



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

## BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - Richard Burt, Designate *lf*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With UK Prime Minister Thatcher  
December 17 at 10:30 a.m.

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Reinvigorate U.S./U.K. relations in the wake of recent frictions over pipeline sanctions and the UNGA Falklands Resolution (talking points provided).

2. Agree on more rational management of East/West economic and political relations in the period ahead (talking points provided).

3. Reinforce UK resolve to maintain pressure on Soviets in the INF negotiations (talking points attached).

4. Seek Thatcher's support for tangible British help in improving the security situation in Lebanon (talking points attached).

5. Maintain UK support for Zimbabwe (talking points attached).

II. SETTING

The Atlantic connection remains central to Mrs. Thatcher's foreign policy. On issues of defense, arms control and East/West relations she has been among our strongest supporters. At the same time, however, she is a determined nationalist, who will not hesitate to oppose us -- and even to lead European opposition -- when she perceives British interests to be at stake. Thus, she was the first European leader publicly to announce that her country would not comply with the pipeline sanctions. And she has been particularly harsh in her criticism of our vote on the Falklands UNGA Resolution.

We believe that Thatcher is eager now to put recent U.S./U.K. frictions behind us. Her general agreement with the

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer

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President's approach to East/West relations remains, and she will want to consult closely with us as we move to exploit opportunities afforded by Soviet leadership changes. At the same time, however, the prospects of national elections in 1983 will make her even more sensitive to what she perceives as pre-emptive U.S. decisions which disregard British honor or British interests.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary  
Ambassador Louis  
Richard Burt

U.K.

The Prime Minister  
Foreign Secretary Pym  
UK Foreign Office Official

IV. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

To be provided.

Drafted: Embassy London

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V. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

Reinvigorate U.S./U.K. relations in the wake of recent frictions over pipeline sanctions and the UNGA Falklands Resolution.

Thatcher has welcomed the Secretary's efforts to de-escalate rhetoric and forge an effective agreement for managing East/West relations. The visit should help confirm a new consensus. But Thatcher recognizes that her electoral appeal rests in part on tenacious defense of British interests. In that regard she may seek our help in negotiations with the Chinese over Hong Kong and with the Spanish over Gibraltar. She will also want the Secretary's assurance on our commitment to avoid preemptive decisions which disregard British interests -- within limits -- as she perceived to be the case on the pipeline and the Falklands UNGA vote.

Talking Points

-- We count on your friendship and support. When there are frictions in our relationship, we want to put them behind us as quickly as possible.

-- This especially true now, with the international situation so much in flux. We need your help and advice.

-- Last few weeks have obviously taught us something about the consultative process. For our part, we have taken those lessons to heart. In the future, we'll try to keep surprises to a minimum.

Only if Raised

--We wish to be supportive of a solution that will maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity, but it would not be wise for us to become publicly engaged in promoting a settlement.

--(Repeat what the Spanish have told you on Gibraltar.)

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Agree on more rational management of East/West economic and political relations in the period ahead.

Lifting pipeline sanctions sets the stage for closer U.S./U.K. collaboration on East/West relations. HMG generally agrees with U.S. on COCOM, the need for an end to credit subsidies, the requirement for strengthening defense, and our approach to CSCE. They will help us -- within limits -- to convince the French and Germans. But with unemployment at 14 per cent, economic steps will present problems if tied directly to jobs.

Talking Points

COCOM

-- We appreciated your help in working out agreement which allowed President to lift pipeline sanctions.

-- But as you know, we are only at the beginning of our efforts to solidify a new Western consensus on security and East/West relations.

CSCE

-- When the CSCE meeting in Madrid reconvenes after Christmas, Alliance unity on our package of new proposals will continue to be essential for achievement of our objectives at Madrid.

-- Vital that we stand firm on proposals on human rights and CDE mandate. They are essential to balanced substantive outcome in Madrid.

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Reinforce UK resolve to maintain pressure on Soviets in the INF negotiations.

Soviet INF negotiators have opened the door a crack towards reductions in the Soviet SS-20 force. Specifically, they have proposed a sub-ceiling on longer range INF missiles and have informally suggested a level of about 150 missiles; depending on specifics (the Soviet proposal is vague), this could require reductions of up to 90 SS-20s from Europe and western Siberia as well as all older SS-4s and SS-5s. While the Soviet position remains unacceptable because it would block NATO LRINF modernization while leaving intact a substantial SS-20 force, we can expect it to arouse Allied interest and concern, especially regarding reactions of their publics.

Talking Points

-- US and Allied pressure for zero-zero outcome may be paying dividends.

-- Although Soviet position remains unacceptable, have seen tentative signs for first time that Soviets may accept some reductions of SS-20s.

-- Soviet position, however, would still prevent NATO LRINF modernization while leaving intact large SS-20 force.

-- Allied unity and firmness will be all the more important to keep Soviets moving towards an acceptable position.

-- As we enter deployment year, we recognize that opposition to cruise is growing in Britain and could be political problem for you.

-- Please know we are sensitive to that situation, and are eager to work with your Government to ensure that there are no unnecessary bumps in the road.

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Seek Thatcher's support for tangible British help in improving the security situation in Lebanon.

Traditionally Thatcher has been more supportive of our Middle East policies than her Foreign Office; but in the case of the MNF, the reverse seems to be true. Although Foreign Secretary Pym has argued for a British contribution of a battalion to MNF, we understand that Thatcher intends to overrule him. Thatcher may, however, agree to provide training for the Lebanese armed forces.

Talking Points

--Your government's recent statements on the Middle East have been very helpful. I hope we can count on your further support.

--What is needed now is a substantial British contribution to our efforts to rebuild the Lebanese armed forces and security forces and to deploy and an expanded MNF which can help to support Lebanese authorities until they can do the job themselves.

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Maintain UK support for Zimbabwe.

Prime Minister Thatcher is uneasy over the recent course of events in Zimbabwe, particularly over the detention of some senior air force officers. Her concern is also part of the Tory infighting--the Thatcher faction believing that Carrington and the FCO are responsible for the Zimbabwe situation and that UK support should be withdrawn--versus the Carrington group, supported by the FCO, who although concerned, argue for continuing support for Mugabe. Zimbabwe has also become caught up in post-Falklands recrimination. Ian Smith's poisoning of the well during his recent London visit did nothing to alleviate the problems among those who view the Mugabe government's relations with Smith as the touchstone of its attitude towards Zimbabwe's whites, the economy, and the rule of law in general. (FYI: You should know that Chet Crocker met with Ian Smith in mid-November and he expressly urged us and the British to remain engaged and to use our influence constructively--as we are doing.)

British assistance to Zimbabwe since independence is substantial and includes the presence of a large and permanent contingent of British military advisors and trainers. This presence negates the need for the Zimbabwe National Army to look elsewhere for substantial military assistance. HMG has just agreed to expand that mission.

In our view the jury is still out on Zimbabwe and we believe it is far too early to give up. Such a move by the UK would seriously undermine the Mugabe government, which up until now has been reasonably pragmatic and which has relied on the West for substantial economic and political support, and would open the door for South African destabilization and for the Soviets and their surrogates to wedge their way into this strategically important country.

TALKING POINTS

--We are fully aware of the fact that some things are going wrong in Zimbabwe and share particularly your concern over adverse trends in law and order, the GOZ's handling of dissident activity and encroachments on the rule of law.

--We are not prepared, however, to take Ian Smith's assessment of what is happening in Zimbabwe at face value, particularly in view of his natural bitterness over the whole Lancaster House process. We do not believe that the Government's poor relationship with Smith is an indication of its attitudes and policies more generally. Besides, Smith tells us that the US and UK should remain engaged and use our influence constructively. We should stay in close touch on how to do this.

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--Vice President Bush was very frank with Prime Minister Mugabe during his recent visit. Mugabe took our message well; he is touchy but admits he has problems.

--In spite of these problems, the Vice President left Harare with the conviction that Zimbabwe and its leaders continue to deserve our support, and that Mugabe is committed to peaceful change, to more pragmatic policies and, to maintaining the rule of law.

--We believe that the proper course is for us to maintain our support while making our points and to act with restraint because outside pressures would be counter-productive at this point.

--I was reassured to see that your government had decided to expand the British military presence in Zimbabwe.

--I am still convinced that together we made the right choice after Lancaster House in committing ourselves to close engagement in Zimbabwe and I believe it is important for us to persevere now, as the going gets rough.

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