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FM LISBON 060057Z JUN 85  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 290 OF 5 JUNE

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATES BILATERAL WITH SHULTZ: SOUTHERN AFRICA.

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY OF STATE SUMMARISED RECENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR CHOGM. SHULTZ AGREED CABINDA WAS SEVERE SETBACK. U.S. WOULD KEEP TRYING ON NAMIBIA. CONGRESS MIGHT WELL VOTE SEVERE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN AFRICA. NOT CLEAR HOW PRESIDENT WOULD HANDLE THIS. AGREED SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE AND DAMAGING.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OPENED UP THE DISCUSSION BY POINTING OUT THAT BRITAIN HAD A VERY CLOSE INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. AFRICAN ISSUES WERE ALSO LIKELY TO BE THE SUBJECT OF VERY GREAT ATTENTION AT CHOGM. ON NAMIBIA, WE HAD GIVEN CROCKER OUR FULL SUPPORT. WE BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST HOPE FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. CABINDA HAD BEEN A GREAT SET-BACK. WE WERE ALSO CONCERNED OVER THE TIDE IN FAVOUR OF DISINVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. AT CHOGM WE COULD NO LONGER COUNT ON SUPPORT FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, AND THE CANADIAN ATTITUDE WAS STILL UNCERTAIN. OUR OWN POSITION WAS THAT WE WERE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS. WE THOUGHT THEY WERE INEFFECTIVE AND DAMAGING.

3. SHULTZ SAID THAT CABINDA HAD BEEN A CONSIDERABLE SET-BACK. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO PRESS THE NEED FOR PROGRESS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. CROCKER WAS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA NOW. IT WAS TRUE THAT OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS SIGNIFICANT IDENTIFIABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. BUT WITH SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF, MANAGING CHANGE HAD PROVED VERY DIFFICULT. HE THOUGHT CONGRESS WOULD PROBABLY VOTE FOR SEVERE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW THE PRESIDENT WOULD HANDLE THIS. HE AGREED THAT SANCTIONS WERE NOT THE RIGHT ANSWER. BUT CONGRESS MIGHT PREVAIL. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT STILL BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE AND DAMAGING FOR THE UNITED STATES NOT TO TAKE CLOSE INTEREST IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

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4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED AND POINTED OUT THE DANGERS OF INCREASED SOVIET PENETRATION IN NAMIBIA IF A SETTLEMENT WAS LONG DELAYED. SHULTZ ADDED THAT IN CONGRESS EVEN SENATOR LUGA, ONE OF THE MOST SENSIBLE AND MODERATE MEN IN CONGRESS, WAS NOW PRESSING FOR SANCTIONS. THIS WAS AN INDICATION OF THE WAY IN WHICH THINKING IN THE U.S. MOVED.

BYATT

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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