

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS
 PS/LADY YOUNG
 PS/MR RENTON
 PS/PUS
 MR DEREK THOMAS
 MR GOODALL
 MR SAMUEL
 MR ~~WILSON~~ DAUNT
 MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) }
 B. NPS (≡) } MOD
 DACU }
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RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

SECRET

FM UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 323

OF 111642Z DECEMBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DNPS AND DACU)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, MOSCOW, BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY THE HAGUE

INFO SAVING OSLO, ANKARA

SCG MEETING: 11 DECEMBER

SUMMARY

1. CAUTIOUS ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR INF IN NEXT ROUND AT GENEVA. FULL SUPPORT FOR US PROPOSALS Tabled ON 1 NOVEMBER. REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIANCE POLICY ON THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES; THE LINE SHOULD BE THAT THE QUESTION DID NOT ARISE UNTIL AFTER INF/START AGREEMENT. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF LATEST US PROPOSALS.

DETAIL

2. GLITMAN (CHIEF US INF NEGOTIATOR) WAS GENERALLY CAUTIOUS IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON INF IN ROUND 4 (WHICH BEGINS ON 16 JANUARY) AT GENEVA. HE SAID IT WAS PREMATURE TO CONCLUDE ON THE BASIS OF THE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT TO A SEPARATE INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT A BREAKTHROUGH WAS IMMINENT. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO REACT POSITIVELY TO THE LATEST US PROPOSALS MIGHT ONLY BECOME APPARENT AFTER THE CPSU CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. HE ALSO EXPECTED THEM TO REVERT TO A FIRM LINKAGE BETWEEN INF/START AND SDI. PERSONAL VIEW OF HOLMES (US CHAIRMAN) WAS THAT NEGOTIATING PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE BUT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INF AGREEMENT IN ISOLATION WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

3. THERE WAS PROLONGED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS. THE GROUP AGREED THAT GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE IN HIS SUPREME

SOVIET SPEECH ON 27 NOVEMBER TO THE QUOTE STUMBLING BLOCK UNQUOTE REPRESENTED BY UK AND FRENCH FORCES MEANT THAT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WERE LIKELY TO FOCUS ON THIS. IT COULD NOT BE ASSUMED THAT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT ALSO IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH INVOLVING US/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON US-SOVIET LRINF LIMITATIONS/REDUCTIONS BEFORE THE QUESTION OF UK, FRENCH (AND CHINESE) SYSTEMS WAS ADDRESSED.

4. THE NORWEGIAN PRESSED FOR QUOTE CONTINGENCY PLANS UNQUOTE FOR BRINGING IN THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. DAUNT (UK) RECAPITULATED AT EACH OF THE MEETINGS THE BASIS FOR BRITISH POLICY AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR REJECTING SOVIET CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS USING THE ISSUE OF UK/FRENCH FORCES AS A SMOKE SCREEN. NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE ONLY TASK IN GENEVA WAS TO ACHIEVE SIZEABLE REDUCTIONS IN THE SUPER POWER STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE ARSENALS. IN THE MEANTIME THE UK WOULD NOT GO BEYOND ITS EXISTING POSITION. DAUNT WARNED AGAINST FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF DISCUSSING IN ADVANCE OF A US/SOVIET AGREEMENT HOW UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE HANDLED. THE GROUP WELCOMED HIS OFFER TO CIRCULATE A SHORT PAPER SUMMARISING THE ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUDING THIRD COUNTRY FORCES.

5. THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE CURRENT ALLIANCE POSITION OF EXCLUDING UK AND FRENCH FORCES REMAINED VALID. A TENTATIVE ITALIAN SUGGESTION THAT NATO SHOULD EXAMINE WAYS OF HELPING THE RUSSIANS TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM THEIR UNCOMPROMISING POSITION WAS FIRMLY REJECTED.

6. HOLMES FULLY AGREED WITH THE BRITISH POSITION. THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO REJECT AT GENEVA SOVIET DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION. THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT THE QUESTION OF UK/FRENCH FORCES WAS IRRELEVANT AND THEY WOULD REFUSE IN THESE BILATERAL TALKS TO NEGOTIATE ON BEHALF OF OTHER ALLIES. TO INDICATE THAT NATO WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. IT WOULD UNDERMINE AMERICAN EFFORTS TO GET EQUAL AND GLOBAL LIMITS ON US AND SOVIET LRINF. THE BEST SITUATION WOULD BE TO DEFER THE ISSUE UNTIL AFTER AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT AND A START AGREEMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT QUOTE INTERIM UNQUOTE MIGHT IN PRACTICE TURN OUT TO BE FAIRLY PERMANENT.

7. THE DUTCH STRESSED THAT NATO'S INF PROPOSALS SHOULD BE CREDIBLE IN PUBLIC PRESENTATIONAL TERMS. GLITMAN POINTED OUT THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A LIMIT OF 140 LAUNCHERS IN EUROPE ON EACH SIDE DID NOT REPRESENT A FREEZE ON US DEPLOYMENTS. THE RESULTING MIX OF PERSHING III AND GLCM UNDER THE 420-450 WARHEAD LIMIT WOULD INVOLVE A REDISTRIBUTION OF THE CURRENT MIX. (ALL 108 PERSHING III ARE ALREADY DEPLOYED IN THE FRG). HE ADDED THAT UNDER ITS GLOBAL ENTITLEMENT THE US WOULD NOT BE OBLIGED TO DESTROY ANY PIIIS REMOVED FROM EUROPE.

8. THE FRG EXPRESSED CONCERN BOTH ABOUT THE NUMBER OF PIIIS WHICH MIGHT REMAIN AND THE US INTENTION TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO CONVERT PII TO SHORTER RANGE PIB. GLITMAN AGREED ON THE SENSITIVITY OF THESE POINTS. ON PIB THE US WOULD FOR THE MOMENT REFER ONLY TO A RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SHORTER RANGE INF (SRINF) DEPLOYMENTS, WITHOUT BEING MORE PRECISE. THEY HAD NOT MENTIONED TO THE RUSSIANS THE POSSIBLE CONVERSION OF PII.

9. THE US SOUGHT ALLIES' VIEWS ON PROVISIONS IN A NEW DRAFT INF TREATY RELATING TO LRINF MODERNISATION. IT WAS AGREED TO PROVIDE VIEWS IN WRITING. DAUNT GAVE A PRELIMINARY VIEW THAT, SINCE THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY DEVELOPING AN SS20 REPLACEMENT AND SINCE THERE WERE CURRENTLY NO SUCH PLANS ON THE NATO SIDE, CONSTRAINTS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS (RANGE, PAYLOAD, ETC) OF ANY REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS WOULD CLEARLY BE NECESSARY.

10. THE US EXPLAINED THAT THE DEFINITION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION BETWEEN SS20S IN RANGE OF NATO EUROPE AND THOSE BASED IN ASIA WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON. THREE OPTIONS WERE FEASIBLE. THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR A DEMARCATION LINE JUST WEST OF NOVOSIBIRSK. THIS WOULD BE CLOSE TO AN EARLIER SOVIET SUGGESTION OF A LINE ON THE 80 DEGREE EAST LONGITUDE. BUT SINCE NOVOSIBIRSK IS OVER 200 KM EAST FROM THE 80 DEGREE LINE, THE US PROPOSAL WOULD PREVENT CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SS20 BASES, OR THE MOVING OF OTHER SS20 LAUNCHERS, EAST OF THE URALS IN SOVIET ASIA WHERE THEY COULD THREATEN NATO FLANKS, ESPECIALLY NORWAY AND TURKEY.

11. THERE WAS ALSO DISCUSSION OF CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE. ANY CONSTRAINTS SHOULD SEEK TO LIMIT SOVIET NUMBERS TO THOSE DEPLOYED AT A SPECIFIC DATE, PROBABLY END 1985, AND TO PRESERVE A US RIGHT TO DEPLOY EQUIVALENT NUMBERS. THE SUBJECT WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN MORE DETAIL AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

12. FINALLY, RUTH PRESSED FOR THE DETAILS OF CURRENT NATO DEPLOYMENTS (108 P.II AND 32 GLCM LAUNCHERS) TO BE MADE PUBLIC. HE ALSO PRESSED FOR THE EAST/WEST SPLIT OF SS20S TO BE REVEALED IN PUBLIC ONCE THE ISSUE OF GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE HAD BEEN SETTLED. HOLMES ACCEPTED THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE FIRST POINT, BUT REMAINED NON-COMMITTAL ON THE SECOND.

GRAHAM

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