



PM/83/91

PRIME MINISTERPrime Minister

For the briefing meeting on Friday  
you can ignore the brief and  
concentrate on this paper.

A. J. C. 17.

1. In preparation for your CHOGM Briefing Meeting on 18 November, I attach a short paper covering the major issues likely to arise at CHOGM, including Grenada and Cyprus. I also attach a copy of the draft agenda (to be finalised by Senior Officials in New Delhi on the eve of the Conference). The paper follows the order and heading of the draft agenda.

2. It would be helpful if on Friday we could consider in particular the following points which arise from the paper:

Style and Format: Will you wish to use the Restricted

✓ Session following the opening ceremony to press for a shorter and more readable communiqué?

✓ Grenada: Are you content with the line in paragraph 2 of the paper?

Security of Small States: Paragraph 3 of the paper suggests that we should not initiate in plenary sessions any discussion of the security problems of small states. This might prove counter-productive and open up divisions (eg within CARICOM). Do you agree? ✓

Southern Africa/Namibia: Are you content with the approach in paragraph 5 of the paper? Will not - press U.S. to

drop her violence that the Cubans have.

World Economic Issues: Are you content with the line in paragraph 6 of the paper?

Yes not

✓ Functional Cooperation: Do you agree that, with the exception of the Commonwealth Foundation, we should resist anything that would increase the Secretariat's expenditure in real terms? (An agreement to participate in any



Commonwealth help for Grenada would of course also have financial implications).

3. Additionally, there is likely at CHOGM to be a fairly full discussion on the general question of disarmament and arms control. Such a discussion would give you an opportunity to emphasise your commitment to arms control and to an improvement in East-West relations, and to stress that the Americans individually and NATO collectively continue to make genuine efforts for progress. We would wish to discourage any specifically Commonwealth initiative on global security or disarmament. (We thought at one time that the Indians and Mr Ramphal might intend some Commonwealth statement on the subject, but have had no recent indication of this).

4. I am copying this minute to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

17 November, 1983

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHOGM),  
NEW DELHI: PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING MEETING,  
18 NOVEMBER

Style and Format.

1. Mr Ramphal has already adopted some of the Prime Minister's proposals for securing improvements in the conduct of CHOGMs. A major further improvement would be to revert to the shorter and more readable communiqués of the early '70s, where related subjects were grouped together by paragraph, without itemising the various views expressed. Sir Geoffrey Howe has spoken about this to Mr Ramphal, who suggested that the Prime Minister might raise the matter at the Restricted Session following the opening ceremony. We have already canvassed our thoughts fairly widely at official level, and can expect support from a range of countries, including Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and Fiji.

World Political Scene: Global Trends and Prospects

2. Grenada is bound to be discussed. There is likely to be a widespread wish that it should not become a major matter of controversy. Our aim should be to look to the future rather than to the past and respond to requests from Grenada once the interim administration has had time to assess needs in the light of the timetable for US withdrawal and the security situation in Grenada. The Advisory Council has been appointed, and its rôle and powers defined. Mr McIntyre will arrive on 27 November and take charge. The Governor-General will then step back from Government and will only act and legislate on the advice of the Council. It seems unlikely that Grenada will have been able to formulate detailed requests for Commonwealth help in time for consideration at CHOGM. We therefore hope Commonwealth Heads of Government will keep options open and indicate willingness to respond individually or collectively to requests when received. The Prime Minister might rehearse what we are prepared to do on a bilateral basis particularly with helping with police advisers and training. If we were asked at New Delhi whether we would contribute to a Commonwealth security presence in Grenada, we could repeat that we would

consider sympathetically requests for help in restoring conditions of peace and security but would want to look closely at the details. A main objective at CHOGM will be to encourage healing of breaches in CARICOM. One way of achieving this would be participation from Caribbean non-intervening countries in supplementing the OECS police contingent if this were acceptable to Grenada. A more likely rôle for the Commonwealth could be assistance with the organisation and supervision of elections which under the Governor-General's timetable would be held in six to twelve months. Monitoring of elections is something that the Commonwealth has done frequently and successfully, most recently in Zimbabwe and Uganda. It will be much too early to take firm decisions about this in New Delhi. If the subject comes up, the Prime Minister might say that we would naturally be glad to contribute to a team if asked and provided the finances were worked out satisfactorily in advance. (Costs incurred by the Secretariat for the Uganda exercise totalled £229,000 and not all the countries which indicated that they would pay in the event did so.)

3. Security of small states. When he called on the Prime Minister on 10 November, Ramphal mentioned the question of the security of small states which he thought should be looked into "when the dust has settled". It would probably not be sensible for us to raise it in CHOGM, at least in plenary. If others did so, the Prime Minister would want to signal British interest, and might propose that the Commonwealth Secretariat consider what should be done. It might also be useful to take the opportunity to discuss the question in the corridors with eg, the Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders.

4. The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence on 15 November makes it certain that the Greek Cypriots will press for more extensive discussion of Cyprus than they would otherwise have wanted. We must obviously try to limit the damage caused by UDI.

Intensive diplomatic activity is already under way, much of it initiated by the Government. We have called for a meeting of the Security Council which, as a result, met informally on 15 November to consider a British draft Resolution. We have also proposed a meeting of the Guarantor Powers (Greece and Turkey) in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and are in close consultation with our main Allies. Current action is therefore focussed on New York.



We see no immediate rôle for the Commonwealth at this stage. Members of the Commonwealth can be united however in the communiqué in calling for non-recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state.

5. World Political Scene: Southern Africa/Namibia. Our objective should be to encourage the Africans to be realistic. We have done what we can to prepare the ground. Ramphal has told Sir Geoffrey Howe that he has encouraged Nyerere to work for a practical, well-focussed discussion; and Sir Geoffrey hopes to have private meetings in New Delhi with the Foreign Ministers of Tanzania, Botswana and Lesotho. The Canadians should be encouraged to share with us some of the burden of defending the Contact Group's position. But we are likely to come under strong pressure to use our influence with the Americans to drop their insistence on Cuban withdrawal. We should urge the Meeting to accept that there is a practical problem about this which has to be overcome. In any case, we must expect a difficult discussion.

World Economic Issues.

6. Our line is now clear; we support many of the detailed points in "Towards a New Bretton Woods", but cannot accept the proposal that work should now be set in hand for an international monetary conference. Instead, as the Chancellor proposed at Port of Spain, we should work for a Commonwealth Group to discuss the issues with international financial institutions. The Prime Minister might additionally offer to bring Commonwealth views to the attention of next year's Economic Summit in London.

Functional Cooperation.

7. The Commonwealth Foundation's present budget of £1.1 million was agreed in 1979. It will ask at CHOGM for an increase to £1.6 million. Many countries will consider that an increase is due, but will balk at one of this size. We plan to urge a compromise of £1.3 million next year, with further increases in future years. Apart from the Foundation, our main concern must be to resist anything that would increase the Secretariat's expenditure (of which we contribute 30%) in real terms. Any other real increases would place an intolerable strain on the planned FCO Vote. We need not be apologetic about this, and can take legitimate credit for the substantial financial contribution we make to the Commonwealth.



8. Mr Ramphal may also ask the Prime Minister to say something about the future of Marlborough House, whose maintenance has been the responsibility of successive British Governments since 1959. The work which the PSA consider necessary will take about 3½ years, will cost at least £4 million, and will entail rehousing the Secretariat while work is in progress (at a probable cost of a further £3 million). PSA Ministers have (reluctantly) accepted these costs as a charge on their Vote, and the PSA are discussing alternative accommodation with the Secretariat with a view to starting work during the second half of next year. The Prime Minister could tell CHOGM that the Government will bear the full costs of repairing Marlborough House, and will do their utmost to minimise inconvenience to the Secretariat while repairs are taking place. (She should be aware that the Secretariat still hope to persuade the PSA to let them use some rooms in Marlborough House while work is in progress: or, failing that, to let them use part of Lancaster House. But the PSA consider that neither of these ideas is practicable.)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
15 November 1983