

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister
Not essential reading
but you may like to glance
Foreign and Commonwealth Office *at it.*

London SW1A 2AH

FERB

6 June, 1984

John John

Chancellor Kohl and German Reunification

/ The Foreign Secretary thought the Prime Minister might
be interested in the enclosed note which we have prepared
by way of comment on Chancellor Kohl's Konrad Adenauer
memorial lecture at Oxford, which she attended on 2 May.
Sir Geoffrey Howe was interested in the article by
Timothy Garton Ash in The Spectator on 12 May, dealing with
Kohl's lecture. The note takes account of it. I am enclosing
/ / The Spectator article and the English text of Kohl's lecture.

[Handwritten signature]
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(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

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COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

CHANCELLOR KOHL'S KONRAD ADENAUER MEMORIAL LECTURE AT OXFORD
ON 2 MAY 1984

1. Kohl's lecture was a comprehensive if somewhat turgid account of his view of Germany's place in the world and his priorities in foreign policy. He is undoubtedly greatly preoccupied with the question of the division of Germany (as is the Federal President elect, Richard von Weizsaecker). His lecture got a largely favourable press in both Germany and Britain. The most interesting analysis in the British press was by Timothy Garton Ash (an expert on Germany) in The Spectator on 12 May.
2. Kohl's central thesis was that Adenauer took a decisive and irreversible decision to anchor the FRG (what Kohl calls the free part of Germany) in the western family of nations, notably in NATO and the European Community. Kohl claimed that he unreservedly endorsed this strategic decision. NATO, for example, he called the 'central element of our raison d'etat'. However, Kohl also insisted that he (and, he believed, the German people) would never give up the idea of reunifying the nation, however long this might take. Immediately, the free Germans had a duty to look after their 17 million compatriots who were oppressed by a communist dictatorship.
3. Kohl argues that the division of Germany can only be overcome within the context of overcoming the division of Europe; for example on page 12: 'Our passionate advocacy of European unification stems to a great extent from awareness that a positive settlement of the German question is only conceivable within a greater European framework'. Kohl appreciates, of course, that overcoming the division of Germany is a very long term objective indeed. Meanwhile, he argues, Germany attaches the greatest priority to uniting Western Europe.



4. On pages 7 and 8 of the lecture Kohl rehearses his familiar theme that the economic and budgetary aspects of the Community are of secondary importance to political union. 'We in the Federal Republic of Germany are prepared to work for the political union of Europe without ifs and buts'. Kohl gave great emphasis to this part of his speech. Richard von Weizsaecker has often made the same point. For Germany a Free Trade Area plus political cooperation are not a sufficient European policy.

5. In his lecture Kohl reviewed German foreign policy across the board; but the passages on relations with the Third World (which come towards the end) although sincere, seemed perfunctory and mainly for the record. Kohl summed up his real interest on page 15: 'The national question, German unity and freedom, European reunification and the security of Europe will continue to receive the special attention of future Federal governments'.

6. Timothy Garton Ash has drawn attention in *The Spectator* to Kohl's reference to the Locarno Pact concluded by Chamberlain, Briand and Gustav Stresemann, the best known Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic (there were no references to Stresemann in the draft provided for Kohl by his officials). Kohl suggested in his lecture (page 5) that Stresemann, together with Chamberlain and Briand, had made a great and largely unrecognised effort to integrate Germany in Western Europe. Stresemann did indeed inaugurate an era of good relations with France in which Germany was accepted into the family of nations entering, for example, the League of Nations. But in praising Stresemann Kohl gave rise to doubts, voiced by Timothy Garton Ash, about his true aims in Europe. Most historians would accept Professor Gordon Craig's assessment of Stresemann that he was concerned with the urgent national requirements of regaining full sovereignty and independence for Germany.



7. A central feature of Stresemann's policy in national questions was the restoration of German power in Eastern Europe. Like almost all German politicians of his time Stresemann regarded the Polish state established in 1919 as an aberration that had grown powerful only because of the temporary weakness of both Russia and Germany, and the collapse of Austria, the three powers which had combined to eradicate Poland from the map at the end of the 18th century. This community of interest with Russia found its clearest expression in the Nazi/Soviet pact of August 1939.

8. There is no evidence in his Adenauer Memorial Lecture or elsewhere that Kohl aspires to emulate Stresemann in Eastern Europe. Kohl has fully accepted the Eastern treaties concluded by the SPD Government with Poland and the Soviet Union in 1970; the FRG thereby renounced force as a means of changing the existing frontiers in Europe. Moreover, Kohl appears to share the very widespread contemporary German feelings of guilt and goodwill towards Poland.

9. However, some people in France, and to some extent in the USA, have expressed concern that in reviving the German national question and claiming continuity with figures such as Stresemann, Kohl may revive potentially dangerous dreams and ambitions in Germany, and open Pandora's box. Their concern is that if the German people come to attach great importance to reunification as a goal of policy to be actively pursued, they will see that the route chosen by Kohl (overcoming the division of Europe and thereby the division of Germany) is most unlikely to succeed within any conceivable time-scale. They fear therefore that the Germans might opt for neutralist, nationalist policies which would make it less easy for the Russians to block the path to German unity. (The Poles and the Russians react to talk of reunification by accusing Kohl of revanchism - aspiring to alter the results of the Second World War, in particular the westward shift of Poland).

/10. None



10. None of these German aspirations amount to immediate practical plans; but there is no doubt that whereas France (and indeed the UK) are content with the status quo in Europe, the Germans are not. This dissatisfaction with the status quo of a divided Germany is bound to lead to speculation as to the implications of German efforts to find a way of keeping the aspiration to reunification alive.

11. Kohl's answer to the concerns expressed in France, discernible in his Adenauer Lecture, is that the aspiration of the German people for reunification must be channelled into safe enthusiasm for European union. That is why Kohl advocates it so passionately and is sometimes so frustrated by the priority attached by others to bookkeeping and agricultural surpluses. His lecture at Oxford was a clear statement of his view that for Germany these problems are of secondary importance. They have to be overcome nonetheless because they constitute a block on the road to European union and thus to his (very long term) ambitions for Germany.

1 June 1984

Europa über Alles

Timothy Garton Ash

Great lecture
but analysis
of this theme?

Last week Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave the Konrad Adenauer Memorial lecture at Oxford, in the presence of the Prime Minister. What he had to say about Germany and Europe may be summarised in three propositions:

1) The long-term goal of all West German governments, but particularly of his government, is to overcome the division of Germany, and therefore of Europe.

2) For the Federal Republic, total commitment to the democratic West, and its alliances, is the only possible path towards this goal.

3) So total is the commitment of the Federal Republic to Europe and the West that it would like the EEC to move forward *schnellstens* towards a United States of Europe.

Neither the truth nor the connecting inner logic of these propositions is self-evident. Take 2) for a start. For so long as it was a nation-state, Germany was wont to manoeuvre between East and West —

specifically, between Russia on the one side, France and Britain on the other. In the 1950s there were compelling reasons for West Germany, the half-nation-state, to return to this traditional *Schaukelpolitik*. As Professor Hans-Peter Schwarz argued in the Konrad Adenauer Memorial lecture at Oxford four years ago, 'the conviction was general that Moscow held the key to reunification'. There was nothing inevitable about Adenauer's grand commitment to the West. Professor Schwarz concluded that 'if, in the future, Bonn was to opt again for a middle path, Adenauer's decision in favour of an anti-Russian policy and a lasting alliance with the Western democracies would only be a temporary affair in the long course of German policy towards Russia.'

Since Adenauer's time, the Federal Republic, under its Social Democrat Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt, has of course developed a distinctive policy towards the East (*Ostpolitik*). And one of the more remarkable features of Dr Kohl's Chancellorship is the way in which, while claiming to be Adenauer's heir, he has taken over the Social Democrats' *Ostpolitik* almost whole — especially in relations with East Germany. The reasons are not far to seek. There is a general consensus in Bonn that the development of a special working relationship with the government of East Germany has brought the Germans in East and West closer together, while at the same time improving West Germany's position in international affairs. In other words, it is seen as being in Germany's *national interest* — and the right-wing nationalist Franz Josef Strauss sees this as clearly as any leftist lover of *détente*.

There is, however, a vital corollary. As Chancellor Kohl clearly acknowledged in a discussion after his lecture, the key to what the East German Government does lies in Moscow. Now, since good relations with the German Democratic Republic are thought by all the main parties in Bonn to

Germany's national interest, and since good relations with the GDR are rightly seen to depend on relations with the Soviet Union, it follows that West Germany must (like all previous Germanies) have a special interest in good relations with Russia. I believe there is a substantial consensus on this point in West Germany — more substantial than the consensus on, say, the necessity of deploying Cruise and Pershing missiles. It may even be a rational consensus. Arguably, if your purpose is to keep the nation together (at least in spirit, human contacts and so forth), then, for that purpose, Moscow is more important to you than Washington. Eastern approaches, not Western alliances, allow German to meet German in Weimar or East Berlin.

Nor is this morally reprehensible. It is a government's business to pursue what it believes to be the national interest. It is what we expect our government to do.

No, the problem is what the government says. What Dr Kohl said last week, with lugubrious pathos, was that poor old Germany, having suffered so much at the hands of history — two lost wars, two inflations, partition, the deportations from the East (his list) would be heartily delighted to surrender its (half-) nation-statehood for the sake of a larger European community. 'The question is,' as he put it to the Bundestag in March, 'who is prepared to follow us on the way to European political union with the stated objective of a United States of Europe' (my italics)? Lead on, Germany! As Prussia 'went up' into Germany, so Germany will go up into Europe.

But why this heroic self-sacrifice? And how does proposition 3) square with proposition 1)? For what would be the Russian reaction to this United States of Western Europe? Hardly, one imagines, to urge the benefits of membership on its East European satellites. Unless, of course, they were offered the kind of secret membership which East Germany currently enjoys in the EEC — many benefits, no disadvantages. If I read Dr Kohl aright, this is roughly how he would square the circle. The U S of E would pursue towards Eastern Europe — but especially towards East Germany — the policies which West Germany is currently pursuing towards East Germany. In return for political recognition and a great deal of money, the communist regimes would allow us (East and West Germans/Europeans) to see a bit more of each other. As the theologians of *Ostpolitik* put it, we must accept the division of Europe in order to overcome it. Germany will give up her national sovereignty (proposition 3) in order to regain it (proposition 1).

At moments like these I wish I had read more Hegel. Such dialectics are beyond me. But let every people pursue its own salvation in its own way. All I object to is being told that their interests are necessarily our interests. And I can think of the odd Frenchman or Pole who would join me in questioning the automatic equation of Germany's interest with Europe's interest.

To say that 'to end the division of Europe it is essential to end the division of Germany' is not merely true — it is a truism. It is like saying that to get from Southwark to St Paul's you have to cross the Thames. But in this case the reverse does not follow, particularly if you take the current West German gradualist view of 'overcoming the division of Germany'. It is perfectly possible for Germans to be getting closer together while other European peoples are being held farther apart. Of course the disjuncture cannot be total, but this is very much what has happened over the two years since martial law was imposed in Poland.

The special German-German rapprochement may be a good thing. It may be a bad thing. But it is not the same thing as the healing of Europe. Perhaps all of Western Europe should try to treat all of Eastern Europe as West Germany treats East Germany. Or perhaps it shouldn't. But at least

we should know what we're talking about.

Chancellor Kohl was right as an historian. Expatriating upon Adenauer's integration of Germany into the West, he observed that this was actually Germany's second attempt at *Westintegration*: the first was made by Gustav Stresemann in the Locarno Treaty of 1925. Turning to Gordon Craig's *Oxford History of Germany*, I read:

Stresemann was no more a 'good European' than Austen Chamberlain or Aristide Briand or any other of the leading statesmen of his time. He was capable of using the sentimental rhetoric that was the characteristic style of the proponents of a future United States of Europe, but he was no believer in that grand design. As a German statesman, he felt that it was his obligation to concern himself with urgent national requirements, and the goal he set himself was to regain full sovereignty and independence for his country.

Translation
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Konrad Adenauer Lecture given by Dr Helmut Kohl,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
in Oxford on 2 May 1984

Mr Vice-Chancellor,
Mr Warden,
Prime Minister,
Excellencies,
My Lords,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great honour for me and it gives me great pleasure to be able to speak to you today in Oxford. This is a place where history and tradition are blended so well with the present, a blend which augurs well for the future.

There are close links between St. Antony's College and the Federal Republic of Germany. As Chancellor of the Federal Republic, I welcome this opportunity to outline some of the main aspects of my Government's foreign policy to citizens of a country whose democratic traditions and virtues have long earned it particular respect among the German people.

I find it particularly gratifying to be here as Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and to be able to deliver this year's Konrad Adenauer Lecture in that capacity.

Thirdly, as a founder member of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and a member of its Board of Trustees, I am grateful that this visit has given me the opportunity to underline the particularly close and friendly relationship which exists between the Foundation and your College.

Birk's ...
Gedanken!

Mr. Llewellyn Smith
CAM 17/5

There are a host of reasons why my remarks on the foreign policy of the present Federal Government should relate to the policy of the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the first Chairman of my party after its establishment, following the war and the Nazi barbarism: Konrad Adenauer, the man to whose legacy I am firmly committed.

Adenauer's policy, and hence the history of the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, can only be understood at home and abroad in the light of the personal experiences of this man, reflecting at the same time the personal experiences of his entire generation. It is no coincidence that the lives of the three figures most instrumental in establishing the Federal Republic after the Nazi period - Kurt Schumacher of the Social Democratic Party, Theodor Heuss of the Free Democratic Party, the first President of our Republic, and Konrad Adenauer of the Christian Democratic Union - should have spanned the years from the German Empire prior to 1914 through the Weimar Republic, the first and sadly unsuccessful democracy in Germany between 1918 and 1933, and the Nazi horror up to the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

..

Like the other two architects of our Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer's life epitomized the high and low points of the history of the Germans during that period. Personal and historical experience enabled these men, like many other men and women of goodwill of all democratic persuasions, to set about creating a liberal order after the war and rebuilding their country from the ashes. And this word "ashes" should be understood in two senses: in the material sense as the ruins of our towns and villages, our flats, houses and production plants but also in the metaphysical sense as the bitter awareness of the devastation Hitler had wrought upon our people.

Germany - that is, the free part of our fatherland in which a liberal order could be built - had to be led out of isolation and disgrace at this historical juncture and reinstated as a respected member of the world community.

Only in retrospect - I myself was still at school and university during those years - can one appreciate the vastness of the problems which had to be

faced; ours was a divided country torn by social upheaval, which Stalin hoped would become ripe for the world revolution along with the rest of Central Europe through the expulsion of millions of people from Eastern to Central Europe following Yalta. More than ten million expellees and refugees were homeless and had to be integrated. Eighteen million Germans found themselves under the Communist heel. The fate of Berlin, the former Eastern provinces and the Saarland was in the balance. The system of Allied control brought about by the 1945 Potsdam Agreement did not come to an end until 1955.

Internationally, the Federal Republic of Germany was subjected to a mixture of threats and enticements by the Soviet Union. Europe was fragmented. The policies of France and the United Kingdom were not free of uncertainty regarding the future of Germany. A revival of United States isolationism reminiscent of the twenties following the Treaty of Versailles was not entirely out of the question.

It is against this background that the strategy pursued by Konrad Adenauer at that time has to be judged. He recognized that if it were ever true that a country's fate is decided by its foreign policy, it was true of Germany. I said "was true", but it would be more correct to say "is true", since the premise still holds good today. This close intertwining of domestic and foreign policy has remained an essential feature of our subsequent development.

Konrad Adenauer laid the foundations of modern German politics; he played a decisive part in developing the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, into the largest centrist popular bloc in Germany alongside the old-established Social Democrats. The CDU and CSU today form sturdy pillars of the German political system and will surely remain so.

By introducing the social market economy - which for us has always been more of a social order than just a matter of expediency - Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard created the conditions for growing prosperity and an

exemplary system of social justice. During the fifties none of us could have foreseen just how sound this social security system would prove in the face of the social pressures of the late seventies and especially of the early eighties, when our Federal Republic experienced mass unemployment for the first time. The effectiveness of this system has contributed significantly to internal peace and social justice.

And it is no coincidence that over the past few decades our country has been one of those least affected by strikes.

Adenauer knew, however, that only within a community of like-minded States and peoples could the stability of German democracy, peace, freedom and social justice be permanently ensured in the face of totalitarian Communism at the dividing line between East and West.

His decision to opt for a free Europe, for an alliance with the United States and for the North Atlantic Alliance, a decision endorsed by the Germans in all our elections, amounted to more than merely a wish to safeguard peace. The supreme objective for him was to preserve freedom, as it is for us today.

It was with good reason that I said in my first Government policy statement on 13 October 1982:

"For us Germans the Alliance (i.e. the Atlantic Alliance) is the central element of our raison d'état." The term "raison d'état", in this context comprises more than a mere definition of political objectives.

"It embraces

- the basic values of our liberal constitution to which we are committed,
- the economic and social system under which we live, and
- the security that we need."

The concept of Europe, the future of free Europe, therefore means more to us Germans than the demand for a flourishing free-trade zone or economic community.

Adenauer's decision to integrate free Germany unreservedly and irrevocably into the free world of democratic nations was a momentous act unprecedented in our history.

Ladies and gentlemen, for many centuries the strategic corridors which crossed in the centre of our continent were of vital importance within the European power system, hence the struggle by all powers to wield influence in Central Europe.

Throughout those centuries the Europeanization of the heart of the continent was always a source of both temptation and doom to us Germans: temptation, because the attainment of nationhood would necessitate a rebellion against the prevailing power system. It is not surprising, then, that the nation-state as forged by Bismarck in 1870|71 lasted only until 1945 and thus had a far shorter lifespan than other European nation-states. Doom, because Central Europe could not be in full control of its own destiny and because any revolt against the status quo threatened its very existence, heralding partition and, all too frequently, disaster.

Adenauer was concerned that renewed German nationalism, the prevalence of short-sighted pacifism and neutralism might cause distrust of Germany to break out anew. Adenauer's policy of integration into the West sought to counteract this danger and to safeguard democracy in Germany.

This was the second and most recent major effort in the history of this century to integrate the Germans into the West. I wish to emphasize, particularly here in Oxford, that in my view we today largely fail to appreciate the great achievement by Neville Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary at the time, in bringing about the Locarno Conference of 1924|25 along with Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, the German and French Foreign Ministers.

The peoples of Europe had to pay heavily for the short-sightedness of those days in Paris and Berlin, occasionally in London and, I am sure, in Washington, too, which prevented this work from being completed. History never repeats itself, but we today, particularly we in Germany with the specific challenge facing us, should not forget for one moment that the more recent integration of Germany into the West constitutes the second such grand design in history and is a great achievement which must be cherished.

The relevance of Adenauer's decision to our times is illustrated by those developments in Europe which can be grouped under the broad heading of "anti-Americanism". We should keep a watchful eye on such developments; I need not spell out their possible repercussions on the European order.

It is precisely this danger which illustrates the importance of the fact underlined in my policy statement that the decision of the Federal Republic of Germany in favour of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance is irreversible and an element of our "raison d'état", implying for the Germans the correct but bitter conclusion that freedom has priority over unification, that it would not help the people of Leipzig to be reunited in a Communist Germany if the majority of Germans thereby surrendered their freedom. This is much easier to say in Oxford, far removed from the iron curtain and the Berlin Wall, than when one is facing one's own kith and kin in Leipzig, Dresden, Potsdam or East Berlin. The partition is not just an academic exercise; it is a division which cuts right through families. There are many families in which chance has ordained that the brother lives in Bonn or Frankfurt while the sister lives in Leipzig or Dresden.

Today Europe and the European Community are faced by the question of whether we are capable of activating effectively the voice of Europe at this historical moment, whether we are able to advance the process of European unification. It is of prime importance that this task be approached from the perspective formulated in the preamble to the EEC Treaty, in which the founders of the European Community announced their determination to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.

This wording is unambiguous. It says clearly that this Community, metaphorically speaking, is more than just a bank into which members deposit a sum of money in the firm expectation that they will subsequently be able to withdraw a larger sum.

It must be made clear that all member States of the Community consider themselves permanently committed to the goal of European unification and that they regard the process which has brought us this far along the road as irreversible.

The discussion following the Brussels summit meeting is reason enough to recall these guidelines. Brussels was a bitter disappointment for the European public. Nevertheless, I must make a plea for fairness: it must not be forgotten that, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory result in Brussels, we had managed by the first months of this year to complete most of the tasks we set ourselves at the Stuttgart summit in the summer of 1983.

A few major items remain to be settled. Though this may be an unsatisfactory state of affairs, I make a fervent plea for greater stamina in tackling this historical task and patience in reaching the decisions it requires.

Those familiar with the history of Europe and its nation-states, characterized more by antagonism than co-operation over three centuries, know that the belief that three hundred years of historical development can suddenly be overturned within the space of thirty years is presumptuous and indicates a lack of respect for historical responsibility.

In the German Bundestag debate on the Brussels meeting, I said that extreme care must be taken not to pass judgement on others. I am aware that a nation such as mine, which has lost two wars during this century, has had its assets depleted by two inflation crises and has suffered partition and the expulsion of many millions of its people, to which I have already referred, that such a nation finds it easier to adjust itself to a future within a larger unit under the European umbrella than those nations which - thank God - have been spared such misfortunes.

At the European Council meeting in Brussels we did all in our power to try to make the summit meeting a success. This has been and will remain the policy of my Government, for we are firmly convinced that only the further development of the Community holds out the promise of an ever closer union of the free peoples of Europe.

For that reason every Federal Chancellor since Konrad Adenauer, notwithstanding party affiliations, has urged that national demands, justified though they may be, should be subordinated to the survival of the Community. I firmly believe in this principle. Not for one moment shall we lose sight of this goal, for we know what is at stake for our continent, at least for our part of the continent.

It is still a question of whether Europe is capable, given the complexities of the international situation, given the military threat, economic and ecological problems, to bring the interests of its member States to a common denominator and to unite. And this unity will eventually require a tighter political organization.

Europe must learn to speak with one voice. This one voice is important, for instance, in relations with our friends and partners in the United States. The question of the moment - and not just in view of the coming elections for the second session of the European Parliament, is this: is every member of the Community prepared to regard its membership as irrevocable, as irreversible, even during the hardest of times? We in the Federal Republic of Germany are.

Are all members prepared to work for the political union of Europe without ifs and buts? I shall say it again: we in the Federal Republic of Germany are.

I hope that our partners can answer these questions in a similar manner.

We shall not be able to go on discussing exclusively economic and political matters in the Community. It is, in my view, impossible to talk within the

circle of Heads of State and Government about the distribution of European Currency Units, agricultural policies and milk quotas and act as if the central and fateful question of how we can best preserve our peace and freedom were no concern of ours. We cannot divide the free part of Europe into two camps. We all participate in economic progress, but only some of us take responsibility for our security.

This does not in any way imply that we seek to construct an alternative to NATO. But, as things stand, the image of a transatlantic bridge is inaccurate. The essence of a bridge is that it has a deck and two pillars. You can draw your own conclusions on whether the European abutment of this Atlantic bridge linking us with Canada and the United States of America is built to meet even the simplest of political and structural requirements.

In addition, what makes this Alliance of free peoples, NATO, absolutely indispensable to us is the fact that the Western powers are confronted on European soil by the imperialist pretensions of the Soviet super-power.

But it is essential that Europeans should increase their weight and influence in NATO, that they should assert their own specific interests more effectively than in the past. The Atlantic Alliance must be adapted to the conditions and demands of the future and its European pillar be strengthened.

At the same time it is important to the Federal Government and the vast majority of the population of the Federal Republic that NATO, and particularly the close friendship and partnership with the United States, should remain the cornerstone of German security policy and the guarantor of our freedom.

Only a strong and united Alliance can safeguard freedom. The Alliance has given us independence and liberty for over three decades. It serves the cause of peace in Europe and throughout the world and remains the basis and prerequisite of genuine détente.

The Alliance, but also an improved East-West relationship, are indispensable conditions for progress in arms control and disarmament. The primary aim of the Atlantic Alliance was and is to prevent war, and so to preserve peace and freedom for our peoples. The surest and hitherto sole guarantee against war is deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, for the Warsaw Pact possesses conventional superiority to this day.

In the seventies, while discussions here went on and on and the modernization of our armaments had practically been abandoned or had ground to a halt, the unilateral Soviet nuclear build-up forced the Western Alliance to take countermeasures. The Soviet Union has regrettably spurned the NATO offer of an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear disarmament which would have obviated Western INF modernization. They have blocked all the settlements we desire and which we have sought to negotiate - for none of us is a missile-maniac.

The Alliance - like the Federal Republic of Germany - withstood the internal and external pressures to which it was exposed during the modernization debate; it passed its acid test, one of great political and psychological importance. I believe that it has emerged strengthened from the INF debate.

We are prepared to return to the bargaining table at any time to continue discussions on nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The paramount objectives of my Government's security policy, like that of all previous Federal Governments, have been and will remain the prevention of a military confrontation in Europe, an end to the arms race on European soil and in the world and guaranteed security at a lower level of armaments.

In the Paris Agreements, the Federal Government under the Chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer renounced the right to manufacture weapons of mass destruction - atomic, chemical and biological weapons. Our position has not changed; we stand by this decision.

Wherever possible, the Federal Republic of Germany has supported arms control and disarmament efforts. Progress in arms control presupposes greater mutual trust and better prospects for dialogue between East and West. We shall do all we can towards this end.

German Ostpolitik had its roots in Adenauer's early efforts to forge a business-like and constructive relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, our largest and most important neighbour whose control over 17 million of our fellow Germans can almost be used as a political pawn. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Moscow in 1955, following Adenauer's visit to the Soviet Union, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow 15 years later are milestones in the postwar development of German-Soviet relations.

My Government seeks constructive and stable relations with our neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the Soviet Union. Everyone knows that the Soviet Union is a difficult partner; since the end of the Second World War, its imperialist policy, handed down from Czarist times, has repeatedly violated German and European interests. Nevertheless, ladies and gentlemen, any policy aimed at preserving and stabilizing peace in Europe requires that the door to dialogue with the Soviet Union be kept open in Europe, even in difficult times.

We naturally observe the agreements we have concluded; we act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

Aware of the rich common heritage of our continent and conscious of our European responsibility, we shall not relax our efforts to seek ways of preserving the advances made in relations with our neighbours in Eastern and South-eastern Europe and to go on developing them.

The Federal Government's pursuit of security and peace serves a vital political purpose, namely to overcome the division of Germany and Europe. Together with the free West and within the European framework we have the

duty and the will to shape our future and to settle our national question as an act of peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are aware of the European dimension of the German partition, which we shall be able to overcome only by peaceful means. The rejection of war and power as instruments of German policy has been reaffirmed time and again by all Federal Governments since 1949.

We need friends more than other countries do. All our neighbours must understand - all of them, I emphasize - that genuine and lasting peace in Europe will be achieved only when the German people are given the same opportunity as almost all the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, the whole world, to determine the course of their own history. I know that this requires patience, and I am realistic. This item is not currently on the international political agenda. And you do not have to be clairvoyant to know that it will take a long time, possibly generations, before this matter is ripe for decision. I ask you only to understand that a German who faces up to his country's history and who stands by its people must call upon the endurance of his friends. ..

In recent months we have often seen television pictures of our Polish neighbours standing in the streets and squares of their cities, proclaiming in song that Poland is not yet lost; we know how many partitions Poland has survived, yet it remains Poland and has never given up its national identity. At the same time, we know there can be no returning to Otto von Bismarck's nation-state. Our passionate advocacy of European unification stems to a great extent from awareness that a peaceful settlement of the German question is only conceivable within a greater European framework.

We realize how great a responsibility devolves upon our country in particular as a stabilizing factor at the heart of Europe. The Germans have learned from their history; we shall never again neglect our European responsibility.

Our responsibility for Europe is also reflected in our relations with the German Democratic Republic, the other part of Germany. While we conduct

the talks necessary for reasons of everyday political realism, let the Chairman of the German CDU assure you that he never forgets that he is dealing with a Communist regime and its leaders; the regime which is depriving my compatriots in the other part of Germany of the most fundamental human rights. The leadership of the German Democratic Republic is now anxious to reinterpret German history and to assume the inheritance of this revised history. Behind the presentation of German history by the German Democratic Republic is the idea of a united Socialist-Communist Germany. The object is to create a sense of national communist identity as a substitute for the legitimization of a society whose philosophy and reality have never been sanctioned by the people of the German Democratic Republic in free elections nor ever would be.

The German people therefore expect every responsible German politician and every Government to work persistently for a state of peace in which they can determine their own unity. **B**ut those who support the unity of our nation must also accept the responsibility of approaching our compatriots in the German Democratic Republic at this critical period in our history. Unity can only mean that we remain united in our thinking, feeling and use of our common language. Unity is upheld when people establish contact, when families are reunited, when young people get to know each other again, when my sons in the south-west of Germany know what Weimar, Eisenach, the Wartburg and many other places which were in the news last year in connection with Luther's anniversary really look like.

The more successfully the hardships of German partition can be eased and overcome within a peaceful order in Europe, the more firmly will peace be consolidated in our continent.

A long road lies ahead of us before that can come about. But we have no reason to become discouraged. History - as you in Oxford all know well - never speaks a last word; it never creates an irreversible situation. International politics are in a constant state of flux.

The situation in divided Germany, too, can change. That has been proved in recent years. This change has also affected Berlin, our old capital. This city has a dual role to play in both Germany and in Europe: it symbolizes staunch defence of democracy and human rights by the free peoples of the West, and functions at the same time as a seismograph measuring the tremors in relations between East and West.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States are active in Berlin in their own right. Their presence is a living symbol of our partnership in the Atlantic community; the three powers are defending the "principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law", as the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty puts it.

We Germans owe a great debt of thanks to the United Kingdom, France and the United States of America, the three Allied powers in Berlin. We remember with gratitude the words you, Mrs Thatcher, spoke to the people of that city when we were there together in October 1982:

"Their (the British forces') presence demonstrates the continuing commitment of Britain, with our French and American Allies, to uphold the freedom of your city. They remain here because there is a vital task for them to do and because you want them to do it. ... We shall work to ensure that these cornerstones of Western freedom continue to guard our way of life."

That is not just a random quote; it is another clear affirmation of a basic political position which is of the greatest importance to all Germans in the German Democratic Republic as well as the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have addressed some of the elements of German policy, the basic principles and aims of my Government. As a leading industrial nation, the Federal Republic of Germany has diverse worldwide interests. Our eyes are not solely trained on Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Our relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America, with the entire Third World, play a major part in our thinking and action in the field of foreign affairs. It is one of the happiest and most encouraging features of our age that in our country a generation has grown up for whom parochial

thinking has increasingly become a thing of the past. Their thinking and action out of a feeling of solidarity for their neighbours who include not only the person living next door or round the corner but also people in Latin America or Asia, an Indian in the Andes or a victim of hunger in the Sahel zone, proves that this generation has grown up with a much more universal outlook.

Co-operation with the Third World is an important part of our policy for worldwide peace; it is based on respect for the independence and self-determination of other countries.

We, as one of the large and comparatively wealthy industrial countries of the world - like you in the United Kingdom - must help the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America to overcome poverty, hunger, despair and intolerable and highly volatile social divisions.

All States, whatever their social order, are subject to the same responsibility to provide assistance in a spirit of solidarity.

Since the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, we have tried to contribute our share on the basis of our historical experience and geographical position. The bulk of our political efforts are undoubtedly focused on Europe and the Atlantic area. The national question, German unity in freedom, European unification and the security of Europe will continue to receive the special attention of every future Federal Government.

The conviction of Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, his legacy to us, that only in close concert with the democratic nations of the West could Germany hope to solve its national problems one day by peaceful means, has become the guiding principle of our policies and an element of the constitutional reality of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In this way we want to learn from history and work towards peace. I believe that it is a good thing to try to learn from history, and I hope that our

neighbours will grow used to the fact that the Germans, for all their past deeds of war, will now and in days to come inscribe their acts of peace upon the pages of history.