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MR POWELL

Prime Minister's Briefing Meeting for Washington

We agreed this morning that, although the Prime Minister's briefing meeting later today is intended to cover the non-arms control aspects of her Washington visit, it would be a wise precaution for you to have by you advance copies of the revised Speaking Notes which we have prepared (on the Geneva negotiations and Chemical Weapons) and of our suggested passages on arms control for inclusion in the Public Statement on leaving the White House on 20 February. I therefore attach these. The top copies, together with all the background material, will reach you during the course of tomorrow, 15 February.

B G Cartledge

14 February 1985

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SPEAKING NOTE

THE APPROACH TO RENEWED UNITED STATES/SOVIET
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

1. Much appreciated McFarlane/Abrahamson briefing in London. Noted your encouragement for United Kingdom ideas on possible United States negotiating positions. Do not wish to re-open Camp David discussions on SDI last December. Re-affirm value and importance of Camp David Four Points, which have now increasingly become basis for wider Alliance stance.

2. As resumption of US/Soviet negotiations at Geneva approaches, we particularly value this opportunity to hear more about your expectations and intentions. You will already be giving consideration to a long-term strategy for the negotiations: expect you share our view that this should

- serve Western interests;
- unite the Alliance; and
- deny Russians the potential for wedge-driving or gaining advantage in negotiations.

Against background of these broad objectives, there are a number of more specific questions which we would like to explore with you. Realise time does not permit in-depth discussion now, but they could serve as reference points for continuing exchanges between us at all levels in coming months.

Negotiating Strategy and Linkage

3. Are we right in assuming that your broad objective will be to achieve during your second term at least the outline of an agreement limiting and reducing offensive nuclear arms?

SECRET

If so, might be useful to try to identify the key elements necessary for the West in any such agreement.

4. Would you agree that the main challenge will be to avoid being impaled on the hook of likely Soviet insistence that any agreement (and perhaps any real negotiations) on the limitation or reduction of offensive nuclear weapons must depend on some US undertaking to restrict SDI-related activities (particularly field testing and/or deployment)?

5. Seems to us that one way to blunt this hook might be to aim for some formal high level re-affirmation of the commitment by both sides to the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty. Have noted with interest that you told Congress in your message of 1 February "our objectives in new negotiations which begin in March are to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty".

Could this best be done by seeking more precise and specific definitions of the scope for permissible research, together with agreed limits on testing and deployment of SDI-related systems or components, drawing on the provisions and mechanisms of the ABM Treaty (e.g. Article V, Article XIII and Agreed Statement D)?

6. If, as we agreed at Camp David, the principal objective of the negotiations is to secure reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides, would there not in any event need to be some kind of joint political understanding that for any such reductions agreement on offensive arms to be successfully implemented, both sides would have to be explicitly agreed about what would and what would not be permissible in terms of strategic defence over the period of the agreement?

SECRET

7. Would you agree that probable Soviet linkage tactics could perhaps be turned back on them by arguing that, unless outline agreement can be reached within the lifetime of this Administration on limitations or reductions on offensive nuclear weapons, the United States might find it politically untenable to abide by the existing legal constraints on the developing, testing or deployment of BMD systems?

8. In attempting to explain to the Russians the rationale for your vision, and to dispel mutual misconceptions about the current level and status of each side's BMD-related research, would it be worth trying to register formal agreement with the Russians now that both sides should review the overall position with respect to offensive and defensive strategic forces at the date on which an offensive force reductions agreement would be due to expire (say 1995) to see whether any major new departures might by then be indicated to maintain or enhance strategic stability?

START

9. Can you give us any idea of what you think a framework START agreement might look like?

Do you envisage an approach combining aggregates of launchers and warheads?

Comparing existing US and Soviet negotiating positions, it seems to us that it should be feasible to construct a package comprising acceptable overall launcher aggregates (ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), matched with overall warhead aggregates, with a sub-limit on ballistic missile warheads [see Background Note].

SECRET

Would this not represent significant reductions by comparison with existing force levels, as well as some reduction in the disparity between ballistic missile throw-weight?

We assume that sea-launched Cruise missiles as well as air-launched Cruise missiles would be covered in such START negotiations. Ground-launched Cruise missiles, of course, would be dealt with in INF.

INF

10. The INF negotiating context seems likely to be particularly tricky. No question of British (or French) systems being included. But Russians seem likely to argue that Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles can only be bargained against Soviet counter deployments, whereas the price for reductions in SS20s is to accept their equivalence with British and French forces.

To spike Russian arguments, do you agree that NATO should continue to work along lines reached when negotiating broke off? [See Background Note.] In particular, do you see scope for US not matching in Europe Soviet global deployments?

ASATS [See also Background Note]

11. Should not a time-limited ban on further testing and deployment of ASATs which respects the principle of balance also be one of our negotiating objectives?

Given Soviet deployments and work in this field, recognise US need to re-establish balance. But West is more dependent and potentially more vulnerable in respect of existing and projected communications, surveillance and navigating satellites in high geo-stationary orbit. Highly destabilising if vulnerable to small scale, high-confidence

SECRET

ASAT attack. SDI space-based assets might themselves then be vulnerable to Soviet ASAT attack.

12. Recognise problems of verification. But on basis of technical exchanges with US, these do not seem to us insuperable, at least in respect of testing of future systems.

Would you, like us, see some advantage in the following possibilities:

- (a) mutual restrictions to one low altitude ASAT system on each side;
- (b) a ban on the development and testing of new ASAT systems, including high altitude ASATs; and
- (c) confidence-building measures, designed to increase the two-way flow of information and to prevent accidents affecting satellites?

13. Recognise problem of inter-relationship with BMD development. But note separate timescales. ASATs now in process of deployment or full-scale testing, whereas decisions to move beyond BMD research unlikely in this decade. If in near term ASAT constraints agreed, always possible at later stage in light of BMD requirements to propose appropriate changes, perhaps in parallel to whatever was relevant in the context of the ABM Treaty.

CONCLUSION

14. Would welcome continuing opportunity for our people to keep in close touch with yours, bilaterally, as your thinking on all this develops. Meanwhile, support US

SECRET

research programme taking account of Soviet developments, as stated at Camp David. Hope British scientists and firms may have a part to play. Would welcome your assurance that any such participation will not be inhibited by US restrictions in scientific exchanges and access to research or the US market [see Background Note].

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SPEAKING NOTE

CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

1. In the light of serious Soviet threat, UK/US agree negotiated and adequately verifiable ban best answer. Threat of US binary production offers important leverage. Despite political sensitivities, recognise case for modernisation in order to improve negotiating hand. But negotiating position must be sound to enable UK and others to express support for politically controversial move.
2. If negotiations failed, strong case for modernisation. But political sensitivity of issue would not disappear. Again, easier to offer public UK support if we can demonstrate that West had been negotiating seriously and constructively, and that blame for failure must be laid at Soviet door.
3. US draft Treaty generally sound. But Article X proposal, while bold and imaginative, also unrealistic; easily exploited by the Russians; and already produced potential division in Alliance. Most important: it does not offer an effective deterrent to Soviet cheating, even if it could be negotiated.
4. UK concept (explained in paper) builds on US approach. Provides better basis for effective deterrence; or if negotiations fail, better ammunition with which to blame Russians. Urge re-evaluation of US position; UK ready to discuss details further.

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Presidential Review Commission (PRC)

5. Note PRC's establishment; possibility of approach to Allies soon. CW politically sensitive issue in UK; no wish to interfere in internal conduct of important US policy review. But prepared for UK to state in strict confidence advantage of "twin-track" approach at Geneva, if approached by PRC and if you consider this would be helpful.

ELEMENTS FOR PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
FOLLOWING WHITE HOUSE MEETING, 20 FEBRUARY 1985

I have had a wide-ranging and extremely useful meeting with the President, during which we reviewed the prospects for resumed arms control negotiations in Geneva on 12 March covering nuclear and space weapons. I re-affirmed my satisfaction that, thanks to United States efforts, negotiations have now been resumed; and my firm support for the United States position. There was full agreement between us on the principles which the West should observe during the negotiations; on the need for the West to show patience and perseverance throughout the process, which could well be lengthy; and on our joint determination to work for a successful outcome.

In our review of the prospects we re-affirmed our attachment to the four basic points which we had earlier agreed at Camp David - the maintenance of balance; the need for SDI-related deployments to be a matter for negotiation; the aim of enhancing deterrence; and the achievement of security at reduced levels of offensive forces. The negotiations in Geneva, the purpose of which is to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides, are bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries account for the overwhelming preponderance of nuclear weapons in the world today. I agreed with the President that British nuclear systems, which constitute a minimum national strategic deterrence of last resort, have no place there. On the other hand, I confirmed that if the two super-powers can achieve substantial reductions in their nuclear forces and

there is no significant change in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would be prepared to review the position and to consider how best she might contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

I spoke to the President of the need, taking account of Soviet developments, for SDI research to continue. I noted that British companies are already involved to some extent in the preliminary stages of the programme, and I would like to believe that they would be enabled to make an appropriate contribution to future work. The continued exploitation of new technology is crucial to Western strength and security. A two-way flow of ideas and business in the defence sector is important for both pillars of the Alliance.

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