



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 February 1982

*Dear Sir,*

Vadim Fedorovich Zadneprovskiy

The Security Service have sought FCO agreement to expel a member of the Soviet Trade Delegation (STD) who has engaged in unacceptable intelligence-gathering activities.

Zadneprovskiy, who does not have diplomatic status, came to the UK in July 1977, to work in the Export Machinery Department of the Soviet Trade Delegation as a representative of the Soviet trading organisations Aviaexport (exports of aeroplanes and aviation equipment), Avtoexport (imports of motor vehicles and manufacturing equipment) and Traktoroexport (import of agricultural vehicles and equipment). He took the place of an identified agent-running KGB officer operating in the scientific and technical field. It soon became clear that Zadneprovskiy did little work relating to his overt responsibilities. Since 1977 he has been observed on many occasions taking prolonged and complicated anti-surveillance precautions during journeys in the London area and he has made frequent journeys lasting some hours to the outer reaches of the free travel area for Soviet officials for no apparent reason, usually indications of agent-running or other intelligence activity.

Evidence obtained by the Security Service shows that Zadneprovskiy is an active and professional KGB agent-running officer. His relationship with one of the agents, a British businessman known as COURT USHER, which first came to their notice in early 1980 \*

~~~~~  
\* has been a fully clandestine one completely unrelated to his official function in the UK and Zadneprovskiy has not attempted to disguise the fact that he is a KGB officer. He has tasked COURT USHER to cultivate contacts in GCHQ and in areas of electronic research and development, to obtain various embargoed items and to provide sensitive information on equipment and procedures used by Special Branch and the Security Service. He has also used COURT USHER on two occasions to deliver equipment in a thoroughly clandestine manner in Vienna to a KGB officer who was expelled from the UK in 1971.\*

The intelligence case against him leaves no room for doubt that we should expel him in accordance with the

/policy





policy announced at the time of the expulsion of 105 Soviet diplomats and officials in 1971. But timing has proved difficult. From October 1980 the Security Service had a particular interest \* ~~~~~ \* against Zadneprovskiy, since the latter was beginning to show keen interest in obtaining additional information about British surveillance equipment, techniques and operations. It is a key requirement for the Security Service to know the extent of the KGB's knowledge of these matters and they had some success through this operation. Moreover, there were some hopes of recruiting Zadneprovskiy, though these eventually had to be abandoned. Finally, by the time the Security Service had decided that they were unlikely to get anything more out of the case and that it should be closed down, action was already in hand in relation to the expulsion of Viktor Lazin (which took place in August 1981) and it was thought unwise to pursue both cases simultaneously.

Then, when the matter was first put to the FCO for action in September 1981, we delayed giving our agreement in view of the need to allow the atmosphere generated by the mutual expulsions triggered by the Lazin affair to die down and of our hopes of obtaining contracts for the West Siberian gas pipeline.

The case has, however, now been brought to a head by evidence strongly suggesting that Zadneprovskiy may shortly return to the Soviet Union. We would wish to take action before this to expel him (as a non-diplomat he cannot strictly be declared persona non grata) and to close down his slot under the ceiling for STD staff. Normally Parliament would need to be told of this action and publicity would both have a beneficial effect as far as other businessmen's contacts with Soviet officials is concerned, and cause the Russian intelligence services considerable harm. The difficulty with acting now is that the Russians may link what we do with our measures over Poland and may be more likely to retaliate on that account, possibly by expelling a member of the Commercial Section of our Embassy in Moscow or a British businessman. Retaliation could also take an indirect form, eg further limitation on movement by our Embassy staff. Some such action is rendered somewhat more likely by the fact that the UK is at present ahead of our European partners in announcing measures against the Soviet Union.

On balance, Lord Carrington believes that it is right to expel Zadneprovskiy. But we propose two measures to

/reduce

\* ~ \* Passages deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland,

18 October 2012

TOP SECRET

The Germans  
are now  
increased some.  
AL 15.  
Z





reduce the risk of retaliation. First we shall make it clear when informing the Soviet Ambassador that retaliation in Moscow would inevitably produce a further reaction here. Lord Carrington considers that, depending on the nature and extent of any Soviet retaliation, it might be necessary to expel a further Soviet official. And secondly, we shall delay informing Parliament and publicizing our action for a period until the dangers are less.

In view of the possible commercial implications, the Secretary of State for Trade should have an opportunity to comment and I am therefore copying this letter to John Rhodes, Department of Trade. It would be extremely helpful if his comments could reach us as soon as possible.

*Yours ever,  
J.P.*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

①

*Content with an announcement in  
the terms? A.J.C. 4/4*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April 1982

*Dear John,* *Yes* *not*

*(A member of the Soviet Trade Mission)*

V F Zadneprovsky

In your letter of 19 February you recorded the Prime Minister's agreement with the recommendations in the penultimate paragraph of my letter of 17 February concerning the expulsion of Zadneprovsky.

One of those proposals was to delay informing Parliament and publicising the expulsion for a period until the dangers were less. As you know, we requested the withdrawal of Zadneprovsky on 22 February. He left on 27 February. There has been no Soviet retaliation so far. We therefore believe that the absence of immediate publicity and the clear statement in requesting Zadneprovsky's withdrawal that Soviet retaliation would prompt a further move by the British side have served a useful purpose. However, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary does not believe that we can hold off the announcement indefinitely. The longer one is delayed, the greater is the risk of accusations of a cover-up when the news does break. Chance press interest or suspicion aroused by Zadneprovsky's hurried departure may prompt an enquiry at any time. There is also the possibility of a parliamentary question about ceilings on Soviet officials in the UK, such as is put down from time to time. Lord Carrington therefore believes that we should aim to announce the expulsion just before the Easter recess and has in mind an inspired written PQ on Thursday 8 April. This would avoid making the announcement in the immediate run-up to the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission in mid-May. The official level review meeting on trade will have been completed. Lord Carrington does not believe that it would be desirable to delay the announcement until after the Joint Commission.

I enclose a draft question and answer. I should be grateful for your comments as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Trade and (in view of the Security Service's interest) the Home Secretary.

*Yours ever,*  
*[Signature]*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTION

To ask the Lord Privy Seal whether there has been any reduction in the permitted level for staff at the Soviet Trade Delegation.

ANSWER

The permitted level for the Soviet Trade Delegation has been reduced from 47 to 46 following the departure from the United Kingdom of Mr V F Zadneprovskiy, whose withdrawal was requested because he had been engaging in activities incompatible with his status.



File

Secret  
R  
amen

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 April 1982

V.F. Zadneprovsky

Thank you for your letter of 3 April. The Prime Minister is content that an announcement should be made in the terms proposed.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and John Halliday (Home Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



TOP SECRET

FILE

SW



COPY NO. 3 OF 3 COPIES

10 DOWNING STREET

*Suwa*

13

*From the Private Secretary*

19 February, 1982

Vadim Fedorovich Zadneprovskiy

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 17 February and John Rhodes' letter of 18 February about the above. She has noted Mr. Biffen's view that since Zadneprovskiy appears to be on the point of departure, it would be best to let him go quietly. The Prime Minister understands, however, that while the evidence suggests that he may shortly return to the Soviet Union, this is not certain and it is possible that his return could be delayed by a matter of months unless some action is taken. In the light of that consideration, and also bearing in mind that the Germans have now joined us in announcing measures in respect of the Polish crisis, the Prime Minister agrees with the recommendations of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary contained in the penultimate paragraph of your letter.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade).

*AJC*

*S*

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TOP SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I understand that you reached provisional agreement with Lord Carrington this morning that this KGB office should be expelled.

2. Mr. Biffen argues (see attached letter) that since he is on the point of departure we should let him go quietly.

3. The trouble with this is that we are not certain that he is about to go. The security service think he may not go until June and that that is too long to wait.

4. Agree that, since his early departure is not certain, Lord Carrington's recommendation should be approved? Yes no

A.J. C.  $\frac{15}{2}$ .





COPY NO: 2 OF 5

TOP SECRET*From the Secretary of State*

B J P Fall Esq  
Private Secretary  
FCO  
London SW1

18 February 1982

Dear Zion

VADIM FEDOROVICH ZADNEPROVSKIY

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 17 February.

If this person were likely to stay, my Secretary of State would have no strong grounds for opposing his expulsion. However we do not wish to add unnecessarily to the signals we are sending to the USSR over the Polish crisis. In this respect the long gap which is emerging between the announcement of our measures and the announcements by our allies is causing us some concern. We would also be unhappy about the risk of retaliation against a British businessman. Since the person appears to be on the point of departure, my Secretary of State thinks it best to let him go quietly.

The Germans have now announced measures.

I am copying this letter to John Coles at No 10.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES  
Private Secretary