



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 December 1982

*John R. Owen,*

Thank you for your letter of 8 December about the Question you put to me in the House on 2 December.

I have noted your comments on the question of a dual-key system for cruise missiles. In the absence of satisfactory results from the Geneva arms control negotiations, cruise missiles will be deployed in this country at the end of next year to bases which, as we have repeatedly made clear over the past three years, will be subject to the Attlee-Truman agreement reconfirmed by President Truman and Mr. Churchill and detailed in a communique in January 1952.

As you say, the Thor missile system, which was deployed here for five years from 1958 to 1963, was governed by an arrangement which was "dual-key" in the sense that the RAF manned the delivery system while the Americans retained control of the nuclear warhead. But there have of course been different arrangements for other systems. Apart from Thor, the arrangements under successive governments - including the one in which you were Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary - have been those set out in the Attlee-Truman agreement. We are satisfied that our national interests have been fully protected by these joint decision arrangements.

Having said this, I accept, of course, that your suggestions are made with the express intention of ensuring public confidence in the NATO twin-track decisions of December 1979. I agree with you that public confidence is extremely important and we shall

/ continue

DR  
e. f. ro  
CO  
WFO  
MOD

continue to do whatever we can to increase confidence and to counter the harmful and totally inaccurate allegations that the British Government have no part in the decision-making process in relation to cruise missiles.

Finally, you ask for assurances that no decision should be taken on the deployment of the missiles without a debate in the House. In the debate we had in January 1980 we did, of course, secure the agreement of the House to the Government's policy on the role of nuclear weapons in our defence policy, when the NATO twin-track decision was fully considered. We stand by our policy, and I remain convinced that unless we proceed with the agreed plans to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles there can be no real prospect of the total removal of the missiles that threaten us. But there will no doubt be opportunities for the House to discuss these issues before December of next year. For example, the Statement on the Defence Estimates is always debated, and you may put down amendments, as you did this year.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Storer

---

The Rt. Hon. Dr. David Owen, MP.



*Pl receive  
this page  
lw*

## 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 8 December about the Question you put to me in the House on 2 December.

*Satisfactory 3/2* I have noted your comments on the question of a dual-key system for cruise missiles. In the absence of *concrete* results from the Geneva arms control negotiations, cruise missiles will be deployed in this country at the end of next year to bases which, as we have repeatedly made clear over the past three years, will be subject to the Attlee-Truman agreement reconfirmed by President Truman and Mr. Churchill and detailed in a communique in January 1952.

As you say, the Thor missile system, which was deployed here for five years from 1958 to 1963, was governed by a dual-key. *But this is not the only precedent.* From the point of view of control, *there is no obvious distinction between weapons on missiles and those carried by aircraft.* Apart from those ~~relating to Thor~~ relating to Thor, the arrangements under successive governments - including the one in which you were Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary - have been those set out in the Attlee-Truman agreement. We are satisfied that our national interests have been fully protected by these joint decision arrangements.

Having said this, I accept, of course, that your suggestions are made with the express intention of ensuring public confidence in the NATO twin-track decisions of December 1979. I agree with you that public confidence is extremely important and we shall

*But there have of course been other systems  
different arrangements for other systems.*

/ continue



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 December 1982

Thank you for your letter of 16 December, with which you enclosed a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Dr. David Owen about control of cruise missiles and the question of further Parliamentary debate.

I enclose a copy of the slightly revised version we will be putting to the Prime Minister over the weekend. If you have any comments, perhaps you could let me know by 1700 today.\*

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to Rober Bone (FCO), Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and David Heyhoe (Lord President's Office).

W. F. S. RICKETT

Derek Piper, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 6169

cc. Feo.  
no  
w/c office

D/S of S/PS/10

16th December 1982

*Pl type as amended*

*Wk  
17/12*

*Alan W. D. J. E.*

*ATC*

*I am not entirely happy with this. Perhaps we could discuss.*

*Wk*

*16/12*

You sent to me last Monday a copy of a letter the Prime Minister had received from Dr David Owen MP about control of cruise missiles and the question of further Parliamentary debate.

I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send, which has been approved by my Secretary of State.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*Alan W. D. J. E.*

(D T PIPER)

W F S Rickett Esq

Thank you for your letter of 8<sup>th</sup> December about the Question you put to me in the House on 2<sup>nd</sup> December.

*I have noted your comments on the question of a dual-key system for cruise missiles.*

[In my reply I made it clear that we had not sought any new or specific arrangements for the control of cruise missiles.] In the absence of concrete results from the Geneva arms control negotiations, cruise missiles will be deployed in this country at the end of next year to bases which, as we have repeatedly made clear over the past three years, will be subject to the Attlee-Truman agreement reconfirmed by President Truman and Mr Churchill and detailed in a communique in January 1952.

As you say, the Thor missile system, which was deployed here for 5 years from 1958 to 1963, was governed by a dual-key. But this is not the only precedent. From the point of view of control, there is no obvious distinction between weapons on missiles and those carried by aircraft. Apart from those relating to Thor the arrangements under successive Governments - including the one in which you were Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary - have been those set out in the Attlee-Truman agreement. [The arrangements we plan for cruise missile bases are the same as those with which you were satisfied in the case of bases for US aircraft.]

*Having said that,*

~~The whole question of control is certainly in our minds, as I am sure it was in those of previous Governments. We are, however, satisfied that our national interests have been fully protected by the joint decision arrangements.~~ While I note that you do not yourself rule out the idea of purchasing cruise missiles - and this would indeed be normal practice for dual control systems -

I have to say that the cost could be considerable. We had to decide whether limited defence funds were best spent in this way.

Having said this, I accept, of course, that your suggestions are made with the express intention of ensuring public confidence in the NATO twin-track decisions of December 1979. I agree with you that public confidence is extremely important and we shall continue to do whatever we can to increase confidence and to counter the harmful and totally inaccurate allegations that the British Government have no part in the decision-making process in relation to cruise missiles.

Finally, you ask for assurances that no decision should be taken on the deployment of the missiles without a debate in the House. In the debate we had in January 1980 we did, of course, secure the agreement of the House to the Government's policy on the role of nuclear weapons in our defence policy, when the NATO twin-track decision was fully considered. ~~As the Foreign Secretary made clear this week in Brussels, there is no question of reconsidering this policy decision.~~ *we stand by our policy, and,* We would, however, much prefer it if the Soviet Union were to agree to the United States' proposals on the zero option which we have supported all along. That would remove the threat we face from the Soviet Union's intermediate-range nuclear forces, and our own deployments would not then have to take place. I still hope, therefore, that the Russians will come to realise why, from the viewpoint of our own safety, the West simply cannot accept an imbalance between us of intermediate-range nuclear forces. <sup>PL</sup> I remain convinced that unless we proceed with the agreed plans to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles there can be no real prospects ~~for either the total removal of the missiles that threaten us, or some other satisfactory balance which falls short of this ideal.~~

*But there will no doubt be opportunities for the House to discuss these issues before December<sup>2</sup> of next year. For example,*

the statement on the Defense Estimates is always debated,  
and you may put down amendments, as you did this year.



010

Covering TOP SECRET

2

Copy No 1 of 5



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-930 3022 218 6169

MO 18/1/1

15th December 1982

Prime Minister

A.F.C. 15/12

h.a.  
16/12

Dear Tom,

In your letter of yesterday you asked for a rather fuller note than we had prepared before on the arrangements for joint decision on the use in an emergency by the United States of UK bases. I enclose such a note, covered by some additional speaking notes.

So far as the reply to Dr Owen's letter to the Prime Minister is concerned, my Secretary of State will be looking at this overnight and we hope to let you have a draft tomorrow morning.

A copy of this letter and enclosures goes to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)

Yours ever

Arthur Phipps

(D T PIPER)

A J Coles Esq

Covering TOP SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

TELEPHONE 01-335 3000



5 DEC 1982



## CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. WHAT ARE THE PRECISE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BY WHICH THE US USES BASES IN THE UK?

The communique issued after the discussion between Mr Churchill and Mr Truman in January 1952 confirmed arrangements reached earlier between Mr Attlee and Mr Truman, in the following terms: "Under arrangements made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by HM Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances at the time."

2. HOW DOES "JOINT DECISION" OPERATE?

The House would not expect me to go into details.  
/If pressed/ This is a long-standing, well understood arrangement between US Presidents and Prime Ministers.

3. WILL THE GLCMs HAVE A DUAL-KEY?

No. The weapon will be owned and manned entirely by the United States.

4. COULD WE NOT HAVE HAD  
A DUAL-KEY ARRANGEMENT?

A dual-key arrangement could entail the UK's purchasing the missiles and supporting equipment (except war-  
heads) and manning them in the same  
way as we do for our Lance missiles  
in Germany.

5. ARRANGEMENTS WHICH  
APPLIED TO THOR SHOULD  
APPLY TO CRUISE

Thor missiles, which were based in the UK for only 5 years (from 1958-63), are the only US nuclear missile system ever based in the UK to be governed by a true dual-key. Our national interests are fully protected by the joint decision arrangements which have applied to other US nuclear forces based in the UK for many years.



MR RICKETT  
AM  
14/12

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 December 1982

Arrangements for Joint Decision on the Use by the U.S.  
of UK Bases in an Emergency

Your Department supplied some briefing on this question for use by the Prime Minister at Question time today. In the event, the Prime Minister did not make use of it.

Mrs Thatcher would now be grateful for a fuller note on the arrangements for joint decision. I should be grateful if you could let me have the basic texts and any comments you wish to offer on their meaning.

It would be helpful if this could reach me by tomorrow night since the matter could be raised at Question time on Thursday.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

From: The Rt Hon Dr David Owen MP

cc BI  
AJL  
cc BFau(fco)



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

8 December 1982

Prime Minister  
worth reading in full. I have  
asked my NOK's office for  
a line to take.

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

wh  
13/12

*Dear Prime Minister.*

Following my Question to you in the House of Commons on 2 December during Prime Minister's Questions, you stated that if Cruise missiles were to be stationed here the same rules would apply to them as have governed American nuclear weapons here for many years. As the Question I posed specifically related to Thor missiles I would be grateful to receive clarification and confirmation that a similar system will be adopted for Cruise missiles if they have to be deployed in this country.

The agreement reached between Harold Macmillan and President Eisenhower over the installation of Thor IRBMs is set out in Cmnd 406. It provides for a 'dual-key' system, whereby the missiles and warheads were provided by the United States and the sites and supporting facilities by Britain under an arrangement where an American key activated the warheads and a British key launched the missile. The Agreement states:

"The decision to launch these missiles will be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments. Any such joint decision will be made in the light of the circumstances at the time and having regard to the undertaking the two Governments have assumed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

The role of Thor missiles as a deterrent was restricted to general NATO purposes approved by both Britain and the United States. I believe it is essential that Britain has a similar veto power over the use of Cruise missiles should they be deployed here. If the US insist that we should purchase the Cruise missiles, as we did for Thor, then I believe this is a price worth paying - preferably to be a charge on NATO as a whole but if it had to be only Britain I believe this would be acceptable.

As you know Lance short range missiles which are deployed by NATO in Europe have an electronically controlled dual key arrangement activated by American and West European officers. So in fact, if the same rules were to apply as govern American missiles with nuclear weapons, in the past and at present, then Cruise missiles, were they to be deployed, would have to have a physical mechanism not just a political mechanism, whereby a British Government controlled the safety catch. I think you would find

/...



that it would be easier to stand by the NATO dual-track decision during the negotiations in 1983 in INF if the British public had total confidence in the capacity of the British Government to determine whether or not Cruise missiles were ever to be launched from British territory, if they had to be deployed.

You also did not give the assurance I asked, that no decision would be taken on the deployment of Cruise without a debate in the House of Commons. I believe it is essential that before any nuclear weapons, as distinct from launchers or even perhaps missiles, were to be transferred to the UK, Parliament should decide in principle whether or not to deploy. The German Defence Minister has already made it clear that any decision on deployment of Cruise, as a result of the outcome of the INF negotiations, will be taken in Bonn, not in Washington and again I think the British public have a right to know that it will be Parliament who will make their own independent assessment about the negotiating position adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively in the INF talks.

The views that I have on this have received quite considerable public support already and I enclose for your interest a copy of an editorial which appeared in the Daily Telegraph last week.

In view of our exchange on the floor of the House on 2 December I am giving a copy of this letter to the press.

Yours sincerely  
David Owen

David Owen

# THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1982

135, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.4

TEL: 01-353 4242. TELEX: 22874/5/6.

CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS: 01-583 3939.

## NATO'S NEW WILL

THE SO-CALLED NATO "twin-track" policy of deploying a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by the end of 1983 unless the Soviet Union has begun to dismantle its corresponding SS-20s is looking in reasonable shape. A year ago, the same could not have been said. Ill-advised and insensitive remarks by American officials, including President REAGAN himself, about the possibility of being able to limit a nuclear engagement to the European theatre had given the Soviet Union and the self-styled peace movement a heaven-sent propaganda advantage. At the same time, Chancellor SCHMIDT was facing increasing criticism from his own party over his personal commitment to take the Cruise and Pershing II missiles on West German soil, while the coalition government in Holland was divided and fearful of defeat over the issue.

Since then, President REAGAN has succeeded in allaying some, but by no means all, European fears with his zero option initiative (which would mean the withdrawal of all intermediate range nuclear forces by both sides) and an apparently sincere promise of a constructive approach to negotiations with the Russians in Geneva. The political scene in Europe has also changed with governments of the centre-right, both firmly committed to the twin-track policy, taking over in Holland and Germany. The robust reaction from Nato's Nuclear Planning Group to a particularly crude piece of Soviet bullying this week was a satisfying confirmation of the new mood.

It is to be fervently hoped that Nato's new determination will be maintained. It would be a disaster for the Alliance if deployment were to be abandoned or in any way postponed unless the Soviet Union succumbs to a most improbable change of heart. That said, the question of deployment of our medium range missiles has been handled with almost as much ineptitude as the neutron bomb fiasco which preceded it. There are times when it seems that Nato's greatest talent is for shooting itself in the foot. One gesture which might at this stage win over more of the doubters would be for the Americans to offer each country which is to take the new missiles control over one of the safety catches. Up to now, this has been conditional on the host nation purchasing the missile (though not the warhead). As Dr DAVID OWEN has argued, national self respect means that people must feel that it is their government which can stop their territory being used to trigger nuclear war.



**Mr. Peter Walker:** The Government have already made good progress in improving the operation of the common agricultural policy. The agricultural share of the Community budget has dropped from 80 per cent. when we took office to around 60 per cent. this year. We are determined to keep up our efforts for as long as necessary.

**Mr. Proctor:** Is it not fair to say that the fundamental reform of the common agricultural policy is pure illusion?

**Mr. Walker:** My hon. Friend should reflect upon the fact that over the past year British food prices have increased by less than 5 per cent., our exports have increased by £600 million in the past four years and our imports are £1,000 million down. He should recognise that Britain is now obtaining considerable benefit from the changes that we have achieved in the common agricultural policy.

**Mr. Deakins:** Will the Minister confirm that he has no intention of seeking any fundamental reforms in the common agricultural policy which would reduce the price of commodities to the British housewife?

**Mr. Walker:** I repeat that under the Labour Government food prices went up by 122 per cent. Under this Government they have gone up by only 32 per cent. as a result of our handling of the common agricultural policy. The view of the Minister of Agriculture in that Labour Government was that the majority of price increases were due to factors outside the Common Market. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman reflects carefully on that.

**Mr. Colin Shepherd:** Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that in any reshaping or adjustment of the common agricultural policy he will not lose sight of the importance of the continuity of food supplies? That has gone largely unremarked during our membership of the Community, but it is valuable to the consumer.

**Mr. Walker:** Yes, Sir. In the 1930s we made the mistake of relying on world markets, and great sections of British agriculture and horticulture were destroyed. After the outbreak of war we recognised the terrible failure of that policy. I am pleased to say that under all post-war Governments adequate food supplies have been ensured, and under this Government our self-sufficiency in the goods that we can produce has increased from 67 to 75 per cent.

## PRIME MINISTER

### Engagements

**Q1. Mr. Duffy** asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 2 December.

**The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher):** This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House I shall be having further meetings later today.

**Mr. Duffy:** Has the Prime Minister noticed that Britain now imports more manufactured goods than it exports? If she thinks that her policy of industrial anorexia is not contributing to that deindustrialisation and to today's horrifying unemployment figures, how does she explain that the crucial factor in this week's savage job cuts in the

Sheffield steel industry was not her pet alibi of poor quality, productivity or delivery, but a lack of domestic demand, notably in engineering steel?

**The Prime Minister:** The hon. Gentleman must have made a mistake in his reference to imports in manufactured goods being more than exports. The monthly figures give imports as cost, insurance and freight, and they give exports as free on board. If one excludes cost, insurance and freight—which come in invisibles—a proper comparison of imports with exports can be made, and if that is done the hon. Gentleman will find that what he said is not so. There is still a surplus of manufacturing exports over imports. The hon. Gentleman has made a common mistake.

The unemployment figures are out today, and unfortunately the underlying trend is upwards. However, there is a deep world recession, which is affecting other countries in Europe and, of course, our industrial competitors further afield.

The hon. Gentleman implied that we need not take any notice of quality and productivity. Of course we must want quality—[*Interruption.*] The hon. Gentleman suggested that he did not want another homily on quality and productivity, but both are vital. The hon. Gentleman went on to speak about demand. I point out once again that the import penetration of cars is above 55 per cent. If those cars were made here, we should have the steel trade here. That also applies to many machine tools. The problem is not a shortage of demand, but the fact that people choose to buy foreign goods instead of those produced here.

**Sir Paul Bryan:** As the Government are about to come to a decision on overseas students' fees, will my right hon. Friend find time today to press the appropriate Ministers to accept the offer of the Hong Kong Government to share with this Government the cost of giving home student status to Hong Kong students?

**The Prime Minister:** I understand that a scheme has been proposed by the Hong Kong Government, the cost of which would be shared fifty-fifty with this Government, and we are considering it.

**Dr. Owen:** In view of today's NATO Defence Ministers meeting, the considerable public disquiet about cruise missiles and the regrettable position that might arise in December next year if there is no progress at the INF and START talks, will the Prime Minister assure the House that if it were necessary to deploy cruise missiles a system would be adopted similar to that adopted for the Thor missiles, whereby they could never be fired without the physical agreement of representatives of the British Government? Will the Prime Minister assure the House that no decision will be taken in December 1983 on their deployment without a debate in the House?

**The Prime Minister:** We are already pledged to honour the NATO commitment, and I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman would wish us to go back on that. He wishes that there were no need to have cruise missiles stationed here. There would indeed be no such need if the Russians dismantled their SS20 systems. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman wishes that as much as we do. Should cruise missiles be stationed here—they will have to be unless the SS20 systems are taken down—the same rules will apply to them as have governed American nuclear weapons here for many years.