CC: MOD 10 DOWNING STREET 23 March, 1983 THE PRIME MINISTER Than The Owen I understand you have asked whether I would have any objection to your publishing the letter you sent me on 14 February and my reply of 9 March. As you know, we have consulted the US State Department. I have to say that I agree with them that public debate about the details of the control arrangements for nuclear missiles can only be of help to the Soviet Union. I leave it to you to decide in the light of this whether to publish our exchange of letters. Personally, / would not do so Commonwell Day out Thelife The Rt. Hon. Dr. David Owen, M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Here is a draft letter to Dr. Owen on the lines we discussed. I have cleared it with Clive Whitmore.

Background references:-

- Flag A Record of my conversation with Dr. Owen
- Flag B Telegram giving US views
- Flag C Your letter of 9 March
- Flag D Dr. Owen's letter of 14 February.




22 March 1983

RESTRICTED

Alan- Over loyan lokeep? See Bu at X. Kay





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 March, 1983

Dear Nick

We spoke this morning about Dr. Owen's correspondence with the Prime Minister about dual control, and in particular the control of Thor missiles.

As you know, Dr. Owen asked, towards the end of last week, whether the Prime Minister would have any objection to his publishing his letter of 14 February, and the Prime Minister's reply of 9 March. When we consulted the Prime Minister, she said that she would be content for this exchange of letters to be published, if the Americans had no objection.

I rang Dr. Owen this morning to explain to him that the State Department would prefer him not to publish the text of this exchange (Washington Telno. 700 of 20 March). I told Dr. Owen that the Americans were obviously concerned that debate about the details of control arrangements would rapidly stray into classified areas and could only be of help to the Soviet Union. Dr. Owen said that he could not accept that the exchange of letters should not be published. He was not trying to make a Party political point and would not publish anything in the week of the Darlington by-election; but the Government were wrong not to accept the case for dual control, and the information contained in the letters was important to the debate on this subject. If it would help us, he would accept some changes to the wording of the Prime Minister's letter, but the essential facts could not be suppressed. He went on to say that he was surprised that he had not been consulted by your Department during their investigations into the incident described in his letter of 14 February; he also said that he was shocked that neither Ministers nor the C in C Bomber Command (Air Vice-Marshal Menaul) had been informed of this incident at the time.

I told Dr. Owen that we had not yet informed the Prime Minister of the Americans' reaction and that I would not be able to do this until Tuesday evening. He said that he understood that we would not get back to him until at least Wednesday.

As I said on the phone, I should be grateful for your advice on whether there are any passages in the Prime Minister's letter that you would wish to amend before publication. I should also be grateful for your advice on whether you feel the Prime

/Minister

Minister should write a further letter to Dr. Owen, saying that she has no objection to his publishing these letters. This letter could put on record any further points you wish to make, and could be published at the same time as her letter of 9 March. You may, however, feel this is unnecessary.

I am copying this to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Jours ever Willie Richett

N. H. R. Evans, Esq., Ministry of Defence

OWONFO 002/20 00 FCO DESKBY 202300Z OO MODUK GR 170 CONFIDENTIAL DESKBY 202300Z FM WASHINGTON 202215Z MAR 83 TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 700 OF 20 MARCH 1983 AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR RESIDENT CLERK). NO 10 DOWNING STREET (DUTY CLERK) MODUK SIGNAL 192130Z MAR 83: PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE ON DUAL CONTROL OF THOR MISSILE. 1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE GRATEFUL TO BE ALERTED TO THIS PROBLEM. THEY WOULD BE HAPPIER IF DR. OWEN COULD BE PERSUADED NOT TO PUBLISH THE TEXTS OF THIS EXCHANGE. BUT IF HE DECIDED TO RELEASE AT LEAST HIS OWN LETTER. THEY WOULD PREFER THE RECORD BE SET STRAIGHT BY PUBLICATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. 2. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE LATTER DOES NOT INVOLVE MATTERS OF POLICY OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THEMSELVES. BUT IN GENERAL THEY BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE, WHERE POSSIBLE, TO AVOID DISCLOSURE OF SPECIFIC DETAILS OF CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN US. IN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CHECK WHETHER IN FACT SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER CLASSIFIED. ON THAT POINT THEY MUST RELY ON OUR JUDGEMENT. FCO PASS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET (DUTY CLERK) WRIGHT NNNN

Mutaxed to thegoes

PRIME MINISTER

Dr. Owen has asked whether he can make public the contents of this letter.

Mr. Heseltine's office tell me the Ministry of Defence have no objections.

Do you have any objections?

Could you possibly let the Garden Room girl know your reaction since Dr. Owen is very anxious to have an answer by Saturday morning, and will ring the Duty Clerk.

WR

18 March 1983

De Due to phone an Dat.

The PM Commented that she was happy her her letter to be made public provided the US knew.

Atter consultations with If I told the Over no decision could be reached until Manday Monumy.