his own country's geographical position. He knows that if the Soviet Union were ever to contemplate aggression against NATO, his country would in all probability witness scenes of appalling destructive horror. His confidence in NATO's strategy of deterrence may not be altogether reinforced by such items as the recent CBS television programme "The Defence of the United States" where soldiers are portrayed planning the number, and yield, of the nuclear weapons which might be used against a picturesque Bavarian village which has, presumably, been overrun by Warsaw Pact troops. His confidence may be indeed shattered when the camera moves away from the model of the Bavarian village the soldiers are using in their exercise to the actual village which the model depicts showing young children in the school playground. He may, perhaps understandably, gain the impression that NATO, and the United States in particular, fully intend to turn his country, and that of his neighbours in the German Democratic Republic, into a nuclear wasteland. He decides he wants no more of a security policy which encourages such a possibility. To him, the Americans have become bellicose madmen intent on the destruction of his nation. To the average American citizen, by contrast, the soldiers in the film were doing no more than showing proper military preparedness; preparedness which is necessary if deterrence is to be maintained. The citizen of the Federal Republic has "gone soft" - is it worth continuing to pay the price of defending such people?

29. My point is that, recognising the paradox upon which deterrence is based, we should take more care to put over the message of the Alliance in terms appropriate for the particular audience addressed at any one time. At the same time, mindful of the power of modern means of mass communication, and the enormous interest the media have shown and will doubtless continue to show in matters of nuclear policy, we should remain constantly aware that a message designed for one specific audience cannot be guaranteed to receive no further circulation. Let us take a hypothetical case.



A Senator from the Southern United States, speaking in the sort of language he believes will make the issues plain to his constituents, may say that the United States Administration is determined to ensure that the Soviet Union could not prevail in any war, conventional or nuclear. For that reason, steps were being taken to ensure that the United States could make an effective response to an attack at any level. At about the same time, a Minister in a West European Government makes a speech saying that all war, worst of all nuclear war, is horrific, and our aim must therefore be to take every possible step to prevent it occurring. Now it is quite possible that the media will pick up both of these statements and headlines could well appear alleging that the United States is preparing to fight and win a nuclear war and that the publics of the European members of the Alliance are being lulled into a false sense of security by their own Governments. And, as we have seen so often in the recent past, European Ministers will have to spend a great deal of time and effort explaining that the two statements are of course entirely consistent and that the United States Senator was saying that the US Administration was determined to show the Soviet Union that it could not hope to gain anything from starting a war - the cost to itself would be unacceptable. In this way the United States and the Alliance as a whole aim to deter war.

30. It is of course possible that the damage-limitation exercise will have some success, but experience suggests that on each occasion that the publics of the European members of the Alliance are exposed to such sensational headlines, some irretrievable damage is inevitably done. And on each occasion, anti-nuclear and anti-American sentiments in Europe are increased, and the anti-nuclear campaigners are given further encouragement in their endeavours. Although the example I have cited is hypothetical, I am sure that most Europeans attending this Conference can call to mind occasions on which this sort of unfortunate public perception of disarray within the Alliance, and alarm about its policies have gained currency in the media of their countries. And such disarray and alarm is of course fully exploited by the Soviet Union and its allies.

31. I should perhaps make one point quite clear. I am not advocating some sort of supra-national Alliance mechanism by which the policy of deterrence can be explained in context, and in measured terms, to the publics of the member nations. Of course each Government has a duty, indeed a right, to present its policies, and those of an Alliance of which it is a constituent part, to its own people in its own way. But I do make a plea that all supporters of the Alliance, in whatever country, should take the utmost care before making speeches and policy statements firstly to ensure that these are set firmly against the background of Alliance policy as a whole and, secondly to have regard to the sensitivities of their partners. Even a small matter such as the precise timing of an announcement can have very significant repercussions on public reactions. Above all, there is an increasing need for the European and American members of the Alliance to be careful to take full account of the likely impact on public opinion in both continents of statements primarily designed for consumption in only one. A simple enough precept, one might suppose, but one that is very difficult to put into practice. One need only look at the variations in public perceptions within nations, for example, to realise how many potential sensitivities can be involved in a given issue. In my own country, for example, a significant number



of Scotsmen who live near the Clyde submarine base are less than happy about the basing of our strategic deterrent force in their vicinity.

32. While in this prescriptive vein, I should also like to draw attention to the need for the utmost care in answering questions about Alliance policy, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. As has already been noted, the media are only too keen to pick upon one isolated sentence - one phrase even - which can, out of context, provide a headline-grabbing story. Despite the fact that such stories almost always distort the sense of the remarks, they nevertheless make news, sell newspapers, and generate severe headaches for those whose task it is to justify, explain and defend the policies of the Alliance. As a politician, I am naturally reluctant to admit that politicians could be the main culprits here. Indeed, while accepting that on occasion political presentation of the Alliance's policies has not always been as deft as would be ideal, I must also remark that senior military men have not always proved to be the best exponents of the strategy of flexible response and of the role that nuclear weapons play within that strategy.

33. Having now mentioned the role of the military, perhaps I could develop this point a little further. I believe we fall down in explaining the doctrinal aspects of NATO's possession of nuclear weapons to the fighting men who, should deterrence ever fail, would be called upon to use them. And in attempting to convince public opinion of the soundness of NATO's security policy of deterrence - within which rests the firm conviction that in a nuclear war there would be no winners - we may, I fear, have neglected to ensure that the military personnel who might actually have to be called upon to operate nuclear delivery systems realise the role that those weapons play within the deterrent strategy as a whole. And we should not underestimate the power of the military to influence public opinion. In many countries within the Alliance, while the military are not allowed to engage in public discussion of topics which are sensitive politically, this does not mean that they can have no influence on public opinion. Quite apart from the fact that once they have finished their military service they are free agents and can freely give their views, they have another importance in the presentation of the Alliance's strategy as a whole. Through their families, their friends and their acquaintances they have many opportunities to put forward rational explanations of the concept of deterrence. This is perhaps a potential source of influence of which we should take more account.

34. In explaining our strategy, both to the populations within the Alliance and to those who serve on their behalf in the armed services we face another major hurdle. In describing this I can quote from the United Kingdom Government's Defence White Paper of 1981: "An enormous literature has sprung up around the concepts of deterrence in the nuclear age. Much of it seems repugnant".<sup>(1)</sup> We have to be able to explain our policies in terms which are readily understandable by the layman and which show that we too are horrified by any prospects of war. This is not easy, but the effort must be made in order that the "peace" movements do not come to be seen to have the monopoly of concern for humanity.

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Footnote:

(1) "Nuclear Weapons and Preventing War" Statement on the Defence Estimates 1981



35. The very idea of using nuclear weapons is of course appalling, and those who cry "Better Red than Dead" no doubt have at the forefront of their minds the devastating horror which the use of nuclear weapons would involve. The third course, of maintaining deterrence while seeking to reduce arms, both nuclear and conventional, on both sides, is unfortunately less eye-catching. Yet we have in recent months seen initiatives by the United States on arms control - in particular the "zero option" has shown to the world that the United States and the NATO Alliance are intent upon ensuring mutual security between East and West at lower levels of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments. And this initiative has been recognised as sincere (despite Soviet and Soviet-inspired counter-propaganda) throughout the nations of the world. It has helped to demonstrate to the publics of Europe, and of the Alliance as a whole, that NATO's policy is not based on unrealistic concepts of fighting and winning a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The stated intention of the United States to seek negotiations to achieve a significant reduction in strategic arms on both sides has been a further reassurance to public opinion in the Alliance. Taken together, these initiatives have shown clearly that NATO is determined to achieve arms control rather than an arms race. We must take every step that we can to continue this improvement.

#### Conclusions

36. I conclude by re-stating that the upsurge of anti-nuclear, and anti-American, sentiment within the publics of the Western Alliance is perhaps the most important problem we face today. And the fact that the opponents of the Alliance's current strategy are still in the minority gives little cause for comfort; we have seen in the past how extremely strident minorities can undermine some aspects of a nation's security policy. Soviet propaganda has no doubt played its part, but the Alliance itself must take the major share of the blame in that it has signally failed to put over to its peoples the basic aim of its strategy of deterrence - the maintenance of peace as well as freedom. Above all, it has failed to convey the message that every part of its security policy, and every weapon in its armoury be it nuclear or conventional, is designed solely with the aim of contributing to deterrence and preventing war; and that it sees a military balance as a basis for arms control, not as the starting-line for an arms race.

37. I have also suggested that, even after 33 years of the Alliance, member nations are still not sufficiently attuned to the contrasting effects on public opinion in different countries which apparently innocent statements may make. I have counselled that we should take more care to think before we speak, particularly when we are to speak about nuclear weapons. But we must continue to speak on matters of security policy - we need, through the process of public education, to try and recover some of the ground we have lost. If we do not succeed, we may find that we have lost the foundation of the security policy which has kept the peace in Europe for over thirty years.

38. I should like, if I may, to end with a suggestion, which is not put forward entirely in a spirit of frivolity. We must make it clear that NATO is the only credible peace movement. To this end, we could, I believe, do far worse when opening any speech or article about nuclear deterrence, than borrow the opening of



Vice President George Bush's recent address to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He began his remarks "... I am here to announce our policy on nuclear war. We're against it."(1)

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Footnote:

(1) "Restoring the Nuclear Balance of Power in the European Theatre" Address by Vice President George Bush at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts October 30 1981



111 FEB 1982





## SAVING TELEGRAM

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*R. Whitmore* *RWS.*

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WEHRKUNDE 81

1. The 18th Annual Wehrkunde Conference was held in Munich on 21 and 22 February. The main speakers were Herr Apel, Mr Frank Carlucci (US Deputy Secretary for Defence), Manfred Wörner (Deputy Chairman of the CDU Parliamentary Party), Dr Luns and Mr Geoffrey Pattie MP (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, RAF). A wider range than normal of Ministers or Junior Ministers from other NATO countries also attended: Bayülken (Turkey), Bandiera (Italy), Van Eekelen (Netherlands) and Nixon (Canada). Senator John Tower, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary for Defence, together with a clutch of Senators and Congressmen, provided a substantial American presence; and the German Politico-Military establishment, from the Generalinspekteur of the Bundeswehr downwards, were there in force.

Summary

2. There was general agreement that a dangerous gap had developed between Western and Eastern military capabilities which needed to be closed; and that there was now a grave threat to the resource-dependent West from outside the NATO area - notably the Gulf - which a new strategy was needed to meet. Discussion was dominated by virtually unanimous pressure from the Americans on the Europeans (and especially the FRG) for a bigger European contribution both in Europe itself and outside it. The European response was muted and somewhat confused. The Americans mingled their adjurations with assurances of determination to consult their Allies and a certain amount of lip service to the importance of arms control. There were suggestions (notably from Sonnenfeldt) that arms control needed "demythologising": others felt that it was precisely the "mythological" aspects of arms control which were important to the Europeans. Suspicions about the "Finlandisation" of Germany were



explicitly voiced but were not not/far below the surface. Mr Pattie's analysis of the threat from outside the NATO area was well received, as were his pragmatic proposals for a better co-ordination of Western efforts to strengthen Third World stability.

#### Detail

3. The main thrust of the proceedings has been extensively reported in the press. This stemmed from the lengthy statement read (with ponderous fidelity to his text and total lack of emphasis) by Carlucci under the title "The US and Europe: Old Partners Facing New Tasks" (copies by bag to Defence Department and UKDEL NATO). Carlucci was at pains to emphasise the importance attached by the Reagan Administration to proper consultation with the Allies and its commitment to implement both elements of the December 1979 "double decision" - TNF modernisation and arms control - equally. But the message that Washington intended to make a major effort to close the perceived defence gap with the Soviet Union, and would expect its Allies to follow suit, came over loud and clear: "Neither Europe nor America has devoted the resources necessary to meet our agreed defence goals... There are many areas in which we might better support each others' defence efforts in Europe. Further neither we Americans nor the Europeans have been sufficiently engaged in the search for ways to\$ protect our common interests in the Persian Gulf and other areas. In sum, a much greater Allied effort is required...". He pledged the United States to maintain the momentum behind TNF modernisation, to improve the capabilities of US conventional forces for Europe and to enhance its "military presence in key areas outside Europe and [its] ability to project forces when and where our vital interests are threatened". On arms control, the US would "generate a realistic approach" so as "to ensure that arms control will serve our security needs and that our approach to negotiations is guided by a realistic strategy". After a somewhat perfunctory tribute to the present Allied contribution to the collective Alliance capability, Carlucci referred to the "critical need to strengthen the conventional force structure in Europe". This would require "substantial additional resources, rather than more rhetoric or disputes about percentages". Washington would "continue to consider the 3% guideline a useful starting point. But in the coming months...we should ask whether there are better ways to increase military capabilities. We should place more emphasis on specific force increases and defence improvements".



4. Outside Europe, Carlucci dwelt on Western Europe's "enormous" stake in the security and stability of the Persian Gulf and listed four ways in which the Europeans could help protect the security of the region: develop close political relations with nations throughout South West Asia; develop "security arrangements" with those countries which could "help our friends in that region to strengthen their capability for self-defence"; and increase their important economic support to other allies and to friendly countries in South West Asia and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, force deployments in South West Asia by the European members of the Alliance, together with supporting facilities, should be strengthened and co-ordinated with US military activities in the region.

5. Carlucci then referred to the "unprecedented budgetary austerity" about to be introduced into the United States stressing that the defence budget by contrast was to be significantly increased. Congress would be asking what new sacrifices the Allies would make to join the American people in their common undertaking. The Administration would point to the substantial contributions already being made by the European Allies and would explain the division of labour that is "appropriate in light of the different capabilities of the Allies". But this would not be enough. It would be necessary to demonstrate that the Allies and friends of the US were contributing their fair share to the common burden. Social welfare and economic prosperity would be impossible unless the Alliance was strong enough to maintain the peace and protect access to energy sources and raw materials. The relative military strength of the Alliance had been declining for far too long and it was time for a common effort to put this right.

6. All the American speakers, including Senators and Congressmen from both parties, offered variations on the same essential theme: the mood of the American people had changed: they were determined to close the gap with the Soviet Union: the US defence budget was to be increased by \$30 billion despite massive cuts in social programmes: above all, that the American people would not understand a situation in which the US and Europe shared the defence of Europe but the US was left to carry the burden in the rest of the world alone. Congressman Stratton said that serious consideration was being given to the re-introduction of the draft, perhaps along the Swiss model of a short period of full-time training followed by several years reserve training. Bennett (US

/Ambassador



Ambassador to NATO) pointed out that the US was now ninth in terms of wages and per capita income, behind the FRG and other European allies. Tower, endorsing and reinforcing Bennett, made the further point that if the Europeans failed to assume their additional share of the conventional defence burden in Europe itself, and the US was thereby forced to accept a situation of hopeless military inferiority in Europe in conventional terms, then the American people would cease to support the stationing of significant numbers of US forces there. Another thread in US thinking was voiced by Senator Quayle, who warned the Europeans that the new Administration would be at least as preoccupied with North/South and problems of the American hemisphere as with the defence of Europe. Sonnenfeldt called for the "demythologising" of arms control.

7. The Germans reacted to all this with a mixture of scepticism, dismay and resignation. In his opening speech, Apel gave a measured and on the whole effective presentation of the Federal Government's position on entirely orthodox lines, recalling the double remit given to the Alliance by Harmel. He stressed the FRG's commitment to both elements of the December 1979 decision, and the steadily increasing contribution it had made to the common defence effort over the past decade at a time when the US defence budget had been declining. He placed special emphasis on the importance attached by the FRG to arms control; and sounded a warning about Western interference in the Third World; the aspirations of the Third World countries needed Western respect and support. Apel spelt out at length details of the FRG's defence contribution over the decade 1970-80 and dwelt on the Bundeswehr's evolution into "the most redoubtable conventional army in Western Europe". But as to increasing defence expenditure, he confined himself to the proposition that "the Bundeswehr will continue to be allocated the funds that are needed to execute its military mission."



8. Wörner, for the CDU, predictably took a tougher tone. He foresaw a situation in which the Federal Republic would become an armed country with nobody willing to use its weapons even in the cause of freedom: suggested that the conventional defence of Western Europe had weakened almost to the point where it was no longer viable: took a side swipe at Ostpolitik ("a policy of détente based on the concept of "change through rapprochement" constitutes belief in the feasibility of the impossible"): and warned against a policy of cooperation with the East which was not capable of applying sanctions when necessary. He argued for a new Western "global strategy" based inter alia on linkage: accepted the need to increase the defence budget, and advocated the establishment of a "new Alliance, not necessarily contractual" of all the democratic industrial countries which rely on raw materials and energy from the Persian Gulf. But he stressed that Germany, because of its geographical situation and divided character, would always need "workable relations between the two blocks"; and he was notably coy about any idea of using the Bundeswehr outside the NATO area.

9. From the other side of the German political spectrum, Lothar Ruehl, the Deputy Government spokesman, pointed to the fundamental strength and, in the last resort, autarkic character of the US economy by comparison with that of the European countries, who were heavily dependent on imported raw materials, imported energy and world trading conditions. This gave the United States a much wider security margin. He strongly criticised the maintenance of high interest rates in the United States, which could lead to a flight of capital from Europe, undermine the Deutschmark and make it impossible for the Europeans to fund the defence expenditure which the Americans expected of them. From further to the left, Kersten Voigt stressed the importance of the North/South dimension, warned against the US pursuing an interventionist policy in the Third World and paid a tribute (received in audible silence by



the Americans) to Andy Young. He suggested that the Brandt report was an important contribution to any overall Western strategy and emphasised the much greater importance attached to arms control in the FRG and in the US. He also put in an eloquent plea for the US to provide a democratic model of leadership within the Alliance, based on ample consultation and readiness to take the views of its partners into account. Horst Ehmke (responding to an outspoken intervention by Senator Cohen to the effect that the US was not letting its Allies off the 3% commitment, which, however artificial, was something the US voters could understand) said sharply that what might go down well in Maine would not be easy to sell to voters in Germany. Ehmke also voiced European resentment at the US's failure to ratify SALT II and warned the US against direct intervention in El Salvador, which could create a second Vietnam there and play into Soviet hands. He was equally against sales of advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia, which he argued would be in neither the German nor the general European interest. Mertes (CDU) provided the statutory reference to the division of Germany and Marx (CDU) drew attention to the West Europeans' responsibility for the Eastern Europeans, especially Poland.

10. The British contingent made a much stronger contribution than last year. After Luns had reviewed the state of the Alliance and attacked false notions of détente on lines reported in the press, Mr Pattie spoke to his paper on "New Dimensions of the Threat" in the terms summarised in FCO telno 295 to Washington. This attracted a good deal of favourable comment inside and outside the conference. Mr Pattie also summed up at the conclusion of the proceedings, drawing attention to the consensus reached in discussion on the threat to the West from outside the Alliance area and, among other things, putting a gentle question mark against the wisdom of the FRG/Soviet gas deal. AVM Gilbert and Geoffrey Ripon both raised the question of the need for a review of the Alliance to ensure better value for money. Sir A Hockaday offered an analysis of the world strategic situation as seen from the Kremlin, highlighting the



difficulties which the Russians faced. Alan Clark (Conservative MP for Plymouth, Sutton) floated the idea of releasing British units from BAOR for deployment outside the NATO area and the possibility of these being replaced from the FRG. This idea attracted some unfavourable notice in the German press (the Frankfurter Allgemeine described it as "even more dangerous" than the disagreement over division of labour between the Europeans and the Americans) but was firmly disowned by other British participants (including John Roper); and Mr Pattie reaffirmed the British commitment to maintain the Rhine Army in Germany.

11. The French were, as usual, thinly represented, the only official being Guehenno, Deputy Head of the Planning Staff at the Quai d'Orsay, who advocated reducing expectations from détente and substituting the notion of stabilisation. Détente for the Soviet Union was an exercise in competitiveness.

Baumel spoke on equally predictable lines about the value to the West as a whole of the French role in Africa. Of the other Europeans, Van Eekelen (Netherlands) made a sensible intervention claiming that the Dutch accepted the need to do more for conventional defence but called on the US to give greater precision to their proposals, making clear exactly what they expected from their allies and how this was to be related to existing programmes such as the LTDP: otherwise the Alliance would get at odds and be thrown into confusion. Holst (Norway) advocated closer coordination between the HLG and the SCG in NATO; warned against any reopening of the TNF element in the Double Decision, which could unravel the whole package; and urged the US to resist the temptation "to re-structure the Alliance on conservative lines" and thus make it unacceptable to (some) European electorates.

WRIGHT  
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THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED