

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 MR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 MR EVANS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER. )  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFFICE  
 DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR C U ROBERTS, IAT~~ ) DOT  
 MR A FORTNAM )

HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/SAMD  
 HD/FID  
 HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
 HD/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF

RESIDENT CLERK

**IMMEDIATE**

DESKBY 191300Z

ADVANCE COPY



CONFIDENTIAL  
 DESKBY 191300Z  
 FM UKMIS GENEVA 191200Z APR 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 155 OF 19 APRIL  
 INFO PRIORITY MONTEVIDEO, PORT STANLEY CIVIL COMMISSIONER.

YOUR TELNO 96: FALKLANDS: ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN.

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY WAS ASKED TO CALL AT ICRC AT NOON TODAY. HE WAS RECEIVED BY PASQUIER, DELEGATE GENERAL FOR LATIN AMERICA AND JOSSERON.
2. PASQUIER SAID THAT AFTER MY CALL ON THE ICRC PRESIDENT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 150 THE ICRC HAD REVIEWED THE WHOLE AFFAIR, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT FURTHER NEWS REPORTS FROM ARGENTINA OF DESTEFANIS'S ACTIVITIES. THEY HAD DECIDED THAT, IN VIEW OF DESTEFANIS'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO SET SAIL IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH HIM, THEY HAD TO CLARIFY THEIR POSITION. THEY PROPOSED TO SEND TO US THIS AFTERNOON A STATEMENT SETTING OUT THEIR ATTITUDE IN DETAIL. THE SAME TEXT WOULD ALSO BE CONVEYED TO DESTEFANIS AND SEPARATELY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT BY THE ICRC DELEGATE IN BUENOS AIRES, CORTHESEY. ALTHOUGH ICRC POLICY IS NORMALLY TO GIVE NO (NO) PUBLICITY TO SUCH MATTERS, THEY ARE CONSCIOUS THAT DESTEFANIS CANNOT BE TRUSTED AND MAY WELL MAKE BIASED AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS TO THE MEDIA. THEY THEREFORE INTEND TO PUBLISH THE TEXT OF THEIR STATEMENT

~~THEY THEREFORE INTEND TO PUBLISH THE TEXT OF THEIR STATEMENT~~  
IN GENEVA THIS EVENING AT A TIME TO BE CONFIRMED TO US IN  
ADVANCE.

We have now  
heard that this  
statement will  
not be published  
until tomorrow  
morning.

WJL  
19/4

3. PASQUIER TOLD LONG THAT THE ICRC NOTE WOULD BE STRICTLY  
FACTUAL. AFTER DESCRIBING DESTEFANIS'S ORIGINAL APPROACH  
ON 24 FEBRUARY AND LATER DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING HMG'S STATEMENT  
ON 28 MARCH, IT WOULD NOTE THAT DESTEFANIS HAD MADE IT CLEAR  
THAT HE INTENDED TO PROCEED WITH HIS OPERATION ON LINES DIFFERENT  
FROM THOSE ESTABLISHED. THIS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE  
ICRC TO TAKE PART IN THE OPERATION, AND IN PARTICULAR TO PLAY  
THEIR ROLE IN PROVIDING PROTECTION.

4. PASQUIER STRESSED THAT THE ICRC STATEMENT HAD TO BE COUCHED  
IN NEUTRAL TERMS. IN PARTICULAR IT AVOIDED EXPRESSING ANY OPINION  
ABOUT DESTEFANIS OR HIS PLANS. IN CONVEYING THE TEXT TO DESTEFANIS  
CORTHESEY WOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA  
CONVENTIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF THE RED CROSS EMBLEM.  
CORTHESEY HAD ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY THE TEXT OF THE  
NOTE TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES FOR INFORMATION, AND IN PARTICULAR  
TO DRAW THEIR ATTENTION TO THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF THE  
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY IN SEEING THAT THESE  
PROVISIONS WERE APPLIED.

5. PASQUIER SAID THAT THE ICRC BELIEVED THAT THESE  
STEPS WOULD IN THE EVENT SUFFICIENTLY DISCOURAGE DESTEFANIS  
FROM PROCEEDING WITH HIS PLANS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE SAID  
THAT THEY SAW AN ELEMENT OF BRINKMANSHIP IN DESTEFANIS' TACTICS:  
BY TRUMPETING HIS PLANS IN ADVANCE HE WAS HOPING TO GENERATE  
SUFFICIENT OPPOSITION TO PROVIDE HIM WITH AN EXCUSE FOR BACKING  
DOWN.

6. LONG DREW ON THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR TUR.  
PASQUIER SAID THAT ICRC HAD MADE THE POINT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO  
THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. THEY WOULD HOWEVER TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY  
OF MAKING THE POINT ONCE MORE WHEN THE DUST HAD  
SETTLED OVER DESTEFANIS.

MARSHALL

NNNN