

CONFIDENTIAL

Security

Ref. A082/0296

MR BUTLER

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*Security: Ritchie of the Foo:
March 82*

Official Secrets: Ritchie and Hambleton

Thank you for your minute of 25 November.

2. The Ritchie case is likely to be over within the morning on 29 November, since she is expected to plead guilty. The Hambleton case is expected to run for at least a week, and perhaps for longer.

3. The two cases are quite different from each other, and from Prime. Miss Ritchie is charged under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, not under section 1; and though the charge of passing information to an Egyptian intelligence officer is serious, the damage done is trivial, particularly by comparison with Prime; and, such as it is, it is damage to international relations rather than to national security. There may be a question whether positive vetting could or should have disclosed that Miss Ritchie was liable to put herself into compromising situations which could make her vulnerable to pressure or blackmail to disclose information she should not disclose, and might not therefore be a fit person to have regular access to highly classified information.

4. Professor Hambleton, though he has dual citizenship, is basically a Canadian traitor. He betrayed Canadian and NATO secrets, but not specifically British secrets. It will be argued in court that British interests suffered from the betrayal of NATO secrets; but the case does not call in question British security procedures.

5. I have just received, and attach as briefing for the Prime Minister, copies of drafts of the opening statements by Counsel for the Crown in both cases.

6. I incline to the view that, for the purposes of answering questions or making statements, the Prime Minister should seek to keep the two cases separate. An additional argument for this is that the Ritchie case will cease to be sub judice on 29 November, so that questions can be asked on 30 November. The Hambleton case will be sub judice all next week at least.

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7. The procedure laid down by the then Prime Minister on 25 March 1969 requires us, in a case where a breach of security has led to a prosecution:

- (1) to send the Chairman of the Security Commission a statement outlining the facts of the case and to ask him whether he thinks that an investigation would be likely to serve a useful purpose;
- (2) to consult the Leader of the Opposition before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission.

8. Lord Bridge is being sent a statement of the facts of the Ritchie case and asked for an opinion. I am suggesting to him that, though the facts of the case might not themselves appear to call for further investigation, the question whether positive vetting could or should have brought Miss Ritchie's vulnerability to light may be a matter to which, particularly in current circumstances, the Security Commission should give attention; and that it might therefore be sensible to refer the case to the Security Commission, to be investigated by the same panel as is conducting the inquiry into the Prime case and dealt with in the same report.

9. I do not think that the Ritchie case calls for the kind of full statement that the Prime Minister has made in some previous cases - eg Blunt, Hollis and Prime. But she will need to say something about a reference to the Security Commission. She could wait to be asked; but there would be something to be said for a short written answer to an arranged PQ, which could be put down as soon as the Ritchie case is concluded. I attach a draft. She could then refer back to that answer in dealing with any other questions on the subject.

10. For next week at least, any questions on the Hambleton case can and should be sidestepped on the ground that the case is sub judice. At some stage we shall have to go through the process of consulting the Chairman of the Security Commission about a reference, but my present view is that this case will not call for a reference to the Security Commission. On this again, the Prime

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Minister will have to be ready to say something, but I hope that we can confine it to a written answer. I will advise further when we see how the case is going.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26 November 1982

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THE QUEENAGAINSTREGINA JANE McINTYRE RITCHIEOPENING NOTEALLEGATION

On various days between mid-November 1981 and some time late in January or early February 1982 the Defendant who at the time held an appointment under the Crown as Second Secretary at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv wrongfully communicated the contents of a number of confidential telegrams to an employee in the Egyptian Embassy with whom she was having an affair.

INDICTMENT

One Count, contrary to Section 2(1)(a) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 in relation to one such telegram. The Court will hear of four other telegrams. However, there are no further counts dealing with these because the substance of the case is that the defendant's conduct as a whole put the public interest at risk rather than that the disclosure of a particular telegram was itself damaging to the public interest.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

This is a very different kind of case from that which your Lordship had to deal with in this Court recently. Miss Ritchie's behaviour was more foolish than wicked. Nevertheless it involved a sad breach of the trust confided in her by virtue of her appointment and of her duty as a servant of the Crown.

What happened, put quite briefly, was this. Having formed an attachment to her opposite number at the Egyptian Embassy, she allowed herself to be so carried away by her involvement as to reveal to him the text of confidential telegrams which had come to her knowledge in the course of her duties.

The damage to our country's interests was not in the event great. Egypt is a friendly power and most of the information she has admitted conveying would have become public knowledge in due course anyway. The mischief lay in the very fact of a breach of confidentiality and the inevitable doubts about our trustworthiness and security which the discovery of her conduct must have given rise to in the minds of other interested parties.

Those Governments, with whom we enjoy harmonious relationships, have a right to expect that confidential exchanges will remain confidential.

DEFENDANT'S HISTORY

RHONA JANE McINTYRE RITCHIE

AGED 30

3rd September 1979

Appointed to the staff of The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.)

By which time on

1st August 1979

She had signed a declaration relating to the Official Secrets Act EX.1 p.1 including "I am aware that I should not divulge any information gained by me as a result of my appointment to any unauthorised person".

5th July 1981

She was appointed as Second Secretary at the Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Report Para.3

In due course she was promoted to First Secretary in Chancery, doing political work, although this promotion came after her unlawful activities.

Miles D.p.1

She would have seen all the telegrams from the F.C.O. to the Embassy and telegrams sent from the Embassy; unless they were subject to special restrictions.

The relevant paragraphs for the purposes of this case are:-

- 11 (Dealing with safeguarding and proper security of classified documents)
- 21 (This forbids discussion of classified matter in the presence of domestic staff and in public generally)
- 23 (which simply reminds officers that they are subject to the Official Secrets Act).

While at the Embassy she met and became friendly with an official at the Egyptian Embassy called Refaat el Ansary.

She started to go out socially with him in August 1981.

Vol.57 of the Diplomatic Service Procedure is relevant here and is also a publication with which she should have been familiar.

Para.7.4

It alerts Diplomatic Service officers to the obvious danger of intelligent services of hostile powers making contacts with nationals of neutral or friendly countries with a view to using them suborn members of our Diplomatic Service. "They should report immediately any indication that there is anything unusual arising from a contact with a national of a non-communist country".

Para.12.1

The Official Secrets Act protects all information and material obtained from official sources, whether classified or not.

DSR/12 (Diplomatic Service Regulations)

This stresses in the strongest terms the personal responsibility of Diplomatic officers for safeguarding all official information in their possession or knowledge. It makes reference to the Official Secrets Act in the following terms:- "Under the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 to 1939, it is an offence for you to disclose to an unauthorised person, either orally or in writing, any information you have acquired through your official duties unless you have received official permission. There is, however, no objection to your repeating information which

has already officially been made public".

THE TELEGRAMS

17th November 1981

No 919

EX.5 p.16

This is a telegram to UK Representative in Brussels, giving the text of a message from Lord Carrington to Mr Haig informing him of the Government's willingness to participate in the Multi National Force (MFO) and Observers

(Cont'd overleaf)

in Sinai - which was repeated to, inter alia, the British Embassy,
Tel Aviv.

As we shall see, when interviewed Miss Ritchie identified this as
one where the substance of the text was passed to Ansary.

21st November 1981

No 1773

Ex.6 p.17-20

This is a telegram to Washington repeated to Tel Aviv stating that the
text of the statement agreeing to participation in the MFO was to be
delivered to the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers the following
day.

Miss Ritchie identified a copy of this telegram and admitted she
supplied Ansary with a copy of the text.

23rd November 1981

No 186

Ex.8 p.30-32

This is a telegram to Tel Aviv giving details of an announcement to be
made in the UK Parliament agreeing to contribute to the MFO in Sinai.
The telegram would have been received in Tel Aviv about noon UK time,
the announcement being made in Parliament at 3.30 pm.

This was not shown to Miss Ritchie at the interview, but she refers to
it in such terms as to make it clear it was one of those of which she
gave what she called an 'advanced copy' to Ansary.

26th November 1981

No 1802

Ex.4 p.13-14

This is a telegram containing a message from Lord Carrington to Mr Haig
in Washington, which was repeated to a number of British Embassies
including Tel Aviv.

Miss Ritchie was shown a copy of this telegram and describes it as the
most sensitive of the telegrams she discussed with Ansary as it was not
going to be made public.

It is in respect of this telegram that Miss Ritchie is indicted.

12th January 1982

Nos 5 and 6

Ex.9 p.33-36

These telegrams refer to a message from Lord Carrington to the Israeli Foreign Minister about European participation in the Sinai Force. These telegrams were not available to show to Miss Ritchie at the interview, but again she mentioned a number of telegrams received between November and January relating to European Foreign Ministers understanding of their countries' participation in the MFO; she stated that when the final text had been decided in January (these are the two relevant telegrams) she told Ansary that the Government's answer was going to be given to the Israelis the following day and she admitted noting down the text and giving it to Ansary.

17th March 1982

Westcott D. p. 4

5.32 pm

Waghorn D. p. 7

Defendant was interviewed in London

Ex.2 p. 3

Q. I have been told today that you have passed the text of certain official telegrams from The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Defence Attache Tel Aviv to an acquaintance of yours called Ansary.

A. If you put it bluntly - yes that's true. It never entered my head in any way to betray secrets.

She was then cautioned.

Q. I have been told that you passed the text of certain telegrams to Ansary. Is that true?

A. Yes, that's true.

She was shown the telegram 1802 of 26th November 1981
and identified it

Ex. 4 p. 13

She was then asked to look at other documents and point out the ones of which she had taken notes to pass to Ansary.

She dealt with:-

Ex. 5 p. 15

A telegram of 17th November 1981 which sets out the text of a message to Secretary of State Haig, about the agreement of various countries to contribute to the multi-national force in Sinai.

About it, she said:

"The substance of this text was passed to Ansary by me. You must appreciate that this is one of many telexes on the statement to be issued by the four European countries on their participation in the multi-national force in Sinai.

What I gave him was the final text of the statement which may have been fully set out in a later telegram. I only did this because I knew the statement would in any case be officially delivered/^{the}next day to the Egyptian foreign minister"

She also admitted giving Ansary the text of a statement that was to be made in Parliament on 23rd November 1981. Ex. 8 p. 30

She said:

"I only did this because I knew the statement would in any case be officially delivered the next day to the Egyptian Foreign Minister."

"There was another telegram or telegrams which are not here giving the text of the statement which would be made in Parliament on 23-11-81 I knew that this also would shortly be public knowledge and so also gave Ansary these texts."

She then made a statement under caution in writing.

Ex. 3 p. 7-12

At p. 9

She describes Ex. 4 p. 13 telegram No. 1802 as
"the most sensitive of the telegrams I discussed with Ansary as
it was not going to be made public but it seemed to me obvious
that the content would also be made known to the Egyptians.

About this and other documents she said :

Ex. 3 p. 10

"As before, I again felt uncomfortable in that I should not have released
it to him, but by the same token I was persuaded that this was something
that he was going to get anyway and was therefore tantamount to an
advanced copy given on a personal basis."

I was only prepared to let him see copies of final texts which I
thought he could get from other sources but I realised that this
was a breach of the rules but I never felt that I had given him
anything which he would not in any case find out from other sources.

Ex. 3 p. 11

She then deals with her personal relationship with Ansary and
completes the statement by saying:

"I am obviously aware of the Official Secrets Act but never felt
that I was breaching its spirit."

SECRET

13

REGINA v. HAMBLETON

NOTE FOR OPENING

Background

Hugh Hambleton, 60 years, was born in Canada.

He went to school in the U.K., and completed his education in Canada.

1944-46. He served in the Free French Army in N. Africa, later transferring to the Canadian Armed Forces where he was engaged in military intelligence.

Up to 1956. He worked at University in Mexico, The National Film Board of Canada and then completed 2 years at the L.S.E. in London.

1956-61. He worked for N.A.T.O. in Paris in the Economic and Finance Division.

After 1961. He returned to the L.S.E. for a short while and travelled a good deal especially to France and Spain.

From 1964 he held the post of Professor of Economics at Laval University in Quebec.

Nov. 1979, he was arrested in Canada and a certain amount of sophisticated spying equipment was seized by the R.C.M.P. (He was not prosecuted by the Canadians).

SECRET

June 1982. He came to London on a British passport where he was interviewed by Special Branch officers and admitted in considerable detail his activities with Russian agents over a period of some 30 years.

He is a British subject, enjoying dual British and Canadian nationality.

Although he was born in Canada, his father and grandfather were born in the U.K. By the British Nationality Act 1948 all Canadian citizens are British subjects. He holds a British passport.

Allegation

He was recruited in Canada in the late 1940's by a K.G.B. officer attached at the time to the Russian Embassy.

For 30 years he has been in almost continuous contact with Russian agents all over the world but mainly in Paris and Quebec.

In 1956, at the instigation of the Russians, he took a part in the Economics Section of N.A.T.O. which was based in Paris (at that time). Whilst there he passed over a great deal of CLASSIFIED material belonging to N.A.T.O. to Soviet agents in Paris. The U.K. was a founder member of N.A.T.O. and the disclosure of that CLASSIFIED information inevitably damaged the interests of the Alliance and each of its members, including the U.K.

After N.A.T.O. he maintained his association with the K.G.B. visiting Moscow in 1975. When arrested in Quebec in 1979 he was found in possession of very sophisticated communications equipment supplied by the Russians.

The evidence against him emerges mainly from his interviews with Special Branch officers in June 1982. He was interviewed on 6 occasions over 3 days (25th, 26th and 27th June). They can be summarised as follows:-

/Pre - N.A.T.O. period/

In c. 1947 he was "cultivated" by Borodin, the cultural attache to the Russian Embassy, in Canada.

Ex.1.
p.24

This occurred over a period of time - with more and more meetings, invitation] to dinner etc. His association with Borodin lasted c 4 or 5 years.

p.32

He realized subsequently that Borodin was a K.G.B. officer. He was given early training by Borodin in the techniques of espionage.

Ex.4
p.179

His family always had a tradition of "sympathy towards the Russian experience". His mother studied Russian and taught English to Tass people.

Ex.1
p.29
p.24

His first wife knew he was being cultivated and provided him with the opportunity to pass over information because her father worked in the Defence office, But he refrained at that early stage.

p.26

He passed over no information in the early days. It was merely training.

p.27,29,32

At the time he was working for the Film Board in Canada.

p.33

His guess was that the Russians thought of him as "playing a role useful to them in the Canadian political scene in the long term future".

p.34

1951/52 He went to Paris to take a doctorate of economics at the Sorbonne.

p.35

Within a year, Borodin appeared in France (in a small village south of Paris) and introduced him to another Soviet agent.

p.36

Thereafter he had a number of covert meetings with a succession of agents. Meetings would be arranged in Paris at particular places at a fixed time of the month.

p.37-39

He was in Paris for 2 or 3 years and in contact with 3 different agents meeting every 3 or 4 months.

p.40

He didn't think he received any money at that stage.

p.41

"They never had to put pressure on me but they easily could. You get in deeply so slowly you don't see it at first".

p.42

c 1954 He moved to L.S.E. in London - for c 2 years p.42/46
- on a grant from the Belgian Government.

There was no contact in London (he claimed) but he went over to Paris for pre-arranged meetings from time to time.

Whilst at the L.S.E. he received about £60 a month in American bills. p.43

"The Russians take care of your fear about jobs. You can always fall back on them for money". p.44

/ N.A.T.O. period/ 1956 - 1961.

17/9/56 he took an appointment as officer, Grade 2 in the Economics Section of N.A.T.O. on the International Staff. Ex.25

He had applied for a post the year before, even offering his services as an economist "without pay". see Ex.21

He had been asked by the Russians to work for N.A.T.O. This was after about a year at the L.S.E. and when his contact at the time was a short blond agent "who seemed to correspond with somebody at the Russian Embassy in Paris". p.45-47

He was pushed very persistently into making an application.

p.48

For about a year after his appointment he heard nothing from the Russians and then contact was resumed.

p.50/52

Meetings with agents became more and more frequent rising to about once a fortnight.

p.53

Venues varied but usually it was some working-class area in Paris.

There were 5 different agents during this period. The best rapport was established with a man known as "Paul".

p.54,74

The Russians were interested in "original authentic documents of the highest classified^{cation}".

p.61

They also wanted him to evaluate N.A.T.O. policy, to forecast what N.A.T.O. was likely to do and to advise what attitude the U.S.S.R. should adopt towards N.A.T.O.

p.67,68

Half way through his time at N.A.T.O., a system was introduced enabling radio contact on a fixed frequency at a fixed time of night. This method was used when the Russians asked for specific documents, Sometimes providing the N.A.T.O. reference number. It was also available in case of emergency.

p.252-5

[Hambleton had access to ^{a large number of} most secret N.A.T.O. documents in the ordinary course of his duties. Their classification was as follows:-

- (1) Top Secret (Cosmic) - applying to information/ Considered so important that its disclosure would result in exceptionally grave damage to N.A.T.O.
- (2) Secret - where disclosure was thought to incur serious damage to N.A.T.O.
- (3) Confidential - disclosure would be prejudicial to N.A.T.O.
- (4) Restricted - disclosure undesirable to the interests of N.A.T.O.

Western
p.19

On his appointment Hambleton had signed a Security Declaration promising to preserve the security of classified information and recognising that he was liable to prosecution if he allowed it to pass into unauthorised hands at any time.

Ex.27

Central Sheets are still available of the classified documents issued to him during his employment and demonstrate the large volume of top secret, secret and confidential material passing through his hands. He also had access to secret documents available to others in the Economics Section.

Ex.31

Dobson
p.15

The North Atlantic Treaty came into force in 1949. It is a continuing agreement between the members of the Alliance for their collective self-defence on the basis that an armed attack against one of them should be considered an attack against all. All members have agreed to protect and safeguard each other's classified information as well as that of N.A.T.O. itself. "N.A.T.O. classified information" is a term that embraces all military, political and economic matters.

Western^c
p.17

He took documents home overnight, photographed them and handed the films over to Soviet agents, returning the documents the next day.

p.63

He was provided with camera^f by the Russians and also used his own.

The films were handed to agents at brief meetings in different parts of Paris, often in the Metro, usually in dark streets.

p.62

p.101

He was still receiving \$60 a month.

p.259

Over 4 years he photographed hundreds of documents — "maybe 300 at the top".

p.66

"A document would be either thick or a single page. If you had 36 frames in a film and you used that say every three weeks on average and passed on two films you are talking possibly about thousands of pages."

p.97

There can be no doubt he passed across a great deal of highly damaging material.

About the nature of that material he had this to say:-

(1) "a certain amount on economics and oil Some would be secret but that doesn't mean anything".

p.64

(2) "economics, politics, oil. I am not saying there wouldn't be others".

"the work of the oil Committee, you know plans to Stockpile oil for thirty days".

p.97

(3) "Although the majority were classified secret that was because they may have come from a file classified secret and in themselves not classified. For example I would see security reports from SHAPE but the whole report was classified. Most would be collected by military attaches and I would avoid that but some stuff which may be classified secret such as reports on political parties from open sources which were classified because they came from an Embassy, I would use these".

p.97

(It was not right to say, in effect, that files marked secret contained unclassified documents. N.A.T.O. practice was to classify each document separately within a file).

(4) "a lot would have N.A.T.O. confidential". p.100

(5) ". there may be parts of a Cosmic document contained in another document which you photograph"

Q. So it is possible that something classified Cosmic could have got to them through you?

A. "Yes. I guess so". p.193

(Although, in the main, he denied passing Cosmic documents, he allowed for the possibility towards the end of the 4th interview. His constant refrain was that Cosmic documents would indicate him as the source. However, as can be seen from the Control Sheets, he was issued with a large number of Cosmic files and it is highly unlikely that he would not have photographed them especially as he had already conceded that the Russians were interested in documents "of the highest classification").

When arrested in Quebec in 1979 he was still in possession of a few N.A.T.O. documents - most marked 'Confidential' and dated 1958, 1959, 1960.

NFE JJFD/4

Whilst at N.A.T.O. the Russians had no other tasks for him in case he was compromised in some way. He was supposed to have a life job there.

p.71

However, he resigned in 1961 for reasons that are not entirely clear.

The Russians wanted him to defect immediately, but he declined.

p.73

/Post N.A.T.O. period/

After N.A.T.O. he was told to lie low for a while.

p.74

He returned to L.S.E. in London and spent a lot of time in Spain - doing a thesis.

p.74

1964. He went to ^Laval University in Quebec as Professor in Economics, where he remained employed until 1979.

Before leaving Europe, he met an RIS officer in Vienna where he was told that they would attempt to find him a position in Western Europe. They wanted to push him towards a job in the Canadian Government.

p.106

On his return to Canada, contact was made with an agent in Ottawa after 3 or 4 months. Meetings lasted a while and then petered out. p.112

2 years later an agent called Rudi Herman approached him at the University saying Moscow was worried that contact had been lost. p.117

He maintained contact with Herman until 1974 meeting every 3 or 4 months. p.118

As is clear from his passport he travelled extensively over those years, including:-

1970 - 2 months in Israel paid for by the Russians after which he prepared a report for them. p.130

There were subsequent visits to Israel in 1975 and 1978. p.137

1971 - 6 months in Peru working at the Canadian Embassy and in the President's office working ^{on} ~~as~~ aid for disaster relief. There was contact with an agent in Lima. p.122

1973-5 Haiti - where he trained Government personnel on how to present reports on projects financed by international banks. He gave his Soviet agent a report on the economic situation there. p.135/136

1975 - He went to Moscow through Vienna and Prague.

There he was trained in different methods of secret communication.

In particular, he was shown:-

(a) how to use a "Tonal Converter"

(he called it a "light" machine). This is a device designed for use at the audio output of a domestic radio receiver to convert a signal conveying a series of tones into a display in which figures corresponding to those tones are illuminated by lights. It is a very sophisticated piece of decoding equipment not available in the West (on the open market at any rate). It involves careful training and practice before it can be used successfully. It enabled Moscow to communicate direct with him in Canada.

NFE Mr "A"

He described in very accurate detail how the machine worked and how he was trained to use it. He was then supplied with a machine in Montreal in 1977 and found with it in his apartment in Quebec in November 1979 by the R.C.M.P.

p.152 et seq.

p.212

JGMBB1

(b) how to use chemicals and specially prepared writing paper to transmit secret messages. He set out in detail the method he was given to reveal messages chemically written on paper. The message would be on a letter or the inside of an envelope.

p.159
et seq.

Experts have confirmed the accuracy of his observations.

NFE Mr."B"

In his office at ^L Naval University, R.C.M.P. officers found a yellow notebook and 2 containers with "potassium iodide" inside.

NFE
JJFD/1,2,3

An expert has discovered that some pages in the notebook have been specially treated for writing secret messages. The same expert has also discovered that the two containers of chemicals can be used for developing incoming secret messages. The instructions for developing secret messages with these chemicals as set out by Hambleton in his interview are very accurate.

NFE Mr."B"

He tended to receive messages in French and on the reverse of the envelope where the address was written. p.162

Whilst in Moscow he saw the head of the K.G.B., Andropov, who said he hoped Hambleton would play a role in world trouble-spots in the future, assessing them politically and economically. An attempt was also made to persuade him to stand for the Canadian Parliament with a campaign financed by the Russians

p.164/5

or to join the Hudson Institute near New York (an institute that carries out research for the Defence Dept.).

p.168

After his return to Canada from Russia, agents were no longer necessary because control was exercised directly from Moscow. He was able to communicate direct - first by secret letters, later through the Tonal Converter.

p.209

He was sent a series of requests through the Tonal Converter to go to the Middle East and other areas. He declined most of them.

p.219

But in 1978 he agreed to go to Cairo where he prepared a report on the Egyptian economy based on a report by the Central Bank of Egypt. He collected his expenses from a contact in Vienna and left the report in Vienna after spending a month in Cairo.

p.226

At the end of 1978 he went back to Vienna where he was told by "Paul" that Western Intelligence Agencies were investigating him and that he should defect to the East. He was given \$5,000 to help his decision. He declined, ~~not to~~.

p.231

He maintains that there has been no contact with the Russians since that meeting.

p.240

He was arrested by the R.C.M.P. in Quebec in November 1979 and the following items were found at his home and office:-

	<u>NFE</u>
Tonal Converter (Decoder)	<u>JGMBB1</u>
Yellow Beaver Notebook (+ treated pages)	<u>JJFD1</u>
2 containers of Potassium Iodide	<u>JJFD1/2</u>
9 N.A.T.O. documents.	<u>JJFD4</u>
2 sheets of paper with instructions for Dead Letter Boxes	<u>DBS1</u>

Finally, He was asked for his motive and, without finding an easy answer, said there was:-

- (a) a sense of belonging to the K.G.B.
- (b) a certain liking for the Security Service network
- (c) an element of glamour and excitement.

p.181
et seq.

To ask the Prime Minister, whether she will make a statement on the security implications raised by the case of Regina versus Ritchie.

Miss Rhona Ritchie, a Second Secretary in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, was tried at the Central Criminal Court yesterday on charges under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. She pleaded guilty, and was given a suspended sentence of years' imprisonment.

2. Miss Ritchie passed information and documents without authority to an Egyptian intelligence officer in Tel Aviv with whom she was having an affair. The facts of the case were fully set out in the statement by Counsel for the Crown in yesterday's proceedings, and I need not recapitulate them here.

3. These were serious offences, and Miss Ritchie's conduct represented a grave breach of her obligations as a member of the Diplomatic Service and of the trust placed in her. The damage was, however, limited. So far as is known, none of the information which she gave was classified higher than confidential. Her activities were prejudicial to the conduct of inter-

national relations, in a sensitive area of those relations, but cannot be described as damaging to national security.

4. In accordance with the procedure described to the House by my predecessor on 25 March 1969, the Chairman of the Security Commission has received a statement outlining the facts of the case and has been asked to say whether in his opinion an investigation by the Commission would be likely to serve a useful purpose. I shall consult the Rt Hon Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, taking into account the views expressed by the Chairman of the Commission, before deciding whether or not to refer the case to the Commission. I will tell the House in due course what my decision is.