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cc: Foo

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 January 1985

Dear Professor Brzezinski,

I finally had a chance during the Christmas-New Year break to read your article on the Future of Yalta which you were kind enough to send me with your letter of 19 November. It is a stimulating and provoking piece though I find much in it with which I do not agree.

I have no doubt of the need for greater European cooperation on political, economic and security matters with the goal of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and of enabling Western Europe to speak and act with greater authority. Your article makes a powerful case for this, though you should not underestimate what has already been achieved in this respect or our determination to press on. I am disappointed however that you appear to ignore Britain's contribution to Europe's defence which is considerably more significant than the Franco-German cooperation to which you do refer.

But I believe that a reduction, especially a punitive reduction, in the American military commitment to Europe would produce the reverse of the result which we both seek. So long as the Soviet military threat remains at its present high level, it is only with unambiguous American military backing that Western Europe will be able successfully to resist Soviet pressure for the sort of neutralized Europe explicitly contemplated in your article. I am convinced that a collective effort by all the Allies including the US will

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be needed to maintain adequate capabilities to match those of the Warsaw Pact; and that US participation in each of the three legs of the NATO triad of forces will be essential to continue to deter the Soviet Union from an attack.

As will be clear from these remarks, I cannot go along with several of your policy prescriptions, though I do agree with your proposal for a reaffirmation of the Helsinki Final Act. There will be an opportunity for this at the 10th Anniversary celebrations next August. But more generally I think that the most effective way for us to exercise a long term influence over developments in Eastern Europe is by the force of example of the West's achievements in the forty years since Yalta. The implications for the East speak for themselves.

Thank you again for sending me the article, and best wishes for the New Year.

Yours sincerely

Ronald Reagan

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

January 1985

Charles - this won't do - it has several phrases that could be very damaging. We shall have to redraft - a short letter I think

Thank you so much for sending me, with your letter of 19 November, a copy of your article on The Future of Yalta. You will not be surprised that I have not been able to read it until the Christmas break.

Quoted out content then looked to be desirable

(I believe that you have made an important contribution to the debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the development of Europe.) Your analysis of Soviet policy in Europe and your prescriptions for Western policy will be read with the close attention they deserve. Even those who may not agree with all of your reasoning will recognise that you have strengthened the already strong case for greater cooperation among the governments of Western Europe.

I think interesting that we should content themselves with a part of his argument of the simple not

I share your view that Western Europe needs to develop its own authority and relevance, both internally and externally. But I ~~must confess that~~ ^{before} ~~I remain to be convinced~~ that a reduction, especially a punitive reduction, in the American military commitment to Europe would produce the *reverse of* result we all seek: to encourage the gradual re-creation of a wider Europe in which States would be free to choose their own path of development, but in which all would be conscious of their common European ties. Indeed, it is at least arguable that some of the policies you propose might produce precisely the opposite result. At the same time, we must be wary of underestimating both what Western Europe has already achieved,

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in terms of political, economic and security coordination, and the determination of Britain and other leading Europeans to reinforce those achievements in future.

These are issues of vital concern to all who enjoy or who yearn for freedom and you do a public service in airing them.

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 December 1984

Prime Minister (3)

A draft reply on these lines is at flag A.

Dear Charles, ^{ans} ^{31/12} attached

Europe - The Future of Yalta

Your letter of 28 November to Colin Budd asked for a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Professor Brzezinski's letter and article on The Future of Yalta.

The Foreign Secretary believes that Brzezinski has made a number of important points which deserve careful attention, even if his historical analysis and policy proposals are of uneven quality. Brzezinski's central theme - that only Europe can save itself ("only Europeans can restore Europe") - is one for which Sir Geoffrey has much sympathy. He believes that, for economic reasons above all, the impulse for greater European cooperation in the political, economic and security fields is a powerful one, which we should welcome and seek to turn to our own advantage. The Foreign Secretary is also convinced that proposals of the Nunn-Cohen type will remain an important, and growing, factor in the equation. And he shares Brzezinski's view that history has not spoken its last word on the post-war division of Europe, though he does not expect history to move quickly on this point.

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? Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary has a number of reservations about Brzezinski's ideas, some of which might have dangerous implications for the future of a strong and free Western Europe. His initial reaction is that the lesson which Brzezinski draws from the experience of the last few decades - that "the historic balance in Europe will be changed gradually in the West's favour only if Russia comes to be faced West of the Elbe rather less by America and rather more by Europe" (p 16) - is a dubious guide to policy, at least in the short and medium term. A closer East-West European relationship bought at the cost of endangering and/or diluting Western freedoms would not be acceptable to the great majority in the West. And it would risk dashing the hopes of the large number of East Europeans, who are sustained by the sight of Western advances in political freedom and free international association as well as by economic and technological progress.

/So long as

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So long as the East's military threat remains at its present level, it is only with strong and unambiguous US military backing that Western Europe can hold on to its values and achievements and hold out against Soviet pressure for European "reunification" on the wrong, neutralist terms. The risk of a drift towards the kind of neutralised Europe explicitly contemplated by Brzezinski on page 18 of his article would be much greater if West European opinion ever lost its confidence in the US commitment to European defence - as expressed in the presence of US ground and air, as well as nuclear, forces in Europe.

As for Brzezinski's prescriptions for Western policy, the Foreign Secretary has considerable doubts about the wisdom of adopting his first and fourth policy proposals, for a public repudiation of Yalta by the Western powers, and for increased assistance to Eastern European dissidents, at a time when the West is seeking to resume a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union with the aim of achieving genuinely balanced arms control agreements.

The most likely Soviet response would be to put off any arms control talks with the US for a considerable time until they had a clearer idea of what this radical switch in Western declared policy meant. In the meantime they would certainly tighten their grip on the Eastern European leaderships, putting at risk individual attempts by the latter to develop their own links with the West and their own minor reforms. Moreover, the Russians would no doubt exploit this extra excuse to intensify their propaganda attacks on Federal German "revanchism". Through these and through pressure on the GDR to curtail inner-German contacts, they would seek to create real doubt in West Germans' minds as to whether the Federal Republic's interests were best served by its present defence and economic alignments.

The Foreign Secretary believes that the right approach is that which the Prime Minister has already generally approved in the context of next year's war-time anniversaries: not to rake over the coals of forty years ago, but to stress the West's achievements since Yalta and our conviction that they are a valuable example for the whole of Europe. The precise implications for the East will largely speak for themselves.

Brzezinski's other ideas (his second and third policy proposals) - for a reaffirmation of the Helsinki Final Act and for increased Eastern European participation in pan-European organisations are ones which the Foreign Secretary

/finds



finds less objectionable. Indeed, as the Prime Minister will be aware, the 10th Anniversary celebrations of the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki next August will provide an opportunity for such a reaffirmation through the statements made by participating states. Brzezinski's third suggestion is best pursued by building on existing points of contact between East and West, especially those connected with the CSCE process, and considering new East-West bodies only when and if there is a clear practical task to be done. Inviting the East Europeans into such distinctively Western and democratic institutions as the Council of Europe would risk diluting precisely what makes these bodies of value: although we should perhaps consider whether we put out enough information on their activities in the East.

Brzezinski's fifth idea - that Europe should assume a more direct role in its own defence - is the one for which the Foreign Secretary has most sympathy, for the reasons mentioned above and rehearsed in his "European Pillar" article in Foreign Affairs. Even so, he thinks that Brzezinski considerably underestimates what Europe has already achieved in this field, and, in doing so, manages to ignore Britain's contribution to European defence (itself considerably more significant than the Franco-German cooperation to which Brzezinski refers). This is yet another example of the way in which our allies too often fail to give enough weight to the importance of Britain's role.

Moreover, Brzezinski totally misapprehends the nature of the problem about the US security commitment to Europe. There are two major flaws in the case he makes for the withdrawal of US ground forces. The first is the problem of defence resources. The collective efforts of all the Allies including the US are going to be needed to maintain adequate capabilities to match those of the Warsaw Pact over the next ten years. It is extremely improbable that European Governments could produce either the men or equipment to compensate for massive US withdrawals. Second, US participation in each of the three legs of the NATO triad of forces has long been regarded as essential to deter the Soviet Union from believing that they could get away with a conventional attack on Western Europe. Brzezinski's offer of strategic defence as part of the compensation for withdrawal of US conventional forces makes neither technical or political sense.

/Overall,

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Overall, the Foreign Secretary's conclusion is that Brzezinski's own analysis gives useful support to the already strong case for increased European cooperation; but some of his arguments are less valid; and several of his policy proposals are seriously flawed. Sir Geoffrey reserves judgement on Brzezinski's version of the post-war settlement, which FCO experts will be looking at in more detail. Perhaps the most significant general shortcoming in the article is Brzezinski's failure clearly to establish what he means by "Europe". Thus Sir Geoffrey has some difficulty in reconciling Brzezinski's call for strengthened Western European defence with his support for a "more authentic Europe" on the lines of the allegedly "positive experience" of Austria and Finland.

/ I enclose, as requested, a draft reply to Brzezinski which conveys the essence of these points without going into his arguments in detail.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski
1800 K Street, NW,
Suite 400,
Washington DC 20006

Copies to:

slzabg

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you so much for sending me, with your letter of 19 November, a copy of your article on The Future of Yalta. You will not be surprised that I have not been able to read it until the Christmas break.

CAVEAT.....

I believe that you have made an important contribution to the debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the development of Europe. Your analysis of Soviet policy in Europe and your prescriptions for Western policy will be read with the close attention they deserve. Even those who may not agree with all of your reasoning will recognise that you have strengthened the already strong case for greater cooperation among the governments of Western Europe.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I share your view that Western Europe needs to develop its own authority and relevance, both internally and externally. But I must confess that I remain to be convinced that a reduction, especially a punitive reduction, in the American military commitment to Europe

would produce the result we all seek: to encourage the gradual re-creation of a wider Europe in which States would be free to choose their own path of development, but in which all would be conscious of their common European ties. Indeed, it is at least arguable that some of the policies you propose might produce precisely the opposite result. At the same time, we must be wary of underestimating both what Western Europe has already achieved, in terms of political, economic and security coordination, and the determination of Britain and other leading Europeans to reinforce those achievements in future.

These are issues of vital concern to all who enjoy or who yearn for freedom and you do a public service in airing them.

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28 DEC 1984