



PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
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12 January 1983

Dr  
12/1

Dear Private Secretary

As part of the series of Ministerial guidance notes on policy presentation issued by the Lord President of the Council, I am today circulating to all Ministers a briefing pack on Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament. It is hoped that Ministers will find opportunities to deploy the material in this pack as widely as possible in speeches and other appropriate occasions.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Andrew Ward".

Andrew Ward

**NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT**

**BRIEFING NOTES**

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There has been much public discussion of late about the issues of nuclear deterrence and disarmament. The Government welcomes this discussion: it is right that everyone should be concerned about such vitally important questions. The attached notes are provided for those who want to understand more clearly the Government's policies. They cover not only nuclear deterrence, but also the closely related issues of arms control and disarmament (which are principally the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and civil defence (which is dealt with by the Home Office).

Ministry of Defence  
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# I - BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR POLICY: THE KEY POINTS TO MAKE

## 1. GENERAL

- a. The Government understands public concern about nuclear weapons; but they cannot be disinvented.
- b. The Government shares the same aim as the unilateral disarmers to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used; but we differ on the means to achieve this.
- c. We have avoided war in Europe for 37 years. Anyone who wants to tear up existing policy must show that their alternative will work as well.

## 2. THE CASE FOR DETERRENCE

- a. The aim of deterrence is to prevent war - nuclear or conventional - by persuading anyone thinking of attacking us that it would not be worth their while.
- b. As long as the Soviet Union possesses massive nuclear and non-nuclear forces, NATO needs sufficient of both to convince them that they could not hope to gain by using these forces.
- c. But deterrence is not the whole story: in parallel, whilst a military balance is maintained, we are constantly seeking lower levels of forces on both sides through arms control and disarmament.

## 3. THE CASE AGAINST UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

- a. Unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain would destabilise NATO and thus reduce the West's ability to deter aggression or the threat of force.
- b. It would not make UK any less of a target for attack because Soviet systems would still be aimed at us as a member of the Alliance.

c. It takes no account of the existing Soviet conventional superiority (tanks, aircraft, guns) in Europe.

d. The Russians, who give such priority to their military power, would never follow our example: they have said as much.

e. It would cut no ice with countries thinking of acquiring nuclear weapons. Their actions will not be influenced by what the UK does, but by their own regional security interests.

f. It would undermine a number of important disarmament negotiations now in train aimed at reaching balanced multilateral force reductions and not merely limitations on growth. If the Russians believe that the West is going to disarm anyway this removes the incentive for them to negotiate seriously.

g. There is no moral merit in abandoning nuclear weapons yet remaining in NATO and relying on US nuclear forces.

#### 4. THE CASE FOR TRIDENT

a. If the Russians ever mistakenly believed that the USA would not come to the aid of Europe if the latter were attacked the United Kingdom's nuclear force under independent control would still deter such an attack. Our Polaris force and decision to acquire Trident are welcomed by all our NATO allies.

b. Polaris will need to be replaced by about 1995; the Trident decision has been taken to maintain this capability. Failure to replace Polaris would be unilateral disarmament. Submarine launched cruise missile alternative would be more expensive.

c. During the period when it is introduced into service Trident will account, on average, for only about 3% of the defence budget per year. Trident is a more advanced system than Polaris. Its extra capability gives us an insurance against any advances in Soviet ABM defences well into the next century.

5. THE CASE FOR NATO INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) MODERNISATION

a. Imbalance of 4 to 1 in intermediate range nuclear forces in or targetted on Europe. Soviet SS20s already being deployed; NATO's comparable capability ageing and increasingly vulnerable.

b. NATO needs cruise missiles to deter the Russians from threatening limited nuclear strikes on Europe in the expectation that the USA would stand aside. The need for them was pressed mainly by the Europeans to show that the USA is firmly committed to Europe's defence.

c. The unanimous NATO decision to modernise its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) was accompanied by a parallel offer to negotiate limitations with the Russians on these weapons. Negotiations have now begun. The NATO aim is to eliminate all INF land-based missiles on both sides.

d. Cruise missiles are not:

- an American plan to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe; they are to deter the Russians from thinking they could do so.
- a new capability: US and UK aircraft based in Britain have been doing the same job for years.
- first strike weapons: their long flight time makes them unsuitable and the SS20s are mobile anyway.
- under sole US control. Matter for joint US/UK decision.

6. THE CASE FOR CIVIL DEFENCE

a. Deterrence can prevent war, but as long as the Soviet Union poses a threat to our security, any humane Government must cater for the remotest possibility that war might come.

b. No civil defence measures could make nuclear war acceptable to the Government but it has a duty to help survivors if we were ever attacked.

c. Any form of attack short of thousands of nuclear bombs would leave many millions of survivors and their numbers could be increased by even elementary civil defence measures. Their survival and recovery would depend largely on the plans which had been made in peacetime and on the implementation of plans by the surviving agencies of government.

d. Our civil defence arrangements, while not so good at, say, public shelter provision, as some countries (Switzerland, Sweden) are in general as good if not superior to that of many other major nations. Warning of enemy attack, monitoring of intensity of fallout radiation, plans for continuation of government and essential services, and public information in a crisis, are all areas where our arrangements are at least as good as other countries. However we are constantly considering what improvements are needed in the light of the risk, and available finances.



## II - SPEAKING NOTES ON NUCLEAR POLICY

### 1. DETERRENCE

We in Britain belong to NATO, an organisation which was set up by the countries of Western Europe and North America after the Second World War, because of the fears caused by Russian expansion into Eastern Europe. NATO is a defensive Alliance; its members regard an attack on one as an attack on all, and are pledged to assist each other. The Alliance has no aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union or any other country. It is, however, the countries of the Warsaw Pact and in particular the Soviet Union, which present the greatest threat to our security. The Soviet Union has immense conventional and nuclear forces - far more than could reasonably be required for purely defensive purposes. The invasion of Afghanistan is only the most recent demonstration that the Soviet Union is prepared to use military strength to achieve its political objective. While, of course, NATO does not need to match the Warsaw Pact weapon for weapon, we do need a range of forces, nuclear and conventional, so as to be able to show that we can defend ourselves against attack at any level. By demonstrating this we aim to deter such an attack from ever being mounted against us in the first place.

Deterrence is not an attractive way of ensuring peace. But at least it has worked: it has helped to keep Europe at peace for over 30 years, despite circumstances that were often difficult. To abandon our security system now, in favour of some alternative which would be quite unproven would be immensely dangerous. Deterrence provides the necessary stability to enable us to negotiate international agreements on disarmament measures which will really give us a safer world if they are verifiable and apply equally to both sides. The possession of nuclear weapons is an essential fact of deterrence: in a world where such weapons exist the NATO alliance must be able to deter their use by an enemy or to resist blackmail based on the threat of nuclear attack.

## 2. THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Britain's nuclear forces are fully committed to the NATO Alliance, but they remain ultimately under the control of the United Kingdom Government. It is this independent control which makes their contribution to deterrence so important. Even if the Russians, perhaps some time in the future, thought they could take the risk of attacking the Alliance in the mistaken belief that the United States would not be prepared to use its nuclear weapons, they would also have to take account of those weapons - with enormous destructive power - in European hands. The risks and uncertainties they would face in starting a war would be so much greater. So therefore would the likelihood that they would be deterred. We have made this unique contribution to Alliance deterrence for over twenty-five years. Our Allies have repeatedly and clearly recognised its importance. To give it up, or let it fade away, would be an act of folly at a time when Soviet military power is growing at an alarming rate, and the disparity between the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact is continuing to widen.

### The Decision to Acquire Trident

Our Polaris submarines first came into service in the 1960s. They will continue to provide a formidable deterrent for the next decade or so. But it will become increasingly difficult and costly to maintain both submarines and missiles in service beyond the mid 1990s. In addition to being fully under United Kingdom control, any replacement system must be able to pose a convincing threat. In other words it must be able to inflict damage on the Soviet Union out of all proportion to any gains they might hope to make by attacking us. It must also be invulnerable to surprise attack. The choice of another nuclear-propelled submarine, like the Polaris boats, as the vehicle to carry the weapons was essentially dictated by this need for invulnerability. Unlike any land-based system these submarines are almost impossible to detect once deployed in the deep oceans.

The choice of missile lay between another ballistic missile like Polaris, or a cruise missile. Cruise missiles cost less each. But much larger numbers are needed to provide an equivalent deterrent threat, and they are much more

vulnerable to long-term improvements in Soviet defences. Because of the larger numbers, cruise missiles would need many more submarines, and these are the most expensive single component of a new force. A cruise missile force would therefore cost more. It would also be more uncertain than a ballistic missile force. For a deterrent capability intended to last well into the next century, Trident has clear advantages over any other ballistic missile system on both operational and cost grounds. Its purchase from the US, on very favourable terms, will allow us to continue the highly successful collaboration which we have over Polaris. The decision to go for the Trident II (D5) system rather than the previously announced Trident I (C4) system is to retain commonality with the US Navy and avoid problems of the UK having to operate a unique system. This will save money overall. It is not because we need the increased accuracy or capability of the D5 missile. The decision to process Trident missiles in the US is also to take advantage of commonality and save money. It will not lessen the independence of the UK deterrent.

#### The Cost of Trident

Trident will clearly be a major item in the defence programme. But it is similar to other major programmes like the Tornado aircraft, taking about 3% of the total defence budget on average during the period when it is introduced into service. Once in service it will, like Polaris, be very economical in running costs and its demand on skilled Service manpower. Over the last twenty-five years we have devoted between 2% and 10% of the defence budget to our strategic nuclear forces, so Trident does not represent any dramatic change. It should not be seen as an addition to the defence programme, but an integral part of it. The Trident programme will not prevent continued improvements in other areas of Britain's contribution to NATO. But it is hard to imagine any way in which this money could be spent on other defence uses which would make such a major contribution to the collective security of the Alliance. The most costly part of the system, the Trident submarines, will be built in the UK.

### 3. GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCMs)

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have had intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe for many years. For the last ten years NATO's forces have comprised F111 and Vulcan aircraft based in the UK. The Vulcans have left RAF service, leaving approximately 170 F111 aircraft. Over this period the Russians have been modernising and increasing their equivalent forces, so that they now have at least 850 INF missiles and aircraft deployed against Europe, including the formidable new SS-20 missile system. NATO's small force is ageing and becoming increasingly vulnerable to new Soviet weapons. For NATO to do nothing in these circumstances would result in a reduction in military capability and show a lack of resolve to maintain Alliance security. It could give the Russians the impression that they could somehow use their growing nuclear arsenal to threaten limited nuclear strikes against Western Europe from a sanctuary in the Soviet Union - strikes which they would judge as being not sufficiently devastating as to provoke an all-out response with strategic weapons. For all these reasons the Alliance judged that some modernisation of its capability was necessary to sustain deterrence. Therefore, in December 1979 NATO Ministers decided unanimously to introduce Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe, starting in 1983.

In parallel with this decision to deploy GLCMs and Pershings the Alliance also agreed that the United States should make an offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate about limiting the numbers of these intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe. As an indication that NATO was not seeking an arms race, the US unilaterally withdrew 1000 nuclear warheads from the European stockpile and have undertaken to withdraw further warheads on a one-for-one basis as the new missiles are deployed. In response to this offer, the Soviet Union initially refused to talk, but eventually they agreed to negotiations which began on 30 November 1981. Just before the start of these negotiations the US proposed a 'zero option' for discussion, ie they will cancel the planned Pershing II and cruise deployments if the Russians will dismantle all their equivalent SS4, 5 and 20 missiles. The limitations must be on all systems world-wide, since the SS20 has sufficient range to strike targets in Europe when based east of the Ural Mountains.

If it could be achieved such an agreement would increase confidence between East and West and pave the way for further negotiations on other systems.

The NATO decision of December 1979 underlines the American commitment to the defence of Europe. It is not part of some plot to ensure that a limited war can be fought on European soil which will not involve the super powers. Nor does it mean that Britain is made more of a target for nuclear attack. The Americans have never assumed that they could limit a nuclear war to Europe. It was in fact the Europeans themselves who wanted cruise missiles in Europe to deter the Russians from any belief that they could fight a nuclear war in Europe without putting Russian territory at risk. Cruise missiles do not give NATO a new capability. They simply modernise an existing capability hitherto provided by Vulcan and F111 aircraft.

#### 4. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Like all members of the United Nations, Britain is committed to the search for realistic and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament which will reduce the balance of forces while maintaining security, both national and international, at lower levels of risk and expense. Our aim is the prevention of war and the creation of conditions in which the world can move towards greater prosperity and co-operation.

We are working to achieve balanced disarmament in both nuclear and conventional forces, through a gradual step-by-step process. This follows closely the approach endorsed by the international community at the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. But as the Final Document of UNSSD I recognised, progress towards world disarmament will depend not on declarations of intent but on the successful negotiation of a number of specific arms control measures.

For example, we have given our strong support to the US objective of negotiating a 'zero level outcome' in the current talks with the Soviet Union on limiting intermediate range nuclear forces, such as the Cruise and SS20 missiles, and we are taking a full part in the NATO consultations on this

subject. We have also supported the efforts of the United States and Soviet Union to reach agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, and we have welcomed the intention to make these Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

We support the objective of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and are taking part in discussions in the Committee on Disarmament to this end. As a depositary power for the Non-Proliferation Treaty we have worked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and we have given the non-nuclear states an assurance about nuclear weapons not being used against them. We support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where nuclear weapons are not already deployed. We have signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on the prevention of accidental nuclear war.

Britain initiated the Biological Weapons Convention - the only genuine disarmament measure since World War II - and our proposals led to a satisfactory outcome of the review conference held in 1980. Our draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in 1976 was a major contribution to the discussions which are continuing in Geneva. We also introduced the draft Convention on Inhumane Weapons which was adopted by a UN Conference in 1980. We have supported the proposal for a UN study on the limitation of conventional forces and weapons.

In the Madrid follow-up meeting to the Helsinki Agreement, which began in 1980, we and our allies have backed the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe to negotiate militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence-building measures applicable to the whole continent of Europe, including the European part of the Soviet Union. We continue to work for agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, where the West has recently tabled new proposals aimed at making progress.

Britain submitted proposals for a comprehensive programme of disarmament being discussed in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. This was discussed at the second UN Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982 where a World Disarmament Campaign was agreed. All this adds up to

considerable international activity in the field of disarmament, in which Britain is fully involved.

The ultimate goal of UN members is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. But universal disarmament will not be achieved overnight. It will be a long haul and there will be setbacks. Prospects at the moment are clouded by the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the persistent pressure on Poland. A further major problem lies in the closed nature of the Russian system, and their unwillingness to provide information or allow independent on-site inspections, as part of the process of verifying that disarmament agreements are being respected. But we believe negotiation is the best way forward, and we shall persevere with our efforts throughout the arms control and disarmament field, although it would be unrealistic to claim it could be done in six years, as some people have suggested.

Against this background of multilateral effort, the Government do not accept that unilateral disarmament is a rational policy. Britain and its allies maintain nuclear weapons as part of a wider defence effort to deter Soviet aggression. Any unilateral reduction by the West would weaken its ability to deter aggression and could therefore increase rather than decrease the risks of war. Nor would Britain be safer without nuclear weapons: our key geographical position in the alliance would still make us a tempting target in any war. Moreover, unilateral nuclear disarmament takes no account of conventional forces in Europe where the existing imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact without the restraint imposed by nuclear weapons, would be a source of great uncertainty and threat.

There is no evidence to suggest that unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain would persuade others to follow suit. The Russians have said quite clearly that they would not do so. It would not therefore be a significant step in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe. Nor is there any reasons to think that it would help to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the world. This must be done by other means. Above all, there is the danger that talk of unilateral moves will encourage the Russians to block any negotiations in the belief that if they wait long

enough the West will disarm on its own, damaging its security interests without obtaining Soviet concessions in return.

We believe the best hopes for progress lie in a measured approach by negotiation. We cannot hope to secure balanced agreements from a position of military weakness, and thus there is a fundamental link between progress towards disarmament and the maintenance of a satisfactory armed defence against aggression.

#### 5. CIVIL DEFENCE

NATO and the UK seek to avoid war through deterrence. That policy has succeeded and will continue to do so provided the Alliance maintains its unity and strength. But as long as we believe that the Soviet Union proves a real threat to our security any humane Government must cater for even the remotest possibility that deterrence might fail and that war might come. If that ever happened our basic civil defence arrangements could save millions from the effects of nuclear attack. These arrangements include an effective warning of attack and fallout radiation, practical advice to help people survive the attack, stockpiles of vital supplies, arrangements for medical care and the continuation of government at all levels to organise recovery. No civil defence arrangements could possibly reduce the consequences of a large scale nuclear attack to a level which would make nuclear war acceptable to the UK. But it is the Government's duty to be able to help survivors if we were ever attacked, remote as that possibility is.



III - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT NUCLEAR POLICY

Q1. ISN'T HIGH EXPENDITURE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNACCEPTABLE AT A TIME WHEN SPENDING ON, FOR EXAMPLE, HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IS BEING DRASTICALLY REDUCED?

A1. The Government understands and sympathises with the feelings of those people who believe that money devoted to defence would, at a time of economic stringency, be better spent on other areas of public expenditure. However, the first responsibility of the Government must be the security of the nation, and if they were to put that security at risk by inadequate precautions they would inevitably endanger all the things such as health, education and social welfare, which we quite rightly value in our society. We, and a good many others, learnt that lesson the hard way in the 1930s and World War II.

Q2. ISN'T IT BETTER TO BE RED THAN DEAD?

A2. The question presents a false choice: these are not the only alternatives open to us. Indeed the central objective of the Government's defence policy is to ensure that we never have to face such a choice. We belong to NATO, and are committed with our Allies to the strategy of deterrence. The aim of this strategy is to make it clear to any potential aggressor that any attack on any NATO member would involve risks to himself out of all proportion to the advantages which he might hope to gain. We have had both peace and freedom in Western Europe for some 37 years now - our defence policies, including deterrence, have seen to that. As long as we maintain deterrence, we see no reason why the British people should ever have to decide whether to be "red or dead".

Q3. ISN'T 'DETERRENCE' AN OBSOLETE EXCUSE FOR THE ARMS RACE?

A3. We have to accept that nuclear weapons, including the knowledge, technology and materials necessary to make them, exist in both East and West. The policy of all British Governments in recent times, and all our Western Allies, is based on nuclear deterrence: to ensure that the Soviet leadership can never calculate that any possible gain from starting a war against us would be worth the risks. But that is not the end of it. No-one - especially from within the ethical traditions of the free world - can rest comfortably on such a policy alone as the basis of international peace for the rest of time. That is why we have to search unremittingly for better ways of ensuring a stable world. Vital amongst these is the Government's commitment to pursue effective measures of arms control and disarmament. But in the meantime, for deterrence to remain effective, we must from time to time modernise our equipment as existing systems become obsolete.

Q4. AREN'T YOU NOW PLANNING FOR A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR?

A4. The West does not believe that nuclear weapons could be used to achieve a military victory in any meaningful sense; and once nuclear exchanges began there would be an appalling risk of escalation into all-out nuclear war. We and our Allies need no convincing of this.

But we also have to convince the Russians that they could not hope to win a limited nuclear war either. With the deployment of accurate modern weapons like the SS20 missile system, the Russians have greatly improved their ability to mount limited nuclear strikes on our military bases and war-ships. The purpose of, for example, mobile cruise missiles is to demonstrate that we have the means of responding to such attacks (and of evading them) without having to resort immediately to all-out retaliation.

We have no desire to fight a limited nuclear war and no belief that we could in any sense win one; our aim is simply to ensure that the Russians do not believe that they could win one.

Q5. WHY HAVE YOU DECIDED TO BUY TRIDENT AND IN PARTICULAR THE D5 MISSILE?

A5. The existing Polaris force entered service in the 1960s. By the 1990s it will be approaching the end of its useful life - in particular the submarine hulls and associated machinery will start wearing out. To fail to plan to replace it - which means taking decisions now because of the long time it takes to get defence equipment into service - would be to give up unilaterally our independent deterrent - which has helped keep the peace in Europe for over 30 years. It could make war more likely, not less. Trident, which is again a submarine based ballistic missile system, is the most effective way of ensuring the UK has a credible strategic deterrent until well into the 21st century.

It was originally intended to adopt the Trident I C4 system, which would be adequate to meet the UK's deterrent needs. However this will be phased out of US service earlier than expected. So as to retain commonality and avoid problems of the UK having to support a system which only it operates ("uniqueness") the Government has decided to go instead for the Trident II (D5) system. This will be cheaper in the longer run, and it will still only cost on average about 3% of the defence budget over the next 18 years. D5 was not chosen because of the increased accuracy or capability of the missile system.

Q5A. WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO PROCESS TRIDENT MISSILES IN THE US?

A5A. Again, to take advantage of commonality with the US Navy System and to save money (several hundred million pounds compared with earlier plans). This decision will not increase the UK's dependence on US facilities; modern technology means that the missiles will remain at sea in the submarines for much longer periods than is the case with Polaris.

Q6. CRUISE MISSILES ARE "FIRST STRIKE" WEAPONS - HOW DO YOU RECONCILE THIS WITH A POLICY OF DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE?

A6. A "first strike" means a surprise attack intended to destroy an opponent's nuclear weapons and, hence, remove his ability to retaliate. Cruise missiles are neither intended for a "first strike" role, nor are they capable of it.

NATO concepts of deterrence do not envisage any type of "first strike" - the main aim is to maintain the peace. But in any event, as the Soviet Union can see quite clearly, the West has not and is not developing the physical capability for a "first strike" strategy even if we wanted one.

Cruise missiles, because of their slow speed, would take 3-4 hours to reach the Soviet Union from the UK, and the target missiles could have been launched from their silos well before they arrived. The number to be deployed in Europe is much smaller than the number of Soviet missile silos, and in addition the Russians have now deployed over 300 mobile SS20 ballistic missiles, of which over two thirds face Western Europe, and those are invulnerable to attack once they have deployed away from their main bases. Like the West, the Soviet Union also has missilefiring submarines with nearly 1,000 ballistic missiles which provide the ultimate guarantee against any attempt to mount a first strike attack.

Q7. YOU SAY THAT NATO DOES NOT PLAN A FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE, BUT SURELY THAT IS NOT WHAT MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID?

A7. NATO's strategy of flexible response makes clear that, faced with the possibility of overwhelming defeat at the conventional level, the Alliance reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in its defence. The purpose of such use would not in any way be to attempt to fight so-called "limited nuclear war" - it would rather be to underline to the aggressor NATO's resolve to defend itself and make clear to him the appalling risks he would be running if he persisted in his aggression. In this way, NATO would seek to make him cease his aggression and withdraw. The fact that the Alliance has necessarily thought through all its possible courses of action in the worst possible case should not be interpreted to mean that such an outcome is regarded as probable or even likely; nor should it be allowed to obscure the fact that NATO's strategy remains essentially one of deterrence.

[Note: Essential for questioner to recognise 'first strike' and 'first use' are technical terms which often become confused. As explained in the answer to Q5 'first strike' means a surprise nuclear attack designed to destroy an opponent's nuclear weapons and hence its ability to retaliate. It forms no part of any NATO intentions. 'First use' means using nuclear weapons first in an existing conventional conflict. NATO recognises this is a course which cannot be ruled out in advance, for example, in a situation where the Alliance was facing defeat at the conventional level. This is not to say that it would not be a course involving a very great degree of risk.]

Q8. WHY SHOULD WE TRUST THE UNITED STATES WHEN THEY CLEARLY INTEND TO LIMIT ANY FUTURE WAR TO EUROPE?

A8. If the US wanted to limit any future war to Europe without themselves being involved, the last thing they should do would be to station their forces and their nuclear weapons in Europe. The decision to deploy US Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe enhances deterrence by demonstrating to the Russians that the US see the defence of Europe as indissoluble from the defence of their own country. The Russians would know very well that the US President had agreed to any decision to fire the missiles and in fact they have stated that they would regard any attack by US nuclear weapons in Europe as coming from the US itself. There can be no illusion therefore on either side that Europe can be fought over in a limited war, away from superpower sanctuaries.



Q9. WHY ARE CRUISE MISSILES UNDER SOLE US CONTROL?

A9. The use of the bases concerned in an emergency will be a matter for joint decision between the two Governments, in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. This is exactly the same arrangement under which US nuclear forces have been deployed in the UK for nearly 30 years. There is no point of principle involved here; the option of having a "dual-key" was open to us. We could have taken it up if we had purchased the missiles and supporting equipment and provided British servicemen to man them, with the United States providing only the nuclear warheads. But this would have cost hundreds of millions of pounds and required over 1,000 additional British servicemen. We judged this was not the best way to use our limited defence resources, especially as we are satisfied with the arrangements for joint decision that have existed for 30 years.

Q10. HAVEN'T CRUISE MISSILES TURNED THE UNITED KINGDOM, ESPECIALLY GREENHAM COMMON AND MOLESWORTH, INTO A PRIME SOVIET TARGET?

A10. If a war should break out our political, geographical and industrial importance would inevitably make the United Kingdom a primary target. But there is no reason to suppose that the cruise missile peacetime bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth would be priority targets. The missiles would be moved from their bases to secret locations in times of tension to prevent the enemy being able to make a direct attack on them. These dispersal locations do not need any advance preparation since the only requirement is for a reasonably level piece of ground with some concealment against air attack. Cruise missiles can be moved from one site to another at frequent intervals. However the key point is that the presence of cruise missiles will make a war less likely in the first place. Nuclear weapons have been based in the UK for more than 30 years with precisely this aim.

Q11. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT 'ZERO OPTION' OFFER MEANS, AND WHY THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT ACCEPTED IT?

All. President Reagan - with the agreement of NATO - has offered to cancel the whole of the planned NATO deployments of Pershing II and cruise missiles if the Russians will dismantle all their equivalent missiles (the SS4s, 5s and 20s). This bold and imaginative proposal is the most important arms control offer since the start of the original SALT negotiations. Discussions between the US and the Soviet Union on reducing these intermediate range nuclear weapons started in Geneva on 30 November 1981. The United States has made it plain that it will consider any genuine and constructive proposals advanced by the Soviet Union during these negotiations.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union so far (a reduction to 300 'medium range systems' on each side by 1990) would merely perpetuate Soviet superiority in these types of systems and, if agreed, allow them to retain all their modern missiles while preventing NATO from introducing any similar systems. The freeze on SS20 deployments announced by President Brezhnev in March 1982 may appear a step in the right direction, but it does not go nearly far enough. It applies only to Europe which can still be threatened by missiles deployed well back in the Soviet Union, and comes after a period of sustained build up by the Russians who have now deployed a total of 300 SS 20s.

Q12. WHAT WERE THE OTHER PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT REAGAN?

A12. In his speech on 18 November 1981, President Reagan put forward proposals covering four areas:

(1) Intermediate range nuclear forces targetted on Europe (the 'zero-option) - see previous Q.

(2) A resumption of talks on strategic weapons. To be rechristened START, (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), instead of SALT, (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), to signify a desire to seek substantial reductions as opposed to limitations on these weapons.

(3) Reducing conventional forces in Central Europe.

(4) Confidence building measures to strengthen arrangements for reducing the risk of war starting by accident or miscalculation.

Taken together, this set of proposals offers a major opportunity to make progress towards enhancing peace and security at lower levels of forces. It represents a genuine and constructive attempt to inject impetus into the arms control process.

Q13. ISN'T THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMMORAL?

A13. The whole question of nuclear weapons raises grave and difficult ethical issues just as much for pacifists as for anyone else. The most central issue is whether it is morally wrong to threaten to use nuclear weapons in order to prevent others using them. The greater good is undoubtedly served by preventing nuclear war.

Whatever view one takes of this question, there is no moral justification for suggesting that Britain should refuse to allow nuclear weapons on its soil while remaining part of an Alliance which relies on them to deter an attack by the Warsaw Pact (which possesses a very considerable superiority in conventional forces). The only logical consequence of unilateral nuclear disarmament is neutrality, and without membership of NATO we would have no means of guaranteeing our security.

In addition, unilateral disarmament by Britain would not prevent others from using nuclear weapons against us; if it increased the risk of nuclear war, then many would argue that unilateral disarmament would be morally wrong itself. Nor is it likely to persuade any other nuclear weapon state to give up their weapons, or influence any non-nuclear weapon power determined to acquire a nuclear capability from doing so. [See also Chapter IV - The Ethical Aspects].

Q14. THE NEUTRON BOMB IS A PARTICULARLY HORRIFIC WEAPON WHICH KILLS PEOPLE AND LEAVES PROPERTY INTACT. SURELY WE SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT?

A14. The 'neutron bomb' which is more correctly known as the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) differs from current nuclear warheads only in that a greater proportion of energy released is in the form of radiation, with correspondingly smaller effects from heat and blast. In other words, there is no difference in principle to nuclear weapons already deployed by both NATO and the Soviet Union. ERWs offer one way of deterring a massed armoured attack by the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe - they currently have an advantage over NATO in Central Europe of approaching three to one in main battle tanks. Of course, there are other ways - both nuclear and conventional - to deter such an attack, and the task of NATO is to find the most efficacious.

It is a gross distortion of the facts to claim that ERWs can destroy people but not property. The point is that they could knock out a Soviet tank attack on the territory of Western Europe without causing massive damage and civilian casualties nearby.

The US decision to proceed with the production of ERWs does not represent a change in the direction of US policy - indeed, when President Carter deferred a decision on the production of ERWs in 1978 he stated that his ultimate decision would be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union showed restraint in its own arms programmes, and his Administration continued the production and stockpiling of ERW components in advance of this.

No proposals have been made for the deployment of ERWs outside the United States, and the US Administration have made it clear that they will consult within the Alliance on any proposals of this kind.

Q15. WOULDN'T UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT?

A15. One-sided nuclear disarmament is not a step towards multilateral disarmament; it is a step away from it. The one is the enemy of the other. For Britain to give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally would do nothing to reduce the dangers of war. Indeed by undermining NATO's ability to deter aggression it might make war more likely. There is no evidence to suggest that any other country would follow our example. In particular the Russians have made it clear that they would not give up their nuclear weapons. Britain is the only nuclear power in Europe which is committed to the common defence of NATO countries. We are an integral part of the balance of power within Europe. The Government would certainly like to see a world in which nuclear weapons for deterrence were not needed. Our approach however is to work towards a steady reduction in both conventional and nuclear armaments on both sides.

Q15A. WHY DOES NATO NOT IMPLEMENT A BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE AS SUGGESTED BY THE PALME COMMISSION AND OTHERS?

A15A. There are a number of difficulties with the Palme Commission's proposal of a 150km Battlefield Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (BNWFZ) in Central Europe.

Militarily a BNWFZ would be of little value, because targets inside it could still be attacked by accurate longer-range systems stationed outside it. Moreover, shorter range systems or warheads could easily be moved back into the zone in time of crisis. A BNWFZ would have no significant effect on the "nuclear threshold" which is primarily determined by the level of conventional forces.

Verification of a BNWFZ would be extremely difficult because the systems concerned are mobile and relatively small and because some are also "dual capable" - that is, aircraft and artillery which have nuclear roles as well as essential conventional ones. But without effective verification a BNWFZ could hardly be expected to build up mutual confidence: on the contrary an inadequately verifiable zone would only increase mutual suspicion.

NATO is concerned to maintain strong conventional forces in order to enhance deterrence and maintain the nuclear threshold as high as possible. That was the primary objective of the Long Term Defence Programme initiated in 1977. In addition NATO is currently studying its nuclear stockpile to see if any changes can be made. The unilateral establishment of a BNWFZ by NATO would do nothing to enhance deterrence, would imply that the territory concerned was less important to NATO than other areas, and would not help the multilateral force reductions which NATO regards as the best way of enhancing security at lower levels of forces.

Q16. WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT DOING ABOUT ARMS CONTROL?

A16. The Government is committed to working for balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures as an integral part of Britain's national security policy. We pursue negotiated agreements because they enhance our security: we recognise that there are some security areas where both East and West have an interest in exercising mutual restraint. To that end the United Kingdom plays a full role in the work of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in negotiations such as those on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe and those aimed at agreeing a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In addition we strongly support American and Soviet efforts to negotiate reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons. The net result of NATO's modernisation programme will be a decrease in the number of warheads in Europe. The US have already withdrawn 1,000 warheads from Europe without seeking any direct reciprocation from the Soviet Union. As the new Pershing II and Cruise Missile systems are deployed, further warheads will be removed one-for-one.

Britain has in the past made a unique contribution to arms control and disarmament. We will continue our efforts to do so in the future.

The Prime Minister re-affirmed Britain's commitments to disarmament - the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security - in her address to the UN Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982.



Q17. ISN'T THERE A DANGER THAT FAILURE OF WARNING SYSTEMS WILL PLUNGE US INTO ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR?

A17. All complex detection systems can produce ambiguous data, and early warning systems are no exception. However, highly trained personnel are constantly on watch to evaluate such data and cross checks would be made with other systems. Also, the decision to use nuclear weapons would have to be taken at the highest political level. They could never be used automatically in response to an early warning system alone.

There are agreements between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (and between the United States and the USSR) specifically to prevent the outbreak of accidental nuclear war: there are also 'hot lines' for communication.

Neither the US or the UK has a policy of launching nuclear weapons purely on early warning evidence, nor do we need any such policy; this is one of the many advantages of having strategic deterrent weapons at sea in submarines.

Q18. WHY DON'T WE SPEND MORE ON CIVIL DEFENCE?

A18. The whole purpose of the Government's defence policy is to prevent war. So long as the NATO Alliance maintains a strong deterrent, the risk of a war in Europe at any level will remain a remote possibility. The Soviet leadership know that if they used nuclear weapons against us they would be running a very grave risk of massive retaliation against Soviet territory. But should such an attack take place, even though the consequences would be appalling, there would still be millions of survivors. No one pretends that survival is possible in the centre of a nuclear explosion. But the further away you are, the better would be your chances of survival with some form of shelter and basic precautions. It is therefore the duty of any humane Government to make some provision for such an eventuality, however remote it might be. However, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to spend large sums on civil defence as long as we maintain our deterrent policies. The purpose of civil defence is to enable our civil resources to respond if peace is broken and there is an enemy attack and the amount of money we spend on it reflects this aim. Of course, we must modernise our arrangements as the need arises and we will be spending about £45 million annually by next year.

Q19. HOW COULD ANYTHING BE DONE IF WE HAVE ONLY FOUR MINUTES WARNING?

A19. It is extremely unlikely that the first hint of Soviet aggression would be a few minutes warning from the Fylingdales Early Warning System. In such circumstances, it is true, we would have no time to activate our civil defence arrangements. But while a missile attack 'out of the blue' is theoretically conceivable, the Soviet Union would have to calculate that Western response to such an attack might be massive retaliation by an invulnerable submarine-launched strategic missile. There is no likelihood that war could start without some sort of political crisis and at least a short warning period of some days during which Soviet military preparations were apparent. Such a warning period might well be followed by a conventional conflict lasting for some days, possibly weeks, before the war either stopped or escalated to some level of nuclear exchange. During all this time the government would be implementing its plans for advice to and protection of the public, for the continuation of essential services, and for the continuity of organised government. If, during a period of conventional war, the Soviet Union attacked us with missiles, people would be prepared and ready to take the immediate selfprotective action necessary in response to broadcast public announcements and the sounding of the attack sirens.

Q20. BUT WHY NOT BUILD MORE SHELTERS?

A20. A public shelter building programme would cost billions of pounds. This has to be balanced against the very unlikely possibility of war in Europe. Our civil defence policy represents an insurance policy against such a risk, which will remain remote provided we maintain our policy of deterrence. Our major Allies follow a similar policy, including the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. However, we are by no means complacent and within the inevitable financial constraints ways of improving our arrangements are constantly under review.

Q21. SURELY THE ARRANGEMENTS MERELY ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF A GOVERNING AND MILITARY ELITE?

A21. Certainly not. Senior Ministers, officials and Service officers would remain in London should a war break out. The Ministers and staffs of regional government in emergency headquarters are essentially reserves in the event of a nuclear attack on Central London. The Armed Forces have similar arrangements. The aim would be for local authorities to continue to provide essential services, and for a form of regional government until central control could be resumed. But control would remain firmly in civilian hands and law and order would be administered under regulations approved by Parliament before an attack took place. The whole purpose of the surviving administrations would be to help the survivors by providing emergency services and information.

Q22. WHAT WILL THE GOVERNMENT DO IF LOCAL AUTHORITIES REFUSE TO CO-OPERATE IN CIVIL DEFENCE PLANNING?

A22. The Government is confident that the great majority of local authorities will continue to discharge their statutory obligations which, briefly, require them to plan in peacetime for the protection of the public and the continuation of essential services in war. The Government hopes that, in a matter so closely related to the nation's vital defence interest, of which the Government is elected to be the judge, local authorities will wish to follow the policy determined by central government and make use of the additional resources which central government has decided to allocate to local civil defence planning. However, the Government is considering the introduction of legislation which will compel local authorities to fulfil their civil defence responsibilities and to participate in associated activities.

#### IV - THE ETHICAL ASPECTS

The following is the text of a letter written by John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, to Mr Michael Latham MP, on 2 March 1981.

"Thank you for your letter of 16th January with copies of the resolution carried by the British Council of Churches at their General Assembly on 24th November, and of the speeches by Dr Greet and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

I am most keenly aware of the grave ethical issues raised by nuclear weapons, with their appalling power. But we face these issues in a world where nuclear weapons inescapably exist. They cannot be disinvented. The Soviet Union is a huge power of totalitarian ideology, with a massive and growing military strength and a proven willingness to use that strength when it thinks it can get away with doing so. It makes no secret of its determination to impose its ideology and its political dominance upon others. In such a world Western Governments are not merely entitled but positively bound to protect their peoples' right to peace and freedom by something more substantial than just good motives and hoping for the best. As Christians, surely we are bound to uphold the essential dignity of individuals against the contempt of human rights demonstrated by the Russian leadership?

Deterrence has helped to keep Europe at peace for over thirty years, despite circumstances that were often difficult. It is still very stably keeping the peace, and the occasional speculation one hears that somehow nuclear war is closer upon us now seem to me quite baseless. To abandon our security system now, in favour of some alternative one which would be quite unproven and which indeed one seldom hears coherently or concretely described, would be immensely dangerous; and accordingly it is not obvious - to put matters mildly - that such abandonment would be of compelling ethical merit. I yield to no-one in my abhorrence of war, especially nuclear war; where I part company with the unilateralist is in my judgement of how war can be most surely prevented.

The hard truth is that without a nuclear capability the Alliance would be unable to deter attack or to resist blackmail based on the threat of attack. Given that, the possession of nuclear weapons by NATO as part of deterrence seems to me plainly justifiable. Its central desire and aim is that nuclear weapons should never again be used, by either side.

So far as the United Kingdom's own nuclear contribution is concerned I would see no integrity in any ethical position which demanded abandonment of our own weapons as fundamentally immoral, while remaining content to shelter under the nuclear umbrella of the United States through membership of NATO. I am, of course, aware of other sorts of arguments urged against British capability, like cost, or the non proliferation considerations which I believe may have underlain the view expressed in the British Council of Churches' resolution in December 1979; but these, with respect, are matters of practical judgement and political opinion, not ethical principle. I adhere to the view taken by all post-war British Governments and re-endorsed recently in public by our Allies, that our capability contributes valuably to the assurance of Western deterrence.

No-one can view these matters as easy, in ethical or any other terms. I note that in their recent statement the Roman Catholic Bishops were unable to reach a clear conclusion. I have much sympathy with the view put recently, in an article from a Quaker viewpoint, by Mr Sydney Bailey: 'Today there is no policy about the threat or use of nuclear weapons which does not pose appalling moral and practical dilemmas' - and he was speaking equally of unilateralism and of NATO deterrence. For myself, I come out where I see the Archbishop of Canterbury does on the fundamental issue: I cannot see unilateral renunciation as the right or responsible course. Like him, too, I look to arms control as a path of improvement. But in the real world, where business has to be done with the Russians, the West will not secure arms control by giving them what they want before negotiation starts.

I deplore, like the Archbishop and Dr Greet, the amount spent on arms. I would like to spend far less, if we could do so without making war more likely. But to ignore that condition - as so many people did in the 1930s - may bring



down on us costs, above all in human life and freedom, far exceeding those of any peacetime provision for defence.

Perhaps I could pick up one other point from Dr Greet's speech. He talks of 'a defence policy that envisages a pre-emptive first strike with nuclear weapons'. If by this is meant a policy that would attempt to disarm an adversary by destroying his nuclear capability, then I can assure Dr Greet that the West has no such policy; nor does it either possess or plan to acquire the sort of capability that could make disarming strikes a real option. Fears to the contrary can rest only on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the nature of modern nuclear armouries and technical developments."

Ministry of Defence

2nd March 1981

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In a message to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, Pope John Paul II said:

"In current conditions deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step towards a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable ..... I reaffirm my confidence in the power of true negotiations to arrive at just and equitable solutions. Such negotiations demand patience and diligence and must notably lead to a reduction of armaments that is balanced, simultaneous and internationally controlled."

## V - THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES

It is difficult to make a simple comparison between the nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Any numerical "balance" cannot take account of such factors as age, operational capability, and numbers and yields of warheads. Comparisons of warhead numbers are particularly difficult since many delivery systems can carry different numbers of warheads and neither side publishes figures about the total number of warheads in its stockpiles.

Moreover since there is plainly little sense in attaching the same weight to an inter-continental ballistic missile and a short-range howitzer, any attempt to draw up a nuclear balance must involve placing the systems into various categories, and these necessarily must to some extent be arbitrary. Overleaf is a diagram showing the total number of systems deployed at the end of 1981, broken down in strategic systems (those defined as such in the SALT agreements) and long, medium and short range "theatre" systems based in Europe. Although the presentation of the figures can be varied, it can be seen that the Soviet Union has a marked superiority both in the total number of systems and in almost every individual category.

Despite this the Russians have claimed that a broad parity already exists in "medium range" systems, and that NATO will be upsetting this balance by its programme to modernise its long-range theatre nuclear forces. However the figures they have produced to support this claim make it clear that their balance has been constructed by selective inclusion and exclusion of systems on either side. Thus they include NATO strategic systems (eg Polaris) but not Soviet equivalents; US aircraft based in the United States but not Soviet aircraft based in the Far East; shorter range NATO aircraft (F4, A6, A7) but not equivalent Soviet aircraft (Fitter, Flogger, Fencer). Although it is possible to argue about where the line should be drawn, any objective balance must include systems of approximately equivalent capability on both sides. If only the longer range land-based theatre systems on both sides are counted, the Soviet Union has a superiority of about 4:1. If shorter range systems of the type the Russians have included on the NATO side are added to both sides, the ratio rises to about 5:1.

It is also worth noting that the Soviet Union first made the claim that parity exists in 1979. Although since then they have withdrawn 150 of their older SS4 and SS5 missiles, each with one warhead, they have deployed a further 180 of their new and formidable SS20s, each with three warheads - an overall increase of 390 warheads. A total of over 300 SS20s is now in service. Meanwhile NATO has not made any increases in its own systems, so, if there was parity in 1979, it cannot exist now. Additionally the Soviet claims about the NATO modernisation programme ignore the fact that the US unilaterally withdrew 1,000 warheads from its European stockpile in 1980/ 81; that Pershing II will replace Pershing I on a one-for-one basis; and that NATO will withdraw a further warhead as each new cruise missile is deployed. Moreover the first of the new NATO missiles will not be deployed until the end of 1983; by which time some 350 SS20s can be expected to have been deployed.

THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES - END 1981 (1)(2)

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS (3)

Soviet Union

818 MIRV	228 MIRV	
1398 ICBMs	950 SLBMs	

156 Heavy Bombers

NATO (excluding France)

550 MIRV	496 MIRV	
1052 ICBMs	640 SLBMs	

573 Heavy Bombers

EUROPEAN THEATRE (Land Based) (4)(5)

Soviet Union

LONG RANGE		MEDIUM RANGE		SHORT RANGE
190 MIRV				
490 Missiles	350 Aircraft	650 Missiles	2000 Aircraft	950 Missiles and Artillery

NATO (excluding France)

LONG RANGE	MEDIUM RANGE	SHORT RANGE
200 Aircraft	180 Missiles	650 Aircraft
		1150 Missiles and Artillery

NOTES: ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

SLBM = Submarine Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

MIRV = Multiple Independently Targettable Re-entry Vehicles.

(1) French systems are not included in this diagram. They comprise 64 SLBM, 36 Mirage IV bombers, 18 S3 missiles and shorter range Mirage IIIA aircraft and Pluton missiles.

(2) The diagram does not include defensive systems such as ABM or air defence missiles and aircraft.

(3) The diagram of strategic forces covers strategic delivery systems of the types defined in SALT.

(4) The European theatre figures do not include some 250 aircraft of the Soviet Naval Air Forces or some 20 aircraft of NATO Air Forces which have an anti-ship capability; nor do they include sea-based nuclear capable systems on both sides which are normally deployed in the European theatre and which have a land attack capability, eg 18 SS-N-5 on Soviet Golf class submarines in the Baltic and 20 A6 and 48 A7 aircraft on US carriers in the Mediterranean.

(5) It is difficult to define precisely the exact ranges of many theatre systems particularly aircraft. These categories are therefore necessarily somewhat arbitrary. For the purpose of this diagram long range theatre systems have been taken as those with an approximate range exceeding 1000 kms; medium range theatre as those with an approximate range between 150 kms and 1000 kms; and short range theatre as less than 150 kms. (Note: some authorities refer to LRTNF as medium range systems to distinguish them from the longer range strategic systems.)

## VI - GOVERNMENT FACT SHEETS AND BROCHURES ON NUCLEAR POLICY ISSUES

Copies of MOD and FCO brochures are available on request. The following list describes some of them briefly.

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 1 - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 2 - NATO

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 3 - DETERRENCE

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 4 - THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The Defence Fact Sheets are designed for background information, rather than 'handout material'.

'NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTING WAR' Essay on the deterrent philosophy which was first published in the Statement on Defence Estimates 1981.

'A NUCLEAR FREE EUROPE - Why it wouldn't work' This explains the fallacy of the European nuclear free zone proposal and includes a map showing how Russian SS20s can strike at the whole of Europe from behind the Ural Mountains.

'CRUISE MISSILES - Some Important Questions' Brief summary of the reasons behind the basing decision, whether Britain has become more of a nuclear target, safety and control aspects.

A further brochure entitled 'CRUISE MISSILES - Some Important Questions and Answers' which covers the same questions in more detail together with additional material on related arms control issues, cost and other matters is also available.

'ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY' - Essay reprinted from the Statement on Defence Estimates 1982 explaining the Government's attitude to arms control and disarmament.

'NUCLEAR DEFENCE: KEY POINTS' - Aide Memoire for speakers.

'THE FUTURE UNITED KINGDOM STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE' Defence Open Government Document 80/23 July 1980. A memorandum setting out the rationale for an independent strategic deterrent and the reason for choosing Trident to replace Polaris. An additional Open Government Document 82/1 'THE UNITED KINGDOM TRIDENT PROGRAMME', dealing with the decision to purchase the Trident II D5 system, was published in March 1982.

Copies of the above material can be obtained from

Ministry of Defence (PR)  
Room 0366  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
SW1 2HB  
Tel 01-218 2386

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The Balanced View - Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control  
Peace and Disarmament - a short guide to British Government Policy  
The Nuclear Debate - sets out the two schools of thought (unilateralism and multilateralism)

Copies of the above brochures, and further information, including a quarterly newsletter on arms control and disarmament can be obtained from

Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
SW1  
Tel 01-233-3907

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A short audio-visual presentation of the deterrence strategy entitled 'A Better Road to Peace' is available to clubs, groups, etc from:

Central Film Library  
Central Office of Information  
Chalfont Grove  
Gerrards Cross  
Bucks SL9 8TN  
Tel: Chalfont St Giles (02407) 4111

A film entitled 'The Peace Game' and explaining how the West has kept the peace, is available from the same source.

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Civil Defence is the responsibility of the Home Office and Scottish Home and Health Department. Copies of official background material on civil defence can be obtained from

Emergency Services (F6) Division  
Home Office  
50 Queen Anne's Gate  
SW1H 9AT  
Tel 01-213-4018.

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The following civil defence publications are available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office (or through main booksellers):

'Nuclear Weapons'	£3.50 (net)
ISBN 0 11 340557X	
'Protect and Survive'	50p (net)
ISBN 0 11 3407289	
'Domestic Nuclear Shelters'	50p (net)
ISBN 0 11 3407378	
'Domestic Nuclear Shelters - Technical Guidance	£5.95 (net)
ISBN 0 11 3407777	