

CONFIDENTIAL

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WED 0111
17 MAR 1982
REGISTR
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HMA'S LUNCH FOR THE PCI, 4 MARCH

- HMA gave lunch on 4 March to On. Napolitano, On. Natta (Berlinguer's deputy, although there is no such formal post), On. Reichlin, and Dott. Minucci. Others present were the Minister, IO and myself. Berlinguer was invited but did not come, pleading a prior commitment; HMA may offer him a tete-a-tete lunch later this year.
- The guests were relaxed throughout and we did not push them hard this time on Poland or on the split with Moscow. Napolitano took the lead, and no significant differences of line were apparent: in the summary record which follows, therefore, I have not usually identified individual speakers.
- PCI/PSI. Craxi had met Berlinguer on 2 March and made clear that he was not interested in any sort of understanding or rapprochement with the PCI at present, since he was in pursuit of the Prime Ministership and such a move would spoil his chances (this explains Reichlin's harsh attack on the PCI in Unita of 4 March). The guests were scathing about the lack of precise PSI policies, especially on the economy, and saw Craxi as an opportunist seeking power for his own sake.
- Berlinguer/Miterrand. Their talk had been a success, revealing in particular a similarity of views on disarmament issues.
- Salvador. Elections would be a farce, and the Italian government (and Ambassador Righetti personally) were much too close to Duarte. Ambiguities in the government's position remained, thinly papered over by the document issued after last week's summit of coalition party secretaries. The PSI line was inconsistent with Socialist

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International policy, and Colombo had been forced to backtrack. The PCI had had no direct contacts with the Salvador opposition since Berlinguer's visit to Latin America.

6. Terza Via. No clear definition was given of what this would mean in economic or political terms, but the first parallel that sprang to Napolitano's lips was Mitterrand's France. He said that the meaning of the Terza Via was clear to those who believed in it.

*like
Berlinguer's
talk*

7. Submarine. The guests accepted the strong probability that the nuclear submarine tracked last week was Soviet, and were puzzled by the length of the chase. Lagorio might have a difficult time in Parliament, especially from the DC. (In the event, he did not).

8. PCI/CPSU. The break with Moscow had caused considerable confusion among the base. A minority were pro-Soviet and a few hardliners were receiving encouragement from the Soviet and East German Embassies: the Soviet embassy sent a claue to Perugia to applaud Cossutta's controversial speech there. The leadership now had the important task of explaining recent developments as the logical culmination of the PCI's search for its own identity (they are all travelling the country to defend the Direzione's line, and to monitor base reactions: for example, Minucci went to speak in Perugia the week after Cossutta).

9. Electoral prospects. The PCI was against anticipated elections and had been even before the imposition of military rule in Poland. They needed time for consolidation within the party. In the medium and long term, their stance over Poland and greater independence of Moscow would bring electoral benefits. Spadolini had done quite well (I had the impression they preferred him to most of the probable alternatives).

10. Transatlantic relations. Napolitano was scathing about Colombo's vague proposal of a Euro-American pact. Nothing that left Europe in a position of inferiority would be acceptable. It was typical of Colombo to utter fine sentiments without making any specific proposal (he compared the "European Act").

11. There was also some discussion of British politics, SDP prospects etc.

R N Culshaw

5 March 1982

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