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010

What is known of the alleged SA-12

Soviet ? handwritten

Prime Minister.

7

Ref. A083/1016

MR COLBY

is anti ballistic missile. Some of this needs further elucidation

The Soviet Attitude to Arms Control and Disarmament

I attach the Prime Minister's copy of JIC(83)(N) 4, a Note on the above subject, which was approved by the JIC on 30 March. Last October the JIC produced an assessment on the Soviet attitude to MBFR: this Note looks at Soviet attitudes across the whole spectrum of arms control negotiations.

2. The Note assesses that the Soviet Union does not regard disarmament as an end in itself but it displays a strong and continuing interest in arms control and disarmament discussions. It seeks to use negotiations to maintain or achieve military superiority; to foster the impression that the Soviet Union is a peace-loving nation; to contain both Western defence expenditure and its own defence costs; and to seek visible endorsement by the United States of its superpower status.

3. The Soviet Union is genuinely concerned to prevent Western deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and its current massive propaganda campaign will continue. The approach of initial deployment may bring some flexibility in the Soviet negotiating position over INF but the JIC cannot yet say what concessions the Soviet Union might be prepared to make in return for the West cutting its planned INF deployment.

4. The JIC assesses that the Soviet Union is seriously concerned to reach a settlement in strategic arms reductions. It may seek to link the START and INF talks if this would improve its negotiating position but for the moment it will probably be content to leave the two sets of discussions separate. A major breakthrough in START is not thought to be imminent, but there is some basis for limited optimism over the prospects of an eventual agreement. In other arms control talks (for example on MBFR and chemical and space-based weapons) progress is less likely.

3. Copies of the Note are being passed to the American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand intelligence authorities; and the text is also being released to NATO.

Lindsay Wilkison

R P HATFIELD

5 April 1983

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR HATFIELD

The Soviet Attitude to Arms Control
and Disarmament

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 5 April and JIC(83)(N)4 which you attached.

Mrs. Thatcher felt that some of the paper required further elucidation. This has been provided in a subsequent discussion with officials.

15 April 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

A. J. COLES

EXTRACT FROM JIC(83)(N)4 31 March 1983

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

[This text has been released to NATO]

INTRODUCTION

1. The Soviet Union does not regard disarmament as an end in itself. But it displays a strong and continuing interest in arms control and disarmament discussions. We examine below its aims and motives.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

2. Soviet arms control and disarmament policy must be seen in the context of the Soviet leadership's determination to play a major and preferably dominant role in world affairs and the Soviet belief that a high absolute level of military strength is an essential element in status and in the preservation of Soviet security. The general Soviet objectives in the arms control field are as follows -

a. Security: To maintain or achieve a degree of military superiority over NATO and other potential enemies, particularly China, and so ensure security of the homeland. The Soviet Union will therefore seek to limit Western capabilities while at the same time preserving its own ability to make whatever improvements are important to it. Restrictions resulting from arms control agreements on programmes to improve Soviet military capabilities have been relatively modest, and the research and development on which future advances depend has scarcely been affected. In particular the Soviet Union will seek to prevent improvements in Western capability in areas where it enjoys or hopes to enjoy an advantage, both directly and by attempting to undermine the West's political will to improve its military capability.

b. Strategic stability: To reduce the uncertainty associated with the advent of new weapons systems by limiting such systems both numerically and qualitatively. More generally, the negotiating process gives an added measure of predictability to strategic arms competition and hence added stability in the United States-Soviet strategic relationship.

c. To contain the growth in Western defence capability: To encourage the Western public to press arms reduction on their own governments and to persuade both Western and non-aligned opinion that NATO bears a heavy responsibility for any arms race. Arms control agreements to date have generally operated satisfactorily for the Soviet Union not only because of their contents but also, on occasions, because of the effect they have had in limiting Western defence allocations.

d. To contain the costs of defence: The rate of Soviet economic growth has declined significantly in recent years and is expected to be lower still during the period up to 1985. If defence expenditure continues to grow at current rates the Soviet leadership will have to face choices in resource allocation and living standards might well suffer - though we do not doubt that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay that price if it was judged necessary to ensure continued security. Moreover, the Soviet Union probably fears that Western technology is better equipped than its own to secure a quantum leap forward in military capability. It may also fear that Western technology will be more closely safeguarded in a period of tension than in one of apparent detente.

e. Propaganda: To foster the impression that the Soviet Union is a peace-loving nation against which further military build-up is unnecessary and that peace is to be equated with socialism. To that end the Soviet Union seeks to exploit declarations and proposals on arms control and disarmament and pursues associated negotiations. The negotiating process itself provides major opportunities for Soviet propaganda which has influenced some sectors of Western, non-aligned and perhaps domestic opinion in the Soviet Union, and has caused difficulties for some NATO governments. Provided it can successfully portray an image of genuine desire for arms reduction, the Soviet Union will often benefit as much, and sometimes more, from initiatives and the process of negotiations than from any outcome. Such an approach is exemplified by the Prague declaration of 6 January 1983* where the centrepiece proposal (a Treaty on Mutual Non-Use of Military Force between NATO and the Warsaw Pact) is for the most part a propaganda exercise.

*JIC(83)(WSI) 2 dated 13 January 1983

f. Super power status: To seek and maintain visible endorsement by the United States of its super power status and its right to be consulted on major world issues.

g. Droit de regard: To establish as far as it can a Soviet droit de regard over Western military programmes, particularly in Western Europe.

h. Decoupling: To further through arms control negotiations its wider objectives of decoupling the defence of NATO Europe from the United States nuclear umbrella, in particular by weakening the link between deterrence in Europe and the United States strategic nuclear forces.

i. Proliferation: To prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. The Soviet Union does not regard disarmament as an end in itself. We would not expect it to undertake significant disarmament obligations except in the interest of achieving some, or all the above objectives.

VERIFICATION

4. The Soviet Union is traditionally reluctant to accept Western requirements on verification for disarmament agreements. It regards these as an intrusion and a threat to its security as well as making evasion harder. It has for example refused to allow on-site inspection of suspected Biological Warfare (BW) establishments. (There are no concrete verification provisions in the 1972 BW Convention, to which the Soviet Union is a signatory.) It would prefer to maintain the paramountcy of "national technical means", for example, telemetry intelligence, seismography and satellite based imagery. The Soviet stance on this subject is causing difficulties in a number of arms control negotiations.

SCOPE OF SOVIET POLICIES

5. Soviet arms control and disarmament policy has over the past twenty years covered a wide spectrum of weapons systems. Examples of agreements signed by the Soviet Union and initiatives and negotiations in which it is at present involved are listed at Annex. Many Soviet proposals aim to capture public opinion (Western, Third World and domestic) through emotive appeal rather than their negotiable content. Those having the greatest impact are resurrected from time to time in different guises. The Soviet Union clearly calculates that a continuing propaganda onslaught can be combined with the conduct of serious negotiations on arms control. We examine in the following paragraphs how the Soviet Union has sought to achieve the objectives in paragraph 2 above in the various sets of current arms control negotiations.

START

6. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), as in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which preceded them, the Soviet Union aims to prevent, restrict or delay deployment by the United States of new strategic weapons. It also aims to stabilise general United States-Soviet relations by removing the uncertainties which the introduction of a new generation of Western weapons systems might cause. The Soviet Union seeks to achieve these objectives not only in the talks in Geneva, but also through encouraging opposition in the United States and Europe to the introduction of those weapons. The Soviet Union's negotiating targets include the full range of current United States strategic programmes: long range sea and air launched cruise missiles (SLCMs and ALCMs), the MX intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM), the D5 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and (reflecting Soviet insistence on the strategic capability of these systems) Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM). At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to preserve its own current advantages, especially in the numbers and throw-weight of ICBMs; also the freedom to improve its own weapons, particularly in the areas of accuracy and reliability where they have often been inferior to United States systems.

Warheads by $\frac{1}{3}$ - Cut of $\frac{1}{2}$ in missiles

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Am. - limits on strategic bombers.

And as in SALT II - limits on ALCM (for bombers) ¹²⁰ ^{London} ²⁰ ^{ALCMs}

144000
2 nos.
2nd stage
START
= weight
Rebo present
is 5-6000 mt
by Russian
More than
double weight
U.S.

7. The Soviet Union has rejected the opening United States proposals which would require the Soviet Union to make a major shift in emphasis away from land based systems, of which it possesses the largest, and the greater number, to submarine based systems. It has included in its own proposal measures which would restrict the United States SLBM advantage. ? Sea launched cruise missiles.

(Domehead) ALCM.

8. On launcher numbers, time has seen a modification in the Soviet approach. In SALT 1, where Soviet weapons were acknowledged to be qualitatively inferior, the Soviet Union obtained an asymmetrical treaty which sanctioned its numerical superiority. In SALT 2, when the qualitative gap was narrower, it was agreed that numbers should be equal, but the Soviet Union demanded far higher levels than the United States desired and refused to cut its own forces by more than 10 per cent. At the START talks it has offered in response to United States initiatives a 25 per cent reduction in strategic system numbers and a cut to unspecified but equal levels in warheads. This offer is, however, conditional on, inter alia, agreement that NATO does not deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.

unacceptable

9. We believe that the Soviet Union is seriously concerned to reach a settlement on strategic arms reduction and may be prepared to offer some concessions. It will be cautious about any agreement to a major reduction of emphasis on ICBMs given the possible implications for its own security, or to accept rigorous on-site inspection, despite the fact that alleged inadequacies in verification procedures were a major factor in the US refusal to ratify SALT 2. The need for some co-operative verification has, however, been acknowledged. Western determination to proceed with the upgrading of its own forces will probably increase the likelihood of an agreement, provided the Soviet Union does not conclude that the United States is itself unwilling to negotiate genuine reductions.

INF

10. Although a START agreement is of major importance to the Soviet Union it regards the intermediate range nuclear force (INF) talks as more urgent and these will have top priority in 1983. Its overriding objective is to frustrate NATO's attempt to reinforce the coupling of the United States nuclear deterrent

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016

55 20
1.050 { 729

263
729
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F 111 -170
[Vulcan - force]
F 4 - cant

Bomber
State aircraft
B-70, B-52, B-1
- need everywhere in Europe
+ F-15 (500) - up to 1,600 km

Jayman +
American
= cant
reach
USIA

F-104
500 km

and Europe which was the main objective of the Alliance's 1979 "dual-track" decision. The Soviet Union wishes to prevent the deployment of GLCM and what it claims to regard as the even more threatening Pershing II, in order

(a) to preserve its overwhelming advantage in intermediate range missiles, (b) to forestall targetting of the Soviet Union from NATO Europe which would present military difficulties for the Soviet Union, and (c) to establish an important new principle concerning the non-stationing of longer-range INF ballistic missiles by NATO in continental Europe. The Soviet Union is conducting a massive publicity campaign to bring popular pressure to bear on NATO governments to abandon their deployment plans. It is unlikely to make major concessions unless and until it is clear that the propaganda has failed.

11. The Soviet Union claims that the "zero option" is unacceptable and tantamount to a call for unilateral Soviet disarmament. The Soviet propaganda offensive stresses the dangerous nature of NATO's plans, not the need for mutual reductions. Nevertheless Andropov's initiative on 21 December 1982*, in which he suggested that, provided Pershing II and GLCM deployment plans were abandoned, the Soviet Union would reduce its SS20 holdings in Europe to the level of British and French nuclear strategic forces, highlights the Soviet concern to appear flexible. NATO has always made it clear that the British and French nuclear forces cannot be counted as INF or included in any sense in an INF agreement. Andropov also insisted that any agreement on missiles must be accompanied by an agreement on medium range nuclear capable aircraft. This would in effect maintain the Soviet Union's advantage in this field.

MBFR

12. We consider that the Soviet Union's main interest in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations is to secure political gains (eg by causing division between the United States and Western Europe) while preserving the military status quo. But it might consider it advantageous to make minor reductions in conventional manpower in Central Europe in return for the achievement of other major goals, provided its overall superiority in manpower was maintained. The Soviet Union only agreed to participate in discussions in exchange for the West accepting the Conference on Security

* JIC(82)(WSI) 51 dated 22 December 1982

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and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and there are no indications that it is interested in any MBFR agreement which would significantly alter the present level of forces in Central Europe, unless it did so in its favour. Indeed, since the West lacks any leverage comparable to that which the Pershing II and GLCM deployments have given it in the INF talks, the Soviet Union has managed to stall the negotiations by presenting and essentially sticking to figures designed to prove that parity already exists. At the same time it has been active and skilful in the negotiations in pursuing a range of particular objectives, including (a) a limited initial agreement which would have the advantage for the Soviet Union of securing juridical sanction for its current military superiority in Central Europe and (b) a ceiling on the manpower of the Federal Republic of Germany (set at about 450,000 for land and air-force manpower combined). Demographic trends and wastage in numbers seem likely to lead to the latter even in the absence of an agreement.

13. The Soviet Union nevertheless seeks to give the appearance of flexibility. Over the years it has modified its original position in relatively minor matters and has hinted recently at some flexibility over verification. Such hints have been studiously vague. The reduction area covered by MBFR does not include Soviet territory, and the Soviet Union might therefore be prepared to offer concessions and "confidence building measures"; but we do not expect any major Soviet move such as would lead to the kind of substantive agreement acceptable to the West. The February 1983 proposals by the Soviet Union for initial and limited Soviet and United States troop reductions, and for an informal political commitment to a general freeze on forces and armaments until negotiations for reductions were complete, would not have been expected by the Soviet Union to lead to purposeful negotiations. The proposals ignored the longstanding Western insistence on data agreement and made only the vaguest suggestion of a move towards improved verification measures. Similarly the recent Eastern hints that the talks might be used as a forum to develop a Swedish proposal for a battlefield nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe is largely political in motivation, as it is known that the West would not contemplate such a zone which would put it at a serious disadvantage.

14. The current international climate is not favourable to an agreement involving the Soviet Union scaling down its military strength in Central Europe, even though evidence that a "businesslike" agreement were possible could be used to Soviet advantage in other talks. The conclusion of an INF agreement providing for broad parity of certain nuclear forces in Europe might, indeed, strengthen the Soviet Union in the conviction that it must retain clear numerical superiority in military manpower in Central Europe.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Improved verification
 15. The Soviet Union was an original signatory, with the United States and the United Kingdom, of the Partial Test ban of 1963. It also took part from 1977 to 1980 in trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive ban, but these were broken off by the United States because it did not believe that in the circumstances such a ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear war or maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. They have not been resumed.

E
 16. Since 1980 Soviet policy appears to have been generally to support calls by non-aligned states in the UN General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) for negotiations leading to a comprehensive test ban and for the resumption of trilateral negotiations. The Soviet Union's interest in concluding a ban of limited duration appears to be genuine but it is unwilling to agree to one of unlimited duration unless France and China also sign the treaty. The Soviet Union might see a ban as a means of holding back Western nuclear arms development as well as a step towards limiting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It remains however very cautious with respect to verification, and it seems improbable that it would be prepared to make substantial concessions in this field in order to achieve a treaty. It has for example recently turned down a United States proposal for improvements in the verification procedures of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty ¹⁹⁷⁴ and the Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ¹⁹⁷⁸ (neither of which the United States has ratified). For the moment the Soviet Union risks nothing, since the United States has stated that it regards a comprehensive test ban as a long term objective.

*USSR/USA
1974*

10 verification status

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

17. The Soviet Union currently possesses a substantial advantage over the West in chemical warfare capability*. It is a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons (CW) although, like other states, it reserves the right to retaliate. Between 1976 and 1980 the Soviet Union took part in bilateral discussions with the United States aimed at concluding a comprehensive ban but no agreement was reached, in part because of characteristic Soviet reluctance to accept on site verification. The Soviet Union is now one of 40 countries taking part in a working group of the CD whose present mandate is to elaborate the terms of a convention to ban CW.

18. The Soviet Union publicly supports the objective of a CW convention. It wishes to prevent the United States from modernising its CW arsenal by developing binary chemical weapons** It is also subject to increasing pressure from Western and non-aligned delegations in the CD to be more forthcoming, particularly over on-site inspection.

19. In response to these combined pressures, the Soviet Union tabled a draft treaty at the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSD II) in June 1982, which included qualified provision for on-site inspection of some aspects of the convention under certain circumstances. In subsequent discussion in the CD the Soviet Union has refused to be more specific about the arrangements it would entertain, in spite of persistent questioning from Western and non-aligned delegations. A recent United States proposal has called for the destruction of all chemical weapons over a ten year period and the opening of all production facilities to systematic checks by international inspectors, but a temporary suspension of meetings of the working group has saved the Soviet Union from the need to make an immediate formal response. The working group is to reconvene shortly.

*JIC(81) 20 and JIC(80)(N) 14

**A binary chemical weapon is defined as a harmful agent produced by the mixing together of two relatively harmless substances inside a warhead during its flight to the target.

Annex

V1 double

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Review

- Nuclear V2



20. The Soviet Union is reluctant to negotiate seriously in a multilateral forum where it is exposed to non-aligned as well as Western criticism and would prefer to resume the bilateral talks with the United States. In the meantime, it will continue where possible to try and exploit negotiations in the multilateral forum so as to maintain pressure on the United States to abandon its binary programme. This would enable the Soviet Union to retain its present advantage in that field. In general it is likely to remain obstructive in CW discussions to a greater degree of on-site inspection.

ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

21. The Soviet Union is a signatory of all the various treaties and agreements governing activities in space. The major treaties with arms control implications are -

- a. the 1967 multilateral Outer Space Treaty which laid down the principles governing the peaceful use of space, inter alia banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space or in earth orbit; and
- b. the bilateral Soviet-United States treaties: the 1972 ABM Treaty prohibiting development, testing or deployment of space-based anti-ballistic missiles or their components*, and the (unratified) SALT II treaty banning fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOB's) i.e. the launching of nuclear weapons in sub-orbital trajectory.

Passage of nuclear weapons through space in a ballistic trajectory is, of course, uncontrolled.

22. In 1978 and 1979 the United States and Soviet Union held a series of bilateral meetings with a view to banning the placing in orbit of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons but little progress was made, partly because of Soviet reluctance to consider effective verification measures. In 1981 the Soviet Union proposed a wide-ranging treaty which would prohibit the stationing of weapons of any kind in Outer Space, including 'reusable' manned space vehicles, and destruction or interference with the functioning of satellites. However, the proposals made no clear reference to ASAT systems or to

* This treaty which is still in force is subject to review every five years, but the Soviet Union probably remains largely content with its terms.

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satisfactory measures for verification and appear to be designed to preserve the present Soviet ASAT advantage, which might quickly be eroded if the United States devoted its energies to this field, while countering potential military uses for the US 'Shuttle'. The Soviet treaty has been submitted to the CD along with an alternative Western approach focusing on ASATs. Soviet negotiating objectives may become clearer if, as is expected, a working group is established in Geneva to consider the subject. President Reagan's recent speech in which he called for long-term research on space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence provoked a strong reaction from Moscow, which roundly condemned the President's approach which, it claimed, could undermine the ABM Treaty.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

23. Before the opening of the Madrid CSCE Review Meeting in November 1980, the Soviet Union made clear its interest in a Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe (CMDDE) as part of the CSCE process. This would offer the Soviet Union a useful forum for largely declaratory measures, and discussion of the mandate might help to distract public attention from Western criticism on human rights. In the event negotiation at Madrid has been on the basis of a Western (French) proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) focusing on "confidence and security building measures". The Soviet Union has provisionally conceded that the "confidence building measures" to be agreed at the CDE should be militarily significant, binding, verifiable, and extend to the whole European area of the Soviet Union, but is pressing for a 'corresponding' concession westwards into the Atlantic which is still under discussion. The Soviet Union appears to attach considerable importance to a CDE as part of its public posture on disarmament, but the final outcome at Madrid is in doubt because the West insists that the CDE must be 'balanced' by progress in human rights.

24. There is little evidence of any link in Soviet thinking between CDE and MBFR but it is not inconceivable that the new Soviet leadership might prefer to seek its political aims in the wider CDE forum and would look for a suitable pretext for subsuming MBFR within it. There are, however, powerful disincentives from the Soviet point of view to this course of action in the geographical area comprised in CDE (which unlike MBFR includes all of European Russia), and in CDE's emphasis on confidence building measures. The Soviet Union is therefore likely to be hesitant about adopting it.

OUTLOOK

25. In arms control and disarmament negotiations Soviet motivation will remain partly substantive and partly presentational, the exact mix depending on circumstances.

26. The Soviet concept of equality and equal security differs from the Western idea of parity in that the Soviet Union expects a degree of "overinsurance" which it will not concede to others. Moreover, as much for historical as ideological reasons, the Soviet Union regards a high absolute level of military power as an essential element in its status as a super power. Nevertheless, the Soviet concern to avoid deployment by the West of new missile systems (particularly Pershing II and GLCM) is genuine and it probably recognises that some concessions in the various arms negotiations may be necessary to limit this deployment.

27. In the run up to the initial NATO deployment of cruise missiles by the end of 1983 the massive Soviet propaganda campaign will continue and all disarmament initiatives will be designed to contain major sections whose principal aim is to portray the Soviet Union as a peace loving nation diligently seeking an accommodation with the inflexible and hawkish NATO alliance. If that propaganda campaign is not successful, however, the approach of the first deployment of NATO's modernised INF may result in some flexibility in the Soviet position on that issue but we cannot yet say what concessions the Soviet Union might be prepared to make in return for the West cutting its planned INF deployment. Although the Soviet Union might suspend negotiations on INF, it is unlikely to break them off entirely in a situation in which its aim is to prevent a significant enhancement in NATO's nuclear capability in Europe.

28. We believe that the Soviet Union is seriously concerned to reach a settlement on strategic arms reductions although current controversies in the West (eg over INF and MX deployment) suggest that major Soviet concessions are unlikely in the near future. It may seek to link the START and INF talks if it believes this will improve its negotiating position but for the moment we think it will be content to leave the two sets of discussion separate. A major

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break-through in START is not thought to be imminent, but we believe there is some basis for limited optimism over the prospects of an eventual agreement. In the other arms control talks progress is less likely, particularly if the Soviet Union maintains its current objections to adequate verification procedures.

31 March 1983

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ANNEX

- A. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE USSR
1. Antarctic Treaty (1959)
 2. Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)
 3. Soviet/United States Hotline Agreement (1963) updated in 1971
 4. Soviet/United Kingdom Hotline Agreement (1967)
 5. Outer Space Treaty (1967)
 6. Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967)
 7. Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
 8. Soviet/United States Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War (1971)
 9. Sea Bed Treaty (1971)
 10. Biological Weapons Convention (1972)
 11. Soviet/United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty - SALT I (1972)
 12. Soviet/United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)
 13. Soviet/United States Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973)
 14. Soviet/United States Treaty on Limiting Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests - the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974). United States not prepared to ratify in present form
 15. Soviet/United Kingdom Joint Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1975)
 16. Soviet/United States Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes-PNE Treaty (1976). United States not prepared to ratify in present form
 17. Soviet/French Joint Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1977)
 18. Soviet/United Kingdom Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War (1977)
 19. Environmental Modification Convention (1977)
 20. Soviet/United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty - SALT II (1979). United States not prepared to ratify in present form
 21. Agreement on Celestial Bodies and Moon (1979)

B. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE USSR*

1. Strategic Arms Reduction - START
2. Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Reductions - INF
3. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions - MBFR
4. Ban on Chemical Weapons
5. Limitation of Conventional Arms Transfer
6. Limitation on Military Activity in the Indian Ocean
7. Ban on Nuclear-Weapon-Carrying Naval Vessels in the Mediterranean
8. Non-extension of NATO and Warsaw Pact Activities to Asia, Africa and Latin America
9. Agreement not to hinder the Use of Major Sea Lanes
10. Extension of Security Guarantees to Non-Nuclear States
11. Cessation of Nuclear-Weapon-Carrying Aircraft Flights over Europe
12. Cessation of all Nuclear Tests
13. Prohibition of New Weapons of Mass Destruction
14. Ban on Radiological Weapons
15. Treaty on the Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons
16. Treaty on the Non-First Use of Conventional Weapons
17. Withdrawal of Foreign Troops to within their own Frontiers
18. Multilateral Reduction of Military Budgets
19. Elimination of Military Bases
20. Freezes on Nuclear and Conventional Arsenals
21. Ban on Neutron Weapons
22. Ban on Weapons in Outer Space
23. Adoption of "Confidence-Building Measures"
24. Calls for Disarmament Conferences
25. Abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
26. Establishment of Nuclear-Free Zones and Zones of Peace

* All but three of these measures (Nos 9, 11 and 13) were explicitly mentioned in the 5 January 1983 Prague declaration of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.