



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 February 1983

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Visit of the Netherlands Prime Minister,  
2 March

I enclose the briefing for the Prime Minister's talks with Mr Lubbers on 2 March. This takes the form of a steering brief, together with:

- A. Agenda
- B. Programme
- C. Telegrams from The Hague on the economy and defence issues
- D. Personality notes on Mr Lubbers and Mr van den Broek

We earlier agreed that fuller briefing was not required in the light of that prepared for this week's Anglo-Italian Summit. I will let you have a draft speech for the Prime Minister's use at lunch by Monday evening.

Mr Lubbers and Mr van den Broek will be arriving at Northolt at 1040. They will be met by Mr Hurd and come straight to No 10 for the talks starting at 1130. They will be returning to The Hague more or less as soon as lunch is over.

Mr Lubbers has now agreed the agenda (Annex A). You have confirmed (your letter of 24 February) the Prime Minister's agreement to the Dutch request that Mr van den Broek be present throughout the talks. In Mr Pym's absence in the United States, Mr Hurd would be available to attend.

The Dutch would like officials to be present at the talks. The following Dutch officials will be in the party:

- HE Jonkheer J L T Huydecoper (Netherlands Ambassador)
- Mr J W Holtslag (Prime Minister's Office)
- Mr J G de Hoop Scheffer (Mr van den Broek's Private Secretary)
- Mr M J D van der Voet (Chief Director of the Netherlands Government Information Service).

/Mr van der Voet



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Mr van der Voet would not attend the talks. The Dutch have not yet decided whether they would like all three remaining officials to be present. They have promised us a reply on Monday. If the Dutch plump for three you may wish us to propose another FCO official in addition to Mr Mansfield who is returning from The Hague for the visit.

*Yours  
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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VISIT OF THE NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER: 2 MARCH 1983

STEERING BRIEF

Introduction

1. Mr Lubbers came to power at the head of a Centre-Right coalition in November 1982. He met the Prime Minister for the first time at the European Council in December. This is his first official visit to London as Prime Minister. He has already visited Paris and Bonn and will travel to Washington later in March.

Objectives and Strategy

2. The visit has been arranged primarily to enable the Prime Minister to develop a good working and personal relationship with Mr Lubbers. The two main items on the agenda for both sides are European security questions and the Community. The Prime Minister may however wish to preface this by asking Mr Lubbers to talk about his first few months in office. They could then briefly review East/West and transatlantic relations in the light of Vice-President Bush's visit. This would lead naturally in to the first agenda item. Although Mr Lubbers may not need much stiffening personally on INF deployment, we need to get across the message that the Dutch attitude will be crucial over the coming months (a point emphasised during the Prime

/Minister's

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Minister's exchanges with Chancellor Kohl on 4 February); that nothing should be done that could prejudice the Geneva talks; and that Dutch opinion should be in no doubt that there is no question of including the British (or French) strategic deterrent. Mr Lubbers is not altogether firm on this last point. Although the Dutch have given a reassuring version of remarks attributed to Mr Lubbers in Bonn in January, it would be useful if the Prime Minister could go over the ground thoroughly on this point.

3. The talks could then turn to Community matters. The key point to make to Mr Lubbers is the political imperative of finding a solution to the budget problem for 1983 and later by the time of the June European Council. We are ready to pursue in parallel discussion of the longer term reform of the Community's financing system, but that will take time and must not hold up a settlement of 1983 and later. There is considerable common ground between us in other areas, notably the internal market, trade and commercial policy, including EC/US agriculture.

4. There are no specific objectives for the remaining two agenda items, world economic problems and indebtedness, and the Middle East, beyond the general one of clarifying the issues in discussion with friends. The Dutch will be expecting a general exchange of views.

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a) European Security Issues, including INF

5. European security, especially the INF double decision, is a major issue in the Netherlands. Mr Lubbers' government are slightly more robust than some of their predecessors, and much firmer than the opposition. But the chances of a positive decision on cruise missile stationing in the Netherlands are still not good. The government are due to take a decision in late 1983 about whether to begin physical preparations for cruise missile stationing; they are also due to put to a Parliamentary vote the decision on whether or not the Netherlands should take the missiles.

6. We believe that Mr Lubbers' personal commitment to INF stationing is firm. A solid majority of his Cabinet also support stationing but there are many opponents within his own parliamentary party as well as the opposition. The domestic political situation is very delicate and Mr Lubbers is probably hoping to avoid further public debate until the publication of the Dutch defence White Paper in the Autumn. He recognises that a failed attempt to secure a positive parliamentary vote on stationing would damage NATO's negotiating position in Geneva. In his discussions with the Prime Minister, his objective will be to avoid having to take a more clear-cut line on INF stationing at this stage. The Prime Minister might like to stress the need for the Dutch:

- (a) to do nothing to undermine Alliance solidarity or to prejudge the outcome of the INF negotiations;

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(b)





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(b) at the very least to avoid a negative decision  
on cruise missile basing, or on preparations for  
it; postponement would be preferable:

<sup>not to</sup>  
(c) give any quarter to the Soviet argument that the  
British and French deterrents should be taken into  
account in INF.

7. On this latter point Mr Lubbers is somewhat unsound. In Bonn in January he was reported as suggesting that the British and French deterrents should be included at Geneva. Dutch officials have said that Mr Lubbers was misreported. According to their version he said that while the Alliance should eventually look for a comprehensive arms control framework embracing all nuclear systems, the time was not right to include British and French forces. The Prime Minister might remind Mr Lubbers that British systems are strategic, and thus excluded from the INF negotiations by definition, like comparable US and Soviet missile firing submarines. Even before the INF decision in 1979 NATO Governments had already agreed that British and French systems should not be on the agenda of the negotiations. It is important that no Allied Government should encourage the Russians to believe otherwise. The Russians' motive is transparent: by using French and British systems in their bogus count, they seek to decouple Europe from the US by preventing Cruise and Pershing II deployments and by removing most existing US INF aircraft from Europe.

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b) European Community

8. The key point the Prime Minister will wish to impress on Mr Lubbers is the political need to find a solution to the budget problem for 1983 and later by the time of the June European Council. He should be sympathetic to the political arguments, despite Dutch opposition to further 'refund type' arrangements. The Prime Minister could remind Mr Lubbers that we were promised agreement on a solution by last November and that since 1980 we have never had to wait beyond the end of May for a settlement for the current year. If there is no agreement by June, the Community faces the prospect of a damaging and divisive row. There will certainly have to be a discussion of the Community's finances at the March European Council.

9. The Dutch want any further temporary arrangements to be seen as a transition to a lasting solution through a reform of the financing system. And they would prefer to concentrate on getting agreement on the outlines of the long term reform before trying to agree an interim solution. The Prime Minister will wish to point out that while we fully share the aim of reforming the financial system in such a way as to remove budgetary imbalances, that will take time to agree and be implemented. Meanwhile our burden, if uncorrected, is running at some 2,000 m ecu a year (over 5 billion guilders). If necessary the Prime Minister could add that we would be willing to continue with the practice begun in 1982 of aligning our measures more closely with Community priorities eg for energy.

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10. On the 1% ceiling, Mr Lubbers is likely to take the line that an increase in own resources will be needed to accommodate enlargement and the development of new policies. We do not see the need for such an increase; as Dutch Ministers have themselves argued in the Council, we need to subject Community expenditure to the same degree of financial control as national expenditure. In particular more needs to be done to curb agricultural surpluses and the rate of growth of CAP expenditure. The Dutch should be sympathetic to this point. However their position on the present price-fixing (where they have supported the Commission's proposals) has not been as robust as we would wish. The Prime Minister might urge them to support our stand and could point out that the Dutch could help themselves to accept lower price rises if they resisted more firmly the proposed revaluation of the green guilder.

11. On the development of new policies, we too see a need to improve the balance of Community spending policies, both for its own sake and because it can contribute to solving the budget problem - although it cannot solve it on its own. We have set out our ideas in 'Positive Approach' (Dutch translation available). She could mention in particular our hope for early progress in the reviews of the Regional and Social Funds, our wish to see a Community coal policy established and our aim of promoting Community cooperation in development and application of new technologies (eg information technology consumer electronics), so that the Community can compete with the US and Japan.

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12. We and the Dutch both want progress on the internal market. They have supported us on insurance. The Prime Minister might suggest that, following the generally successful Internal Market Council on 1 February (and in view of the expectation that the 1 March Council will reach a decision on at least one of the three priority areas on the agenda) we should continue to work for more concrete progress at future meetings. In particular we would appreciate Dutch support in getting services firmly on the agenda, not with the idea of taking these subjects away from the other specialist Councils (eg the ECOFIN, which does insurance, and Transport Councils) but so that the Internal Market Council can monitor and encourage progress.

13. The Dutch are staunch free traders and generally oppose moves towards protectionism, though they usually leave it to the Germans to make the running on this in the Community. We need to remind the Dutch that we too believe strongly in maintaining the open trading system and understand the dangers of a trade war leading to a 1930s type depression; but that they must recognise the need to take steps where the actions of trading partners place excessive strain on the system, particularly where unequal and unfair trading conditions prevail (Japan, NICs, Spain). There are no specific points of commercial policy we need to raise: we agree on the need to reach an accommodation with the US on agriculture, and on the need for any Community action to strengthen the CCP to be within existing international rules.

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14. If the Dutch raise the prospects for the 21/22 March European Council, the Prime Minister might point out that this looks like having a fairly long agenda: in addition to the usual items the Council will review progress on the work commissioned in December (internal market, energy/research, innovation/industrial policy, enlargement) and will need to have a discussion of the future financing of the Community.

15. If the Dutch raise the Council's failure to agree on a uniform electoral system in time for the 1984 Parliament elections, the Prime Minister might point out that lengthy discussions in Brussels have failed to produce agreement on a common basis either for the method of voting or for extending the franchise. In these circumstances we could not contemplate legislation which would have involved a major change in our procedure.

16. The Dutch may possibly raise the Genscher/Colombo proposals which they support. Subject to progress made by Foreign Ministers on 1 March, we expect a text to be adopted at the March European Council.

17. If the Dutch raise yet again the idea of UK support for the European Institute of Public Administration established last year at Maastricht to train European civil servants, the Prime Minister might say that in the current public expenditure climate, we cannot agree to a financial contribution, although we have not finally ruled out the Dutch suggestion of funding a couple of academics.

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c) World economic problems and indebtedness

18. A modest recovery in the world economy is now widely expected in 1983. The Prime Minister may wish to say that while there are potential threats to recovery, they are unlikely to postpone it yet again. There is a continued need for convergence of economic policies to establish stable interest and exchange rate regimes. Continued adherence to prudent macro-economic policies remains essential for sustainable recovery. The developing countries are likely to raise the prospects for recovery at UNCTAD VI (Belgrade June 1983). The Prime Minister will wish to emphasise how important it will be to present Western policies in a positive light. Preparations within the EC and OECD are moving ahead satisfactorily.

d) The Middle East

19. The Iran/Iraq War is now stalemated. Though a major Iranian attack may still come, it no longer seems inevitable. The UK is willing to support an even-handed statement by the President of the Security Council calling for an end to hostilities. But UN action is unlikely to encourage settlement until both combatants modify their conditions for peace. The Prime Minister may wish to say that in our view there is nothing effective that the Ten can do at this stage. We have no leverage in Tehran. But there is a strategic interest in not isolating Iran.

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20. The Prime Minister could explain that the UK contribution to the Multinational Force in Lebanon is designed to demonstrate our support for the Lebanese Government. The lack of progress in Israel/Lebanon negotiations and attacks on Palestinian population are worrying.

21. The stagnation of Arab/Israel peace efforts is dangerous for Arab moderates. The Prime Minister will wish to make clear our concern that the Ten should attempt to inject urgency primarily by keeping up pressure on the US, but also by encouraging the Arabs to exploit this opportunity for peace. (FCO Ministers are considering whether there is scope for a further statement by the Ten at the European Council.)

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VISIT OF THE NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER: 2 MARCH

AGENDA

- A European Security Issues, including INF
- B European Community Topics, in the run-up to the European Council, to include Budget and trade issues.
- C World Economic Problems and Indebtedness, including UNCTAD VI
- D The Middle East





VISIT OF THE NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER: 2 MARCH

Programme

10.40 Arrival at RAF Northolt

11.30 Talks start at No 10.

1.00 for

1.15 Lunch

Mr Lubbers and Mr van den Broek will leave more or less straight after lunch.



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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 49 OF 22 FEBRUARY

MIPT : LUBBERS VISIT: ECONOMY ISSUES.

1. LUBBERS IS CONVINCED THAT RADICAL CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN DUTCH ECONOMIC POLICIES. HIS GOVERNMENT IS TAKING DECISIONS TO CUT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE. LAST WEEK THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION ANNOUNCED MEASURES INVOLVING A LOSS OF OVER 9,000 JOBS , MOST OF THEM TEACHERS AND MORE THAN HALF THROUGH COMPULSORY REDUNDANCIES. CUTS IN THE OVERALL MANPOWER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND A FREEZE ON SALARIES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED. LUBBERS IS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE VIGOROUS EFFORTS OF RUDING, HIS FINANCE MINISTER, TO CARRY THROUGH SPECIFIC CUTS, DESPITE RESISTANCE IN THE SECOND CHAMBER , TO ACHIEVE THE COALITION PROGRAMME FOR A LARGE REDUCTION IN THE BUDGET DEFICIT OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS. DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE POLICE WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE CUTS.

2. THESE MEASURES ARE CAUSING SOME DIFFICULTY IN THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PARLIAMENTARY PARTY (FRACTIE). THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENT IN THE PARY WHICH FEELS MORE COMFORTABLE IN COALITION WITH THE SOCIALISTS THAN WITH THE LIBERALS. MOREOVER, LUBBERS DOES NOT YET ENJOY THE SAME STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE GRASS ROOTS AS DID VAN AGT, WHICH GAVE THE LATTER AN OCCASIONAL WEAPON TO DISCIPLINE THE RECALCITRANTS IN HIS FRACTIE. ON THE OTHER HAND , LUBBERS UNDERSTANDS THE FRACTIE WELL AND HE PLAYS AN ACTIVE AND IN SOME WAYS A DOMINATING ROLE IN ALL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY.

3. THE BIG QUESTION MARK CONCERNS THE AMOUNT OF TIME HE HAS AVAILABLE FOR THE ECONOMIC REFORMS HE BELIEVES NECESSARY BEFORE PUBLIC RESISTANCE GROWS TOO STRONG. HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR ANY EVIDENCE FROM THE UK THAT THERE IS LIGHT AT THE END OF THIS TUNNEL. HE IS ALSO INTERESTED IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OIL MARKET AND ITS LIKELY EFFECT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

4. ALTHOUGH A LEAKED RECENT REPORT OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING AGENCY HERE AND THE LATEST OECD ANALYSIS ARE BOTH PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE DUTCH ECONOMY, PARTICULARLY THE SIZE OF THE PSBR AND THE LACK OF INVESTMENT , I FOUND LUBBERS CONFIDENT AND RELAXED. HIS IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WITH INCREASED UNEMPLOYMENT AND A DECLINE IN GAS REVENUES. BUT HE CLAIMED THAT UNEMPLOYMENT WAS NO LONGER A DECISIVE ISSUE IN THE

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SURVIVAL OF GOVERNMENTS. HE ARGUED THAT THE FALL IN GAS PRICES, WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THAT OF OIL WOULD BENEFIT THE ECONOMY SUFFICIENTLY QUICKLY TO OFFSET ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE PSBR (RUDING IS, PROBABLY RIGHTLY, LESS OPTIMISTIC ON THIS POINT). HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT DEREGULATION, IE THE REDUCTION OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS, TO WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT IS PUBLICLY COMMITTED, AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET WILL PROVIDE A MUCH NEEDED FILLIP TO INVESTMENT.

5. IN SUM, LUBBERS SEEMS TO BE ENJOYING HIS JOB. ON ECONOMIC ISSUES HE DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A FLEXIBLE MONETARIST. HE HAS NOT YET HAD TO DEAL WITH STRONG AND PERSISTENT TRADE UNION RESISTANCE. WHEN HE DOES, THERE ARE NO SIGNS SO FAR THAT HE WILL CHANGE HIS POLICIES AT THE FIRST WHIFF OF GRAPESHOT. FOR THE TIME BEING, THERE IS A FAIR MEASURE OF GENERAL SATISFACTION THAT A DUTCH GOVERNMENT IS AT LAST CARRYING OUT THE PROGRAMME IT HAS PUT FORWARD.

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FM THE HAGUE 221530Z FEB 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 048 OF 22 FEBRUARY  
AND INFO SAVING WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO BONN BRUSSELS

MY TELNO 035 : LUBBERS VISIT : DEFENCE ISSUES

1. I SAW LUBBERS YESTERDAY AND THE FOLLOWING IS MY ASSESSMENT OF THE LATEST POSITION HERE IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONVERSATION AND OF OTHER INFORMATION. MY MIFT DEALS SIMILARLY WITH **ECONOMIC ISSUES**.
2. WHEN I SHOWED LUBBERS THE AGENDA FOR HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER (YOUR TELNO 25) HE SHOWED NO SURPRISE THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY MEASURES INCLUDING INF SHOULD BE THE FIRST ITEM. I SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO DISRUPT THE TIMETABLE FOR INF DEPLOYMENT. I WAS SURE THAT, DESPITE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS THERE MIGHT BE, YOU ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO STICKING TO IT. INEVITABLY ANY FAILURE BY OUR FRIENDS TO DO THE SAME WOULD MAKE OUR TASK MORE DIFFICULT.
3. LUBBERS SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO HANDLE INF DEPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS. ALTHOUGH THE PROVISIONAL PLAN WAS TO PUBLISH THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER IN SEPTEMBER FOLLOWED BY A DEBATE AND A VOTE IN THE SECOND CHAMBER ON DEPLOYMENT, IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO TAKE FIRST THE GENERAL DEBATE ON THE GOVERNMENTS' PROGRAMME FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR WHEN PARLIAMENT RECONVENES AFTER THE SUMMER VACATION. THIS DEBATE COULD BE EXPECTED TO END IN A GOOD VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE A MORE SATISFACTORY ATMOSPHERE FOR THE DEFENCE DEBATE. BUT THE TIMING WOULD ALSO DEPEND ON THE COMMITMENT TO INFORM PARLIAMENT AS SOON AS THE PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT REQUIRED THE SUBSTANTIVE CHOICE OF A SITE OR SITES.
4. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, LUBBERS EXPLAINED, BUT MADE NO EXCUSES FOR, THE QUOTE MORAL UNQUOTE ELEMENT IN THE RELUCTANCE OF SO MANY DUTCHMEN TO HAVE CRUISE MISSILES ON DUTCH SOIL. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE UNDERSTANDING SHOWN BY VICE PRESIDENT BUSH. BUT HE FINALLY SAID THAT IF ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THERE WAS ONLY A 25 PER CENT CHANCE OF GETTING A POSITIVE VOTE ON DEPLOYMENT IN THE SECOND CHAMBER, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WRONG FROM THE POINT OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TO MAKE THE ATTEMPT.
5. AT THE MOMENT THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THERE IS A SOLID MAJORITY IN THE CABINET IN FAVOUR OF INF DEPLOYMENT. VAN DEN BROEK AS FOREIGN MINISTER HAS A CLEAR VIEW OF THE NEED TO STAY IN LINE WITH NATO, AND SEVERAL OTHER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MINISTERS ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW HIS LEAD, WHILE THE VVD CONTINGENT (THE JUNIOR PARTNERS IN THE COALITION) ARE ALSO FIRM.

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6. ON THIS ISSUE LUBBERS SUFFERS, HOWEVER, FROM AN ACHILLES HEEL IN THE SHAPE OF HIS PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, A QUARTER OR SO OF WHOM HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GENERAL AND INF DEPLOYMENT IN PARTICULAR. THREE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS HAVE ILLUSTRATED THIS WEAKNESS. AROUND A QUARTER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT OPPOSED THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO VOTE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGAINST THE RECENT SWEDISH/ MEXICAN PROPOSAL FOR A NUCLEAR FREEZE. LAST MONTH THEIR PARLIAMENTARY SPOKESMEN ON DEFENCE MATTERS (FRINKING AND DE BOER) WROTE A DEFEATIST PAPER ON DEPLOYMENT WHICH WAS LEAKED TO THE PRESS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PUBLICLY CRITICISED BY LUBBERS, THE TASTE REMAINS. FINALLY, VAN AGT IN A RECENT TELEVISION PROGRAMME SAID THAT IF IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT INF DEPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS WOULD LEAD TO WIDESPREAD CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND CHAOS, THEN IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO GO AHEAD.

7. MEANWHILE, PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT ARE PROCEEDING DISCREETLY. AMERICAN TEAMS ARE AT WORK AND THEY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THIS PROCESS SATISFACTORILY AT LEAST UNTIL THE AUTUMN. THERE IS NO PARTICULAR REASON WHY THIS SHOULD GIVE RISE TO PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTY BEFORE THEN.

8. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, LUBBERS IS KEEPING AN EYE ON THE REACTIONS OF THE NETHERLANDS' MAIN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE US, FRG, BELGIUM AND THE UK. IT STRENGTHENS HIS HAND DOMESTICALLY IF HE CAN SHOW THAT OTHERS ARE FULFILLING THE PROGRAMME ON TIME. EQUALLY, DEVELOPMENTS AT GENEVA ARE CLOSELY FOLLOWED HERE. THE POINTS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER MADE IN HER JANUARY INTERVIEW WITH BRIAN WALDEN ABOUT THE ZERO OPTION AND INTERIM STEPS FIT WELL WITH LUBBERS' PRESENT THINKING. HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE BRITISH DETERRENT IS NOW CORRECT, BUT HE HAS BEEN INCLINED TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF A BOW TO DUTCH PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS POINT WITHOUT APPRECIATING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GENEVA. IT WOULD BE WORTH REMINDING HIM AGAIN OF THESE.

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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LUBBERS, RUUD F M (CDA)

Prime Minister since 4 November 1982

Born on 7 May 1939 in Rotterdam into a strongly Catholic family. One of nine children. The family was well off, owning a mechanical engineering business, but the children were brought up to live frugally (and Lubbers still does).

He married in 1963 Ria Hoogeweegen. They have three children - Bart (18), Paul (16), and Heleen (14). It is a happy marriage. The family all attend church regularly, and are keen hockey players.

#### Life Before Politics

Attended Jesuit boarding school in Nijmegen. Studied economics at Rotterdam University. PhD in 1962; wrote thesis on 'The influence of differences in productivity levels in various countries on the current account of the balance of payments'.

Wanted to pursue an academic career, but pressure from home led him to join the family business: Secretary to the Board of Directors from 1963-5, and joint Managing Director (with two of his brothers) from 1965-73. Held various positions in those years in Catholic employers' organisations.

#### Political Career

Minister of Economic Affairs 1973-77 (in Cabinet led by Den Uyl). Member of Second Chamber 1977-82 (floorleader of the Christian Democrats from November 1978). In December 1977 chose to remain floorleader rather than become Minister of Housing in the 1977-81

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van Agt Cabinet (Finance, the post he wanted, went to Andriessen, now the Dutch Commissioner in Brussels). Prime Minister since 4 November 1982.

Was never part of the old KVP (Catholic) establishment, and in his early years in politics was on the left of the party. His Cabinet experiences have moved him to the centre of the CDA. He sees the CDA as a centre party: with a dual rôle, putting a brake on the Socialists and ensuring that the need for a social conscience is not forgotten by the extreme right. He is known to feel that van Agt moved the image of the CDA too far to the right.

Has few political enemies, and equally few close friends. His approach is pragmatic, rather than ideological: he is not given to sermons on the principles of Christian Democracy. He searches for the middle ground, in order to achieve consensus, and is a bridge-builder par excellence. If he gains his point he can be extremely flexible on language.

#### Personality

A pleasant, indeed in some respects charming man - but seen by many as sphinx-like, and full of riddles. Habitually shows very little of his hand, and keeps himself tightly buttoned up. Something of a loner (he likes cemeteries).

With the habitual restraint goes an opaque verbal style which, many think, is often deliberate. His delivery is generally unclear, and he sometimes speaks in short, sharp snatches - which compounds the problem. He is a great balancer: putting first the pros and cons, then often adding afterthoughts, he usually leaves a fairly misty impression. Frequently thinks out loud.

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He is undoubtedly highly intelligent, a hard worker and an expert manager. He impresses others through functional efficiency rather than by inspiring them. He drives his Ministers hard and often knows more about their problems than they do.

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BROEK, HANS VAN DEN (CDA)

Minister for Foreign Affairs since November 1982.

Born 1936

Studied law, Utrecht. 1965-68 solicitor in Rotterdam; 1969-76 company secretary and accounts manager with ENKA in Arnhem; 1970-74 Rheden town councillor; 1976 elected to Second Chamber where he was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and reserve member of the Defence Committee. Played an active rôle in the debate within the CDA on nuclear weapons (he then supported INF stationing).

Pleasant and friendly. On the right wing of his party.

Married. Two children. Speaks good English and is generally anglophile: he spent some time at school in the UK.