

GRS 740

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081600Z

FM BONN 081345Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 012 OF 08 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, EAST BERLIN, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING CONSULATES GENERAL IN THE FRG

MY TELNO 004 TO WED: CALL ON CHANCELLOR KOHL

SUMMARY

1. A 70 MINUTE TOUR D'HORIZON IN ADVANCE OF THE 18 JANUARY ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS IN BONN. KOHL CORDIAL AND EXPANSIVE. MORE STRESS ON THE SENSITIVITY OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE. FRG AND UK MUST KEEP REMINDING REAGAN OF EUROPE'S INTERESTS IN THE US/USSR DIALOGUE. NEED FOR LONG-TERM THINKING ON DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON KOHL ON 7 JANUARY, HIS FIRST DAY BACK AT HIS DESK. HE WAS IN FRIENDLY AND TALKATIVE MOOD. HE STARTED WITH A LONG DIGRESSION INTO THE RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT QUESTION OF DRAFT DODGERS COMING TO BERLIN AND SO STRENGTHENING THE GREEN AND MALCONTENT ELEMENT THERE. WHEN THE FEDERAL AND BERLIN AUTHORITIES HAD THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED WHAT COULD BE DONE THEY WOULD APPROACH THE ALLIES. I SAID WE WERE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM; THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER IT COULD BE BETTER TACKLED AT THE BERLIN OR AT THE FRG END.

[Raised with you by Reagan of Berlin. Kohl may refer at summit]

3. KOHL THEN SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE NEED FOR MORE LONG-TERM AND STRATEGIC THINKING BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON SUCH ISSUES AS EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WAY TIME WAS WORKING AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND BRINGING SLOW CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE MOST UNDERRATED EVENT OF 1984 WAS KADAR'S AGREEMENT TO ADMIT AUSTRIAN CABLE TV TO HUNGARY.

4. I PRESSED KOHL TO EXPLAIN HIS IDEAS ON EUROPEAN UNION, REMINDING HIM OF THE SPEECHES AND ARTICLES IN WHICH YOU HAD MADE THE BRITISH APPROACH VERY CLEAR. HE SAID HE WANTED PRAGMATIC, PRACTICAL STEPS FORWARD, BUT WOULD NOT SPECIFY. THE MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AT BRUSSELS WOULD BE SWAMPED WITH DETAIL, BUT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS STRONGLY THAT A DAY BE KEPT ASIDE AT MILAN FOR A REAL DISCUSSION OF THE LONGER-TERM PERSPECTIVE.

HE SAID I UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. I REITERATED THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCLUSIONS OF FONTAINEBLEAU, INCLUDING THE 1000 MECU REFUND. KOHL SAID "YES, YES".

[Something missing?]

CONFIDENTIAL

15. AS

CONFIDENTIAL

5. AS REGARDS THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATION MUST BE CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE. EUROPE MUST SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO THE US. EVENTS WERE AT A TURNING POINT AND THE WEST PERHAPS IN A STRONGER POSITION THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE WAR. HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE BEST FITTED, BY THEIR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH REAGAN AND THEIR BASIC SUPPORT OF US POLICIES, TO KEEP REMINDING THE US OF EUROPEAN NEEDS AND INTERESTS.

6. KOHL AGAIN STRESSED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAY THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE WOULD BE HANDLED IN THE FRG AND BY HER ALLIES. IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN EARLIER ANNIVERSARIES FOR THE SENSIBILITIES AND FUTURE ORIENTATION OF THE NEW POST-WAR AND POST-NAZI GENERATION OF GERMANS. IT WAS A CENTRAL TASK FOR HIM TO WORK TO CONSOLIDATE AND MAKE IRREVERSIBLE THE ANCHORAGE OF THE WEST GERMANS WITHIN THE WEST. THIS WAS WHY HE WAS DEVOTING SO MUCH TIME TO THE REFUGEE AND EXPELLEE ORGANISATIONS. HE WANTED ALSO TO COUNTER TRENDS TOWARDS LEFT WING NATIONALIST FORMS OF NEUTRALISM. THE GDR'S ATTEMPTS TO APPROPRIATE GERMAN NATIONAL TRADITIONS WAS A THREAT IN THIS CONNECTION.

7. I DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MAIN SUBJECTS FOR THE ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS ON 18 JANUARY WOULD BE EAST-WEST RELATIONS, TRANSATLANTIC QUESTIONS AND THE COMMUNITY. (KOHL HAD NOT MENTIONED THE ENVIRONMENT, AND I DID NOT DRAW ATTENTION TO IT). BUT I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT THE TWO MINISTERS OF DEFENCE WOULD BE MEETING: THEY SAW EYE TO EYE ON SO MANY THINGS, EG WEU AND IEPC. KOHL AGREED AND SAID THAT MUCH MORE SHOULD BE DONE IN DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION.

8. I TOLD THE CHANCELLOR OF THE SOVIET REJECTION OF THE LATEST ALLIED APPEAL TO THE USSR FOR HESS'S RELEASE. THIS APPEAL, AT UK INSTIGATION, HAD FOLLOWED KOHL'S WARNING TO ME OF NEW CHURCH PRESSURES. THE CHANCELLOR STRESSED THE NEED TO BRING HOME TO ORDINARY GERMANS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALONE RESPONSIBLE FOR HESS'S CONTINUED DETENTION.

COMMENT

9. EVEN MORE THAN USUAL, KOHL APPEARED TO HAVE PLENTY OF TIME TO TALK BUT NOT MUCH INCLINATION TO LISTEN. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

2
CONFIDENTIAL

TAND

CONFIDENTIAL

AND LOCARNO MADE THEIR USUAL APPEARANCES, THOUGH ONLY BRIEFLY.
KOHL'S CONCEPT OF THE ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT SEEMED TO BE FORWARD-
LOOKING AND "STRATEGIC" MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE PRIME
MINISTER, WITH SPECIALIST QUESTIONS BEING HANDLED MAINLY BY THE
ACCOMPANYING MINISTERS.

10. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG (NOT TO ALL).

BONN WILL PASS TO BMG BERLIN AND CONSULATES GENERAL IN THE FRG.

BULLARD

LIMITED
WED
SOV D.
EED
NAD
SED
PLANNING STAFF
INFORMATION D
NEWS D
RESEARCH D
ECD'S
DEFENCE D
ACDD
ERD
MAED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIRKIND
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR RENWICK
MR O'NEILL

COPIES TO
PS/MR HESELYNE MOD
PS/MR JENKINS DHSS
PS/MR CHANNON DTI
PS/MR LAWSON DOE
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
MS LAMBERT CAB. OFFICE
MR HOWYNN DS12 MOD

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

3

CONFIDENTIAL