

PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister of Trinidad cannot come tonight - he has an engagement.

I have suggested that we will try to fit him in at 1830 hours tomorrow evening. This would mean your leaving the President's reception after 45 minutes or so. I have made it plain that you will only have 30 minutes available for Mr Chambers - he is apparently quite content with that.

Agree that we may go ahead on this basis?

A. & C.

Robin has confirmed  
that the PM is  
content.

22 November 1983

M/K.  
22/11.



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION  
NEW DELHI, INDIA

The High Commission for the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland presents its compliments to the High Commission for the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and, with reference to its note, No. 212/83 of 22 November 1983, has the honour to state that the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, would be delighted to meet the Honourable Goerge Chambers, Prime Minister of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, and suggests that the meeting be held at 1830 hours on 23 November at the Residence of the British High Commissioner.

The High Commission for the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the High Commission for the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the assurances of its highest consideration.



23 November 1983



High Commission for the Republic of  
Trinidad and Tobago  
131, Jor Bagh,  
New Delhi-110003, India

No. 212/83

The High Commission for the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago presents its compliments to the High Commission for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and has the honour to request an appointment with The Honourable Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for the Honourable George Chambers, Prime Minister of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.

The High Commission for the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the High Commission for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the assurances of its highest consideration.

NEW DELHI

22 November, 1983



MR COLBY

Grades

Prime Minister

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING  
NEW DELHI 1983

FOR THE INFORMATION OF DELEGATIONS

The attached paper is being circulated at the request of the Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago.

*Hugh Craft*

Hugh Craft  
Conference Secretary

Commonwealth Secretariat  
Vigyan Bhavan  
New Delhi

24 November 1983

STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER TO THE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - 26 OCTOBER 1983

It is incumbent on the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago to direct its attention to the tragic circumstances which have visited Grenada over the last few days. I should like, therefore, to outline to this Honourable House, to the people of Trinidad and Tobago and to the wider regional and international community, the position of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago on those unprecedented and ominous developments.

On Friday October 14, 1983, reports reached the Government of Trinidad and Tobago that the Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop, had been placed under house arrest. Subsequently, further reports indicated that Deputy Prime Minister, Bernard Coard, had resigned from the Government in order to dispel rumours that he was implicated in a plot to assassinate Mr. Bishop.

By Wednesday, October 19, news was received that Prime Minister Bishop, together with some of his Cabinet, two prominent union leaders and several civilians had been shot and killed by the military in Grenada. The ensuing events, as reported, led to the imposition of military rule in Grenada, and the establishment of a Revolutionary Military Council. The Military Council imposed, among other things, a twenty-four hour curfew over a four-day period.

The Cabinet of Trinidad and Tobago, considered these developments the following day, that is to say Thursday October 20, 1983. Immediately after the Cabinet meeting, I convened a Press Conference at which I expressed the feeling of shock and dismay of the Cabinet at the news of the execution of the former Prime Minister of Grenada and several of his Ministers.

I indicated that this Government viewed with horror the importation of such execution into the English-speaking Caribbean and that under no circumstances whatsoever could the Government and people of Trinidad and Tobago countenance the execution of public figures in the settlement of political disputes. I also announced that in the circumstances, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago had taken the following decisions with immediate effect and until further notice:-

- i. Trinidad and Tobago would not participate in any Caricom meetings whatsoever in which Grenada would be present.
- ii. No Grenada citizens or nationals would be allowed entry into Trinidad and Tobago without a visa.
- iii. No exports from Grenada into Trinidad and Tobago would be afforded Caricom treatment and that no vessels registered in Grenada would be allowed the facilities of the Caricom Jetty in Trinidad and Tobago.

Further, I made it quite clear that the Government of Trinidad and Tobago would take such steps as were necessary to ensure the safety of Trinidad and Tobago nationals in Grenada.

I emphasised that these decisions of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago were without prejudice to any decision which might be taken by Caricom Heads of Government at an emergency meeting which was scheduled to take place in Port of Spain over the weekend of Saturday 22 and Sunday 23 October 1983. The hosting of this meeting by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago was proposed by the Prime Minister of Saint Lucia and after appropriate consultations.

The emergency meeting took place in Port of Spain on Saturday 22 and Sunday 23 October, 1983 and was attended by: the Deputy Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda, the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, the Foreign Minister of Barbados, the Prime Minister of Belize, the Prime Minister of Dominica, the President of Guyana, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Chief Minister of Montserrat, the Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.

Proposals were advanced to the meeting that were consistent with the established foreign policy of Trinidad and Tobago based on the principles of the United Nations Charter to which we fully subscribe. The fundamental elements of this policy are non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the avoidance of the use of force in the conduct of international relations and in the settlement of disputes. These proposals were:

- i. No involvement of any external elements in the resolution of the Grenada situation;
- ii. The resolution of the Grenada solution should be wholly regional, that is to say, Caricom in nature;
- iii. The regional solution pursued should not violate international law and the U.N. Charter;
- iv. Any proposed solution should have as its primary purpose the restoration of normalcy in Grenada.

Subject to a minor reservation by one Prime Minister, which as Chairman, I was confident would have been resolved, there was agreement in principle on the proposals advanced. In respect of specific proposals relating to the restoration of normalcy in Grenada, the meeting considered whether the Governor-General, as the legal representative of the Queen, should be used as a point of contact in Grenada. We decided that through contact with the Governor-General, we would seek to accomplish the following:-

- a. the immediate establishment of a broad-based civilian government of national reconciliation whose composition was acceptable to the Governor-General. The primary function of that Government would be the putting into place of arrangements for the holding of elections at the earliest possible date;

- b. acceptance of a fact-finding mission comprising eminent nationals of Caricom States;
- c. the putting into place of arrangements to ensure the safety of nationals of other countries in Grenada and/or their evacuation where desired;
- d. the acceptance of the deployment in Grenada of a Peace-keeping Force, comprising contingents contributed by Caricom countries.

These proposals and objectives in fact, represented the position of Trinidad and Tobago. As Chairman, I intimated to the Meeting that I had reason to believe that the persons exercising authority in Grenada would be willing to treat on the basis of these proposals and objectives. My judgement, derived from consultations I had held with the President of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, who is in London, and who at my request, had been in contact with the Governor-General of Grenada. In addition, I spoke with the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.

By 3.06 a.m. on Sunday when the adjournment was taken it was apparent that consensus had emerged in support of the proposals and objectives, so much that Heads of delegations including some of the OECS had suggested names of eminent persons who would comprise the fact-finding mission to Grenada. It had also been agreed that I, as Chairman of the Meeting, would be entrusted with pursuing the initiatives. At that point, it was agreed that the number, the composition and the terms of reference of the fact-finding team would be decided on the resumption of the meeting later that morning.

The single consideration standing in the way of complete agreement was what action members would take in the event that the regime in Grenada refused to treat on the basis of the proposals. On this one point there was a division of views. Some members held that there should be instant resort to force, including extra Caricom assistance in connection there with, if required. Others, among them Trinidad and Tobago, maintained the position that force, be it regional or extra-regional, should not be the first resort in



respect of a sister Caricom State. As Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago I indicated that I would wish in the circumstances to take the matter to Parliament before agreeing to the use of Trinidad and Tobago forces in hostilities outside of Trinidad and Tobago.

When the meeting reconvened later that morning, one of my colleagues from the OECS immediately informed us that a leading personality of a Caricom country had agreed to serve on the fact-finding mission. Whatever transpired between the adjournment and the resumption, which incidentally was one hour later than the appointed time, is not within my knowledge. But certain Heads, for the first time, stated that there was no consensus on the proposals and that in any event they were of the opinion that no further discussions should continue along those lines. Instead, they wished to direct their attention to two papers which had earlier been circulated, one by the Prime Minister of Jamaica and the other by the OECS members present.

The Jamaica paper, which was entitled "The Protocol of Port of Spain" proposed far-reaching amendments to the decision-making mechanisms contained in the Treaty of Chaguaramas - the Caricom Agreement. The OECS paper proposed sanctions to be imposed on Grenada.

A majority of members took the political decision to suspend Grenada from Caricom and to support the sanctions on Grenada. The sanctions proposed were as follows:

1. No official contact with the existing regime;
2. The regime would not be permitted to participate in the deliberations and business of the Organization;
3. Representatives of the regime would not be permitted to participate in or chair caucuses or groupings pertaining to meetings of international agencies and would not be permitted to speak on behalf of the OECS in international agencies.

4. The regime would not be allowed to benefit from the trade, economic and functional co-operation arrangements of the Organization;
5. No new issues of currency will be made to the regime under the East Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) arrangements;
6. The OECS Governments will cease all sea and air communication links with Grenada.

At the conclusion of the meeting I proceeded to hold a Press Conference on the meeting in my capacity as Chairman. Immediately thereafter, I spoke to the press in my capacity as Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. After the Press Conference, I had discussions with the President of Guyana and the Prime Minister of Belize who together with the Prime Minister of the Bahamas and myself were not in favour of military intervention as a first resort. On Monday, I spoke again to the President of Guyana and to the Prime Minister of Bahamas. I also attempted to reach the Prime Minister of Belize but he was airborne at the time. We continue to be in touch on the matter.

I would like to inform this Honourable House that in relation to my earlier statement that the Government of Trinidad and Tobago would take such steps as are necessary to ensure the safety of Trinidad and Tobago nationals the Ministry of External Affairs had established a mechanism for receiving information on Trinidad and Tobago nationals who wished to leave Grenada. As of the evening of Tuesday October 25, it had been ascertained that there were 136 Trinidad and Tobago nationals in Grenada who wished to be repatriated.

We had also established contact with the office of the Governor-General of Grenada with a view to working out arrangements for repatriation. It was decided that a BWIA aircraft would be despatched to Grenada to transport our nationals.

New developments, however, in Grenada have precluded the implementation of these arrangements.

It is now public knowledge that military forces have landed in Grenada and are currently engaged in hostilities there.

I would like to state that the first official notification I, as Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and current Chairman of Caricom, received of the landing of forces in Grenada came from the United States Embassy in Port of Spain through the Minister of External Affairs several hours after the actual landing. I wish to state further that to date, I have received no notification from any Caricom member country of any intention to request assistance from the Government of the United States to intervene militarily in Grenada nor have I been informed by any Caricom member country that such a request had in fact been made. At an emergency meeting of Cabinet, yesterday, the entire situation as was then known was reviewed.

I later called in the United States Ambassador, the British High Commissioner, the Venezuelan Ambassador, the High Commissioner for Canada, and the Acting High Commissioner of India to discuss the developments in Grenada and to appraise them of the position of the Trinidad and Tobago Government in the continuing crisis. I also invited and met with the Archbishop of Port of Spain and the Bishop of Trinidad and Tobago at Whitehall for discussions on the crisis. Earlier today, I met the Colombian Ambassador at his request, and I have arranged a meeting with the Nigerian High Commissioner. Other diplomatic representatives will be called in as necessary.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago maintains its original position on this matter and continues to hold firmly to the view that:

1. It is regrettable that a solution involving the non-use of force, proposed during the emergency meeting of the Heads of Government was not allowed to be pursued;
2. It is regrettable that a solution of a purely Caricom nature was not agreed upon and was not allowed to be pursued;
3. It is regrettable that measures involving the use of force as a first resort have been embarked upon;
4. It is regrettable that military intervention of this nature has been imported into the Commonwealth Caribbean.

In the light of the present situation and in pursuance of our original initiatives, we shall seek:

- i. the earliest possible withdrawal of combat forces in Grenada;
- ii. through appropriate channels, the earliest establishment there of a Caricom peace-keeping presence in which we are prepared to participate. In this regard, we wish to state that in our view there is a clear distinction between the role of an occupation force and that of a peace-keeping force.
- iii. the establishment of a broad-based civilian government. The primary function of the civilian government would be the earliest putting into place of arrangements for the holding of free and fair elections.
- iv. the establishment of a fact-finding mission comprising eminent nationals of Caricom States.

At the present, the Security Council of the United Nations, the Permanent Council of the OAS and the United Kingdom Parliament are all meeting on this matter.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago is deeply conscious of the implications of all these developments for Trinidad and Tobago and for the Caribbean as a whole. Whatever the circumstances and however justifiable it may appear in the eyes of others, the commitment of our armed forces in the situation that I have described and which in the view of many, is tantamount to war, cannot be made on the basis of emotion or editorial hyperbole. Such a commitment requires, in my view, reference to the Parliament of the sovereign people of Trinidad and Tobago. Moreover, in the instant case it involves a sister Caricom country which has a large and significant community of its nationals in Trinidad and Tobago.

Last year the Heads of Government of Caricom States, at their meeting in Ocho Rios, took specific decisions against the use of force in the resolution of disputes. More recently, in July of this year at the Fourth Conference of Heads of Government of Caricom countries in Port of Spain, they reiterated this commitment to the non-use of force. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago, as a party to these decisions could not now depart from these agreed principles particularly without resort in the first instance to efforts <sup>to</sup> a peaceful resolution of the problem.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago deeply sympathises with the people of Grenada on what is obviously a troubled time not only for them but also for the Caribbean region and stands ready to assist in a resolution of the crisis in accordance with its stated principles.

Finally, let me make it clear that it is our intention to treat with this issue on a non-partisan basis and we invite our friends opposite to treat the matter likewise so that the country, the region and the international community will be in no doubt whatsoever as to the attitude of this Honourable House on matters of national, regional and international moment.

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING  
NEW DELHI 1983

At the request of the Delegation of Trinidad & Tobago the attached paper is being circulated to replace that on the same subject circulated earlier today.

*Hugh Craft*

Hugh Craft  
Conference Secretary

Commonwealth Secretariat  
Vigyan Bhavan  
New Delhi

25 November 1983



REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS' MEETING (1983):  
REPORT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TO THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS  
OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, NEW DELHI -  
NOVEMBER 23 - 29, 1983



## REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Two months ago, Trinidad and Tobago had the privilege of hosting the annual Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers. The Meeting, a significant event in the international financial calendar, attracted special attention this year for two reasons. First, the continuing crisis in the world economy and second, the consideration by Finance Ministers of the Report - "Towards A New Bretton Woods." This Report had been commissioned as a result of the initiative of the distinguished Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Robert Muldoon, at the annual Meeting held in London in 1982. Because of the importance of the issues raised in the Report, the Ministers of Finance felt that it should be brought to the attention of this Meeting and accordingly mandated me to convey to you the essence of our discussions.

The Commonwealth has taken a lead in focusing attention on vitally important issues pertaining to the functioning of the international financial and trading system. Finance Ministers were impressed with the outstanding quality of the Report and considered it a major contribution to the on-going search for answers to a wide range of inter-related issues on the international financial and trading system. Ministers agreed that the analysis and recommendations

/should receive...





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should receive full, detailed and careful consideration both inside and outside the Commonwealth and requested the Secretary-General to seek the widest possible circulation and discussion of the Report.

I can state quite categorically that there was overwhelming support for the Report as a whole despite the reservations of some Ministers on certain aspects. It was generally accepted that there were basic problems in the functioning of the international financial and trading system. Indeed, there was a strong feeling that the current difficulties affecting the world economy were the result of deep-rooted structural defects and were not simply cyclical in origin. Consequently, economic recovery in the developed industrialised countries by itself should not be expected to stimulate and sustain growth and development in the world economy as a whole.

Moreover, considerable doubts were expressed about the strength of the recovery. Ministers took particular note that it had not yet had any significant impact on the developing countries. Although they welcomed the substantial reduction in inflation in the industrialised countries they expressed concern that the recovery

/remained at risk...



## REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

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remained at risk mainly because of the continuing high real interest rates and the reduced import capability of the developing countries. The expansion in world trade and the resurgence of economic growth continued to be forestalled by the stubbornness of the recession, by protectionism and by the degree of adjustment demanded of the developing countries in the absence of appropriate financing.

Finance Ministers were of the considered opinion that the motivation behind the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions remained largely valid today. There have been manifestations of some capability of adjustment to changing circumstances over the years and certainly many of the recommendations contained in the Report could be implemented through the existing institutions.

It is clear that there have been fundamental changes in the world economy since Bretton Woods. Several countries have become independent and are today at various stages of development requiring different approaches for the solution of their economic problems. In addition, not only is there growing interdependence among countries but the issues which are critical to their economic fortunes are also

/closely interwoven...



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closely interwoven. For example, just as high interest rates in certain countries adversely affect others, so too does the price of primary commodities influence the capacity of developing countries to service their debt. In the present economic setting these are some of the circumstances which give added impetus to the need for reform along the lines proposed in the Report.

Finance Ministers wished it to be understood that the establishment of the process of reform, a subject of the utmost importance, should not delay consideration of immediate or short-term issues. Accordingly, considerable attention was paid to those matters which were before the annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) scheduled to commence almost immediately after the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting.

Those matters included the following:-

- problems affecting recovery and the consequences of slow recovery in the industrialised countries for the developing countries.

/- the deteriorating...



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- the deteriorating situation regarding international liquidity.
- the external debt situation of the developing countries.
- the level of commodity prices.
- the problem of unemployment.
- the resource position of the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank and the IMF.
- conditionality or the conditions of access to and use of IMF resources.

Ministers emphasised the great importance of the role of the international financial institutions and the urgent need to ensure that they are provided with adequate resources. They were able to speak with one voice about the dangers posed to IDA by the delay in securing its seventh replenishment. They pledged their support for IDA and requested the Minister of Finance of Canada to convey to the Bank/Fund Meetings the strength of their support. Ministers also called for early agreement on a selective capital increase for the World Bank and for urgent implementation of the IMF's quota increase. Regretably, all those matters are still outstanding.

/The Finance Ministers...



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The Finance Ministers accepted that the achievement of change in the long-term requires determined political action. They did not, however, attempt to reach a common view on the nature of the required action or on the process and the specific proposals contained in chapter nine of the Report and entitled "Next Steps". Indeed, the Report merely proposed a process of consultation in the international community while recognizing that other approaches were possible. I agree with my colleague from New Zealand that what is needed is a concrete expression of political will and I fully endorse his proposal to establish a core group of Heads of Government assisted by the Secretary-General to advance the process of consultation with the wider international community.

Three Reports on economic matters are before us. Pursuant to my mandate I have reported on the deliberations of the Finance Ministers. I am firmly of the opinion that the issues dealt with in

/the other Reports...



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the other Reports, that is - Protectionism : Threat to International Order and The North/South Dialogue : Making It Work - must be considered in an integral fashion along with the Report entitled "Towards A New Bretton Woods". The work of the proposed Commonwealth consultative team in stimulating dialogue among countries in the search for consensus could facilitate the process of preparation for an international conference to consider the reforms needed to meet the challenge for the world financial and trading system.