



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 May 1985

*Dear Charles,*Chancellor Kohl's Visit to Chequers, 18 May: Locarno

It is just possible that Chancellor Kohl may speak to the Prime Minister about a plan for marking the 60th Anniversary of the Locarno Treaty (more correctly, group of Treaties) with an academic seminar in Berlin, possibly attended by Foreign Ministers.

Locarno is Kohl's favourite treaty. He sees it as the first attempt to bring Germany out of her post-war humiliation and back into the Western community of nations. He thinks it failed because British interest melted away, and because the United States was absent. The Treaty was initialled in Locarno on 16 October 1925 and signed in London on 1 December the same year.

Some months ago Sir Julian Bullard had the idea of marking the anniversary with a lecture given in German and in Bonn by a British academic. He had in mind Professor James Joll. He thought of December rather than October, in order to register the London connection. He hoped he could get Chancellor Kohl to be present, and to attend a dinner at the Residence afterwards.

When Sir Julian Bullard put this idea to Teltschik, with the blessing of the FCO, he was told that the Chancellor had rather more far reaching ideas. Kohl was thinking of a conference of academics, to be held in the Reichstag in Berlin. Western Foreign Ministers might be invited (apparently not the Foreign Ministers of Poland and Czechoslovakia, although they also were signatories). It was left that Sir Julian Bullard would reflect on the German proposal, and the Germans on his.

/Since



Since then the Chancellor's office have been too busy to take the matter forward. They may in any case have had their fill of anniversaries for one year. But in case the Chancellor speaks to the Prime Minister on Saturday, you should be aware that we have distinct reservations about the idea of a grand seminar in Berlin - not so much for Berlin reasons, but because of the obvious flaws in the Locarno Treaty itself. It established greater security for Germany's western borders than for those in the East; it took the artificial attitude that an attack by France on Germany was as much to be resisted by Britain as an attack by Germany on France, and as likely; and it did after all fail to keep the peace. For all these reasons we consider that Sir Julian Bullard's suggestion for a lecture in Bonn would be more appropriate.

You may like to warn the Prime Minister. Teltschik said to Sir Julian Bullard at one point that he thought the Chancellor might already have mentioned the matter to her, perhaps at the European Council meeting at Brussels in March.

/ I enclose as background a copy of Roger Bone's letter of 6 June 1984, commenting on Kohl's Adenauer lecture at Oxford in May 1984.

*Yours ever,  
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
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6 June, 1984

John John

Chancellor Kohl and German Reunification

The Foreign Secretary thought the Prime Minister might be interested in the enclosed note which we have prepared by way of comment on Chancellor Kohl's Konrad Adenauer memorial lecture at Oxford, which she attended on 2 May. Sir Geoffrey Howe was interested in the article by Timothy Garton Ash in The Spectator on 12 May, dealing with Kohl's lecture. The note takes account of it. I am enclosing The Spectator article and the English text of Kohl's lecture.

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(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
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Mr. Budd, Private Office

Paras 6-11 of my  
note of 1 June 1984 deal  
with Locarno, Stresemann and  
Kohl.

John A. Munro

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CHANCELLOR KOHL'S KONRAD ADENAUER MEMORIAL LECTURE AT OXFORD  
ON 2 MAY 1984

1. Kohl's lecture was a comprehensive if somewhat turgid account of his view of Germany's place in the world and his priorities in foreign policy. He is undoubtedly greatly preoccupied with the question of the division of Germany (as is the Federal President elect, Richard von Weizsaecker). His lecture got a largely favourable press in both Germany and Britain. The most interesting analysis in the British press was by Timothy Garton Ash (an expert on Germany) in *The Spectator* on 12 May.

Attached

2. Kohl's central thesis was that Adenauer took a decisive and irreversible decision to anchor the FRG (what Kohl calls the free part of Germany) in the western family of nations, notably in NATO and the European Community. Kohl claimed that he unreservedly endorsed this strategic decision. NATO, for example, he called the 'central element of our raison d'etat'. However, Kohl also insisted that he (and, he believed, the German people) would never give up the idea of reunifying the nation, however long this might take. Immediately, the free Germans had a duty to look after their 17 million compatriots who were oppressed by a communist dictatorship.

3. Kohl argues that the division of Germany can only be overcome within the context of overcoming the division of Europe; for example on page 12: 'Our passionate advocacy of European unification stems to a great extent from awareness that a positive settlement of the German question is only conceivable within a greater European framework'. Kohl appreciates, of course, that overcoming the division of Germany is a very long term objective indeed. Meanwhile, he argues, Germany attaches the greatest priority to uniting Western Europe.

/4. On

4. On pages 7 and 8 of the lecture Kohl rehearses his familiar theme that the economic and budgetary aspects of the Community are of secondary importance to political union. 'We in the Federal Republic of Germany are prepared to work for the political union of Europe without ifs and buts'. Kohl gave great emphasis to this part of his speech. Richard von Weizsaecker has often made the same point. For Germany a Free Trade Area plus political cooperation are not a sufficient European policy.

5. In his lecture Kohl reviewed German foreign policy across the board; but the passages on relations with the Third World (which come towards the end) although sincere, seemed perfunctory and mainly for the record. Kohl summed up his real interest on page 15: 'The national question, German unity and freedom, European reunification and the security of Europe will continue to receive the special attention of future Federal governments'.

6. Timothy Garton Ash has drawn attention in The Spectator to Kohl's reference to the Locarno Pact concluded by Chamberlain, Briand and Gustav Stresemann, the best known Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic (there were no references to Stresemann in the draft provided for Kohl by his officials). Kohl suggested in his lecture (page 5) that Stresemann, together with Chamberlain and Briand, had made a great and largely unrecognised effort to integrate Germany in Western Europe. Stresemann did indeed inaugurate an era of good relations with France in which Germany was accepted into the family of nations entering, for example, the League of Nations. But in praising Stresemann Kohl gave rise to doubts, voiced by Timothy Garton Ash, about his true aims in Europe. Most historians would accept Professor Gordon Craig's assessment of Stresemann that he was concerned with the urgent national requirements of regaining full sovereignty and independence for Germany.

7. A central feature of Stresemann's policy in national questions was the restoration of German power in Eastern Europe. Like almost all German politicians of his time Stresemann regarded the Polish state established in 1919 as an aberration that had grown powerful only because of the temporary weakness of both Russia and Germany, and the collapse of Austria, the three powers which had combined to eradicate Poland from the map at the end of the 18th century. This community of interest with Russia found its clearest expression in the Nazi/Soviet pact of August 1939.

8. There is no evidence in his Adenauer Memorial Lecture or elsewhere that Kohl aspires to emulate Stresemann in Eastern Europe. Kohl has fully accepted the Eastern treaties concluded by the SPD Government with Poland and the Soviet Union in 1970; the FRG thereby renounced force as a means of changing the existing frontiers in Europe. Moreover, Kohl appears to share the very widespread contemporary German feelings of guilt and goodwill towards Poland.

9. However, some people in France, and to some extent in the USA, have expressed concern that in reviving the German national question and claiming continuity with figures such as Stresemann, Kohl may revive potentially dangerous dreams and ambitions in Germany, and open Pandora's box. Their concern is that if the German people come to attach great importance to reunification as a goal of policy to be actively pursued, they will see that the route chosen by Kohl (overcoming the division of Europe and thereby the division of Germany) is most unlikely to succeed within any conceivable time-scale. They fear therefore that the Germans might opt for neutralist, nationalist policies which would make it less easy for the Russians to block the path to German unity. (The Poles and the Russians react to talk of reunification by accusing Kohl of revanchism - aspiring to alter the results of the Second World War, in particular the westward shift of Poland).

/10. None

10. None of these German aspirations amount to immediate practical plans; but there is no doubt that whereas France (and indeed the UK) are content with the status quo in Europe, the Germans are not. This dissatisfaction with the status quo of a divided Germany is bound to lead to speculation as to the implications of German efforts to find a way of keeping the aspiration to reunification alive.

11. Kohl's answer to the concerns expressed in France, discernible in his Adenauer Lecture, is that the aspiration of the German people for reunification must be channelled into safe enthusiasm for European union. That is why Kohl advocates it so passionately and is sometimes so frustrated by the priority attached by others to bookkeeping and agricultural surpluses. His lecture at Oxford was a clear statement of his view that for Germany these problems are of secondary importance. They have to be overcome nonetheless because they constitute a block on the road to European union and thus to his (very long term) ambitions for Germany.

1 June 1984

when a pack from the wars but that is not true. American stomachs are tending. We are in an era when even a kitchen whose owners do not subscribe to any of the mass circulation cooking magazines will still have four or five different kinds of vinegar. A serious cook will have strawberry vinegar, lemon vinegar, sage vinegar, raspberry vinegar, tarragon vinegar and you name any other flavour you can think of. You will, naturally, make your vinegar yourself, although you will purchase a bottle of Balsamic vinegar which any gourmet snob will tell, whether correctly or not I cannot say, comes only from the village of Modena in Italy. The point to note is that this recondite item is now commonly available in the better grocery stores across America.

What holds for vinegar is true for the rest of what goes into the salad dressing. Only an oaf would use anything but first pressing olive oil costing per ounce about the same as opium. But the food madness places as much emphasis on variety as it does on quality, so now you may get your vinaigrette made from walnut oil or hazelnut oil. As for the salad itself, every year they discover a new kind of lettuce to put into it. Until 1982 nobody in America had ever heard of arugula (or roquette as some call it); until last year Americans would have told you radicchio was an acronym for a left-wing Italian terrorist group.

Foodism is too big and has been going on too long to be called a fad. It is on its way to becoming a major element in the culture, if it hasn't already done so. But within the new American foodism fads streak across the national palate with the speed of service in a fast food franchise. A couple of years ago it was *pesto*. Everybody in the country making over the medium income (the po' folks don't get into gourmety too much, ya know) was growing basil plants. Then it was sushi time and this year it's been *prima vera* all winter long. Everything has got the name *prima vera* stuck in front of it. There are restaurants, admittedly of uncertain quality, advertising pizza *prima vera*.

Foodism is changing American domestic architecture. More homes are built without living rooms or dining rooms. The kitchen has taken over that space. The life of the family revolves around the preparing and eating of food interspersed with periods when the family members, bursting at the gut from gustatory pleasure, break out of the front door and do violent exercise to keep the fat off and blow the cholesterol out of their tubes. Home is a banqueting hall and outside is a vomitorium, so to speak, for we are a nation which wants both to pig out and to keep our tummies flat.

Strange and inexplicable land, America invented and invaded the rest of the world with its franchised, mass-manufactured fast food and yet now the number of four-star restaurants is growing more rapidly than McDonald's or Col. Sanders's Southern Fried Chicken. The chef/proprietors of these places are generating star quality of

near cinematic proportions and one, Paul Prudhomme of New Orleans, literally takes his restaurant on tour from time to time. Last year he opened up for a month in San Francisco where lines longer than those waiting to see an Oscar-winning picture queued up for hours for their turn to sample ecstasy.

Having wider impact is the multiplication of good but not great restaurants where the new kind of critic, guide and teacher waiter flourishes. After you're seated he hands you the menu and then tells you to ignore it. He is about to recite the specialities of the day in the manner of a teacher dealing with

a retarded pupil. 'For the first course you should have the *salade tiède de ris de veau, poêle de pleurotes, confit de trevise and truffes noisette à l'huile de noisette*, which means (stupid) a warm salad of calf's sweetbreads, mushroom, a mildly bitter red chicory, black truffles and hazelnut oil. The chef is very good with sweetbreads. Oh, I recognise that look on your faces. What are you? From Iowa. Just don't think what they are and learn to eat them.'

Americans are learning to eat sweetbreads and sea urchins and where once they had to go to Europe to eat well, now they stay home.

## Europa über Alles

Timothy Garton Ash

Last week Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave the Konrad Adenauer Memorial lecture at Oxford, in the presence of the Prime Minister. What he had to say about Germany and Europe may be summarised in three propositions:

1) The long-term goal of all West German governments, but particularly of his government, is to overcome the division of Germany, and therefore of Europe.

2) For the Federal Republic, total commitment to the democratic West, and its alliances, is the only possible path towards this goal.

3) So total is the commitment of the Federal Republic to Europe and the West that it would like the EEC to move forward *schnellstens* towards a United States of Europe.

Neither the truth nor the connecting inner logic of these propositions is self-evident. Take 2) for a start. For so long as it was a nation-state, Germany was wont to manoeuvre between East and West —

specifically, between Russia on the one side, France and Britain on the other. In the 1950s there were compelling reasons for West Germany, the half-nation-state, to return to this traditional *Schaukelpolitik*. As Professor Hans-Peter Schwarz argued in the Konrad Adenauer Memorial lecture at Oxford four years ago, 'the conviction was general that Moscow held the key to reunification'. There was nothing inevitable about Adenauer's grand commitment to the West. Professor Schwarz concluded that 'if, in the future, Bonn was to opt again for a middle path, Adenauer's decision in favour of an anti-Russian policy and a lasting alliance with the Western democracies would only be a temporary affair in the long course of German policy towards Russia.'

Since Adenauer's time, the Federal Republic, under its Social Democrat Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt, has of course developed a distinctive policy towards the East (*Ostpolitik*). And one of the more remarkable features of Dr Kohl's Chancellorship is the way in which, while claiming to be Adenauer's heir, he has taken over the Social Democrats' *Ostpolitik* almost whole — especially in relations with East Germany. The reasons are not far to seek. There is a general consensus in Bonn that the development of a special working relationship with the government of East Germany has brought the Germans in East and West closer together, while at the same time improving West Germany's position in international affairs. In other words, it is seen as being in Germany's *national interest* — and the right-wing nationalist Franz Josef Strauss sees this as clearly as any leftist lover of *détente*.

There is, however, a vital corollary. As Chancellor Kohl clearly acknowledged in a discussion after his lecture, the key to what the East German Government does lies in Moscow. Now, since good relations with the German Democratic Republic are thought by all the main parties in Bonn to

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be in Germany's national interest, and since good relations with the GDR are rightly seen to depend on relations with the Soviet Union, it follows that West Germany must (like all previous Germanies) have a special interest in good relations with Russia. I believe there is a substantial consensus on this point in West Germany — more substantial than the consensus on, say, the necessity of deploying Cruise and Pershing missiles. It may even be a rational consensus. Arguably, if your purpose is to keep the nation together (at least in spirit, human contacts and so forth), then, for that purpose, Moscow is more important to you than Washington. Eastern approaches, not Western alliances, allow German to meet German in Weimar or East Berlin.

Nor is this morally reprehensible. It is a government's business to pursue what it believes to be the national interest. It is what we expect our government to do.

No, the problem is what the government says. What Dr Kohl said last week, with lugubrious pathos, was that poor old Germany, having suffered so much at the hands of history — two lost wars, two inflations, partition, the deportations from the East (his list) would be heartily delighted to surrender its (half-) nation-statehood for the sake of a larger European community. 'The question is,' as he put it to the Bundestag in March, 'who is prepared to follow us on the way to European political union with the stated objective of a United States of Europe' (my italics)? Lead on, Germany! As Prussia 'went up' into Germany, so Germany will go up into Europe.

But why this heroic self-sacrifice? And how does proposition 3) square with proposition 1)? For what would be the Russian reaction to this United States of Western Europe? Hardly, one imagines, to urge the benefits of membership on its East European satellites. Unless, of course, they were offered the kind of secret membership which East Germany currently enjoys in the EEC — many benefits, no disadvantages. If I read Dr Kohl aright, this is roughly how he would square the circle. The US of E would pursue towards Eastern Europe — but especially towards East Germany — the policies which West Germany is currently pursuing towards East Germany. In return for political recognition and a great deal of money, the communist regimes would allow us (East and West Germans/Europeans) to see a bit more of each other. As the theologians of *Ostpolitik* put it, we must accept the division of Europe in order to overcome it. Germany will give up her national sovereignty (proposition 3) in order to regain it (proposition 1).

At moments like these I wish I had read more Hegel. Such dialectics are beyond me. But let every people pursue its own salvation in its own way. All I object to is being told that their interests are necessarily our interests. And I can think of the odd Frenchman or Pole who would join me in questioning the automatic equation of Germany's interest with Europe's interest.

To say that 'to end the division of Europe it is essential to end the division of Germany' is not merely true — it is a truism. It is like saying that to get from Southwark to St Paul's you have to cross the Thames. But in this case the reverse does not follow, particularly if you take the current West German gradualist view of 'overcoming the division of Germany'. It is perfectly possible for Germans to be getting closer together while other European peoples are being held farther apart. Of course the disjuncture cannot be total, but this is very much what has happened over the two years since martial law was imposed in Poland.

The special German-German rapprochement may be a good thing. It may be a bad thing. But it is not the same thing as the healing of Europe. Perhaps all of Western Europe should try to treat all of Eastern Europe as West Germany treats East Germany. Or perhaps it shouldn't. But at least

we should know what we're talking about.

Chancellor Kohl was trained as an historian. Expatriating upon Adenauer's integration of Germany into the West, he observed that this was actually Germany's second attempt at *Westintegration*: the first was made by Gustav Stresemann in the Locarno Treaty of 1925. Turning to Gordon Craig's *Oxford History of Germany*, I read:

Stresemann was no more a 'good European' than Austen Chamberlain or Aristide Briand or any other of the leading statesmen of his time. He was capable of using the sentimental rhetoric that was the characteristic style of the proponents of a future United States of Europe, but he was no believer in that grand design. As a German statesman, he felt that it was his obligation to concern himself with urgent national requirements, and the goal he set himself was to regain full sovereignty and independence for his country.

## A monument to the dead

Gavin Stamp

In theory, the idea of building designs by dead architects is an attractive one: there are unexecuted projects by Inigo Jones, Wren and Soane that I should like to see realised. But about the controversial unexecuted design by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969) which Mr Peter Palumbo is determined to build I have my doubts. Its many admirers describe it as 'timeless', as if that word has any meaning when applied to a mid-20th-century office block made of steel and bronzed glass and requiring electricity to make it habitable. Unfortunately, to realise this timeless design in time, a large number of ordinary little buildings, perfectly good of their own time and ten of them listed as being of architectural importance, is to be sacrificed.

This sacrifice is necessary, we are told, because London has no building by the great German modernist. No: but nor can we boast any masterpiece by Le Corbusier, Alvar Aalto or Frank Lloyd Wright, let alone any by Schinkel, Bernini or Ictinus (we do have one by Gropius — the former Playboy Club in Park Lane — but nobody seems very proud of that). Do we really need them? The supreme interest of architecture as an art is that it is a specific response to a particular site and to particular conditions and circumstances at a certain moment in time. A building is not like an abstract painting of the sort for which Mr Palumbo might also be prepared to pay millions, a transportable object of an integrity independent of its surroundings, but he seems to regard the Mies design he commissioned in this light: as highly priced 'high art'.

The public inquiry into Mr Peter Palumbo's pet project which began on 1 May has fully deserved the surprising amount of publicity devoted to the controversy. The proposal to sweep away a large chunk of the surviving old City of London is a matter of great public concern and a big fight is on. On one side is the RIBA, the ageing architectural establishment and various academics and pundits who are, I hope, a little ashamed of having been swept along by so smooth a public relations machine; on the other is (amazingly) the City Corporation, the GLC, every conservation society, and, I strongly suspect, public opinion.

Mr Palumbo commissioned Mies to design his tower over 20 years ago, in 1962. Planning approval was granted in 1969 after a public inquiry but permission was withheld until enough of the site had been acquired by Mr Palumbo's firm to enable the scheme to be executed in one phase. An integral part of the scheme is the creation of a new open space in front of the Mies tower — 'Mansion House Square' — by demolishing a host of small, largely Victorian buildings standing on the traditional City street pattern which is part Victorian and part mediaeval. Mr Palumbo has now bought all of these, but it is his tragedy that times have changed and such ordinary buildings are valued for the collective contribution they make to the grain and quality of a city.

Times have changed; or have they? Listening to Mr Michael Manser, President of the RIBA, who sincerely believes that London's tower blocks would be better twice as big, or to Mr Richard Rogers, who thinks that architecture is a matter of 'excitement', we are back in the heady 1960s.

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