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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 041800Z FCOLN

TELNO 1584

OF 041700Z DECEMBER 85

MY TELNO 1554 : CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE

SUMMARY

1. FIRST CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE: GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND REASONABLY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR 1986 BILATERAL AGENDA. DATES FOR HIL VISIT TO LONDON TO BE DISCUSSED IN JANUARY: GENERAL APPROVAL FOR SUGGESTED ROUNDS OF OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS. EMPHASIS ON SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS ALREADY IN TRAIN FOR NEXT US/SOVIET SUMMIT. REQUEST FOR A STRAIGHT ANSWER FROM HMG ON WHETHER WE FAVOURED A RESUMED CTB NEGOTIATION OR NOT: THIS WAS RELEVANT TO THE NEXT SUMMIT.

DETAIL

2. MY FIRST CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE TOOK PLACE ON 4 DECEMBER AND LASTED FOR FIFTY MINUTES. SHEVARDNADZE WAS RELAXED AND AT TIMES JOVIAL. AFTER THE EXCHANGES OF COURTESIES APPROPRIATE TO A FIRST CALL I RECALLED THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV AT CHEQUERS AND IN MOSCOW AND THEIR RECENT EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. I SAID THAT THESE EXCHANGES HAD LAID A GOOD FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD A DEVELOPING DIALOGUE AND THEN CONVEYED YOUR ORAL MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO. 1058, AS UPDATED IN YOUR TELNO. 1152).

3. I SAID THAT YOU HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO MENTION THE LIST OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES WHICH YOU HAD SENT TO SHEVARDNADZE IN HELSINKI ON 1 AUGUST AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT EARLY PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THEM. (THERE WAS NO ADVERSE REACTION FROM SHEVARDNADZE, WHO SIMPLY NODDED). I THEN SAID THAT I LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH THE MFA VERY EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR POSSIBLE DATES FOR SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO LONDON. I EMPHASISED THE STRENGTH OF YOUR HOPE THAT THIS VISIT COULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS AT THE END OF FEBRUARY 1986. I WOULD ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE OTHER BILATERAL EVENTS PROPOSED IN YOUR MESSAGE: I HAD ASKED FOR A CALL ON ACADEMICIAN MARCHUK TO DISCUSS MR WALKER'S POSSIBLE VISIT IN THE SPRING, AND I COULD ALREADY PUT FORWARD THE SUGGESTION THAT THE PROPOSED OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BILATERAL ISSUES MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN LONDON ON 20/21 JANUARY. ALL THESE DETAILED EXCHANGES WITH HIS DEPARTMENT WOULD BE GREATLY HELPED IF SHEVARDNADZE COULD GIVE THE BILATERAL AGENDA WHICH YOU HAD OUTLINED HIS GENERAL ENDORSEMENT AND APPROVAL. IT WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE TO ME AND TO MINISTERS IN LONDON TO HEAR SHEVARDNADZE'S OWN VIEW OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF UK/SOVIET RELATIONS AND OF THE AGENDA FOR THEM WHICH WE HAD PUT FORWARD.

4. SHEVARDNADZE THANKED ME FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND WISHED ME WELL IN MY MISSION HERE. IT WAS EASY TO DESTROY BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT A MORE COMPLICATED TASK TO CONSTRUCT THEM. HE, TOO, HOPED THAT OUR COOPERATION WOULD NOW DEVELOP. IN THIS WE COULD DRAW ON THE GOOD FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH GORBACHEV, AS CONTINUED IN THEIR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE. WE COULD "TAKE SOMETHING FROM THEIR ARSENAL". DESPITE REMAINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US THE FACT THAT A DIALOGUE WAS THUS IN PROGRESS WAS ENCOURAGING.

5. RECALLING HIS OWN MEETINGS WITH YOU, HE SAID THE FIRST HAD GONE WELL, AND HAD FAVOURABLY IMPRESSED HIM: BUT THE SECOND WAS, FRANKLY, "BAD". THE REASONS WERE WELL KNOWN, HE WOULD NOT RAKE OVER THEM BUT "WOULD LET BYGONES BE BYGONES". HE WAS DISPOSED TO INTERPRET THE SPIRIT OF THE MESSAGE WHICH I HAD JUST CONVEYED AS INDICATING THAT YOU TOO RAGDRROD THE NEW YORK MEETING AS AN EXCEPTION

6. THERE WAS MUCH WHICH HE LIKED IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH TO OUR RELATIONS WHICH I HAD SET OUT. IT WOULD NOW BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. IN GENERAL, IT SEEMED TO HIM REASONABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE PREPARATORY OFFICIAL LEVEL MEETINGS. HE AGREED WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT OFFICIALS SHOULD DISCUSS REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND INDEED PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD AIM TO "SYSTEMATISE" OUR CONSULTATIONS COVERING ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS AT THE WORKING LEVEL IN ORDER TO ACCUMULATE A CERTAIN PROGRESS ON THESE MATTERS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF OFFICIALS COULD DRAW UP A LIST OF THESE ISSUES AND GO ON TO CONSIDER THE MODALITIES OF BILATERAL EXCHANGES ON THEM. SUSLOV INTERJECTED THAT A DRAFT WAS ALREADY IN PREPARATION.

7. AS TO HIS VISIT TO LONDON, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOW "RIPENING" AND WE WERE "GETTING CLOSER TO IT". THE PRINCIPLE WAS AGREED AND DATES COULD BE CONSIDERED AND AGREED THROUGH THE USUAL CHANNELS AFTER THE CPSU CONGRESS: BUT BEFORE THE VISIT TOOK PLACE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE ACHIEVED A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN OUR RELATIONS SO THAT YOU AND HE COULD GIVE A FURTHER IMPETUS TO WORK ALREADY IN PROGRESS.

8. MIFT SUMMARISES SHEVARDNADZE'S COMMENTS ON THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE GENEVA SUMMIT AND THE QUESTION WHICH HE ASKED ME TO PUT TO YOU ABOUT A RESUMED TRILATERAL CTB NEGOTIATION. HIS REMARK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWERS, BRITAIN AND FRANCE, COULD NOT BE "LEFT ON ONE SIDE" IN THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE ON SECURITY MATTERS PROMPTED ME TO SAY THAT, IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR HIS VISIT TO LONDON TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE NEXT US/SOVIET SUMMIT SO THAT HIS EXCHANGES WITH YOU ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS COULD FORM PART OF THE PREPARATORY PROCESS. IF HE ACCEPTED THIS, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO GET DOWN TO THE DISCUSSION OF DATES IN /JANUARY

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JANUARY 1986 RATHER THAN WAITING UNTIL AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS. SHEVARNADZE AGREED AND SAID THAT DATES COULD INDEED BE DISCUSSED IN JANUARY. (IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT DATES IN MARCH/APRIL/MAY MIGHT BE FEASIBLE FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW).

9. SEE MIFT.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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SOVIET D
DEFENCE D
R D
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
WED
ACDD
CRD
FED
NED
PUSD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR FERGUSSON
SIR W HARDING
MR SAMUEL
MR DAUNT
MR DAVID THOMAS
MR LONG

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GRS 450

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TO DESKBY 041800Z FCO

TELNO 1585

OF 041655Z DECEMBER 85

INFO PRIORTIY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA

MIPT (NOT TO ALL)

CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE: EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. AFTER GIVING HIS REACTIONS TO YOUR MESSAGE OUTLINING OUR FUTURE BILATERAL AGENDA AND TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS AND FOR HIS OWN VISIT TO LONDON, SHEVARDNADZE VOLUNTEERED SOME COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET VIEW OF GENEVA FOLLOW-UP: AND ALSO PUT A QUESTION ON CTB.

DETAIL

POST-GENEVA

2. THE GENEVA MEETING HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT LANDMARK. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD OF COURSE BEEN REALISTIC IN THEIR EXPECTATIONS, AND HAD HARBOURED NO ILLUSIONS THAT ONE MEETING COULD SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS OR IN EAST/WEST AFFAIRS. NONETHELESS, DESPITE THE LACK OF AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS, A BEGINNING HAD BEEN MADE TO AN IMPORTANT JOURNEY AND IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. AS HE HAD YESTERDAY TOLD MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD IMMEDIATELY EMBARKED, AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING, ON ITS PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT WHICH WOULD BE NO LESS COMPLICATED OR IMPORTANT. THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN GENEVA "WOULD NOT RETURN TO GENEVA EMPTY-HANDED" IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. IN THIS THE EUROPEAN POWERS, PARTICULARLY THE NUCLEAR STATES, SHOULD NOT BE "LEFT ON ONE SIDE". THERE WERE SOME MATTERS IN WESTERN ATTITUDE WHICH WERE NOT CLEAR TO HIM. THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART HAD ANNOUNCED A UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING, HAD HALTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS20S IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE AND HAD EVEN PROPOSED THE DISMANTLING OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEMS. THE WESTERN RESPONSE WAS TO CONTINUE INF DEPLOYMENT. "THAT WOULD NOT DO". IF IT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO EUROPEAN SECURITY BOTH SIDES MUST ASSIST IN CREATING THE RIGHT BACKGROUND. THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM EVEN THOUGH IT RECOGNISED THAT THE COURSE OF US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DETERMINE THE OVERALL SITUATION. IN THIS CONTEXT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE AND USEFUL IF PETROVSKY OR OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS COULD HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH US AT THE WORKING LEVEL AS WE HAD PROPOSED.

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3. FINALLY, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT ONE QUESTION TO ME: HE DID NOT SEEK AN IMMEDIATE REPLY BUT WOULD LIKE ME TO REPORT IT TO YOU FOR CONSIDERATION. HE WOULD LIKE A STRAIGHT ANSWER - "YES OR NO" - ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A CTB WHICH BEEN BROKEN OFF AT A LATE STAGE WHEN ALMOST COMPLETED. NOW, AFTER THE FIRST GENEVA MEETING AND WITH A VIEW TO THE NEXT PHASE IT SEEMED RIGHT TO RESUME THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS A MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DETENT, AS REGARDS SPECIFIC BARRIERS TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND WITH REGARD ALSO TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD CONSULT AT ALL APPROPRIATE LEVELS EVEN BEFORE HIS VISIT TO LONDON. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS REMARKS TO YOU.

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PS/MR EGGAR
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