

Argentine Relations

DESKBY 221545

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
MR EVANS
MR URE
~~MR GILLMORE~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF-MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR)
MISS M E CUND) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR A D S GOODALL) CABINET OFFICE
DIO)

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER)
~~MR C U ROBERTS~~, IAT) DOT
MR A FORTNAM

HD/PUSD (2)
HD/SAML
HD/FID
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

mt

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY

GRS 520
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 221545Z
FM UKMIS GENEVA 221445Z APR 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 169 OF 22 APRIL
TO IMMEDIATE BERNE
AND TO PRIORITY: WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CIVIL
COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY.

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY



YOUR TEL NO 100: FALKLANDS/ ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN.

1. I SHALL SEE THE PRESIDENT OF THE ICRC TOMORROW EVENING.
HEAD OF CHANCERY SPOKE THIS MORNING TO THE DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS AT ICRC, JEAN-PIERRE HOCKE, TO PREPARE THE GROUND
AND TO SECURE PRELIMINARY REACTIONS.

2. LONG EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH ICRC HAD DECIDED NOT TO
PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN THE DESTEFANIS OPERATION THERE WAS
STILL A SERIOUS RISK THAT DESTEFANIS MIGHT
GO AHEAD ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE ON 30 APRIL AS HE HAD PUBLICLY
ANNOUNCED. WE WISHED TO DISCOURAGE THIS FOOLHARDY VENTURE,
NOT LEAST TO PROTECT THE BEREAVED PARENTS AND RELATIVES OF
THOSE BURIED IN THE FALKLANDS, WHO COULD WELL BE EXPOSED TO
SERIOUS INCONVENIENCE, DISCOMFORT AND EVEN DANGER. WE NOTED
THAT ICRC WERE IN CONTACT WITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES
AND THAT THEY INTENDED TO SPEAK TO THE ARGENTINES ABOUT

~~WAS THAT THEY INTENDED TO SPEAK TO THE ARGENTINES~~ ABOUT DESTEFANIS' REPORTED INTENTION TO USE THE RED CROSS FLAG IN BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. WE HOPED THAT THE ICRC WOULD PUT IT TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THAT DESTEFANIS' PLANS SHOULD BE ACTIVELY DISCOURAGED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE BEREAVED RELATIVES.

3. HOCKE REPLIED THAT THE ICRC HAD FORMALLY NO FURTHER ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION. THEY HAD TO BE CAUTIOUS IN DEALING WITH GOVERNMENTS LIKE THAT OF ARGENTINA TO AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MATTERS AND TO PROTECT THEIR OTHER HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE COUNTRY CONCERNED. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR THEM TO APPEAR TO TAKE SIDES AGAINST DESTEFANIS AND HIS PLANS (C.F. PARA 2 OF MONTEVIDEO TEL NO 249 , JUST RECEIVED). BUT THEY WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD AS OPPORTUNITY OFFERED AND WITHIN THESE LIMITATIONS TO STRESS TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF DESTEFANIS' PLANS. THIS WOULD NATURALLY BE ON THE USUAL BASIS THAT ICRC DEALINGS WITH GOVERNMENTS WERE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. IT WOULD BE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE FOR US TO LET IT BE KNOWN LATER THAT WE HAD ASKED THE ICRC TO APPROACH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES IN THIS SENSE. LONG SAID THAT OUR PURPOSE WAS TO DISCOURAGE DESTEFANIS FROM SETTING SAIL AND EXPOSING INNOCENT PEOPLE TO RISK; WE WERE NOT SEEKING TO SCORE POLITICAL POINTS.

4. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE LIMITS OF ICRC'S FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE ARE NARROW. IN THIS SENSE IT IS MISLEADING TO THINK OF THE ICRC AS STILL "PLAYING THE LEAD ROLE" AS PARA 1 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 265 PUTS IT. ICRC HAVE IN FACT FORMALLY DECLINED TO PLAY A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN DESTEFANIS' VENTURE, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT. THEY HAVE DONE WELL FOR US, AND IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO ASK THEM TO GO BEYOND THEIR OWN STRICT CRITERIA.

5. I AM PUZZLED BY THE LAST PHRASE OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TUR. IS THIS ON THE ASSUPTION THAT THE ICRC NO LONGER HAVE A ROLE? IF THE ICRC CAME BACK INTO THE PICTURE, AFTER THE ORGANISERS OF A VISIT ACCEPTED THE CONDITIONS EARLIER LAID DOWN, WOULD IT THEN BE A FURTHER CONDITION THAT THE VISIT SHOULD HAVE QUOTE AUTHORITATIVE BACKING IN ARGENTINA UNQUOTE?

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT AT /RECD AT 222 1525Z DR/KAB