


SECRET AND PERSONAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

*Le V*  
*copy L03 ARX*  
*13 December 1985*

UNITED STATES POSITION ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND SDI

Thank you for your letter of 9 December analysing Mr. McFarlane's briefing at Chequers on 24 November.

The Prime Minister thinks that we should allow for the possibility that the United States may have included some negotiating fat in the Geneva proposals. They may have proposed a total ban on mobile missiles in the belief that this would give them a peg on which to hang a full statement of their concerns about the difficulty of verification and the possibility of mirving. She also suspects that the United States might not ultimately insist on a 50 per cent cut in throw weight, a ban on the upgrading of the SS-18 or a ban on Soviet GCLMs.

The Prime Minister has asked me to emphasise most strongly that no hint of the interpretation in the previous paragraph should reach United States officials. Further enquiries about the Administration's intentions and positions should carefully avoid any risk on that score. The Prime Minister also points out that the United States negotiating position would be seriously undermined if knowledge of the possible existence of negotiating leeway on these important aspects were to leak. The only officials to see this letter should therefore be the senior official concerned in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



To use  
an

LOBARX

Draft letter from Mr Powell to

L V Appleyard Esq, FCO

Copies: R C Mottram Esq, MoD  
M C Stark Esq, Cabinet Office

United States Position on Nuclear Arms Control  
and SDI

Thank you for your letter of 9 December analysing Mr McFarlane's briefing at Chequers on 24 November.

2. The Prime Minister thinks, <sup>but we should</sup> ~~judging from~~ ~~contacts with senior members of the Administration,~~ <sup>allow for the possibility</sup> (that the United States may ~~possibly~~ have included some negotiating fat in the Geneva proposals. They may have proposed a total ban on mobile missiles in the belief that this would give them a peg on which to hang a full statement of their concerns about the difficulty of verification and the possibility of mirving. <sup>She also</sup> ~~It may also be that~~ <sup>suspects that</sup> the United States <sup>might</sup> ~~would~~ not ultimately insist on a 50 per cent cut in throw weight, a ban on the upgrading of the SS-18 or a ban on Soviet GCLMs.

Mr Powell

Sir R. Armstrong  
has seen  
this

L Malabar  
XU

3. The Prime Minister has asked me to emphasise most strongly that no hint of the interpretation



in the previous paragraph should reach United States officials. Further enquiries about the Administration's intentions and positions should carefully avoid any risk on that score. The Prime Minister also points out that the United States negotiating position would be seriously undermined if knowledge of the possible existence of negotiating leeway on these important aspects were to leak, ~~and that~~ <sup>officials</sup> the only ~~people~~ to see this letter, ~~apart from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary,~~ should therefore be the senior ~~one official~~ <sup>Foreign & Commonwealth</sup> concerned in the ~~two~~ Departments, ~~and Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Mallaby in~~ <sup>Christopher</sup> ~~the Cabinet Office.~~ <sup>Office, the Ministry of Defence and</sup>

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CM